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May 2021

### Administrative Appeal Decision - Tirado, Miguel (2020-01-16)

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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE**

Name: Tirado, Miguel

Facility: Fishkill CF

NYSID: [REDACTED]

Appeal Control No.: 05-020-19 B

DIN: 95-B-1018

Appearances: Joshua Mitzman, Esq.  
11 Market Street, Suite 221  
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601

Decision appealed: April 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Demosthenes, Agostini


Papers considered: Appellant's Letter-brief received August 26, 2019


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.


Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

**If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.**

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 1/16/20 .

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

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Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 18-month hold. The instant offense involved the appellant shooting and killing the victim after being ordered to by a co-defendant. Appellant, through counsel, submits a 100-page brief raising the following issues:

- 1) the Board regulations, which became effective July 30, 2014, do not satisfy Executive Law § 259-c(4) as amended;
- 2) the Board failed to adequately consider Appellant’s COMPAS instrument;
- 3) the Board’s decision was unlawful, arbitrary and capricious because it was based solely on the nature of the offense in violation of Executive Law §§ 259-i and 259-c(4);
- 4) the Board failed to conduct the analysis set forth in Executive Law § 259-i;
- 5) the Board’s decision was unlawful, arbitrary and capricious because the Board overemphasized Appellant’s prior record;
- 6) the Board failed to consider all relevant statutory criteria including Appellant’s submission and positive accomplishments;
- 7) the Board improperly considered Appellant’s [REDACTED] history;
- 8) the determination is conclusory and fails to adequately state the basis for the decision;
- 9) counsel was improperly denied access to records in that there are confidential sections of the Parole Board Report;
- 10) the Board improperly relied on a crime for which Appellant was not arrested or charged;
- 11) the Board acted as a sentencing judge and effectively resentenced Appellant;
- 12) the 18-month hold is excessive;
- 13) the Board was biased insofar as the panel was comprised of two members; and
- 14) the Board unlawfully abdicated its discretion and instead based its decision on an executive policy with respect to violent felons.

The arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 1983).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

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While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4<sup>th</sup> Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4<sup>th</sup> Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of Murder in the second degree; Appellant’s criminal record [REDACTED], a prior state term of incarceration, and a violation of probation; Appellant’s institutional efforts including clean disciplinary record since 2014, completion of ART and Phase I of Transitional Services, enrollment in a GED class, and work as an electrician’s helper; and release plans to live with his daughter. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, Appellant’s parole packet including letters of support and assurance, the sentencing minutes, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, an official statement from the District Attorney.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the serious instant offense that was violent, heinous, and showed a depraved indifference to human life and Appellant’s criminal record. See Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Olmosperez v. Evans, 114 A.D.3d 1077, 1078, 980 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (3d Dept. 2014), affd 26 N.Y.3d 1014, 21 N.Y.S.3d 686 (2015); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 1997); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole,

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157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990). The Board also cited official opposition to Appellant’s release. See Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).

Appellant’s challenge to former 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3 (2014) – which is incorrect – is misplaced inasmuch as the regulation was repealed in 2017. Appellant’s additional challenge to the Board’s consideration of his COMPAS is without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

Inasmuch as Appellant contends the Board failed to consider requisite factors, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d

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Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).

Appellant's suggestion that the Board improperly considered Appellant's [REDACTED] history is without merit. [REDACTED]

Matter of Cobb v Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1500, 59 N.Y.S.3d 915 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Amen v. New York State Div., 100 A.D.3d 1230, 954 N.Y.S.2d 276 (3d Dept. 2012); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Martin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 47 A.D.3d 1152, 851 N.Y.S.2d 664 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Waters v. New York State Div. of Parole, 271 A.D.2d 779, 706 N.Y.S.2d 213 (3d Dept. 2000); Matter of Pina v. Hammock, 89 A.D.2d 799, 453 N.Y.S.2d 479 (4th Dept. 1982).

Appellant's contention that the determination is conclusory and fails to adequately state the basis for the decision is likewise without merit. The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

As for access to confidential sections of the Parole Board Report, there was no impropriety as the Board may consider confidential information. Matter of Molinar v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214, 991 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dept. 2014). An inmate has no constitutional right to the information in his parole file, Billiteri v. U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976), and generally is not entitled to confidential material, Matter of Justice v. Comm'r of New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 130 A.D.3d 1342, 15 N.Y.S.3d 853 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Perez v. New York State Div. of Parole, 294 A.D.2d 726, 741 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d Dept. 2002); Matter of Macklin v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 821, 711 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (3d Dept. 2000).

As for Appellant's contention that the inquiry about uncharged crimes constituted an impermissible factor, the Board may inquire into the circumstances of the offense, subsequent developments, and the inmate's state of mind consistent with the Executive Law. See, e.g., Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1274, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 720 (3d Dept. 2014). That the Board explored Appellant's involvement in the drug trade – when the instant offense was committed at a location where such activity was taking place – was not improper. The

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record reveals Appellant volunteered the information and there is no indication that the Board's decision was influenced by the alleged crimes for which Appellant was not arrested or charged.

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), *lv. denied*, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

The Board's decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 18 months is within the Board's discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), *lv. denied*, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); *see also* Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 18 months for discretionary release was excessive or improper.

There is nothing inherently improper about a two-member panel, which is authorized by law. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.1(b). Inasmuch as Appellant asserts bias, there must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed from such bias. Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), *lv. denied*, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000). Here, there is no such proof. Moreover, because Appellant failed to raise an objection to the complained of fact at the parole interview, this claim has not been preserved. Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000).

Finally, there is no merit to the apparent claim that the decision was predetermined based on an alleged executive policy to deny parole to violent felony offenders. Allegations that the Board has systematically denied parole to prisoners convicted of violent crimes have been dismissed repeatedly by the Courts. *See, e.g.,* Matter of Cartagena v. Alexander, 64 A.D.3d 841, 882 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dept. 2009); Matter of Motti v. Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 1030, 831 N.Y.S.2d 298 (3d Dept.

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2008); Matter of Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dept. 2007); Matter of Wood v. Dennison, 25 A.D.3d 1056, 1057, 807 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Ameyda v. Travis, 21 A.D.3d 1200, 800 N.Y.S.2d (3d Dept. 2005), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 703, 811 N.Y.S.2d 335 (2006); Matter of Bottom v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 1027, 773 N.Y.S.2d 717 (4th Dept.), appeal dismissed 2 N.Y.3d 822, 781 N.Y.S.2d 285 (2004).

**Recommendation:** Affirm.