Legitimizing Lies

Courtney M. Cox

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ABSTRACT

Lies are everywhere today. This scourge of misinformation raises difficult questions about how the law can and should respond to falsehoods. Legal discourse has traditionally focused on the law’s choice between penalizing and tolerating lying. But this traditional framing vastly oversimplifies the law’s actual and potential responses. Using trade secrets as a case study, this Article shows that the law sometimes accepts lies as a legitimate option for fulfilling legal requirements and may even require lies in increasingly common circumstances.

Commonly supposed legal and moral commitments against lying do not undermine this reality. To the contrary, the Article reveals that the interplay between lying and the law is much more descriptively and normatively complex than the contemporary discourse generally acknowledges. And it provides support for the law remaining neutral with respect to the normative valence of lying at a time when the main argument favoring neutrality and against an anti-lying perspective—that the remedy for false speech is more speech—has been called into question.

Moreover, in legitimizing certain lies, the law takes lying seriously as a dual-use technology, one that can be put to good ends as well as bad. This raises important practical questions about how to lie, legally and morally, with implications in areas ranging from privacy to procedure to professional responsibility. Making this shift, from questions of justification—of when and whether lying is permitted—to questions of practicality, is increasingly urgent.

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in the shadow of mass surveillance. This Article does not answer all questions raised by law’s legitimization of lying, but by reframing the debate, it takes a critical step for clarifying the value of truth and the law’s role in promoting it.

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INTRODUCTION

Lies are everywhere today. Their pervasiveness has amplified traditional debates about how the law can and should respond to lies. Within these debates, it is received, if contested, wisdom that the law and commonsense morality disfavor lying, with permissible lies forming an uneasily tolerated exception. The doom scroll of lie-induced harms seems to reinforce this wisdom, underscoring the importance of ideals about truth. But this largely unexamined reflex carries with it a danger: we risk blinding ourselves to the depth and breadth of the law’s response to lying and the complexity of justice’s commitment to truth.

Legal scholars have long focused on law either penalizing or permitting lies, but the law takes other approaches to deception as well. In this Article, I show that the law also accepts lies in express satisfaction of legal requirements and likely requires lying in increasingly common situations. This phenomenon often passes without notice. Courts are discreet and may not call these acts lies. But a lie by any other name is two. And in accepting these acts (and mislabeling them), the law legitimizes lies.

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3 See 167 CONG. REC. S14 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell) (“Self-government, my colleagues, requires a shared commitment to the truth and a shared respect for the ground rules of our system.”); id. at S21 (statement of Sen. Cory Booker) (“The shame of this day is it is being aided and abetted by good Americans . . . who are surrendering to the passion of lies as opposed to standing up and speaking truth to power . . . .”); id. at S25 (statement of Sen. Robert Casey); id. at S25–26 (statement of Sen. Mitt Romney).

4 See infra Section II.B.

5 See, e.g., SolarCity Corp. v. Pure Solar Co., No. 16-cv-01814, 2016 WL 11019989, at *1, *4, *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2016); see also infra Section III.C.
Using trade secrets as a case study, I show how law legitimizes lying. Trade secret law provides a remedy for theft of a company’s confidential information—but only if a company has taken “reasonable precautions” to keep the information secret.6 Enter the lie: decoys, mislabeled scripts, phishing simulations, honeypots, obfuscation, misinformation, the $1.5 billion industry in “deception technology,” to name a few, are all deceptive precautions that straightforwardly satisfy this reasonable precaution requirement.7 What is more, if deception is really the “next big thing” in information security—as trade publications and even the Wall Street Journal recently declared8—then trade secret law will increasingly require such precautions as “reasonable precautions.”9 Other areas of law similarly focused on avoiding harm, such as negligence, may follow.

All of these precautions are deceptive practices, and many undeniably involve lies.10 They present falsehoods as true, in contexts where the audience is invited to rely on the representation made.11 This fits squarely within current philosophical analyses of lying.12 But these analyses have yet to gain recognition within the legal literature. Some scholarship—particularly commentary aimed at justifying stronger anti-lie prohibitions—focuses on a very narrow concept that excludes much of what the law counts as lies.13 Other scholars include within the concept of a lie not merely the description of the action, but also the value judgment that lying is wrong—which then makes it very difficult to talk about what exactly is wrong (or not) with lying.14 An important contribution of this Article is to bring recent philosophical work on lying to bear on the legal debate moving forward.15

In addition to denying that common deceptive precautions are lies, there are other ways of resisting my claim that trade secret law legitimizes lying and exploring them proves fruitful. “Reasonable pre-

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6 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 175, 180 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839.
7 See infra Section II.B.
8 Preston, supra note 1; accord Heidi Mitchell, Deceiving the Deceivers: A New Way to Combat Hackers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2020, at R2.
9 See infra Section II.B.4.
10 See infra Sections I.B, II.B.
11 See infra Sections I.B, II.B.
12 See infra Section I.B.
13 See infra Section I.B.
15 E.g., JENNIFER MATHER SAUL, LYING, MISLEADING, AND WHAT IS SAID (2012); THOMAS L. CARSON, LYING AND DECEPTION (2010).
“cautions” sets a floor, but not a ceiling, on the precautions that may be taken to protect a trade secret. Equity, criminal law, torts, and other doctrines and substantive laws not considered may provide such limits and create legal risk. Such limits are not categorical, but they are complicated. Far from undermining the analysis, such limitations raise further questions: if I am right, lawyers specializing in deceptive practices—deception specialists—will be needed, raising interesting tensions with the ethical rules that seem to preclude encouraging clients to lie.

This is not a niche curiosity. Trade secret law protects key information assets: data and algorithms. Meanwhile, digitization and remote work are eroding the effectiveness of facilities-based precautions, trends accelerated by the pandemic. But corporate secrets are not the only thing at stake: that data includes personal data and those algorithms can be manipulated. Trade secret decisions about “reasonable precautions” are harbingers of what is to come in other areas of the law, like negligence.

What are we to make, then, of the phenomenon of the law legitimizing lies? And particularly, what the phenomenon entails about the relationship between law and truth? Some scholars and many practitioners believe that a corollary of the law’s commitment to truth is a general disfavor or prohibition on lies and deception, as lies and deception are often thought to under-

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16 See infra Section II.C.

17 See infra Section II.C.


19 Daniel Markovits has begun upending common misconceptions about what these rules require. See generally DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (2008).

20 See infra Section II.A. For discussion of trade secrecy’s increasing importance (and dangers), see Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 1183 (2019); and Jeanne C. Fromer, Machines as the New Oompa-Loompas: Trade Secrecy, the Cloud, Machine Learning, and Automation, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 706 (2019).


mine truth.23 This corollary is somewhat controversial24 and perhaps unlawful,25 but it (or at least its normative version) is experiencing a renaissance.26 It comes down to defaults: Is the law’s default setting to disfavor lies and make exceptions by permitting certain ones? Or is the law generally neutral, despite its supposed commitment to truth, picking out certain lies and deceptions to police? Which is true as a descriptive matter, and which should be true as a normative one?

The trade secret case study presented here constitutes strong evidence that the neutral view provides the better descriptive picture, and that the neutral view may be more consistent with the commitment to truth than the anti-lie corollary. The case study also makes defending the corollary harder because ordinary morality cannot ground a legal objection to the law’s legitimizing lies. The moral status of the lies at issue are contested (as a descriptive, not normative, matter), dooming any “Argument from Morality” that the law cannot work this way.27

Challenging the Argument from Morality confirms the breadth of the claim—that law legitimizes lies—while providing a framework for further work. Trade secret law provides a natural starting point because a common exception to the rule against lying is for protective lies—lies that protect persons or property by keeping a secret.28 But interestingly, the exception for protective lies is not what defeats the Argument from Morality. And so my analysis’s implications extend beyond trade secrets and protective lies, to areas ranging from privacy to procedure to professional responsibility—to name only a few. Mapping this ethical terrain provides a framework for further work in these other areas of law.

These two strikes against the anti-lie corollary come at a time when rampant misinformation threatens the primary argument against the anti-lie corollary—that the best remedy for false speech is more

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23 See infra Section III.A.
25 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“Absent from those few categories where the law allows content-based regulation of speech is any general exception to the First Amendment for false statements.”).
27 See infra Section III.B.
28 See infra Section III.B.2.
speech. 29 But my case against the Argument from Morality is a descriptive one, about what ordinary morality holds and whether it can affect the law. We may still have normative concerns about whether, despite what ordinary morality suggests, the law should legitimize lying in this manner. 30 I do not minimize these concerns, and I believe that those who do err.

But the law has a solution: it can lie. Unlike others, I entertain the possibility that the law’s deception on this score is a feature, not a bug. 31 And so I do not believe that the ultimate question—whether law should legitimize lying—is the next or even most important question to ask.

The next questions instead concern how to lie as legally and ethically as possible, if possible. The case study illustrates that lying is not special. It is like other dual-use technologies—tools that can be used either responsibly or illicitly, for good ends or bad. 32 The important question for lying, as with all dual-use technologies, is how it is used and whether such uses can be managed. Only then can we answer the ultimate question of whether and when the law should legitimize lies, and whether it should do so openly.

