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Administrative Appeal Decision - Mccarthy, Brian M (2020-02-04)

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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: McCarthy, Brian

Facility: Cayuga CF

NYSID: [REDACTED]

Appeal Control No.: 05-015-19 B

DIN: 87-D-0088

Appearances: Cheryl L. Kates, Esq.
P.O. Box 734
Fairport, NY 14450

Decision appealed: April 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.


Board Member(s) who participated: **Coppola, Smith, Drake**

Papers considered: Appellant's Letter-brief received September 9, 2019


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.


Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner


 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 2/4/2020 .

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

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Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. The instant offense involved the appellant raping, strangling, and beating his female victim on a college campus, resulting in her death. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision was based on erroneous information in violation of due process; 2) the Board failed to review age as a mitigating factor; 3) the Board improperly resentenced Appellant; 4) the Board failed to properly assess risks and needs because the Board did not review a SASSI and the Board failed to cite relevant reasons for deviating from the COMPAS findings; 5) the Board failed to discuss all mandatory factors including the sentencing minutes, criminal history, and comments of the defense attorney; 7) DOCCS failed to comply with 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8005 document requests; and 8) the decision was conclusory and lacked detail. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

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The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: Appellant’s instant offense of Murder in the second degree; Appellant’s criminal history; Appellant’s institutional efforts including improved disciplinary record, completion of required programming, and work as a dorm porter; and release plans to live with his fiancée. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, an official statement from the District Attorney, and Appellant’s parole packet including letters of support and assurance. The Board also had before it and considered two independent assessments provided by Appellant.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant murder offense representing a serious escalation in criminal behavior, Appellant’s lack of credibility regarding how and why he was interacting with the victim, and Appellant’s lack of insight into the motives that led him to commit the crime. See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997); Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017). It was well within the Board’s authority to make an assessment of Appellant’s credibility. Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.) (“credibility determinations are generally to be made by the Board”), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008).

Appellant’s argument that the decision was based on erroneous information in violation of due process is without merit. Erroneous information, if not used in the decision as a basis for parole denial, will not lead to a reversal. Matter of Khatib v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Restivo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1096, 895 N.Y.S.2d 555 (3d Dept. 2010); Matter of Grune v. Bd. of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007); see also Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Perea v. Stanford, 149 A.D.3d 1392, 53 N.Y.S.3d 231 (3d Dept. 2017). While community opposition is a permissible consideration, see Matter of

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Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, 91 N.Y.S.3d 308, 311 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Clark v. New York Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 134, here the Board did not rely on specific details contained within opposition letters in denying parole. Nor did the Board rely on the COMPAS instrument in its decision. The transcript reveals there was a discussion of both the COMPAS calculations relating to prior sentences and Appellant’s criminal history outside the context of the instrument. (Tr. at 30-32.) We also note the Board did not rely on penal philosophy.

An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. Of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

Contrary to Appellant’s claim, Matter of Hawkins v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 140 A.D.3d 34, 30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 400 (3d Dept. 2016) – which requires consideration of youth and its attendant characteristics for inmates serving a maximum life sentence for crimes committed as juveniles – does not apply whereas here the inmate was an adult when he committed the instant offense. Matter of Cobb v Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1500, 59 N.Y.S.3d 915 (3d Dept. 2017) (Hawkins inapplicable to offender who was over 18 at time of offense). Cf. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding unconstitutional mandatory life imprisonment without parole for juveniles under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (distinguishing juveniles under 18 from adults).

Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. Of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. Denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been

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resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). Appellant’s maximum sentence is life. The Board acted within its discretion to hold Appellant for another 24 months, after which he will have the opportunity to reappear before the Board.

Appellant’s additional contention that the Board failed to properly assess risk and needs is without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

The Board was not required to review a Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory (“SASSI”). The COMPAS instrument simply suggests an additional assessment such as SASSI might be useful upon release. The record also reflects the Board considered the independent assessments Appellant submitted. That the Board asked Appellant why he opted to obtain independent risk assessments does not provide a basis to disturb the decision.

Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the transcript reflects discussion of the sentencing minutes (Tr. at 3-4.) and a review of the record reveals the Board sent requests for recommendation to the sentencing judge and Appellant’s defense attorney in letters dated March 12, 1996 and did not receive a response.

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The Board also properly solicited the recommendation of the Office of the District Attorney as required by 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(d)(7). The District Attorney who responded in 2015 was not in office when Appellant was convicted, nor did she portray herself as being in the position when Appellant was convicted. The Board was nonetheless entitled to consider her recommendation. Appellant's suggestion that the recommendation lacked credibility because the District Attorney's law license was later suspended for two years is unavailing. The District Attorney's recommendation is but one factor for the Board to consider. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii).

Appellant's contention that DOCCS failed to comply with 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8005 because it did not release requested documents is without merit as the interview was conducted prior to the release of Directive 2014 on June 3, 2019.

Finally, the Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Recommendation: Affirm.