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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Nichols, Lo	renzo	Facility:	Clinton CF	<i>2</i>	* =
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.	04-016-19 SC	ii a	= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
DIN:	88-A-1701	181				1 2
Appearan	ces:	Cheryl Kates Esq. P.O. Box 734 Fairport, New Yo) D 189 \$:=	a a	12 ×	g 25
Decision	appealed:	March 2019 decis months.	ion, denying disc	retionary release and	imposing a hole	d of 24
Board Member(s) who participated:		Coppola, Smith	e e			E E
Papers considered:		Appellant's Letter-brief received September 17, 2019				
Appeals I	Jnit Review:	Statement of the A	Appeals Unit's Fi	ndings and Recomme	ndation	a
Records r	elied upon:			Parole Board Report rm 9026), COMPAS	• A Lancacca and the second	Charles and Charle
Final Det	ermination:	The undersigned	determine that the	decision appealed is	hereby:	M
2/m	missioner missioner missioner		Vacated, remanded	for de novo interview for de novo interview for de novo interview	Modified to _	
If the Fin	al Determin	ation is at variance	ce with Findings	and Recommendati	on of Appeals	Unit. written

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on AH 2020 (AH).

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant challenges the March 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant's underlying instant offense involved him being the head of a drug gang that sold over \$2 million dollars per year in drugs. At the time of his arrest, appellant possessed in his desk one semi-automatic pistol and two revolvers, and also hundreds of bags of heroin, cocaine and marijuana. Appellant also incurred convictions in two other jurisdictions at this time as well (one federal and one from another State). Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board never stated what some of the sentences would be under the revised Rockefeller Drug Law amendments. 3) the Board did not have the sentencing minutes from the other jurisdictions. 4) the sentencing minutes are illegible. 5) the Community Opposition contains false information and is based upon penal philosophy. 6) counsel's FOIL requests were improperly denied. 7) the Board used crimes appellant was not convicted of, in violation of the due process clause of the constitution. 8) appellant will not be free if parole is granted, but rather must serve out sentences in other jurisdictions. 9) the decision lacks details. 10) the letter from the criminal defense lawyer was not read. 11) the jail time computations have errors. 12) the decision illegally resentenced him. 13) some of his criminal history was committed when he was a youth, but the Board didn't consider youth and its attendant circumstances. 14) the decision was predetermined. 15) the Board failed to list the facts in support of the statutory standard that was cited. 16) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, and the 2017 regulations, in that the positive portions of the COMPAS were ignored, no valid reason for departing from the COMPAS was given, and the statutes are now evidence and rehabilitation based. Also, the COMPAS has errors. 17) the 24 month hold is excessive.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d

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at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

That the Board found appellant's postconviction activities outweighed by the serious nature of his crimes does not constitute convincing evidence that the Board did not consider them, see Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994), or render the decision irrational, see Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

The Board decision may mention that he committed one offense while on parole. Matter of Webb v. Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 810 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Moore v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412, 413 (3d Dept. 2016). Matter of Ward v. New York State Div. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1375, 40 N.Y.S.3d 803 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Guzman v. Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st Dept. 2006).

The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense and that it was an escalation in illegal behavior. See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

The Board may conclude that high level drug trafficking leads to violence, as long as there is some support in the record, even if the conviction is for drugs only. <u>Comfort v New York State Division of Parole</u>, 68 A.D.3d 1295, 890 N.Y.S.2d 700 (3d Dept. 2009).

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The risk in the crime of hurting innocent bystanders may also be considered. <u>Saunders v Travis</u>, 238 A.D.2d 688, 656 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (3d Dept 1997), <u>leave to appeal denied</u> 90 N.Y.2d 805, 661 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1997).

The Board may emphasize the inmate's failure to take responsibility for the criminal offense. Cruz v Alexander, 67 A.D.3d 1240, 890 N.Y.S.2d 656 (3d Dept. 2009); Abdur-Raheem v New York State Board of Parole, 78 A.D.3d 1412, 911 N.Y.S.2d 257 (3d Dept. 2010); Khatib v New York State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014); Crawford v New York State Board of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016). The Board may consider the inmates minimizing of their role in the crime. Serrano v New York State Executive Department-Division of Parole, 261 A.D.2d 163, 689 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept 1999).

The record reflects that the Board considered the sentence length the inmate would have received under Penal Law §70.70/70.71. The Board was not required to explicitly mention or address the weight accorded this factor in its decision. See Matter of Vaughn v. Evans, 98 A.D.3d 1158, 950 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (3d Dept. 2012) (inmate's sentencing history was before the Board and it is not required to articulate each statutory factor it considers or the weight accorded to each factor).

The sentencing minutes are not illegible. Nor is the Board required to have the sentencing minutes for the current out-of-jurisdiction convictions.

Per 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8006.3, the Appeals Unit lacks subject matter jurisdiction on FOIL matters.

The fact that a grant of parole in New York would not lead to appellant's release, but rather, the beginning a lengthy prison sentence in another jurisdiction, does not mean a Board denial is irrational bordering on impropriety. <u>Perez v Evans</u>, 76 A.D.3d 1130, 907 N.Y.S.2d 701 (3d Dept. 2010).