This Article thus represents a sharp break, on multiple dimensions, from trends in the growing body of literature on the law of lies and deception. That literature generally focuses on whether and how the law can (or should) penalize lying, or else permit it. 33 These questions have always been relevant in diverse areas from commercial law to procedural issues to criminal prosecution. 34 And these questions are of increasing importance and urgency as the problems of misinformation and fake news loom paramount. 35 But, as I argue here, there is

29 See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 727 (“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.”).
30 See infra Section III.C.
31 See infra Section III.C.
32 See Herbert Lin, Governance of Information Technology and Cyber Weapons, in GOVERNANCE OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES (Elisa D. Harris et al. eds., 2016) 112, 112–13 (defining dual-use technology as “technology intended for beneficial purposes that can also be misused for harmful purposes”).
33 See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59 (2018); Cass R. Sunstein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387, 390 (2020); Shiffer, supra note 26; see also infra Section I.A.
34 See infra notes 48–62.
another way to think about them, and it does not begin by assuming (or trying to justify the view) that lying is bad.

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I canvasses the literature’s traditional framing of the law’s response to lying, and then offers conceptual clarity about what a lie is, correcting common errors in the literature. Armed with this background, Part II turns to the Article’s central case study: trade secrets. Part II shows how this increasingly important body of law accepts lies as a legitimate option for fulfilling its reasonable precaution requirement, and how it might require lying under increasingly common circumstances. Part III turns to various strategies for resisting this account, including the Argument from Morality and the objection that these are not really lies, among others. Finally, Part IV builds from the case study in Part II and the analysis of Part III to explain the normative and ethical implications moving forward.

Developing a positive, pragmatic theory of lies and deception in the law is growing increasingly urgent. Recent events and the scourge of online misinformation demonstrate, palpably, lying’s dangers and the difficulty of controlling deceptions.36 Meanwhile, lying is fast becoming one of the best—and possibly only—ways to defend against cyberthreats37 and to preserve autonomy in the shadow of mass surveillance.38 This Article does not answer all of the questions these dilemmas raise, but it takes a critical step by showing the full breadth of what constitutes lying and exploring the breadth and depth of the law’s response.

I. ON THE SUPPOSED PROHIBITION AGAINST LYING

There is much disagreement about lying, but most agree that lying is generally wrong even if most (regrettably) lie. The traditional legal debates over the relationship between the law and lying focus on the scope of that prohibition, and so on issues of punishment, tolerance, and justification.

There is also much disagreement about what lying is, though it often goes unstated. As a result, the legal literature has often missed developments in the philosophical literature that clarify the concept of lying in important ways.

To appreciate how the law’s response to lying is both broader and deeper than typically assumed, we need to appreciate the focus of the

36 See infra Section III.A.
37 See infra Section II.B.
38 See infra Section IV.B.
existing debate about the law’s response, and we need to get clear about what lying is—what actions, specifically, are we concerned with? In Section I.A, I describe the traditional debates. In Section I.B, I discuss the definition of lying and how it compares to deception.

A. The Law of Lying

There is general agreement within both ordinary and philosophical morality that lying is wrong, at least in a majority of central cases. But there is much less agreement about why, and the circumstances where lying is permitted (if any).

Some situate the wrong of lying within a generally consequentialist (or utilitarian) framework, focusing on the bad consequences that result. These views are generally more permissive of lying because the wrong of a lie is contingent on the harm that might result.

Other theorists follow a nonconsequentialist approach, arguing, for example, that the wrong of a lie is that it is an affront to human autonomy, agency, or dignity. These views are generally less permissive, though some define “lie” more narrowly so as to not count permissible lies as lies. Immanuel Kant is probably the most famous for this approach, and many take his view to be that lying is wrong because it uses another person—and, specifically, her reason—as mere means.


40 “Consequentialism” refers to moral theories that evaluate acts (or rules) based on the consequences. Consequentialism must be paired with a theory of the good—a theory about what consequences are good or bad. Within philosophical literature, “utilitarianism” refers to the combination of consequentialism with “welfarism,” the view that an outcome’s goodness depends solely on the well-being of individuals. The legal literature sometimes uses “utilitarianism” in the narrower, philosophical sense, but often uses the term interchangeably with “consequentialism,” assuming them the same. See Kagan, supra note 39, at 59–69.


42 See, e.g., Sidgwick, supra note 41, at 485–92.


45 See Korsgaard, supra note 43, at 331.
Still others have attempted to reconcile these two approaches. In addition, there is a sense in which all lying is necessarily an affront to the truth, because it breaks many of the linguistic rules that make conversation possible. Common to all these accounts is a general anti-lying attitude, and any plausible account of lying will need to account for this discomfort with lying or else explain why such discomfort is misplaced.

Legal debates concerning lying generally fall into these same paradigms. Some, like Saul Levmore and Richard Posner, have advanced a cost-benefit view of the law’s decision to penalize or permit lying, both as a general matter and in specific contexts like contracts, marketing, and undercover reporting. As with the philosophical debates, this broadly consequentialist approach is more permissive of lying than alternatives—and occasionally skeptical of a categorical prohibition. By contrast, others, like Aditi Bagchi, have offered non-consequentialist accounts which draw narrow exceptions to the prohibition, often limited to cases where lying serves as a defense against wrongdoing or is justified by background injustice. Still others walk the line between these approaches, seeking to articulate a more unified description of the varied moral norms animating the law’s decision to penalize (or permit) lying and deception in given cases.

More so than the philosophical debate, the legal debate tends to address specific contexts in which lying and deception occur, rather than as a unified theory across different substantive areas. This is

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46 See, e.g., MacIntyre, supra note 41, at 316.
47 See id. at 311–12 (“To assert is always and inescapably to assert as true . . . . [Some have] suggested that ‘the utterance of a falsehood is really a breach of a semantic rule’ . . . .” (quoting Erik Stenius, Mood and Language Games, 17 SYNTHèSE 254, 269 (1967))).
48 Levmore, Theory of Deception, supra note 18, at 1369 & n.41; see generally Porat & Yadlin, supra note 24.
51 See Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351–52 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Levmore, Judging Deception, supra note 18, at 1781–90.
53 See, e.g., STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING (2006). Green describes himself as adopting a “primarily non-consequentialist, or deontological” approach to wrongfulness, id. at 39, but adopts harmfulness as a limiting principle for applying the moral norms governing lying and deception to criminal law. Id. at 44–45.
54 See generally, e.g., id. (criminal law); Hoffman, supra note 50 (marketing); HASDAY, supra note 26 (family relationships); Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161 (1999) (sexual privacy); Irina D. Manta, Tinder Lies, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 207 (2019)
perhaps not surprising, given the looming specter of the First Amendment and how its application varies with context.\textsuperscript{55} The most comprehensive treatment to date is that of Seana Shiffrin, who advances a “qualified [moral] absolutism about lying” in the nonconsequentialist tradition and argues for stronger legal regulation of lying than traditionally thought possible or prudent.\textsuperscript{56}

Whatever the strengths or implications of these varying views, common to all of them is a generally prohibitive outlook that focuses on the line between lies that are prohibited (and so penalized) versus those that are permitted (and so not penalized). This is, perhaps, not surprising. The law is customarily viewed as embodying, or at least aspiring to, a commitment to truth.\textsuperscript{57} Misrepresentations are barred by the rules of professional conduct and can provide the basis for civil liability;\textsuperscript{58} criminal offenses involving fraud are the “most frequently charged” and “most widely and variously codified.”\textsuperscript{59} Even where the law might be said to “welcome[] deception,” as with police interrogation tactics and other prosecutorial deception, it is often “not officially sanctioned” but condoned through “indifference”\textsuperscript{60}—and perhaps uneasily so. And those lies that escape penalty are typically recast or reframed as something else, like “mere puffery.”\textsuperscript{61} In other words, permissive lies are generally treated as the exception rather than the rule, some as true exceptions (i.e., justified), some by definitional exclusion, and some escaping penalty because of the law’s limitations (especially First Amendment limitations).\textsuperscript{62}

Recent events suggest this seeming default is not without reason. Theranos, a startup with a purportedly “cutting-edge blood-testing
system,” catapulted to unicorn status—a startup valued at over $1 billion—by misrepresenting a key fact about its proprietary blood-testing technology; namely, that the technology did not exist.63 Worse still, Theranos defended its deceptive practices by crying “trade secrets.”64 John Carreyrou’s chronicle of Theranos’s rise and fall reads like a case study of the numerous ways in which lies and deception cause harm:65

There are the obvious direct and indirect harms from false beliefs in the reliability of Theranos’ technology, not only to investors and business partners, but also, more devastatingly, to patients.66 There is the blatant use of others as mere means. And there is the undermining of trust among employees. Carreyrou even suggests that the Theranos scandal arose from a culture that rewarded deceptions: though taken to extremes, Theranos followed Silicon Valley’s “vaporware” playbook—the practice of securing investments for “already” developed software and hardware innovations that would “take years to materialize, if . . . at all.”67

When one adds the pervasive and detrimental effects of fake news and misinformation on social media, from politicians, and within the news itself—and the new dangers presented by sophisticated deep fake technologies that enable every ill from involuntary porn to sophisticated forgeries—it is easy to fear the sky is falling.68 Not surprisingly, much recent work argues for stronger prohibitions on lying.69

