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# ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

| Name:                 | Bernhard,   | Nicholas                                   | Facility:            | Queensboro CF                                 |                   |             |
|-----------------------|---|--|----------------------|---|-------------------|-------------|
| NYSID:                |   | e* ,                                       | Appeal Control No.:  | 07-104-19 B                                   | 9 x               | 277         |
| DIN:                  | 15-A-3990   | )  |                      |   |                   |             |
| Appearan              | ices:   | Nicholas Bernhard<br>Queensboro Corre      | ectional Facility    | 25.   | *                 |             |
| 1.                    |   | 47-04 Van Dam S<br>Long Island City,       |                      |   |                   |             |
| Decision              | appealed:   | July 2019 decision                         | n, denying discretio | nary release and impo                         | sing a hold of    | 24 months.  |
| Board Me<br>who parti | Village and the second | Berliner, Cruse                            | f n n                | eth<br>D                                      |                   |             |
| Papers co             | nsidered:   | Appellant's Brief                          | received Septembe    | er 11, 2019                                   |                   | *           |
| Appeals 1             | Unit Review:  | Statement of the A                         | appeals Unit's Find  | ings and Recommend                            | ation             |             |
| Records               | relied upon:  |  |                      | arole Board Report, In<br>n 9026), COMPAS ins |                   | *           |
| Final Det             | ermination:   | 1  |                      | ecision appealed is he                        | 97.9              |             |
| Lely                  | nissioner   | Affirmed                                   | Vacated, remanded fo | or de novo interview                          | Modified to       | €<br>:=:    |
| The                   | missioner<br>nissioner  | Affirmed                                   | Vacated, remanded fo | or de novo interview                          | Modified to       | 7 %<br>7 %  |
|                       |   | nation is at varianc<br>le Board's determi |                      | nd Recommendation nexed hereto.               | of Appeals Un     | it, written |
| This Fina             | l Determinat  | ion, the related Stat                      | ement of the Appea   | als Unit's Findings and                       | d the separate fi | ndings of   |

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 243000

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Appellant challenges the July 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. The instant offense involved Appellant participating in the criminal enterprise of an organized crime family including loan-sharking and gambling activities. Appellant also perjured himself when giving sworn testimony to an independent review board. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board failed to overcome the presumption of release created by receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate; 2) the Board did not consider all the required statutory factors; 3) the decision was made on the Board's perception of the instant offense and the opinion of the District Attorney; 4) the Board did not engage in a forward-looking paradigm and failed to provide the required detail regarding the departure from the COMPAS; 5) the decision was conclusory in nature; and 6) the Board effectively resentenced Appellant. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). In this case, the appellant received an EEC, therefore the deprecation standard does not apply here.

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4<sup>th</sup> Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4<sup>th</sup> Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole,

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157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

An EEC does not automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate consideration of the statutory factors including the instant offense. Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006). Moreover, the Board is not required to give each factor equal weight. Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817. The Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society. Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of Enterprise Corruption and Perjury in the first degree; Appellant's criminal history including a prior misdemeanor conviction; institutional efforts including clean disciplinary record since his last Board interview, receipt of an EEC, completion of required programming, and work as an inmate mobility assistant and as a porter; and release plans to live with his son and work as a sales representative or at a moving company. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the sentencing minutes, the COMPAS instrument, the case plan, and letters of support.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the nature of the instant offense and strenuous opposition from the District Attorney, leading the panel to question Appellant's judgment and disregard for the law. See Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Torres v. New York State Div. of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 128, 128-29, 750 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1st Dept. 2002); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009 Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995). The Board acted within its discretion in determining

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these considerations rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and rendered discretionary release inappropriate at this time. See generally Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 342 (3d Dept. 2015).

There is no merit to Appellant's contention that the Board did not engage in a forward-looking paradigm and failed to provide the required detail regarding their departure from the COMPAS. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259-c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board's regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

Here the Board considered the COMPAS instrument and did not depart from it. That is, the decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. The Board concluded, *despite* low risk scores, release would be inappropriate because there is a reasonable probability that if released at this time, Appellant would not live at liberty without again violating the law and that his release at this time would be incompatible with the welfare of society. This is entirely consistent with the Board's intention in enacting the amended regulation.

The Board's decision also satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of

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<u>Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Little v. Travis</u>, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Matter of Davis v. Travis</u>, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); <u>People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Finally, Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), Iv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

**Recommendation:** Affirm.