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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS: THE PROPORTIONALITY RULE

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INTRODUCTION

The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in the usual stark and unadorned constitutional prose: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The constitutional restriction binds both the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government and through the fourteenth amendment is applicable to the states as well. While both branches are governed by the constitutional limitation, our system of judicial review provides an enormous potential power for the federal judiciary to strike down sentences presumably fixed by state legislatures as appropriate sanctions reflecting the judgment of their constituencies as to the seriousness of particular criminal offenses.

This paper is primarily concerned with only one aspect of the “cruel and unusual” clause—the so-called proportionality principle. Simply expressed, the principle dictates that a punishment which is grossly or excessively severe in relation to the gravity of the crime charged must be struck down by the courts as violative of the eighth amendment. Even before Gilbert and Sullivan’s Mikado, an article of popular faith had been that the punishment fit the crime. In American jurisprudence, however, responsibility is deemed to be on the legislature which created the crime and fixed the sanction. Only recently has it become recognized that punishment grossly in excess of the gravity of the

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1. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. As with most constitutional language, “[t]he words [the judge] must construe are empty vessels into which he can pour nearly anything he will.” Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1930).

2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The cruel and unusual punishments clause has been applied to the states, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664, 666-67 (1962), but the Supreme Court has not expressly incorporated the excessive bail and excessive fines restrictions into the fourteenth amendment. This incorporation would seem to be implicit, however, in the fourteenth amendment per se. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (dictum); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398-401 (1971). In O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 (1892), the Court had indicated that the eighth amendment was not binding on the states.

offense may offend the Constitution of the United States. I will briefly
review the history of the principle and the test which has been
developed to apply it. I will suggest some inherent weaknesses and
dangers in the test and indicate the balancing of principles which must
be employed in applying it lest it become a device for the imposition
of judicial concepts of criminal punishment in the guise of constitutional
interpretation.

I. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: AN EVOLVING CONCEPT

The history of the cruel and unusual punishment clause has been set
forth in several law review articles and in expansive judicial opin-
ions. There is no need to present it in detail here.

The phrase itself, “cruel and unusual punishments,” first appeared
in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 which prohibited such sanctions.
Historians generally have perceived the prohibition to be a reaction to
the treason trials of 1685—the “Bloody Assize” caused by the abortive
rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth. The penalty for treason involved
hanging by the neck, being cut down while still alive, and then being
dismembered, beheaded, and quartered. (I omit some of the more
grisly details.) That the methods of punishment employed by the
English then and later were cruel and barbarous by today’s standards
is quite apparent.

There is another view which has gained some acceptance that the
phrase “cruel and unusual punishments” was inserted in the English
Bill of Rights not simply as an interdiction of barbarous methods of
punishment, but also to prohibit sentences which were disproport-
ionate to the gravity of the crime committed. One theory is that the
conviction of the infamous Titus Oates for perjury in 1685 and his
subsequent sentence support the proposition that a sentence dispropor-
tionate to the crime was cruel and unusual within the meaning of the
Bill of Rights. In 1679, Oates swore that he was present at a meeting
where a group of influential Catholic laymen and Jesuit priests plotted

4. E.g., Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning,
57 Cal. L. Rev. 839 (1969); Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlighten-
ment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine,
5. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-22 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Carmona
874 (1979); People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 119-30 app., 332 N.E.2d 338, 347-54 app., 371
6. Granucci, supra note 4, at 854. Nor were the Stuarts the first English monarchs to arouse
public anger by inflicting a penalty commonly believed to be disproportionate to the offense.
In 1579, Queen Elizabeth incurred public wrath by having the right hand of an author, John
Stubbs, and his printer, William Page, hacked off for publishing an attack on a marriage match
that the aging queen desired with a French nobleman. Elizabeth was not unmoved by the public
dissent; she did not stay the sentence but did send her personal physician to attend to the wounds
to murder the Protestant King Charles II and to place his brother
James, a Catholic, upon the throne. Oates, who had a vivid ima-
gerination, provided certain lurid details—the Jesuits were to kill the King
with silver bullets and, if that failed, four Irish ruffians were to stab
him to death. As a result of the alleged "Popish Plot," panic prevailed
in London and, as a result of Oates' testimony, a score of innocent
Catholics were executed in the manner heretofore described. James II
eventually did ascend the throne, evidence of Oates' perjury became
overwhelming, and in 1685 he was convicted of perjury, sentenced to
prison for life, severely flogged, fined, placed in a pillory four times a
year, and defrocked as a minister of the Church of England.7 After the
revolution of 1688, the flight of James II and the ascension to the
throne of William and Mary of Orange, Oates was not only pardoned
but even given a lifetime pension.8