64 Id. at 284.
65 See infra Part III.
66 See Carreyrou, supra note 63, at 283–85; see also, e.g., Michael Segal, Does Theranos Mark the Peak of the Silicon Valley Bubble?, NAUTILUS (May 31, 2018), http://nautil.us/issue/60/searches/does-theranos-mark-the-peak-of-the-silicon-valley-bubble [https://perma.cc/JPN9-Z7DX]. Former officers of Theranos, Elizabeth Holmes and Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani, were charged with numerous counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349. See generally Third Superseding Indictment, United States v. Holmes, No. 18-cr-00258 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2020). Holmes was convicted of three counts of wire fraud and a related conspiracy account against investors; a mistrial was declared as to three additional counts of wire fraud against investors and she was acquitted on the remaining patient-related charges. See Final Verdict Form, Holmes, No. 18-cr-00258 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2022); Minute Order, Holmes, No. 18-cr-00258 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2022); see also Order, Holmes, No.18-cr-00258 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2022) (setting sentencing for September 2022). At the time of writing, charges against Balwani remain pending, with trial continued until March 2022 owing to the ongoing pandemic. Stipulation and Order Regarding Trial Schedule, United States v. Balwani, No. 18-cr-00258 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2022).
67 Carreyrou, supra note 63, at 296; see also infra Section III.C.
68 See Chesney & Citron, supra note 35.
69 See generally Shiffrin, supra note 26; Hoffman, supra note 50; Hasday, supra note 26; Manta, supra note 54.
But all this attention to the line between penalizing and permitting, between wrong lies and exceptions, overlooks the breadth and depth of the law’s potential responses. We will return to that question in Part II after getting some conceptual clarity about what a lie is.

B. What Is a Lie?

To see that law can legitimize lies, we first need to get clear about what lying is—what actions, specifically, are we concerned with? Although most everyone has a general understanding of what a lie is, philosophical and now legal consensus has been notoriously elusive about which actions, specifically, are included. And as is probably obvious, which practices “count” will affect our understanding of the law’s relationship to lies.

Some analyses limit the concept of “lies” or “misrepresentations” to intentionally false statements or assertions. These analyses exclude omissions, merely misleading statements (i.e., true but misleading statements, like half-truths), and conduct. There are various reasons for limiting the analysis in this way. For example, Jennifer Saul excludes omissions, merely misleading statements, and conduct because her project focuses on the lying-misleading distinction in “what is said” and whether it matters morally. And Seana Shiffrin excludes conduct to avoid difficult questions about whether one may assert through conduct (as by making a face) and whether one may lie without making an assertion (as where sports players grimace as if in pain to get the opposing team penalized).

By contrast, some theorists and practitioners adopt a broader view. For example, some expand the definition of lying to include omissions and statements that mislead (even if not strictly false). This is the approach taken by Black’s Law Dictionary in defining the related term “misrepresentation”:

**Misrepresentation.** “[t]he act or an instance of making a false or misleading assertion about something, usu[ally] with the intent to deceive,” including “not just written or spoken

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70 See, e.g., Saul, supra note 15, at 1; Kagan, supra note 39, at 113. The question of what “counts” as a lie differs from two related legal questions: (1) what practices the law of deception regulates and (2) how the relevant laws identify those practices. See Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause, supra note 56, at 452-69 (identifying and describing three dominant approaches). These questions are related, but distinct—the law may not regulate all acts that “count” as lies.  

71 E.g., Saul, supra note 15, at 1–20; Shiffrin, supra note 26, at 12 n.13.  

72 See Saul, supra note 15, at 1, 3 n.7.  

73 See Shiffrin, supra note 26, at 12 n.13.
words but also any other conduct that amounts to a false assertion."\textsuperscript{74}

These broader views have the advantage of capturing relevant conduct that those debating the regulation of lies care about. For example, consider President Clinton’s infamous denial of his affair with Monica Lewinsky, stating “[t]here is no improper relationship” (omitting the qualifier “at present”),\textsuperscript{75} trademark law, which creates liability for the misleading use of marks and product appearance (trade dress);\textsuperscript{76} and sumptuary laws, which once penalized people who “silently, but directly, lied” about their class by “dressing above their station.”\textsuperscript{77} The broader view counts this behavior. Unfortunately, it does so by collapsing what many believe to be important distinctions between “direct lies” and “merely misleading.”\textsuperscript{78}

This Article carves something of a middle path and focuses on what I call “deceptive practices.” Deceptive practices present or imply falsehoods. Unlike the limited view of “lies,” deceptive practices include misleading assertions, omissions, and conduct. This focus is consistent with the broader view of “misrepresentation” generally taken by the law.\textsuperscript{79} I will use the term “affirmative misrepresentation” to refer to the narrow category of intentionally false statements or assertions. I will use “lie” in a more colloquial sense, where its meaning is clear and unlikely to cause confusion, for ease of exposition. Using these terms (1) sidesteps the debate about whether the broader category are also “lies” in a meaningful sense, (2) avoids confusion with the narrower understanding, and (3) allows us to make the distinction between lies and mere misleading that a broader definition of lies would otherwise collapse. In what follows, I describe these concepts in

\textsuperscript{74} Misrepresentation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

\textsuperscript{75} Saul, supra note 15, at vii (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{76} See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a); see also A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).

\textsuperscript{77} Dan Ariely, The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty 120–21 (2012) (called into doubt on other grounds as described in, for example, Tom Bartlett, A Dishonest Study on Dishonesty Puts Prominent Researcher on the Hot Seat, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 17, 2021, at 8); see also Peter Goodrich, Signs Taken for Wonders: Community, Identity, and A History of Sumptuary Law, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 707, 717–19 (1998) (reviewing Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law (1996)). In addition to penalizing such misrepresentations, sumptuary laws also sought to impose moral order of various sorts, from penalizing idolatry and excessive consumption to “instituting an ‘imagined social order’” that grounded such misrepresentations. Goodrich, supra, at 713–15, 722.

\textsuperscript{78} Saul, supra note 15, at vii; see infra Section III.B.5.

\textsuperscript{79} Misrepresentation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 74.
greater detail, and distinguish them from the related concept of deception.

1. Deceptive Practices, Deception, and Lies

The distinguishing feature of deceptive practices is how they operate: deceptive practices (or at least those with which we are concerned) present or imply falsehoods. “Falsehood” here has its standard meaning of an untrue statement or proposition.80 This broad definition of “deceptive practices” is consistent with the conduct described by the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “misrepresentation.”81

A deceptive practice deceives—that is, the deception is “successful”—where it causes the target of that practice to have a false belief.82 Lies present a clear example of deceptive practices: When Dave lies to Gina, he says something false but pretends that it is true. When Gina comes to believe what Dave says is true—when Gina comes to have a false belief—the deception succeeds.

Not all deceptive practices aim at deception, just as not all lies are intended to impart a false belief. A witness may lie on the stand to avoid repercussions from the mob boss; he might not intend to deceive and may even hope that he does not.83

The deceptive practices to which we will turn in Part II all aim at preventing the target of the deceptive practice from learning the content of a trade secret.84 That is, these practices seek to deny the target a true belief in the content of the trade secret. This means that there is an important distinction between a successful deception, just discussed, and a successful deceptive practice. A deception is successful when it causes the target to believe the intended falsehood. By contrast, a deceptive practice is successful when it achieves its goal of denying the relevant true belief. For example, information dumps—the “deliberate[] mixing [of] critical documents with masses of other documents to hide their existence or obscure their significance”—are a deceptive practice whose success does not depend on the success of the

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81 Misrepresentation, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 74.
82 See, e.g., Carson, supra note 15, at 46; Sidgwick, supra note 41, at 317; see also Saul, supra note 15, at 75–76; infra note 84.
84 Many definitional accounts of “deception” include a success requirement, that a “deception” must successfully lead its target to believe a falsehood. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 15, at 3; Saul, supra note 15, at 71. By contrast, common definitions of “lying” do not include a success requirement. “My dog ate my homework” is a lie, even if not believed.
deception. Of course, the most interesting deceptive practices will be deceptive practices that make use of a successful deception, but, strictly speaking, a successful deception is not necessary for the deceptive practice to achieve its goal.

Different deceptive practices have different types of “targets” (or audiences). The most common have direct intentional targets, as with the example of a lie told to a particular person. But there may be both direct and indirect intentional targets, as where a lie is told to Gina in the hopes that she will report it to Kei. And there may be collateral targets—targets who are not intended, but hear the lie anyway, as where a lie aimed at one person is broadcast to many listeners. There may also be unknown targets, as in the case of a mislabeled door, aimed at those who are looking for what is hidden behind the door (whoever those people turn out to be). Many deceptive precautions have multiple types of targets: the mislabeled door may have both known and unknown intentional targets (those who seek what is hidden) as well as known and unknown collateral targets (anyone else who passes by).

Finally, the concept of deceptive practices, as used here, does not include a moral (or legal) judgment about whether the practice is wrong or improper. Good philosophical practice usually requires identifying a practice before analyzing the question of whether all or only some instances of that practice (if any) are wrong or improper. This differs from the approach sometimes adopted in the legal literature, which then, as a result, struggles to articulate the distinction between lies that are wrong and those that might be permissible.

2. A Word on Warranting and Other Requirements

Our definition roughly tracks contemporary analyses of lying, which have corrected various mistakes in traditional definitions. Most of the standard definitions of lying, traditional and contemporary, include at least three requirements:

1. the liar states that P;

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85 See In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 351, 363 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (noting procedural rules were amended to curb this practice). Information dumps succeed where the target does not form a true belief as to which document is critical, and do not depend on the target forming a false belief that a particular document is not critical.

