May 2021

Administrative Appeal Decision - Eldridge, Michael (2020-01-16)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Eldridge, Michael **Facility:** Woodbourne CF

NYSID: [redacted] **Appeal Control No.:** 02-091-19 B

DIN: 93-A-6906

Appearances: Michael Eldridge, 93-A-6906
Woodbourne Correctional Facility
99 Prison Road
P.O. Box 1000
Woodbourne, NY 12788-1000

Decision appealed: January 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.

Board Member(s) who participated: **Cruse, Davis**

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received August 20, 2019

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

_____ ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____
Commissioner

_____ ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____
Commissioner

_____ ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____
Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 1/16/20 (AH).

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant challenges the January 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant is incarcerated for two separate instant offenses. In one, the appellant followed two women to their apartment to purchase cocaine, entered the residence without authorization, attempted to stab one woman, and threw another woman on the floor before stabbing her, causing three lacerations to her liver. In the second, the appellant approached the female victim in an airport parking lot, forced her into his car at knifepoint, took her to a secluded area, and forced her to engage in various sexual acts. He then stole personal property, choked the victim into unconsciousness, and left her stranded on the roadside. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board failed to consider the required statutory factors, as indicated by markings on the Commissioner's worksheet, and did not utilize the future-focused analysis mandated by Executive Law § 259-c(4); 2) the Commissioner infused his personal beliefs into the proceedings and made erroneous statements during the interview; 3) the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it denied parole based solely on the instant offense and did not cite any aggravating factors; and 4) the Board's decision was conclusory and lacked detail. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be

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presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: Appellant's instant offenses of Rape in the first degree and Burglary in the first degree, committed while on parole; Appellant's criminal history including two prior state terms of incarceration for robbery and prior failures on community supervision; and Appellant's institutional efforts including completion of [redacted] and SOP and enrollment in a fatherhood program. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, Appellant's parole packet, and letters of support.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offenses and Appellant's criminal history including prior failures on community supervision. See Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385, 772 N.Y.S.2d 540 (2d Dept. 2004); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); People ex rel. Yates v. Walters, 111 A.D.2d 839, 839, 490 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (2d Dept. 1985); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983). While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always required to support emphasis on an inmate's offense, Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, the Board's decision here was based on additional considerations including Appellant's prior criminal history.

Markings on the worksheet used by the Commissioner do not suggest that required statutory factors were never considered and do not provide a basis to disturb the Board's determination. A review of the record reveals certain lines were crossed out because the Commissioner simply did not wish to use that language in the decision.

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Appellant's argument that the Board failed to utilize the future-focused analysis mandated by Executive Law § 259-c(4) is without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board's regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

Appellant's contention that the Commissioner infused his personal beliefs into the proceedings is likewise without merit. The transcript as a whole does not support Appellant's contention that the parole interview was conducted improperly or that he was denied a fair interview. Matter of Rivers v. Evans, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 989 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Mays v. Stanford, 55 N.Y.S.3d 502, 150 A.D.3d 1521 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Bonilla v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 32 A.D.3d 1070, 1071, 820 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (3d Dept. 2006). The Commissioner observing that many other people with drug problems do not engage in the type of criminal behavior that Appellant did (Tr. at 6.), that Appellant's victims were women (Tr. at 18.), and that Appellant used a knife during both instant offenses (Tr. at 8.) did not render the interview improper.

Appellant also argues that the Commissioner erroneously stated that Appellant forced the victim into her car when Appellant in fact forced the victim into his own vehicle. In view of the Appellant's failure to correct the misstatement during the interview, and in the absence of any evidence the Board's determination was meaningfully affected by an error of fact, the Board's decision will not be

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disturbed. See Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept. 2011).

Finally, the Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Recommendation: Affirm.