An influential law review article, which has espoused the view that
"cruel and unusual punishments" should be equated with the dispro-
portionality of the sentence and not simply the barbarity of the method
of punishment, argued that Oates' sentence was cruel and unusual not
because of the flogging and pilloring, which were normal methods of
punishment in those days, but because a term of life imprisonment was
disproportionate to the crime of perjury.9 This argument, in my view,
is unpersuasive both logically and historically. Oates' perjury led di-
rectly to the barbaric execution of some twenty-one innocent people,
including seven Jesuits, one of whom was the provincial of the English
Society.10 Winston Churchill, hardly an Anglophobe, in his discussion
of the Popish Plot, describes Oates as "being as wicked as any man
who ever lived."11 The usual punishment for perjury at the time in-
cluded "branding or tongue-boring, or both."12

Oates' sentence, viewed in the light of contemporary penological
practices, was neither cruel nor unusual. His eventual release and re-
ward by William of Orange was not the result of any belief that he had
been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment but, as described by a
modern biographer of Oates, it was "an act of gratitude by William of
Orange . . . who knew his friends and recognized the instruments
which helped him attain the throne of England."13 While Titus Oates
was a fascinating as well as frightening character, I do not believe his
sentence casts any light upon the meaning of the phrase "cruel and

9. Granucci, supra note 4, at 859-60; see Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 425 n.4 (2d Cir.
13. Id. at 329.
unusual punishments" nor does it support the proportionality principle.

In 1791, the same phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" was adopted with little debate as part of the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution. It is quite clear that the framers intended to outlaw barbarous punishments. The first eighth amendment cases to come before the Supreme Court established that punishments involving lingering death or torture, which were acceptable to our Anglo-Saxon legal forebearers, were cruel and unusual under the interdiction of the eighth amendment.\(^\text{14}\) In \textit{In re Kemmler},\(^\text{15}\) however, the Court held that death by electrocution was not cruel and unusual under the United States Constitution.

The question as to whether a term of imprisonment could be so excessively disproportionate to the offense so as to be within the eighth amendment was not addressed in the Supreme Court until 1892 and then only in dicta in a dissenting opinion. In \textit{O'Neil v. Vermont},\(^\text{16}\) the defendant, who was licensed to sell liquor in New York, had been sentenced to 19,914 days (over fifty-four years) for conviction on 307 counts of illegal sale of liquor shipped to Vermont. The majority did not reach the question of whether the penalty violated the eighth amendment since that point had not been raised as error.\(^\text{17}\) In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Field, however, considering the fact that the penalty was more harsh than could have been imposed for burglary or manslaughter, concluded that "[i]t was one which, in its severity, considering the offences of which [the defendant] was convicted, may justly be termed both unusual and cruel."\(^\text{18}\)

In 1910, the Supreme Court decided \textit{Weems v. United States},\(^\text{19}\) which is now regarded as the seminal case with respect to the proportionality principle. The defendant, an official of the Philippine government, was convicted of falsifying public records and was sentenced under the Penal Code of the Philippines, then a United States territory, to fifteen years of hard and painful labor, with a chain at the ankle hanging from the wrists. He was stripped of the right of parental

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15. 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
16. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
17. \textit{Id.} at 331. The majority also opined that the eighth amendment did not apply to the states, \textit{id.} at 332, but this view was expressly rejected in 1962. See note 2 \textit{supra} and accompanying text.
18. 144 U.S. at 339 (Field, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Field accepted "whipping for petty offences" as a form of punishment within the state's power. \textit{Id.} at 340 (Field, J., dissenting).
19. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Court was construing the Philippines' Bill of Rights which contained a cruel and unusual punishment clause identical to the language of the eighth amendment. \textit{Id.} at 365, 367.
authority, guardianship of person or property, participation in the
family council, marital authority, administration of property, and the
right to dispose of his property. He was placed under surveillance by
the state for the rest of his life, could not vote, hold office, receive
retirement pay, or even change his residence without permission.20
Only six Justices participated in this decision and two, White and
Holmes, dissented. The majority found that this punishment was
“cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and
follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its character. Its punishments
come under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of
their degree and kind.”21 The Court was repulsed by the nature of the
penalty as well as its lack of proportion to the seriousness of the
underlying crime. Thus, the Court compared the punishment of the
defendant to those imposed in the same jurisdiction for crimes which
the Court considered to be more serious than the one for which the
defendant had been convicted.22 It also compared the punishment
under attack with those imposed in other jurisdictions for the same
crime.23 These two steps have become major parts of the contempo-
rary proportionality test.24