86 A successful deception is also not necessary for a deceptive practice to be morally wrong. See Carson, supra note 15, at 21.

87 E.g., Klass, supra note 14, at 711, 731–36 (focusing on “deception,” defined as “an act or omission that wrongfully causes a false belief in another” (emphasis added)).

88 See generally, e.g., Saul, supra note 15; Carson, supra note 15.
(2) the liar believes P is false or is probably false; and
(3) the liar takes themselves to be in a “warranting context”—a context in which the liar presents P as true (as opposed to, e.g., the theatre).89

Our definition of “deceptive practices,” as discussed supra, expands the first requirement to include not just statements, but other non-statement means of communicating P, like conduct. Our definition also takes as implicit the second requirement—that the purveyor of the deceptive practice believes P is false or is probably false—to avoid complications about whose beliefs count for this purpose (when it is, e.g., a company undertaking the deceptive practice). Instead, our definition requires that P actually be false. In this way, our definition is perhaps overinclusive; for example, our definition includes “bullshit,” where the speaker does not know or care whether P is true or false.90 But in other ways, our definition might be underinclusive, as there are good reasons to think that a person lies even if they are mistaken about whether P is false.91 The overinclusiveness is consistent with the broader focus taken by the article—bullshit is certainly a type of deceptive practice even if it is not, strictly speaking, a lie.92 The underinclusiveness is also fine for our purposes: the main examples with which we are concerned include at least one falsehood.

The warranting requirement—the third requirement, supra—merits further consideration. Our definition uses the phrase “presents.” This is roughly correct, but it does not clearly exclude creative expression not normally counted as “lies” (e.g., theatre). Most philosophical analyses seek to exclude such fictional or figurative devices and do so either by express exclusion93 or through a warranting requirement.94 For example, philosopher Thomas Carson describes

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89 E.g., SAUL, supra note 15, at 3 (“If the speaker is not the victim of linguistic error/malapropism or using metaphor, hyperbole, or irony, then they lie if (1) they say that P; (2) they believe P to be false; (3) they take themself to be in a warranting context.” (footnote omitted)); see also, e.g., CARSON, supra note 15, at 30, 39; Andreas Stokke, Lying and Asserting, 110 J. PHIL. 33, 46–54 (2013).

90 See generally HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005).

91 See SAUL, supra note 15, at 6.


93 E.g., SAUL, supra note 15.

94 E.g., CARSON, supra note 15; Stokke, supra note 89, at 55.
“warranting” as an “invitation” to rely upon what is said, which actors arguably do not.95

I use the weaker “presents” for two reasons. First, something like theatre could be used as a deceptive precaution, and so it is appropriate for our purposes that it be counted or at least, ambiguously included. And second, although Carson emphasizes that the invitation is not a promise and need not be sincerely offered, it would be easy to confuse an invitation to rely with inducing reliance. But reliance is not part of the standard analytic definition of lying—a student lies when he says the dog ate his homework, even though he is not believed—even if reliance is an important element of certain lying-related legal causes of action (e.g., common-law deceit)96 and even if reliance is central to one of lying’s main harms.97 To avoid this confusion, I offer the weaker “presents,” with the consequence that my definition does not clearly rule out certain kinds of figurative speech.

The warranting requirement is really a modification of the intent requirement once believed “essential” to the definition of lying.98 The intent requirement was usually conceived of as an intent to deceive, i.e., to impart a false belief to the listener.99 Recent philosophical scholarship has shown the intent requirement is unnecessary as a conceptual matter,100 though it may have moral significance.101 But while

97 See, e.g., id. at 1011.
98 E.g., FRANKFURT, supra note 90, at 8; ARNOLD ISENBERG, Deontology and the Ethics of Lying, in SELECTED ESSAYS OF ARNOLD ISENBERG 245, 249 (1973); see also, e.g., L. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 366–68 (1930) (denying that “legal fictions” are lies because such fictions are “not intended to deceive”).
99 Stokke, supra note 89, at 33.
100 Id. (discussing literature). It is not entirely clear whether Shiffrin means to adopt this requirement. In place of (3), Shiffrin uses the following: “A intentionally presents P in a manner or context that objectively manifests A’s intention that B is to take and treat P as an accurate representation of A’s belief.” SHIFFRIN, supra note 26, at 12. This suggests that “[a] lie involves the assertion by a speaker of a proposition she does not believe but offers in a context in which it is to be taken as true (or, at least, as believed by her)).
101 For example, intent to deceive has moral significance on deontological accounts that situate the wrong of a lie in the use of others as mere means. Shiffrin’s account is somewhat confusing on this score: she does not situate the wrong of the lie in deception, believing these to be distinct wrongs, and so it would not seem necessary to her argument that lies require intent. Her later work appears to relax this requirement. Cf. Seana Shiffrin, Learning About Deception from Lawyers, 93 ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 69 (2019) (arguing morally significant deception includes certain unintentional deceptions); id. at 71 (omitting intent requirement in stating that “[a] lie involves the assertion by a speaker of a proposition she does not believe but offers in a context in which it is to be taken as true (or, at least, as believed by her)”).
intent to deceive may matter morally, that is a question of the line between permissible and impermissible lies, and not of the line between lies and not-lies.

3. A Right to Know

Finally, some theorists add the requirement that the target has the right to know P (or the truth value of P, or what P is meant to hide). That is, these theorists maintain that, in addition to the three requirements identified above, a misrepresentation as to P is a lie if and only if the lie’s target has a right to know P. By contrast, our definition does not include a requirement that the target has the right to know P (or the truth value of P, or what P is meant to hide). The right-to-know definitions are thus narrower than ours because they exclude some practices that ours would capture.

Theorists who use the narrower definitions often advocate stringent—even absolute—prohibitions on lying. A narrow definition makes this easier by excluding what others would call permissive lies. Rather than say such lies are permitted, the narrower definition denies that they are lies. But this begs the question of such lies’ normative status, especially in our case where our focus is on lies that aim to protect information that others arguably do not have the right to know.

II. How Law Legitimates Lies: A Case Study

With a clearer understanding of the nature of lies, we can turn to the relationship between deceptive practices and the law. Both law and commonsense morality have been characterized as exhibiting a general disfavor toward lying, with permissible lies forming the exception. It is not surprising, then, that the literature has focused on the extent to which the law should penalize lying, and where the law might tolerate lying (by not penalizing it), whether for reasons of administrability, the First Amendment, or because such lies are not wor-


103 See Carson, supra note 15, at 18–19 (discussing strategy and how it fails).

104 The exception may swallow the rule. E.g., Manta, supra note 54; see also, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
thy of punishment. Some have already argued or observed that, by declining to punish or by tolerating lying, the law might incentivize lying. But even this view simplifies the law’s response to permitted lies.

The law goes further still. The law does not merely permit or penalize lies. The law also legitimizes lies: the law treats lies as a legitimate option for satisfying legal requirements and, in some cases, as the only option for satisfying those requirements. While the literature focuses on the line between the first two responses, permit or penalize, this Article now turns to circumstances where law legitimizes lying.

A natural starting point to understand the breadth of law’s relationship with lying, and the depth of its permission, is with the law governing secrets: the law of trade secrets. As Section II.A explains, trade secret law provides a remedy for misappropriation of confidential information, but only if a company took “reasonable precautions” to keep the information secret (the “reasonable precaution requirement” or “RPR”).

Section II.B shows how deceptive precautions straightforwardly satisfy this legal requirement. The use of such precautions has a long history and an even brighter future with the rapidly expanding market for “deception technology.” Litigants have begun relying on these precautions to satisfy the RPR, and courts have recognized the value of such precautions. As these precautions become best practices, the law might even treat them as mandatory for securing legal relief—that is, the law might require lying.

This is not to say that this legitimization lacks limits. As Section II.C explains, the RPR creates a floor, but not a ceiling. A tangled web of other substantive areas of law opens a company to risk of sanctions or liability for harms caused by deception. But these limits are

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105 See supra Part I.
106 See Simon-Kerr, supra note 60, at 2181; see also Levmore, Judging Deception, supra note 18, at 1780–81.
108 See infra Section II.A.
109 See infra Sections II.B.1–2.
110 See infra Section II.B.3.
111 See infra Section II.B.4.
not categorical, and so do not undermine the fact that the law legitimizes lies.

At the outset, I emphasize that my claim is limited. I do not argue that all deceptive precautions satisfy the reasonable precaution requirement, but rather that a significant set of deceptive precautions could. Even so, as I explain in Section II.D, this limited conclusion is itself remarkable: what the trade secret case study reveals is not merely an instance of the law condoning or tolerating lying, but affirmatively and expressly treating lying as a legitimate option by providing legal relief in virtue of having taken such measures.\textsuperscript{112}

A. Trade Secrets and the Reasonable Precaution Requirement

Trade secret law protects commercial secrets—like the recipe for Coca-Cola or Google’s search algorithm—against misappropriation. As explained in Section II.A.1, trade secret law protects a broad range of commercially valuable information and is of increasing importance in the information economy.\textsuperscript{113}

Because it protects informational assets, but only against misappropriation (e.g., procurement by fraud), there are two dominant views of trade secret law: as intellectual property, and as the codification of commercial ethics.

