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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Walls, Emi	manuel	Facility:	Otisville CF		
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	05-125-19 B	s 8	L 20
DIN:	00-A-1717					2
Appearar	nces:	Mary Raleigh Esq. 27 Crystal Farm Roa Warwick, New York				
Decision	appealed:	April 2019 decision, months.	denying discretion	onary release and	imposing a hold	l of 24
Board Me who parti		Davis, Alexander		ar .	۰. * ي	ية 19
Papers co	onsidered:	Appellant's Brief red Appellant's Supplen			ber 23, 2019	
Appeals	Unit Review:	Statement of the Ap	peals Unit's Find	ings and Recomm	endation	
2	¥.		æ		*	
Records	relied upon:	Pre-Sentence Investi Board Release Decis Plan.				
Final Det	mination:	The undersigned det	ermine that the de	ecision appealed i	s hereby:	6 A2
X	lu	AffirmedVa	cated, remanded fo	or de novo interview	Modified to	•
Com	missioner		cated, remanded fo	r de novo interview	Modified to	17 1911
Com	missioner	/		2	т Г. Л. Б .	*
1		AffirmedVa	cated, remanded fo	or de novo interview	Modified to	
Com	missioner			8.		

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on $\frac{2|4|2020}{2020}$ (AH).

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant's instant offense involved him shooting his girlfriend to death, and during the incident also shooting his two year old son, who survived. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board decision incorrectly states appellant lacks remorse. 3) appellant did what a prior Parole Board instructed him to do. 4) the decision lacks detail. 5) the decision illegally resentenced him. 6) the Board failed to list any facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 7) the decision failed to suggest any future guidance. 8) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the mostly positive COMPAS was ignored, and, the statutes are now future focused.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. <u>Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not be given equal weight. <u>Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision</u>,

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156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Gordon v. Stanford</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Porter v. Alexander</u>, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); <u>Matter of Walker v. Travis</u>, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); <u>Matter of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); <u>Matter of Confoy v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); <u>Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).

T]here is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect by considering remorse." <u>Matter of Silmon v. Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000). Remorse is relevant not only to rehabilitative progress but also to whether release would deprecate the severity of the offense. <u>Matter of Phillips v. Dennison</u>, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 2007). <u>Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford</u>, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018) (limited expression of remorse). It was well within the Board's authority to make an assessment of Appellant's credibility (<u>Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison</u>, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), <u>aff'd</u>, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008)) and there is record support. The interview transcript reflects an inability and/or unwillingness to engage in a meaningful discussion about his son.

There is no legal requirement that a second Parole Board panel must follow the recommendation of a prior Parole Board panel. <u>Flores v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 210 A.D.2d 555, 620 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142 (3d Dept 1994).

That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); <u>accord Matter of Reed v. Evans</u>, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. <u>Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); <u>Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as "contrary to the best interest of the community"); <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale).

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The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Little v. Travis</u>, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Matter of Davis v. Travis</u>, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); <u>People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

As for Appellant's complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. <u>Matter of Francis v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Matter of Partee v. Evans</u>, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), <u>aff'd</u>, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), <u>Iv. denied</u>, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. <u>Matter of Burress v. Dennison</u>, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); <u>Matter of Cody v. Dennison</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), <u>lv. denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. <u>Hodge v Griffin</u>, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing <u>Romer v Travis</u>, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. <u>Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. <u>Ward v City of Long Beach</u>, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. <u>Siao-Paul v. Connolly</u>, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); <u>Hanna v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019).

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The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board's determination was affected by a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. <u>Matter of Silmon v Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); <u>Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. <u>Dolan v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>Tran v Evans</u>, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); <u>Boccadisi v Stanford</u>, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259-c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d

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Dept. 2014); <u>accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory factors. <u>Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); accord <u>Matter of Lewis v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017).

The Board still is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense. <u>See Matter of Montane v. Evans</u>, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Lewis v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017).

Recommendation: Affirm.