While the language of Weems arguably does support the doctrine
of proportionality, it must be remembered that the Court was considering
not simply a fifteen year prison term, but one accompanied by “painful
labor” in chains, lifetime supervision, and civil interdiction. It is
difficult, indeed, to believe that the Supreme Court would have held a
fifteen year term of imprisonment unconstitutional had it not been for
the barbarous terms which had accompanied and, indeed, followed its
service.25

Weems is an important decision in any event because of its
affirmation of two principles of jurisprudence, the first of which is
indeed basic and the second almost obvious. The first is as the Court
stated:

[T]here is a certain subordination of the judiciary to the legislature. The function of the
legislature is primary, its exercises fortified by presumptions of right and legality, and

20. Id. at 364-66.
21. Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 380.
23. Id. at 380-81.
24. E.g., Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141-42 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975); see 44 Fordham L. Rev. 637 (1975).
25. Weems was not followed in Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (4th Cir. 1978),
where the issue was solely the length of sentence unaccompanied by barbarous conditions. Accord,
Contra, id. at 420-21 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
is not to be interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of their wisdom or propriety. They have no limitation, we repeat, but constitutional ones, and what those are the judiciary must judge.  

The second is that the eighth amendment prohibition is evolutionary in nature. This principle was succinctly formulated by Chief Justice Warren: "The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." I believe that there may well be some question as to whether we Americans have, in general, espoused higher standards of decency and whether our society is becoming more instead of less mature. Nonetheless, in the context of criminal sanctions, no one can seriously contest the proposition that the human physical and mental torture, degradation, and loss of personal dignity acceptable to Sassenach or the Sioux, have long since been rejected, at least in democratic societies. Hence, it is beyond doubt that what was an acceptable sanction at the time of the adoption of the Constitution is hardly permissible today and forms no basis for judicial inquiry to determine present constitutional criteria.

What is significant is that since Weems was decided in 1910, there has been no opinion in the Supreme Court which has struck down a noncapital punishment on proportionality grounds. Indeed, since then there has been only one other case in which a majority of that Court found that a noncapital penalty violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause. In Robinson v. California, as noted by Chief Judge Kaufman in a prior Sonnett Lecture, the Court ruled that a person could not be convicted of a crime simply because he suffered from the condition or status of being addicted to a narcotic drug. Although the two are often confused, whether a certain act should be a crime and whether the punishment should fit the crime are entirely separate inquiries.

Throughout the present decade the Supreme Court has struggled with the apparently intractable problem of capital punishment. A judge must be careful in applying these precedents which involve the

26. 217 U.S. at 379.
27. Id. at 378.
31. 370 U.S. at 667.
32. H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 36 (1963). See also E. van den Haag, Punishing Criminals 4 (1975). In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), a plurality of the Court concluded that denationalization for wartime desertion was cruel and unusual punishment. Although the rationale of the decision is not entirely clear, the Court explicitly rejected any argument that the punishment was excessive in relation to the gravity of the crime. Id. at 99.
ultimate irrevocable sanction, and in which a majority opinion is rare, to cases involving much different considerations because of the lesser penalties involved.34 Two propositions are clear, however, from the opinions in the death penalty cases. One is that the Supreme Court now accepts the principle of proportionality as constitutionally mandated.35 The other is that there is a strong presumption that the legislative penalty is valid because "the constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards."36 Whether the proportionality concept was within the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689 or in the minds of the founding fathers when the eighth amendment was adopted is academic. It has now been espoused in principle by the Supreme Court37 and the New York Court of Appeals,38 as well as a large number of other state courts.39

II. THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST

The cases have developed a generally accepted three-pronged test to determine whether a sentence is so excessively disproportionate to the crime that it violates the eighth amendment. The three steps are: first, a judgment by the court of the gravity of the offense; second, a comparison of the sentence under review with that imposed in the same jurisdiction for other crimes which the court considers to be more serious; and third, a comparison of the challenged sentence with those imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime.40 There is even