But as explained in Section II.A.2, whichever view is correct, trade secret law only helps those who help themselves by keeping their confidential information secret. This requirement, known as the “reasonable precaution requirement” (“RPR”), provides the hook for our case study. It is common across all sources of trade secret law—state common law, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”),\textsuperscript{114} and federal statutes.\textsuperscript{115}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} Cf. Levmore, \textit{Theory of Deception}, supra note 18, at 1362–74 (building theory of tolerated deception).
\item \textsuperscript{114} \textit{Unif. Trade Secrets Act} (UTSA) § 1(4)(ii) (Unif. L. Comm’n 1985).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
1. Trade Secrets

A trade secret is “confidential information which is not disclosed in the normal process of exploitation.”116 Virtually anything can be protected as a trade secret, provided it can be kept secret: recipes, source code, algorithms, cell lines, client lists, business methods, manufacturing processes, sales numbers, and market research.117 Trade secrecy is also recursive: the very precautions that protect trade secrets can constitute trade secrets.118 Coca-Cola’s recipe and Google’s search algorithm are famous examples, as are some of the measures for protecting them.

Although the subject matter of trade secrets is virtually limitless, the requirement of confidentiality—of secrecy—is paramount. Such secrecy need not be absolute.119 But information is not a trade secret if it is generally known within the relevant industry,120 or if a company failed to take reasonable precautions to preserve its secrecy.121

Trade secret law, unlike other forms of intellectual property, only protects against misappropriation. “Misappropriation” means unauthorized disclosure of the secret;122 unauthorized use of the secret;123 or improper acquisition of the secret in violation of accepted norms of commercial ethics and corporate diligence (whatever and however un-

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119 See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn. 1983).


121 See infra Section II.A.2.

122 See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475–76.

123 See id.; see also Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 728 F.2d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 1982).
der theorized those norms may be). By way of example, improper acquisition includes not only procurement by fraud, but also extreme forms of corporate diligence, like aerial photography. Trade secrets are not protected against reverse-engineering or independent development (unlike patents). And trade secrets are not protected against mere copying (unlike copyrighted works).

Trade secret law has long occupied an uneasy position in the pantheon of intellectual property and unfair competition law. Trade secret law, like other forms of intellectual property, protects an information asset. But, unlike other forms of intellectual property, trade secret law only protects that asset against misappropriation. Accordingly, there are two dominant theories of trade secret law: one which characterizes trade secrets as intellectual property, and one which theorizes trade secret law as a form of unfair competition, and specifically, as the codification of commercial ethics.

However these competing views are reconciled (or not), trade secret law is an increasingly important part of modern commercial law for two reasons: subject matter coverage, and improved enforcement options.

First, trade secret subject matter is well-suited to twenty-first century needs. In addition to providing a cheaper and longer-lasting alternative to patents, trade secret protection is available for a broader range of commercially valuable information. This expansive subject matter is critical in the information economy: algorithms, data, source code, and business methods are not reliably covered by patents or copyright, and recent Supreme Court precedent has further eroded what protection had been available. By contrast, trade secret law

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124 See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970).
125 See, e.g., Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623, 630 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding improper acquisition where defendants feigned interest in buying plaintiffs’ business).
126 E.g., E.I. DuPont, 431 F.2d at 1017 (holding aerial photography of construction site constituted misappropriation).
128 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting lack of registration and expiration). For some types of information assets, trade secrets may provide an effective complement to patents. See Katyal, supra note 20, at 1225–26 (collecting literature).
130 See id. For illuminating discussions of multiple drivers behind the trend toward trade secrecy, see especially Fromer, supra note 20, at 717–26 (describing technological drivers); and
lacks substantive limits on protectable subject matter, and so can protect these information assets.

Second, two shifts in dispute resolution have made trade secrets easier to enforce. The Defend Trade Secrets Act ("DTSA"),131 enacted in 2016, created a federal civil cause of action with powerful remedies, including ex parte seizure of materials containing secrets (like hard drives or laptops).132 And courts increasingly enforce arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act,133 ensuring access to a confidential forum (if desired).134 Unsurprisingly, trade secret litigation has “exploded” in recent years.135

2. The Reasonable Precaution Requirement

Trade secret law does not help those who fail to help themselves: “One who possesses a trade secret and wishes to protect it must act to preserve its secrecy.”136 This element of a trade secret claim is known as the “reasonable precautions requirement” or RPR.137 Common precautions include physical and technological limits on access; notifying employees and collaborators of the need to protect confidential information; and imposing contractual limits on employment and disclosure.138

Katyal, supra note 20, at 1192–236, (providing historical overview of shifting intellectual property coverage for source code and describing trade secrecy “as default and destination”).

137 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); Unif. Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) § 1(4)(ii) (Unif. L. Comm’n 1985); Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1939); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 (Am. L. Inst. 1995) (important factor). The requirement is also called the “reasonable secrecy precautions” requirement or “RSP requirement.” Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation and the Requirement of Reasonable Secrecy Precautions, in The Law and Theory of Trade Secrecy Precautions 46, 46 ( Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011), and the “reasonable efforts requirement,” Rowe, supra note 115, at 2, 5.
138 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Thomson Reuters, Corporate Counsel’s Guide to Protecting Trade Secrets § 2 (2021) [hereinafter GUIDE TO PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS] (discussing trade secret protection).
Although putative secrets will not receive protection if disclosed unconditionally, the RPR does not require absolute security or secrecy. And with good reason: trade secret law aims, in part, at reducing overinvestment in security while encouraging limited disclosure that benefits innovation (e.g., joint ventures). All that is required for trade secret protection is that a company make reasonable efforts.

Like most tests for "reasonableness," whether a particular set of precautions satisfies the RPR is a case-by-case factual inquiry that, except "in . . . extreme case[s]," cannot be determined as a matter of law. The dominant approach, articulated by Judge Posner in *Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc.*, is a cost-benefit approach: whether a particular set of precautions is reasonable "depends on a balancing of costs and benefits that will vary from case to case." Such costs include both the direct cost of guns, guards, and gates—security's "sticker price"—and indirect costs, like "[in]convenience, employee cooperation, [and] disruption." These costs must then be evaluated in light of the protection actually afforded (some secrets are easier to keep) and the secret's value. In short, there is no "bright line test for determining when an owner has made a reasonable effort."

Because whether precautions are reasonable "depends on the circumstances of each case," courts rarely find that a particular precaution was required and instead look to the totality of precautions taken. But there are exceptions. Nondisclosure agreements have become al-

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139 Peterson, supra note 116, at 432–33 & nn.387–88 ("[T]he surest way to lose a trade secret is to generally disclose it without an express or implied obligation of confidentiality.") (collecting cases).

140 See USM Corp., 393 N.E.2d at 900 (collecting cases); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970).


142 See E.I. DuPont, 431 F.2d at 1017; Rockwell, 925 F.2d at 178; USM Corp., 393 N.E.2d at 901.

143 Rockwell, 925 F.2d at 179–80; accord Niemii v. NHK Spring Co., 543 F.3d 294, 301 (6th Cir. 2008).

144 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991).

145 Id. at 179–80.

146 GUIDE TO PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, supra note 138, § 2.12.


most mandatory. Similarly, failure to take either industry-standard precautions or basic precautions that are necessary under the circumstances will generally prove fatal to a trade secret claim.

The role of the RPR has recently been the subject of some disagreement, but Judge Posner’s decision in Rockwell canvasses the territory well: the RPR serves two main purposes, evidentiary and remedial. First, the RPR provides (a) evidence that the defendant took the secret by improper means (i.e., it did not merely leak), and (b) evidence of the secret’s value (as a function of security costs). Second, the RPR has “remedial significance”: firms that failed to protect their secrets do not gain windfalls “merely because the defendant took the secret from [them], rather than from the public domain as it could have done with impunity.” Thus, the more that is spent on protecting a secret, “the more [the secret’s owner] demonstrates that the secret has real value deserving of legal protection, that he really was misappropriation.” To this picture should be added the recent contribution of Deepa Varadarajan, who has revived the case for viewing the RPR as also serving a role similar to possession for real or chattel property: providing notice of what is claimed.

Whatever the merits of the various theoretical views, the RPR remains black letter law, with the DTSA following the UTSA in adopting the RPR as an independent requirement. The predomi-

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149 E.g., Weins v. Sporleder, 569 N.W.2d 16, 23 (S.D. 1997); see also Peterson, supra note 116, at 432–33 & nn.387–88 (collecting cases).

150 E.g., Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1063–64 (2d Cir. 1985) (passwords); see also Rowe, supra note 115, at 26–27 (“[A] reexamination of what are reasonable measures to protect information based on current business norms is not only logical but is consistent with trade secret law.”).

151 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 141, at 348–50 (arguing RPR should be demoted from a separate requirement to an evidentiary issue concerning secrecy); Bone, supra note 137, at 76 (“The only credible justifications rely on enforcement cost and signaling benefits, but without more careful analysis, we cannot be sure that these benefits are strong enough to justify a general rule applicable to all cases.”); Peterson, supra note 116, at 390 & n.31 (cautioning against overemphasizing secrecy as RPR’s critical function is showing lack of abandonment).

152 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991).

153 Id. at 178–79.

154 Id. at 179 (“It would be like punishing a person for stealing property that he believes is owned by another but that actually is abandoned property.”).

