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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Ayala, San	nuel Facility: Fishkill CF
NYSID:	Appeal O4-192-19 B
DIN: 78-A-0767	
Appearances:	Norman P. Effman, Esq. Wyoming County-Attica Legal Aid Bureau 18 Linwood Avenue Warsaw, NY 14569
Decision appealed:	April 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 15 months.
Board Member(s)	Alexander, Smith, Crangle
who participated:	
Papers considered:	Appellant's Brief received August 27, 2019
Appeals Unit Review:	Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation
Records relied upon:	Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.
Final Determination:	The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:
// VolVIII.	
Commissioner	
1 al ili	Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to
Commissioner	
	ation is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written le Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of	

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 1/16/2020

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Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 15-month hold. The instant offenses involved the appellant and two others entering a home, raping and killing two women by shooting them multiple times in the head and body, and removing property from the residence, all while four young children were inside the house. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider the required factors; 2) the Board impermissibly resentenced Appellant based upon unspecified outside opposition to his release and the assertion that his release would trivialize the victims of his crime; 3) the decision was conclusory and based exclusively on the instant offense and criminal history without giving any weight to factors in Appellant's favor; 4) the Board disregarded the COMPAS report and did not base the decision upon a present-focused fair consideration of Appellant's rehabilitation; 5) Appellant was not given a fair hearing and denial of release was a foregone conclusion; and 6) the Board irrationally determined that Appellant's remorse was not genuine. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204

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A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel. Herbert</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offenses consisting of eight counts of Murder in the second degree, one count of Rape in the first degree, four counts of Robbery in the first degree, three counts of Burglary in the second degree, four counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the second degree, one count of Grand Larceny in the second degree, one count of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the first degree, two counts of Grand Larceny in the third degree and two counts of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the second degree; Appellant's criminal record including a prison term in Connecticut for a robbery involving a gun; Appellant's institutional efforts including clean disciplinary record since 2010, completion of ART and participation in the YAP program; and release plans to either live with his sister and work at a plastic company, or to live at a halfway house if his interstate transfer is not accepted. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, Appellant's parole packet including letters of support and elements of his relapse prevention plan, the sentencing minutes, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, Appellant's letter sent to the apology bank, an official statement from the District Attorney, and community opposition to Appellant's release.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release at this time would be incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law. The Board concluded, consistent with the statute, that release would trivialize the tragic loss of life Appellant caused. In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense representing a continuation of Appellant's criminal history, official and community opposition to his release, Appellant's minimization of his role in the instant offenses, statements that were inconsistent with earlier interviews, and uncertainty as to whether Appellant's remorse is genuine. See Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990); Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release

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per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

Appellant's contention that the Board relied on unspecified outside opposition to Appellant's release is without merit. The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998). Community opposition is also a permissible consideration. See Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, 91 N.Y.S.3d 308, 311 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Clark v. New York Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 134.

Appellant's claim that the decision was conclusory is likewise without merit. The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

As for the COMPAS instrument, the 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board's regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the

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Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

Appellant's suggestion that he was not given a fair hearing and that denial of release was a foregone conclusion is unavailing. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). There is no evidence the Board's decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000).

As for an alleged similarity to prior Board decisions, since the Board is required to consider the same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, it follows that the same aspects of the individual's record may again constitute the primary grounds for a denial of parole. Matter of Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Bridget v. Travis, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept. 2002). The Board is required to consider the same factors each time he appears in front of them. Matter of Williams v. New York State Div. of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept.), Iv. denied, 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2010).

Inasmuch as Appellant disputes the Board's finding with respect to remorse, it was well within the Board's authority to make an assessment of Appellant's credibility (<u>Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison</u>, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), <u>aff'd</u>, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008)) and there is record support. The interview transcript reflects that Appellant minimized his role in the instant offenses, repeatedly insisting that he only participated in raping

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and killing the victims because he was afraid of his co-defendant. (Tr. at 17, 20, 22.) These statements were inconsistent with earlier interviews. Such minimization and inconsistencies bear on insight and remorse, which are relevant to the Board's determination. See Matter of Applegate, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018).

In conclusion, Appellant has failed to demonstrate the Board's decision was not made in accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational "bordering on impropriety." <u>Matter of Silmon v. Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting <u>Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)).

Recommendation: Affirm.