As for not entertaining community opposition, appellant seeks to void the First Amendment. The right of citizens to petition the government extends to all departments of the government. Calififornia Motor Transport Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed2d 642 (1972). A decision will not be reversed simply because material expressing personal penal philosophy was included in submissions which were otherwise properly considered. See Matter of Duffy v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 132 A.D.3d 1207, 1209, 19 N.Y.S.3d 610 (3d Dept. 2015) ("The Board's decision will be upheld if there is nothing indicating it was influenced by, placed weight upon, or relied upon any improper matter, in the victim's family statement or otherwise"). See also Matter of LaBarbera v. New York State Div. of Parole, Index No. 12711/18, Decision/Order of Jan. 17, 2019 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Co.) (Mott, J.S.C.) (Board properly considered community opposition and no indication Board relied on erroneous assertions); Matter of Bottom v. Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Index No. 902448-17,

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Judgment dated Jan. 10, 2018 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (DeBow A.S.C.J.) (there was no indication Board was influenced by improper objections predicated solely on victims' police officer status); Matter of Bailey v. New York State Div. of Parole, Index No. 973-16, Decision & Judgment dated Aug. 17, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (Hartman A.J.S.C.) (even assuming PBA letters contained inaccuracies or were inflammatory, Board would be permitted to consider them for what they were worth per <u>Duffy</u> and will be presumed not to have relied on inappropriate matters therein unless decision indicates otherwise).

The Board may consider all of the circumstances surrounding the conviction, including conduct for which the inmate was not convicted, as long as evidence of said conduct is in the record, and it is not the sole basis for the Board's decision. Williams v Travis, 11 A.D.3d 788, 783 N.Y.S.2d 413 (3d Dept. 2004); Nunez v Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 1240, 857 N.Y.S.2d 810 (3d Dept. 2008); Fransua v Alexander, 52 A.D.3d 1140, 860 N.Y.S.2d 327 (3d Dept. 2008); Brower v Alexander, 57 A.D.3d 1060, 867 N.Y.S.2d 801(3d Dept. 2008) Iv. den. 12 N.Y.3d 707, 879 N.Y.S.2d 53.

The letter from appellant's former criminal defense lawyer was considered. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). There is no evidence the Board's decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000). Nor was any penal philosophy discussed. Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied with its duty. See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985).

That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release

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as "contrary to the best interest of the community"); <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. <u>Duemmel v Fischer</u>, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria. <u>Haymes v Regan</u>, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). The due process clause is not violated by the Board's balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be second guessed by the courts. <u>Mathie v Dennison</u>, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

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Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to conditions imposed by the state legislature. <u>Banks v Stanford</u>, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018). Parole release is a statutory grant of a restricted form of liberty prior to the expiration of a sentence. <u>Johnson v Superintendent Adirondack Correctional Facility</u>, 174 A.D.3d 992, 106 N.Y.S.3d 408 (3d Dept. 2019).

The Board was aware of appellant's age when reviewing his prior criminal history. But the cases dealing with youth and its attendant circumstances are inapplicable in that instance.

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. <u>Hodge v Griffin</u>, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing <u>Romer v Travis</u>, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. <u>Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. <u>Ward v City of Long Beach</u>, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. <u>Siao-Paul v. Connolly</u>, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); <u>Hanna v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019).

The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board's determination was affected by a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. <u>Matter of Silmon v Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); <u>Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel. Herbert</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Concerning the alleged jail time computation errors, appellant didn't raise them during the interview, thereby waiving the issue. Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000); Matter of Shaffer v. Leonardo, 179 A.D.2d 980, 579 N.Y.S.2d 910 (3d Dept. 1992); Boddie v New York State Division of Parole, 288 F.Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). In any event, this issue was discussed at length with appellant during the interview and played no part in the decision. As such, the Board did not rely on erroneous information. Paniagua v Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1018, 56 N.Y.S.3d 894 (3d Dept. 2017). As such even if an error does exist, it would be harmless error at

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most. <u>Matter of Rossney v. New York State Division of Parole</u>, 267 A.D.2d 648, 649, 699 N.Y.S.2d 319 (3d Dept 1999); <u>Khatib v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014).

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. <u>Dolan v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>Tran v Evans</u>, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); <u>Boccadisi v Stanford</u>, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017.

The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. <u>Fuller v Evans</u>, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) <u>cert.den</u>. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851.

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do not represent an evidentiary or rehabilitation/forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259– c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other

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statutory factors. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board still is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense. See Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017).

Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) did not alter this approach. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2 (reaffirming "any [risk and needs] instrument used is not dispositive"). Indeed, the COMPAS does not (and cannot) supersede the Board's authority to determine, based on members' independent judgment and application of section 259-i(2)(c)(A)'s factors, whether an inmate should be released. See 2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amended regulation was intended to increase transparency in the Board's decision making by providing an explanation if and when the Board departs from scales in denying an inmate release. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.

The decision is consistent with amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as there is no departure to explain. That is, the Board's decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale within the assessment. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. In fact, the Board cited the COMPAS instrument in its denial.

Appellant did not raise any alleged COMPAS errors during the interview, thereby waiving the issue. Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000); Matter of Shaffer v. Leonardo, 179 A.D.2d 980, 579 N.Y.S.2d 910 (3d Dept. 1992); Boddie v New York State Division of Parole, 288 F.Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

The Board's decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the Board's discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), Iv-denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013). In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed. Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold).

Recommendation: Affirm.