155 Id. at 179–80.


157 For a survey critiquing these and additional theoretical views, see generally Bone, supra note 137.

nant mode of analysis (for now) remains a Rockwell-ian cost-benefit analysis.¹⁵⁹ And this self-help requirement may be even more justified in a digital age, where legal remedies alone may be insufficient to address misappropriation.¹⁶⁰

B. When Lies Secure Trade Secrets

Trade secret law requires companies to protect their secrets to be eligible for legal relief.¹⁶¹ One common way of protecting secrets in ordinary life is relatively inexpensive: lie. Verbal decoys, like outright lies and misleading half-truths, can obscure a secret and even conceal its existence.¹⁶² Is the same true for companies that need to protect commercial secrets? And if so, could the law recognize such efforts as “reasonable”?

The answer is yes. Deceptive precautions have both a longstanding history within intellectual property (Section II.B.1) and are emerging as an essential component of cybersecurity best practices (Section II.B.2). These deceptive precautions—many of which involve lies—satisfy the standard doctrinal test for the RPR. And though few courts have expressly addressed the issue, early harbinger cases suggest that courts will follow this standard doctrinal analysis, at least where the deceptive precautions are used as actual precautions and not to troll (Section II.B.3). Moreover, there may be an increasing number of situations where a company that fails to undertake such precautions will fail to satisfy the RPR (Section II.B.4). In other words, the law might not only legitimize certain lies; the law might require them.

This is not to claim that all such precautions could satisfy the RPR. As I explain in Section II.C, there are limits on “reasonable” precautions—on the lengths to which a company can go to protect its secrets. In so doing, I identify a gap in the literature and trade secret law itself, which largely focuses on the behavior of trade secret defendants.¹⁶³ But as relevant here, these limits do not categorically exclude lies, and so do not undermine the easy doctrinal case that lies

¹⁵⁹ See Rowe, supra note 115, at 9.
¹⁶⁰ See id. at 3.
¹⁶¹ Rockwell, 925 F.2d at 180; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A).
¹⁶² Cf. Kim Lane Scheppelle, Legal Secrets 22–23 (1988) (“[T]he purpose in not telling the truth is often the attempt to keep a secret.”).
can satisfy the law. To the contrary, they suggest that deception specialists may be needed.

I. A Tradition of Deceptive Precautions

Given the tensions described in Part I, deceptive precautions might seem unusual—at least outside companies, like Theranos, engaged in widespread fraud. Many practitioners have expressed surprise at my thesis, that a plaintiff’s own misrepresentations could satisfy an element of her legal claim, let alone be required by it. Unsurprisingly, it is infrequently litigated—at least not under these terms.

But there is actually a long and venerated history of using deception to protect industrial secrets and information assets that continues to present day.\textsuperscript{164} The examples make for good stories, like the fake town in the map that became a real one.\textsuperscript{165}

Some deceptive precautions are used to conceal. Companies, including law firms, commonly use code names for sensitive matters.\textsuperscript{166} Some mislabel facilities’ doors\textsuperscript{167} or directories\textsuperscript{168} or scripts.\textsuperscript{169} Others mask computer internet protocol (“IP”) addresses to hide geographic locations.\textsuperscript{170} The “long-awaited casting” of the mother in the hit

\textsuperscript{164} I use the term “information asset,” instead of the term “intellectual property,” because such cases often involve assets for which it is unclear whether the assets are entitled to protection under our intellectual property laws and so it is unclear whether the assets are properly identified as intellectual property. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).


\textsuperscript{166} \textit{See, e.g.}, George N. Saliba, Technology and Law Firms: Is Your Attorney up to Speed?, \textit{N.J. BUS. MAG.}, Jan. 2008, at 1, 3.

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{See infra} note 172 and accompanying text.


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sitcom *How I Met Your Mother* was “kept secret from the show’s incredibly rabid followers” by, among other things, labeling the audition script “USC Student Thesis Film” because it was “[s]omething no one in Hollywood would ever actually read.”\(^{171}\)

Some conceal directly: the telephone booth that provided a direct line between Churchill and Roosevelt during World War II was kept in a room labeled as a bathroom.\(^{172}\) Others through misdirection: a former car engineer recounted that, during road tests, her design team constructed fake car parts so that corporate spies—literally, photographers in trees—would focus on the decoy and not the actual innovations while the car drove past.\(^{173}\) Sometimes, as in the road-test case, the deceptive precaution functions by imparting a false belief (however fleeting) about the object of inquiry. In others, it is enough that the false representations merely deny a true belief: the producers of *Game of Thrones* reportedly created many false endings to disguise which was real.\(^ {174}\)

In addition to concealing, some deceptive precautions are used to discourage would-be misappropriators. Major agricultural companies have been known to “lie” to each other about their “ability to determine [a seed’s] parentage,” “essentially . . . trick[ing] [another] into

\(^{171}\) Stransky, *supra* note 169.


\(^{173}\) E-mail from Dalila Argaez Wendlandt, Assoc. J., Massachusetts Supreme Jud. Ct., to Courtney M. Cox, Assoc. Professor of L., Fordham Univ. Sch. of L. (Feb. 18, 2022) (on file with author) (describing past experiences as an engineer).

not misappropriating its trade secrets by leading it to believe it would get caught.”175

Some deceptive precautions are used as second-level security precautions, testing and reinforcing the defenses that protect the underlying information asset. For example, Apple “[c]ompany lore” reportedly “holds that plainclothes Apple security agents lurk near the bar at [a local] BJ’s and that employees have been fired for loose talk there.”176 As Adam Lashinsky reports, “[i]t doesn’t quite matter if the yarn is true or apocryphal. The fact that employees repeat it serves the purpose.”177 Interestingly, this precaution not only works regardless of whether it is true (as Lashinsky observes), but the precaution is also deceptive regardless of whether it is true: either the deceptive precaution is the undercover security, or the deceptive precaution is the rumor (causing employees to falsely believe that there are or might be undercover agents).

Some deceptions are similarly used as safeguards to identify and trace security breaches. False entries in everything from databases and client-lists178 to phonebooks179 and maps180 trap the unwary who blindly copy material. This type of deceptive precaution—often called a “mountweazel” after a particularly colorful example181—is perhaps the most familiar within intellectual property because it is the most frequently litigated: in addition to serving as a safeguard, such deceptive precautions also provide evidence.182 This technique has been updated and expanded in the digital age, as discussed next.183

Finally, some deceptive precautions are used ex post, to remedy security breaches that have occurred by obscuring the truth once it is out there. Some in Hollywood proactively plan for this inevitable ex post need: Warner Brothers reportedly “hired Kevin Smith to write a fake screenplay for the 2016 tentpole Batman v Superman: Dawn of Justice, with the express intent of leaking it online as a decoy to draw

176 ADAM LASHINSKY, INSIDE APPLE 40 (2013).
177 Id.
178 See infra text accompanying notes 206, 237.
181 See infra Section III.B.4.
183 See infra Section II.B.2.
spoiler-hunters away from any legitimate news.” Unsurprisingly, such precautions are generally not litigated, but circulate as rumors; litigation would undermine the strategy.

Unless barred for some other reason, all these deceptive precautions would straightforwardly satisfy the doctrinal test for the reasonable precaution requirement, either on their own or as part of a general security package. All involve deceptive practices: presenting a falsehood as true. And many involve the narrower category of direct lies that we call affirmative misrepresentations: an assertion that P (e.g., this document is titled “USC Student Thesis Film”), where P is false, made in a context in which P is presented as true—that is, a context in which those who hear or read P are invited to rely on the representation as truthful.

2. Deceptive Precautions as “The Next Big Thing”

Deceptive precautions have taken on a new importance in the digital age. The trend has been growing since at least the turn of the millennium, but has only recently received attention in the legal literature, mostly as a minor entry in the broader phenomenon of “active defense”—cybersecurity defenses that engage with the hacker rather than barring entry, and which range from observational honeypots and other deceptive technology to active and even aggressive means like counterstrikes or “hackbacks.”

One of the earlier recognized deceptive cyberprecautions is the honeypot. A honeypot is a decoy computer or network system designed to attract hackers. Its creators design the honeypot to look

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185 See supra Section I.B.


187 See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 113, at 416–17; Bruce P. Smith, Hacking, Poaching, and Counterattacking: Digital Counterstrikes and the Contours of Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 171 (2005); Dorothy E. Denning & Bradley J. Strawser, Active Cyber Defense: Applying Air Defense to the Cyber Domain, in UNDERSTANDING CYBER CONFLICT: FOURTEEN ANALOGIES (George Perkovich & Ariel E. Levite eds., 2017); see also Stephanie Balitzer, Note, What Common Law and Common Sense Teach Us About Corporate Security, 49 U. MICH. L.L. REFORM 891, 896 (2016) (“Passive defense strategies generally encompass those strategies that block intruders from entering a network, whereas active defense strategies involve corporations proactively engaging hackers.”). Confusion has resulted from grouping observational and investigative deceptive techniques together with counterstrikes and hackbacks as “active” defense, as many objections to the latter do not apply to the former.

