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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Davis, Robert		Facility:	Green Haven CF		
NYSID:		3 as	Appeal Control No.:	06-043-19 B		-
DIN:	81-C-0288					
Appearance	ees:	Mary Raleigh Esq. 27 Crystal Farm Road Warwick, New York			, ,	N St
Decision a	ppealed:	May 2019 decision, d	enying discretio	nary release and imp	oosing a hold of	24 months.
Board Mer		Crangle, Smith, Agos	tini		e sa	
Papers considered:		Appellant's Brief rece	eived October 11	1, 2019	31	6.
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation						
	66	21 51		-5	*:	
Records re	elied upon:	Pre-Sentence Investig Board Release Decisi Plan.				
Final/Determination:		The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:				
1		VAffirmed Vac	ated, remanded fo	r de novo interview _	_ Modified to	<u> </u>
Comm	issioner		a 5		g (8)	2 2
4			ated, remanded fo	r de novo interview	Modified to	- 15 m
Corn	issioner	3		5 B		
(Chu	14		ated, remanded fo	r de novo interview _	Modified to	* 1
Comm	nissioner	W 1988		ii.	= = 9	.M.

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 2/24/2020T.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant challenges the May 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant is incarcerated for three different crimes. In the first, appellant repeatedly beat a minor child for at least a year and a half, and finally murdered her by striking her with a karate weapon, strangling her with a cord, and drowning her in a bathtub. In the second crime, he repeatedly over the course of a year beat a second minor child with sticks, belts, military boots and extension cords, causing serious injuries. In the third, appellant possessed a loaded 38 caliber revolver in his car. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors, along with many mitigating factors. 2) the decision is based upon erroneous information as his recent disciplinary ticket was not violent. 3) the decision is similar to prior decisions. 4) the decision illegally resentenced him. 5) the COMPAS has errors on it. 6) the decision lacks detail. 7) the decision failed to list any facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 8) the Commissioners didn't review his entire packet. 9) the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law are future focused.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

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Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime, the Board considered other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor considered. Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018).

The Board may take note of the inmate's disregard for the life of another human being. <u>Hakim v Travis</u>, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); <u>Angel v Travis</u>, 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept 2003). The Board may consider the inmate's blatant disregard for the law and the sanctity of human life. <u>Campbell v Stanford</u>, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 105 N.Y.S.3d 461 (2nd Dept. 2019).

The Board may take into account an inmate's when denying parole release. See Matter of Dudley v. Travis, 227 A.D.2d 863, 642 N.Y.S.2d 386 (3d Dept.), Iv. denied, 88 N.Y.2d 812, 649 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1996); Matter of Baker v. Russi, 188 A.D.2d 771, 591 N.Y.S.2d 540 (3d Dept. 1992); see also Pender v. Travis, 243 A.D.2d 889, 662 N.Y.S.2d 642 (3d Dept. 1997), Iv. denied, 91 N.Y.2d 810, 670 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1998); People ex rel. Brown v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, Parole Bd. Div., 67 A.D.2d 1108, 415 N.Y.S.2d 137 (4th Dept. 1979), appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 707, 418 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1979); Rodriguez v. Henderson, 56 A.D.2d 729, 730, 392 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (4th Dept.), Iv. denied, 42 N.Y.2d 801, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1977).

The Board may consider an inmate's failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole. <u>See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), <u>Iv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); <u>Matter of Karlin v. Cully</u>, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <u>Iv. denied</u>, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).

The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Espinal v. New York Bd. of Parole, 2019 NY Slip Op 04080, 2019 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4057 (3d Dept. May 23, 2019) (COMPAS instrument yielded mixed results); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).

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As for an alleged similarity to prior Board decisions, since the Board is required to consider the same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, it follows that the same aspects of the individual's record may again constitute the primary grounds for a denial of parole. <u>Matter of Hakim v. Travis</u>, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept. 2003); <u>Matter of Bridget v. Travis</u>, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept. 2002). The Board is required to consider the same factors each time he appears in front of them. <u>Matter of Williams v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2010).

That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as "contrary to the best interest of the community"); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been

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resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

The Board did review all papers that were submitted. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied with its duty. See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. <u>Hodge v Griffin</u>, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing <u>Romer v Travis</u>, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. <u>Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. <u>Ward v City of Long Beach</u>, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. <u>Siao-Paul v. Connolly</u>, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); <u>Hanna v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019).

The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board's determination was affected by a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. <u>Matter of Silmon v Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); <u>Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

The alleged error concerning appellant's discipline does not appear in the final Board decision. Erroneous information, if not used in the decision as a basis for parole denial, will not lead to a reversal. Matter of Khatib v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Restivo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1096, 895 N.Y.S.2d 555 (3d Dept. 2010) [status report]; Matter of Grune v. Bd. of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014,

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838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007)[status report]; see also Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017) [misstatement by commissioner in interview that inmate did not correct]; Matter of Perea v. Stanford, 149 A.D.3d 1392, 53 N.Y.S.3d 231 (3d Dept. 2017) [erroneous information in PBR which inmate corrected during interview].

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. <u>Dolan v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>Tran v Evans</u>, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); <u>Boccadisi v Stanford</u>, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).

Appellant didn't raise the issue of an alleged COMPAS error during the Board interview, thereby waiving the issue. Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000).

Contrary to Appellant's claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept.

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2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

Recommendation: Affirm.