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STATE OF NEW YORK -- BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Medina, R	uben	Facility:	Green Haven CF	e .
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	.11-035-18 B	
DIN:	05-A-2236				
Appearan	<u>es:</u>	Ruben Medina 05A22 Green Haven Correcti 594 State Route 216 Stormville, New York	ional Facility		
Decision a	appealed:	October 2018 decision months.	n, denying discr	etionary release and imposing a hold o	of 12
Board Me who partic		Davis, Demosthenes			
Papers cor	nsidered:	Appellant's Brief rece	eived March 11,	2019	
Appeals U	nit Review:	Statement of the Appe	eals Unit's Find	ings and Recommendation	
Records re	elied upon:			arole Board Report, Interview Transcri 19026), COMPAS instrument, Offend	
Final Dete		/		ecision appealed is hereby: r de novo interviewModified to	
Comm	issioner	Affirmed Vac	ated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to	
Comm	issioner issioner			r de novo interview Modified to	

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on $\frac{5/10/19}{66}$.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Medina, Ruben	DIN:	05-A-2236
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Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 12-month hold. Appellant's instant offense involved him shooting the victim to death. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board failed to provide facts in support of the statutory standard cited in the decision. 3) the decision lacked details. 4) as appellant was only 16 years old when he committed the instant offense, the Board failed to consider youth and its attendant circumstances when committing the crime, in violation of the 8th amendment of the Constitution.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. <u>Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision</u>, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Gordon v. Stanford</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

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The Board may consider an inmate's failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole. <u>See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); <u>Matter of Karlin v. Cully</u>, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).

The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument. <u>Matter of Bush v.</u> <u>Annucci</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); <u>Matter of Wade v. Stanford</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related crimes); <u>Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family support), <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).

That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." <u>Matter of Mullins</u> <u>v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); <u>accord Matter of Reed v. Evans</u>, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. <u>Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); <u>Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as "contrary to the best interest of the community").

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Little v. Travis</u>, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Matter of Davis v. Travis</u>, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); <u>People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. <u>Hodge v Griffin</u>, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing <u>Romer v Travis</u>, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. <u>Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714

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(3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. <u>Ward v City of Long Beach</u>, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. <u>Siao-Paul v. Connolly</u>, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); <u>Hanna v New York State</u> Board of Parole, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019).

The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board's determination was affected by a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. <u>Matter of Silmon v Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); <u>Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).

A review of the interview transcript reveals the Board questioned appellant very extensively about his age at the time of the crime, his lifestyle and problems at that time, and how he may or may not have changed. The Board decision also mentions his age at the time of the crime was considered. Thus, the Board complied with cases mandating these considerations, and the denial was proper. <u>Allen v Stanford</u>, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept. 2018). As for the Eighth Amendment, the denial of parole under a statute invoking discretion in parole determinations does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. <u>Lustgarden v Gunter</u>, 966 F.2d 552, 555, (10th Cir. 1992), <u>cert den.</u>506 U.S. 1008, 113 S.Ct. 624, <u>rehearing denied</u> 507 U.S. 955, 113 S.Ct. 1374; <u>Bressette v New York State Division</u> of Parole, 2 F.Supp.2d 383, 387 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). Nor has the Board in any way resentenced the appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole, as nothing in the Board's decision indicates a permanent denial of parole consideration. <u>Hodge v Griffin</u>, 2014 WL 2453333 (SDNY 2014).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant's contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 Amendments to the Executive Law is likewise without merit. Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented a fundamental change in the legal regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on forward-looking factors, this proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. The Board still must conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116

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A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014). Thus, even where the First Department has "take[n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]", it has nonetheless reiterated that "[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every factor equal weight" and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize "factors which emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors". <u>Matter of Rossakis v.</u> New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).

Recommendation: Affirm.