188 Walden & Flanagan, supra note 186, at 318–19; Ben Lutkevich, Casey Clark & Michael
and act like a real system that is part of the network, but the honeypot is often separate, a mere decoy that is “isolated” (electronically or physically) from the main system and “closely monitored.” The honeypot can thus serve as a decoy, “deflect[ing] the hacker from breaking into the real system” and buying time for an appropriate response. The honeypot can also be used for research or investigative purposes, allowing the honeypot operators to gather information about the intruders, their methods, and the system weaknesses being exploited, and to “document evidence for criminal prosecution” or other civil remedies. Sometimes a given network will operate multiple honeypots (“honeynet”) and there are also “centralized collection[s] of honeypots and analysis tools” used for broader study (“honey farm”).

Unlike other forms of “active defense,” the honeypot is generally passive. Though the information generated could be used for counter-offensives, the decoy itself is not active and does not necessarily cause harm to the intruder’s system (or to third-party systems used by hackers as shields). Accordingly, many of the criticisms levied against “active defense,” and so much of the legal debate about active defense, does not apply to the more passive honeypot. (For this reason, the grouping of honeypots and other passive detection and deception technologies with the more aggressive forms of active defense, like counterstrikes, has led to some analytic confusion.) And it appears that honeypots can be designed to avoid pitfalls presented by various communications statutes, like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. In-
indeed, many of the legal concerns raised about honeypots apply primarily to their use in law enforcement because of entrapment issues that are raised; these entrapment concerns do not apply to civil trade secret remedies.

“Deception technology” further develops—or at least, rebrands—the basic principles underlying the honeypot into its own “emerging category of cyber security defence [sic].” Like honeypots, deception technology “seeks to trick hackers into thinking they are getting close to critical data.” Unlike most honeypots, deception technology includes decoys and traps hidden throughout the main system itself (rather than a walled-off system) and are used primarily to track, trace, and redirect a hacker that has already breached the outer perimeter.

Some known uses of deception technology have been reactive, concealing trade secrets from and buying time against known intruders. When SmartProcure repeatedly attempted to hack BidPrime’s system and scrape its trade secrets, “BidPrime security realized that [SmartProcure was] not going to stop” and that if SmartProcure realized “they had been detected, [they] would resort to even more subversive measures.” Accordingly, “[t]o protect its trade secrets,” BidPrime “substitute[d] scrambled archive data for the data that would be displayed [in response to] searches performed under [one of SmartProcure’s fake] account[s].” As BidPrime explained in its complaint:

[Real, but older, data was still displayed for searches performed under [SmartProcure’s fake] account, and the data was mixed up. For example, a bid request result would display a real bid request title and a real bid request expiration

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). See Walden & Flanagan, supra note 186, at 345–47; Harrington, supra note 193, at 18–19. This is not to minimize the difficulty of design. See infra Section II.C.

199 See Harrington, supra note 193, at 18–19.


202 The meaning and use of these terms continue to evolve.


205 See id. ¶¶ 24, 60.
date but, due to BidPrime’s defensive scrambling, the expiration data may not have belonged with that particular bid title. In addition, to protect its trade secret bid source database, BidPrime dummied the bid source URLs that accompanied the scrambled bid requests.206

Increasingly, however, companies use deception technology proactively to identify and defend against unknown threats. For example, Illusive Networks capitalizes on the way authorized users inadvertently leave trails of information, including credentials, in places like their browsers’ caches.207 Hackers, once in a system, find and leverage this information to gain further access.208 Illusive plants fake credentials within this trail.209 When hackers then use the fake credentials, “the system disorients them with deceptive data” and alerts the security team.210 As Illusive’s marketing explains, “[Illusive’s] Attack Detection System plants deceptions on every endpoint that looks like the data attackers need to move towards critical assets. Immediate post-perimeter detection allows you to foil attacker reconnaissance and their lateral movement process.”211

Deception technology is exploding. Sold as products, services, or both, by companies like Illusive, MITRE, TrapX, and Attivo Networks, the deception technology market was valued at $1.48 billion worldwide in 2018, a figure projected to reach $3.72 billion by 2026.212 According to Illusive’s chief executive, “the technology is more wide-

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206 Id. ¶ 60.


208 See id.

209 See id.; Mitchell, supra note 201.

210 See Mitchell, supra note 201.


spread than many assume, especially in highly regulated industries like banking, insurance and government.” 213

Known users include national brands in diverse industries, from Land O’Lakes (agriculture) to Aflac (insurance) to Procter & Gamble (consumer products). 214 In 2020, Illusive Networks completed a $24 million funding round, drawing interest from Spring Lake Equity Partners, Marker, New Enterprise Associates, Bessemer Venture Partners, Innovation Endeavors, Cisco, Microsoft, and Citi. 215

Such deception technology is not the only use of deception that has become important. Misinformation—that ubiquitous topic du jour—also has a corporate security role to play. Trade secret law traditionally focused on former employees, partners, or corporate spies who misappropriate intellectual assets to compete. 216 But competition is no longer the only concern. Now, there is the risk that “hacktivists,” disgruntled ex-employees, and other corporate enemies publish stolen secrets online. 217 Once the secret becomes widely available, it is no longer secret and trade secret protection disappears. 218 But the options for stopping the spread are limited: takedowns are slow and unreliable. 219 And seeking one risks further publicity (the “Streisand effect”). 220 Enter the lie: instead of an immediate takedown, bury the secret in an information flood.

There is speculation that Cisco did exactly this: when its source code appeared online, Cisco reportedly posted fake versions from fake usernames and IP addresses. 221 Doing so obscured whether any of the versions were authentic and (if so) which one it was. 222 This

213 Mitchell, supra note 201 (explaining the perspective of Ofer Israeli, CEO of Illusive Networks).
216 See Rowe, supra note 113, at 408–09.
217 See Rowe, supra note 115, at 22–25 (collecting cases).
218 Cundiff, supra note 21, at 399; Rowe, supra note 115, at 21 n.158.
220 See Cundiff, supra note 21, 406–07 (discussing split regarding continued protection); Rowe, supra note 219, at 1086. See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2004) (reversing preliminary injunction in part because secret had spread online).
221 See Cundiff, supra note 21, at 408 & n.220.
222 Id.
technique has proven reasonably effective, as evidenced by a growing industry of public relations firms that publish rumors about their clients to bury or undermine negative or invasive press.223 Early researchers and companies in this space identified “publicity disinformation, and other techniques of psychological operations” as aggressive, last resort measures,224 suggesting broader and perhaps more dangerous uses than Cisco’s.

Finally, deceptive precautions in cyberspace may be pedestrian. You, dear reader, have probably been on the receiving end. One of the biggest vulnerabilities in any network, computer or otherwise, remains the human one.225 By now, most are aware of phishing: “A digital form of social engineering to deceive individuals into providing sensitive information.”226 But while most people are aware, at least nominally, of the risk, hackers have grown adept at mimicking legitimate communications.227 And so, IT professionals increasingly recommend “phishing simulations” as part of best security practices: sending fake phishing emails to employees.228 These simulations help IT identify employees who fail to report threats (a common problem) and those likely to fall for them, while simultaneously training employees on how to recognize threats and respond appropriately.229 This deceptive precaution is increasingly recommended as a best practice,230 but involves lying to the workforce.

229 Id.
3. Lies as a Legitimate Option

Given the trend toward the cost-benefit approach to the RPR suggested in *Rockwell and E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher*, most of the deceptive precautions described above easily count as a “reasonable precaution” for purposes of the RPR. And litigants have begun to treat them as such, citing their use of fake data as examples of precautions taken. Where adopted, deceptive precautions provide evidence that (1) the trade secret owner treated the information as secret; (2) the defendant took the secret by improper means (i.e., it did not merely leak); and (3) that the secret had value (as a function of security costs).

At least one court has recognized this possibility. In *SolarCity Corp. v. Pure Solar Co.*, SolarCity sued a competitor, Pure Solar; Pure Solar employees; and a former SolarCity employee who had leaked customer information to Pure Solar. SolarCity learned of the problem when it began receiving complaints from customers about why Pure Solar had their contact information. SolarCity developed a honeypot to investigate. As described in the complaint, once the software was implemented,

any time a user exported customer data from SolarCity’s customer database . . . the customer’s actual phone number would be replaced with a different “decoy” phone number obtained by SolarCity through a third party vendor. SolarCity acquired multiple such decoy phone numbers to avoid duplication and detection. SolarCity then acquired a separate “honeypot” phone and had all calls to the decoy customer phone numbers routed to it. A SolarCity employee would answer the honeypot phone and obtain as much information as possible about the caller and the customer he or she was attempting to call. SolarCity analyzed the information obtained from these calls and information from call logs to the decoy phone numbers to determine whether the calls

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231 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).


235 *Id.* at *1.

