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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Henry, Rennie Jr. Facility: Otisville CF

NYSID: [REDACTED] Appeal Control No.: 11-126-20 B

DIN: 97-B-0458

Appearances: Eve Rosahn, Esq.
125 Frenchtown Road
Shohola, Pennsylvania 18458

Decision appealed: November 2020 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.


Board Member(s) who participated: **Berliner, Corley**

Papers considered: Appellant's Letter-brief received May 6, 2021


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.


Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Appellant and the Appellant's Counsel, if any, on

08/27/2021/CC

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**Name:** Henry, Rennie Jr.**DIN:** 97-B-0458**Facility:** Otisville CF**AC No.:** 11-126-20 B**Findings:** (Page 1 of 4)

Appellant is serving a sentence of 21 years to life upon his conviction by plea of Murder in the Second Degree. In the instant appeal, Appellant, through counsel, challenges the November 2020 determination of the Board denying release and imposing a 24-month hold on the following grounds: (1) the Board failed to contact the sentencing court, district attorney or defense counsel because the Parole Board Report – while reflecting no official statements were received – does not indicate statements were solicited; (2) the Board impermissibly denied release based on the crime without properly considering other factors such as his institutional achievements and remorse; (3) the Board improperly resentenced Appellant; (4) the Board failed to take the forward-looking approach mandated by the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law; (5) the Board departed from the COMPAS instrument without sufficient reasoning in violation of § 9 NYCRR 8002.2(a); and (6) the decision does not comply with Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a)(i) because it is conclusory and fails to adequately explain the reasons for the parole denial.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such incarcerated individual is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider factors relevant to the specific incarcerated individual, including, but not limited to, the individual’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Schendel v. Stanford, 185 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 126 N.Y.S.3d 428, 429 (3rd Dept. 2020); Matter of Campbell v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 1015, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2d Dept. 2019). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990).

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**Name:** Henry, Rennie Jr.**DIN:** 97-B-0458**Facility:** Otisville CF**AC No.:** 11-126-20 B**Findings:** (Page 2 of 4)

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense wherein Appellant caused the death of his estranged pregnant wife by inflicting blunt force trauma to the head, dismembered her body and burned part of her corpse, disposed of her remains, and then staged her home to make it appear she left and misled the police and her family over a period of weeks; that it is his only conviction of record; his positive institutional record including both required and volunteer programming, work and good disciplinary record; statements bearing on remorse; and release plans to reside with family, work as an IT support tech, pursue an IT certification and continue teaching anger management in the community. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the pre-sentence investigation report, the sentencing minutes, Appellant's detailed case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and Appellant's parole packet and letters of support/assurance. In addition, a review of the record confirms requests for official statements were sent.

After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly placed emphasis on the seriousness of the offense and multiple aggravating factors, namely, the brutal and heinous nature of Appellant's crime against his estranged pregnant wife and his course of action over a period of several weeks to conceal his crime misleading authorities and the victim's family. See Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(a); Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Olmosperez v. Evans, 114 A.D.3d 1077, 1078, 980 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (3d Dept. 2014), affd 26 N.Y.3d 1014, 21 N.Y.S.3d 686 (2015); Matter of Carrion v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 210 A.D.2d 403, 404, 620 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (2d Dept. 1994).

That the Board found Appellant's positive postconviction activities outweighed by the seriousness of his offense does not render the decision irrational. See Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dept. 2007); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997); People ex rel. Thomas v. Superintendent of Arthur Kill Corr. Facility, 124 A.D.2d 848, 508 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dept. 1986), lv. denied, 69 N.Y.2d 611, 517 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1987). The Board was not required to give each factor equal weight and could place greater emphasis on the gravity of his offense. Matter of Campbell v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 1016, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461, 465 (2d Dept. 2019); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Copeland v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 (3d Dept. 2017).

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**Name:** Henry, Rennie Jr.**DIN:** 97-B-0458**Facility:** Otisville CF**AC No.:** 11-126-20 B**Findings:** (Page 3 of 4)

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), *lv. denied*, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). Moreover, that the sentencing court did not impose the maximum sentence is not an indication that the court made a favorable parole recommendation. Matter of Duffy v. New York State Div. of Parole, 74 A.D.3d 965, 903 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dept. 2010). The Board had and considered the sentencing minutes.

Appellant's additional contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is likewise without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259-c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); *see also* Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board's regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each incarcerated individual by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. *See* Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); *accord* Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); *see also* Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**Name:** Henry, Rennie Jr.**DIN:** 97-B-0458**Facility:** Otisville CF**AC No.:** 11-126-20 B**Findings:** (Page 4 of 4)

That is exactly what occurred here. The Board considered the COMPAS instrument and did not depart from it. That is, the decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. For example, the Board did not find a reasonable probability that Petitioner will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law but rather concluded, *despite* low risk scores, release would be inappropriate under the other two statutory standards. This is entirely consistent with the Board's intention in enacting the amended regulation.

Finally, the Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the incarcerated individual of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002). The Board addressed several factors in individualized terms and explained those that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations. The Board also properly provided its statutory rationale for denying parole. Compare Matter of Vaello v. Parole Bd. Div. of State of New York, 48 A.D.3d 1018, 1019, 851 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746–47 (3d Dept. 2008), with Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011). The Board is not required to state what an incarcerated individual should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. Matter of Francis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), *aff'd*, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), *lv. denied*, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).

Recommendation: Affirm.