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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Acevedo,	Vidal	Facility:	Cape Vincent CF
NYSID:		Appeal Control No.:	07-173-18 B
DIN: 17-R-2373	ļ		
Appearances:	Scott Otis Esq. P.O. Box 344 Watertown, New Yor	k 13601	
Decision appealed:	July 2018 decision, de	enying discretion	hary release and imposing a hold of 13-months.
Board Member(s) who participated:	Berliner, Alexander,	Shapiro	
Papers considered:	Appellant's Brief reco	eived December	27, 2018
Appeals Unit Review:	Statement of the App	eals Unit's Find	ngs and Recommendation
Records relied upon:			role Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case
Final Determination:	The undersigned deter	rmine that the de	ecision appealed is hereby:
after		ated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to
Commissioner	AffirmedVac	ated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to
Chankhen .	AffirmedVac	ated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to
Commissioner			

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 2/27/19 66.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant challenges the July 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 13-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board didn't properly weigh the required statutory factors, as the statutes focus on rehabilitation. 2) overall the COMPAS scores are good, only old criminal history categories are high. 3) the Board decision illegally resentenced him. 4) the Board failed to make required findings of fact. 5) he is not guilty of the tier III disciplinary ticket.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. <u>Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not be given equal weight. <u>Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision</u>, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense. <u>See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); <u>Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); <u>Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 307

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A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); <u>Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of</u> Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. <u>Matter of Davis v. Evans</u>, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Lashway v. Evans</u>, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

After considering the relevant factors, the Board was allowed to place greater emphasis on the inmate's criminal record including prior failures while under community supervision. <u>See</u>, <u>e.g.</u>, <u>Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole</u>, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Davis v. Evans</u>, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); <u>People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983).

The Board may consider an inmate's failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole. <u>See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); <u>Matter of Karlin v. Cully</u>, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).

The Board may consider the denial of an EEC in denying parole. <u>Matter of Grigger v. Goord</u>, 41 A.D.3d 1128, 840 N.Y.S.2d 174 (3d Dept. 2007).

The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument. <u>Matter of Bush v.</u> <u>Annucci</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); <u>Matter of Wade v. Stanford</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related crimes); <u>Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family support), <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).

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Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. <u>Matter of Burress v. Dennison</u>, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); <u>Matter of Cody v. Dennison</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), <u>lv. denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); <u>accord Matter of Reed v. Evans</u>, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. <u>Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); <u>Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as "contrary to the best interest of the community").

As for the disciplinary matters, pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and 259-k(1), the Board is required to obtain official reports and may rely on the information contained therein. See Billiteri v U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976); Lee v U.S. Parole Commission, 614 F.Supp. 634, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Carter v Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dept. 2011) lv. app. den. 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011).

Concerning rehabilitation, even a positive institutional record (which this inmate does not have) does not automatically entitle him to release, as discretionary release shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); <u>Matter of Gutkaiss v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 50 A.D.3d 1418, 857 N.Y.S.2d 755 (3d Dept. 2008); <u>Matter of Faison v. Travis</u>, 260 A.D.2d 866, 688 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (3d Dept.), <u>appeal dismissed</u> 93 N.Y.2d 1013, 697 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1999).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. <u>Hodge v Griffin</u>, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing <u>Romer v Travis</u>, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason

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and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. <u>Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. <u>Ward v City of Long Beach</u>, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Recommendation: Affirm.