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Administrative Appeal Decision - Kovacs, Stuart (2019-03-22)

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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Kovacs, Stuart

Facility: Woodbourne CF

NYSID: [REDACTED]

Appeal Control No.: 08-113-18 B

DIN: 97-A-1247

Appearances: Glenn Kroll Esq.
92 Main Street
P.O. Box 10
Bloomingburg, New York 12721

Decision appealed: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24-months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Berliner, Cruse, Shapiro

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received December 19, 2018


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.


Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 3/22/19 66.

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Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board decision is arbitrary and capricious in that they failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. Rather, they only looked at the instant offense. 2) the Board violated his due process liberty interest in a legitimate expectation of early release. 3) the Board decision doesn't satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard. 4) the decision lacks detail. 5) he is being punished for maintaining his innocence, turning down a lighter plea bargain offer, and going to trial, by being re-sentenced to life without parole. 6) the decision lacks future guidance. 7) the COMPAS and TAP were totally ignored. 8) the 24 month hold is excessive.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime (murder 2nd degree conviction, with a sentence of 20 years to life), the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not be given equal weight. Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017).

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Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime, the Board considered other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor considered. Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017).

Inmate's unwillingness to accept responsibility for violent crime is a sufficient basis for denying parole. Webb v Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 810 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dept. 2006), lv.den. 7 N.Y.3d 709, 822 N.Y.S.2d 483; Okafor v. Russi, 222 A.D.2d 920, 635 N.Y.S.2d 340 (3d Dept. 1995); Epps v Travis, 241 A.D.2d 738, 660 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1017 (3d Dept. 1997). The Board may emphasize the inmate's failure to take responsibility for the criminal offense. Cruz v Alexander, 67 A.D.3d 1240, 890 N.Y.S.2d 656 (3d Dept. 2009); Abdur-Raheem v New York State Board of Parole, 78 A.D.3d 1412, 911 N.Y.S.2d 257 (3d Dept. 2010); Khatib v New York State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014); Crawford v New York State Board of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016). The Court dismissed a challenge to parole denial based on an attempt to blame the victims. Matter of Marcelin v. Travis, 262 A.D.2d 836, 836, 693 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (3d Dept. 1999).

The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).

An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

Completion of the minimum term of the sentence still does not create any protected liberty interest. Motti v Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 1114, 1115 (3d Dept. 2008).

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Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. Duettel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria. Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).

The due process clause is not violated by the Board's balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).

A substantial/preponderance of the evidence issue arises only where a quasi-judicial hearing has been held and evidence has been taken pursuant to law. If no hearing was held, the issue does not arise. Horace v Annucci, 133 A.D.3d 1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). A proceeding to determine whether an inmate should be released on parole is not a quasi-judicial hearing. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018). So there are no evidence issues.

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Nothing in the Board's decision indicates a permanent denial of parole consideration. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(SDNY 2014).

Once an individual has been convicted of a crime, it is generally not the Board's role to reevaluate a claim of innocence. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Copeland v New York State Board of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 (3d Dept. 2017). The record does not support appellant's contention that the Board improperly took into account the inmate's decision to go to trial. Cody v Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv.den.8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698.

As for Appellant's complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. Matter of Francis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of

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Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff'd, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).

As for the TAP, Corrections Law 71-a and 112(4) have no guarantee of release upon an inmate's successful completion of programs. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(SDNY 2014).

The 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here. The 2011 amendments did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole, namely (1) whether “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law”; (2) whether release “is not incompatible with the welfare of society”; and (3) whether release “will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Here, the Board relied on the second and third standards in denying release. Even uniformly low COMPAS scores and other evidence of rehabilitation would not resolve the broader questions of society's welfare, public perceptions of the seriousness of a crime, or whether release would undermine respect for the law. Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result, and declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). The COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013).

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In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

The Board's decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the Board's discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).¹ Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months for discretionary release was excessive or improper.

Recommendation: Affirm.

¹ For interviews conducted before the 2017 amendments, the provision was found at 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3 (d) (2014)