34. "Death is irrevocable; life imprisonment is not. Death, of course, makes rehabilitation impossible; life imprisonment does not. In short, death has always been viewed as the ultimate sanction, and it seems perfectly reasonable to continue to view it as such." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 346 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
37. See cases cited note 35 supra.
authority that the comparison can include the penalties imposed by foreign nations.41

The aim of the test is to reduce the input of judicial subjectivity in eighth amendment jurisprudence. While a three-pronged test facially phrased in objective terms is not to be lightly discarded (and I suppose must be viewed with more respect than a two-pronged test), I am frankly becoming less and less convinced that the proportionality rubric is of any real value in cases where the only claim is that the eighth amendment has been violated simply because of the length of the term imposed.42 There is no case, in fact, in either the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, or the New York Court of Appeals where a sentence has ever been set aside for this reason, even though the test has been accepted.43 This is because Weems itself has emphasized the great deference which must be paid to the state legislature. As Chief Justice Marshall pointed out in 1820, "[i]t is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment."44 Mr. Justice Stewart has recently emphasized that "a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the people."45

The first prong of the test requires the court to make a judgment as to the seriousness of the crime charged and this of course invites the substitution of the subjective views of the judge for those of the legislature.46 The concern here is both constitutional and practical. We must

42. This discussion does not purport to encompass those instances in which a challenge under the cruel and unusual punishment clause is made to brutal treatment or harsh deprivations inflicted upon inmates during their confinement. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 190-94 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). See also Kaufman, supra note 30, at 509-12.
43. Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 993 (1975), is the only circuit court case striking down a sentence for a term of years solely because of its length. In Downey, the defendant received a sentence of thirty to sixty years imprisonment for his first offense of possession and sale of a small amount of marijuana. Compare Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978) (as applied to petitioner, a Texas statute mandating life imprisonment upon third conviction for any felony held violative of eighth amendment) and Hart v. Cointe, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973) (mandatory life sentence for third felony conviction unconstitutional where crimes were perjury, passing $30 check with insufficient funds, and transporting $140 worth of bad checks across state lines), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974) with Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976) (setting aside on eighth amendment grounds five years of a twenty year sentence for simple assault to comport with the maximum for assault with intent to murder, of which simple assault is merely a lesser included offense), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 973 (1977). See In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974); In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (collecting cases); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972).
44. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
46. See Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 410-12 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 874
observe the doctrine of separation of powers as well as federalism. This emphasizes the need for judicial restraint. A practical consideration, of course, is the institutional limitation on judicial factfinding. The legislature, acting through commissions and committees with funds for counsel, staff and public hearings, is patently better equipped than the judiciary to make the factual and social determinations which underlie any decision as to the gravity of a crime. It is also more attuned to contemporary community standards and can best judge the public's concern about particular criminal activity.

The second prong of the test is even more vulnerable since it calls for a comparison by the judicial branch of the statutory sentence imposed for the crime committed with those imposed for more serious offenses in the same jurisdiction. The problem of determining the gravity of a particular crime is difficult enough without having to make judgments about other crimes. It is rather simple to make a decision that smoking in the subway is not as serious as rape. But comparing the crimes of and punishments for arson and kidnapping, automobile larceny and drunken driving, requires the digestion of a vast amount of penological and sociological data not usually available to the jurist. The comparisons cannot be mechanically applied and the danger of the judiciary's substitution of its judgment on a social issue for that of the legislature charged with the responsibility of making the decision initially is apparent.

The third step of the proportionality test requires the court to compare the sentence under review with those imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime. This is the least susceptible to misuse as a tool facilitating the substitution of individual judicial policy views for those of the legislature. At the same time, it is flawed and is basically antagonistic to the principles of federalism. The Supreme Court has

(1979); Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1201 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thornberry, J., dissenting); Note, Criminal Procedure—Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis in Its Infancy, 52 N.C L. Rev. 442, 452-53 (1973). See also 1976 Wis. L. Rev. 655, 667-69.

