May 2021

Administrative Appeal Decision - Lindsey, Nevin (2020-01-16)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Lindsey, Nevin **Facility:** Attica CF

NYSID: [redacted] **Appeal Control No.:** 03-054-19 B

DIN: 18-A-3513

Appearances: Norman Effman, Esq.
Wyoming County-Attica Legal Aid Bureau
18 Linwood Avenue
Warsaw, NY 14569

Decision appealed: February 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 months.

Board Member(s) who participated: **Crangle, Coppola**

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received June 17, 2020

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

Commissioner — ___ Affirmed ___ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview ___ Modified to _____

Commissioner — ✓ Affirmed ___ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview ___ Modified to _____

Commissioner — ✓ Affirmed ___ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview ___ Modified to _____

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 1/16/20 (AH).

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant challenges the February 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 12-month hold. The instant offense involved the appellant and two others removing around $2,900 worth of merchandise from a department store and proceeding past points of payment before an employee stopped them as they attempted to leave. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board failed to consider Appellant's sentencing minutes and recommendations; 2) the Board failed to consider Appellant's transitional accountability plan (TAP); 3) the Board failed to consider Appellant's risk assessment; 4) the decision was arbitrary and capricious; and 5) the hold beyond Appellant's conditional release date was excessive. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

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The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: Appellant's instant offense of Grand Larceny in the fourth degree; Appellant's criminal history including prior state terms of incarceration for criminal possession of stolen property and assault, and an outstanding warrant in Pennsylvania; Appellant's institutional record including educational efforts, a Tier III ticket for contraband, and denial of an EEC; and release plans to live with his daughter and work as an installer for a telephone company. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the case plan and the COMPAS instrument.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense and Appellant's criminal history reflecting repeated unlawful behavior and disregard for the law. See Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990); Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); People ex rel. Yates v. Walters, 111 A.D.2d 839, 839, 490 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (2d Dept. 1985); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983). The Board also cited the COMPAS instrument's medium score for criminal involvement. See Matter of Espinal v. N.Y. State Bd. Of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017).

While the Board did not possess the sentencing minutes despite a diligent effort to obtain them, the Appeals Unit has been able to obtain them since his appearance before the Board. A review of those minutes reveals the court made no recommendation with respect to parole. Accordingly, any error in failing to consider them is harmless and does not provide a basis for setting aside the appealed from decision. Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Davis v. Lemons, 73 A.D.3d 1354, 899 N.Y.S.2d 919 (3d Dept. 2010); Matter of Valerio v. New York State Div. of Parole, 59 A.D.3d 802, 872 N.Y.S.2d 606 (3d Dept. 2009).

Appellant argues that the Board did not review his risk assessment and failed to comply with 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8002.2(a) by explaining its departure from the overall COMPAS scores. This contention is without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans,

116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board's regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here. In fact, the Board cited the COMPAS instrument in its denial and highlighted Appellant's criminal involvement score. Insofar as Appellant disputes other scores, the Board does not determine COMPAS scores and an administrative appeal is not the proper forum to challenge the COMPAS instrument.

As for the TAP, the name of the TAP was changed to "Offender Case Plan." The applicable regulations refer to and require consideration of the "case plan." 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(a)(12). Accordingly, no further regulation is required. Inasmuch as Appellant contends the case plan was inadequate, the inmate identified no deficiency during the interview. See Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000). If the inmate was unsatisfied, the inmate should have raised the issue with the DOCCS counselor with whom he reviewed it. Matter of Frazier v. Stanford, Index No. 1381-16, *Decision & Order* dated Aug. 24, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (Melkonian A.J.S.C.). The Board was not required to attach his Reception COMPAS and properly considered the most current case plan prepared by DOCCS.

Finally, Appellant's contention that the decision somehow is resulting in an improper hold beyond his Conditional Release date is mistaken. The Board's determination with respect to discretionary release is a distinct basis for release that has no impact on conditional release.

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In conclusion, Appellant has failed to demonstrate the Board's decision was not made in accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational "bordering on impropriety." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)).

Recommendation: Affirm.