47. It is often said, as it was recently by United States District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., that "the power of the federal judiciary to review and to decide matters involving the legislative and executive branches of government is circumscribed by two basic constitutional doctrines"—separation of powers and federalism. Johnson, The Role of the Judiciary With Respect to the Other Branches of Government, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 455, 463 (1977). As Judge Johnson seems to realize, however, the effectiveness of these principles as a check on judicial power depends on self-restraint. See id. at 466. Where the judiciary is concerned the appropriate question is indeed, "Quis custodiet custodes?"


recognized, for example, that there is no national standard for obscenity and that the courts are to apply local community standards. Yet this leads to the anomaly that while a jury is required to apply local standards in determining whether an act is criminally obscene, consideration of national standards is encouraged in determining whether the punishment is constitutional. The rationale supporting the distinction of using local standards to determine whether a first amendment violation has occurred, but a national standard to decide whether an eighth amendment infraction has transpired, is not at all clear.

The use of the standards of foreign nations to determine the constitutionality of punishment seems to be generally of little or no help. Aside from differing moral, social, and cultural values, I would suspect that a few years in a dungeon in some foreign climes can hardly be compared with incarceration in most modern American penal institutions.

In any event, a state may be faced with a particularly virulent type of criminal activity and I submit it should have some latitude in determining a strategy to combat that crime; one means may be the imposition of a longer sentence. In Carmona v. Ward, the most recent case in our circuit to challenge a prison term as unconstitutional because of its length, we held it to be significant, as had the New York Court of Appeals, that New York had a particularly acute drug problem. The state legislature in 1967 had embarked upon a penal law approach which emphasized treatment of the addict and not incarceration. Six years and over one billion dollars later, the legislature determined that the program was not successful and adopted admittedly stern measures with lifetime maximum prison terms. It is not for the courts to determine the wisdom or effectiveness of the program. It has engendered criticism and it may well not be working, but the legislature has already made changes and is clearly in the best position to make more. We held the drug statute not to be violative of the Constitution and the Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari in a seven-to-two decision.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would point out that a prison term so disproportionate in length in comparison with the gravity of the crime as to

52. Id. at 412.
53. Id. at 413.
54. Id. at 415-16 & n.19; cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1979, § A, at 20, col. 1 (criticizing the harshness of the statute).
shock the conscience should be held to be cruel and unusual under the
eight amendment of the Constitution. This is so neither because it
was in the minds of the framers of the English Bill of Rights in 1689,
nor because of the Bloody Assize or the trial of Titus Oates, nor even
because the founding fathers had it in mind in adopting the language
of the prior act. What books Jefferson may have read hardly support
the inference that he believed the maxim “let the punishment fit the
crime” was of constitutional dimension. Nor do I believe that a lone
dissent in O’Neil or the majority opinion in Weems (which involved
barbarous treatment) necessarily preordained acceptance of the pro-
portionality principle. I see no reason to strain or struggle with doubt-
ful historical or judicial precedent to establish the point. Unless the
eighth amendment is to become totally moribund in a sentencing con-
text and the phrase simply a shibboleth, since barbarous methods of
punishment have generally disappeared, it must apply to extraordinar-
ily excessive terms. This I accept because, as I have indicated, the
clause is evolutionary in character, not because the founding fathers
had the principle in mind.

At the same time, I believe that state legislatures usually do not act
aberrantly and are normally responsive to and reflect community stan-
dards. Unlike federal judges who serve for life, the legislator must
answer to his constituency after relatively brief terms of office. The
deference we must pay the legislative determination is due not only to
constitutional concepts of separation of powers and federalism, but
also because of the institutional difficulty of the judiciary making the
social, moral, and penological decisions inherent in the test which has
been constructed. I believe it is of some significance that in the most
recent federal case in point, the Fourth Circuit, which had initially
employed the proportionality test, has now refused to apply it at least
where the sentence is for a term of years. It will set aside such a term
which is within the state’s statutory maximum only where there are
“extraordinary and special circumstances.”

So-called judicial activists, of course, will maintain that the refusal
to set aside admittedly harsh sentences constitutes an abdication of the
constitutional mandate, but this requires an understanding of what our
constitutional mandate really is. From the foregoing discussion, I
submit that our responsibility is narrow indeed. The role of the federal
judiciary becomes even less active where the state courts have already
upheld the constitutionality of the statute against the same attack. The
state court judges have sworn to uphold the same Constitution as the
federal judiciary.

56. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974).
57. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1233 (4th Cir. 1978).
I think the significant factor is judicial restraint. I recall to you Mr. Justice Frankfurter's elegant articulation of the point: "[T]here is not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief, for every undesirable exercise of legislative power. . . . In a democratic society like ours, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's representatives." 58