236 *Id.*
were to actual customers in SolarCity’s database who had been assigned decoy numbers. If SolarCity was able to confirm that the call was to a customer in its database, SolarCity could then determine who exported the customer’s information and when it had been exported.237

SolarCity alleged that the honeypot quickly “began receiving . . . calls from Pure Solar sales representatives.”238 SolarCity analyzed the decoy numbers and traced them to an employee whose “username was the only username that was consistently associated with exports of customer information where Pure Solar attempted to call on a customer using the decoy phone number.”239

SolarCity relied on its use of the honeypot, in conjunction with other security measures, to allege that it had satisfied the RPR under both the DTSA and California UTSA.240 SolarCity also relied on honeypot evidence to support its other claims, including to establish a timeline for the application of the DTSA, to support allegations of ongoing activity for purposes of a RICO claim, and to show loss for its claim under the CFAA.241

In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court recognized the honeypot’s evidentiary value. Although the defendants had not challenged SolarCity’s satisfaction of the RPR, the court recognized the honeypot as evidence of both misappropriation and value. The court accepted allegations about the honeypot as “sufficient facts” to allege that “unlawful misappropriation” occurred after the DTSA’s effective date.242 And the court found that SolarCity “established ‘loss’” under the CFAA because it had “alleged that Defendants’ actions required it to undertake ‘an investigation,’ that included developing ‘software applications that would detect the export of data from a search application accessing SolarCity’s customer database,’ acquire a honeypot, and analyze the information obtained from these

237 First Amended Complaint, supra note 232, ¶ 19.
238 Id. at ¶ 20.
239 Id. at ¶¶ 21–22.
240 Id. ¶¶ 42, 55 (“Plaintiff made reasonable effort and took reasonable steps in order to keep secret the information, including . . . by taking steps to determine whether breaches of the information contained in the database occurred and to address and take action to respond to actual or potential breaches.”); see also id. ¶¶ 19–22.
241 Id.; Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 11, 15, SolarCity, No. 16-cv-01814 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2016).
honeypot calls,” a loss worth at least $5,000. The parties eventually settled.

4. When Lying Is the Only Option

Trade secret law legitimates certain lies—like SolarCity’s honeypot scheme—through the RPR. But could trade secret law mandate such precautions? If the court’s approval of the honeypot precaution in SolarCity is any indication, then the answer is: probably, especially as deception becomes more widely adopted as cybersecurity best practices.

While the RPR’s case-by-case inquiry means that courts rarely fault the failure to take a particular precaution, some precautions are effectively treated as mandatory. Disclosing a trade secret without a nondisclosure agreement will generally bar a claim. Older cases required that secrets be kept under “lock and key.” And, analogously, courts today increasingly recognize that failing to protect electronic passwords is a failure to take reasonable precautions. These exceptions follow a pattern: they are basic, commonsense, and widely adopted. In short, they are best practices.

A review of cybersecurity’s history suggests that deceptive precautions are on that trajectory. Honeypots, developed in the early 1990s, grew increasingly commercialized around the turn of the millennium and have remained a standard investigative tool. Phishing simulations are here to stay, and unlike fire alarms, cannot be preannounced. And today’s “deception technology”—that $1.5 billion

243 Id. at *9 (citations omitted).
244 Order, SolarCity, No. 16-cv-01814 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018).
market aimed at identifying and mitigating internal threats—is already being touted as best practices.\textsuperscript{250} If such precautions would have caught a rogue employee or an external threat that breached the firewall, any litigator worth their salt will point to the failure to adopt such precautions as a failure to satisfy the RPR.

That such precautions will ultimately be required is consistent with expert views about what the RPR requires in the age of cybersecurity. The digital era presents “enhance[d] . . . risks of trade secret misappropriation through electronic means.”\textsuperscript{251} Accordingly, Elizabeth Rowe, for example, has argued that “what security measures are reasonable [under the circumstances]” now include proactive risk assessment and mitigation of electronic threats.\textsuperscript{252} Deception technology provides exactly that: risk assessment and mitigation—in real time and with minimal false positives.\textsuperscript{253}

Will courts affirmatively require “deception” technology? A First Amendment defense might be raised, though its scope is unclear, and in any event, has not prevented courts from requiring basic notice and nondisclosures.\textsuperscript{254} And courts might not be willing to do so under that name (“deception”) given the tensions described in Part I and returned to in Part III.\textsuperscript{255}

But both possibilities might escape notice: courts have been slow to pop the hood on technical precautions.\textsuperscript{256} Litigants may discuss in general terms the precautions taken, using euphemisms like “honey-pot,” “decoy,” and “obfuscation”; brand names of leading services; or certifications that confirm compliance with cybersecurity protocols without courts realizing that such compliance is satisfied through the use of deception technology.


\textsuperscript{251} Rowe, supra note 115, at 26.

\textsuperscript{252} Id. at 26–27.


\textsuperscript{255} See infra Section III.C.

\textsuperscript{256} See Rowe, supra note 115.
C. Reasonable Limits

The cost-benefit approach in *Rockwell* and *E.I. DuPont* establishes a floor of reasonableness: a company must take at least those precautions that are cost-effective. But it does not establish a ceiling—a way to tell when a trade secret owner has gone too far. There must be limits to what is “reasonable,” to the extent of self-help permitted trade secret owners. A company couldn’t kill someone and seek relief on that basis, could it? Analogously, one might worry the RPR would go too far if it recognized lies as a legitimate option for satisfying a legal requirement—or worse, mandated them.

Any argument that deceptive precautions do not (as opposed to should not) satisfy the RPR presupposes that there is some legal limit on what counts as “reasonable.” The limits on a trade secret plaintiff’s behavior, especially regarding precautions, remain undertheorized. But, as will be discussed, it is clear that such limits do not categorically preclude deceptive practices from satisfying the RPR.

Such limits on what counts as “reasonable” might be derived from one of three sources: equity, criminal law, and torts.

*Equity.* There is a principle of equity that might appear to foreclose legal recognition of deceptive precautions—namely, that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud.” Lies often form the basis of unclean hands defenses, including in trade secret cases. While the unclean hands doctrine requires that the alleged misconduct be tightly related to the dispute before the court, deceptive precautions seem to fit that bill: the precautions taken by a trade secret owner are “at the heart of every trade secret misappropriation case and often determine[] the outcome.” Indeed, courts have declined to strike unclean hands defenses based on the use of honey-

257 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179–80 (7th Cir. 1991); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970).

258 See supra note 163.


260 See, e.g., Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., No. 13-cv-0405, 2016 WL 3143943, at *29 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2016) (finding unclean hands barred patent enforcement where, inter alia, plaintiff lied by omission about firewalling relevant personnel during joint venture and patents were based on trade secrets that had been misappropriated as a result); Thermech Eng’g Corp. v. Abbot Lab’ys, No. G030381, 2003 WL 23018553, at *8–9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting unclean hands defense based on, inter alia, plaintiff’s alleged lie in which plaintiff failed to inform defendant that it used a different Teflon product than the one on the purchase order).


262 Rowe, supra note 115, at 3; see also Scherer Design Grp., LLC v. Ahead Eng’g LLC, 764 F. App’x 147, 154 (3d Cir. 2019) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
pots—at least against copyright trolls who use honeypots to “seed” their work and generate litigation.263

But this limitation is not a categorical one and may in fact be quite limited. Where courts have accepted unclean hands based on the trade secret owner’s lies, it is usually because the trade secret owner engaged in fraud-based misappropriation (including to gain the trade secret at issue).264

Several courts have expressly rejected an unclean hands defense based on protective lies and deceptive precautions.265 For example, in Advanta USA, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.,266 Advanta attempted to raise an unclean hands defense to trade secret misappropriation, arguing that Pioneer had lied when it told Advanta that it was “monitoring Advanta’s commercial hybrids and that it had the ability to determine their parentage,” even though “Pioneer’s technology was not reliable for this purpose” until years later.267 The court reasoned that “Advanta’s argument—essentially that Pioneer tricked Advanta into not misappropriating its trade secrets by leading it to believe it would get caught—is unpersuasive.”268 And in Scherer Design Group, LLC v. Ahead Engineering LLC,269 the Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of an unclean hands defense even though the

263 See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses at 3–4, 10, Malibu Media, LLC v. Schmidt, No. 19-cv-00599 (W.D. Tex. May 4, 2020); Malibu Media, 2020 WL 5351079, at *1–2 (denying in relevant part motion to strike); Malibu Media v. Doe, No. 13-11432, 2014 WL 2616902, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2014) (“To the extent defendant’s unclean hand defense relies on a seeding of Plaintiff’s videos, the Plaintiff’s motion to strike will be denied in part.”).

264 See, e.g., ACI Chems., 615 So. 2d at 1196–97; Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1295–96 (5th Cir. 1970); see also Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Bryan, 784 F. Supp. 982, 998 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting unclean hands based on plaintiff’s subterfuge during investigation of misappropriation, noting that “the doctrine of unclean hands is only applicable when the conduct relied on is directly related to the subject matter in litigation—in this case meaning that it would have to be related to the creation or acquisition of the trade secrets themselves”). One might also expect courts to find unclean hands if a trade secret owner behaved as a troll and lied for the purpose of inducing misappropriation so as to generate a dispute. Cf., e.g., Malibu Media, 2020 WL 5351079, at *1–2 (denying motion to strike unclean hands defense raised against copyright troll that used “a ‘digital honeypot’—a scheme in which a copyright holder displays a work online in a way that lures users into downloading the work, only to then sue the users for copyright infringement”).


267 Id. at *10.

268 Id.

269 764 F. App’x 147, 148–50 (3d Cir. 2019) (not precedential).
plaintiff had surreptitiously accessed the defendant’s Facebook account to monitor suspected misappropriation.\footnote{Id. at 148–50 (explaining that the plaintiff accessed the account using cached password on the defendant’s returned company laptop and “installed software that allowed . . . [IT] to monitor . . . [the defendant’s] Facebook activity [after the defendant’s termination] without detection”); see also Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Bryan, 784 F. Supp. 982, 998 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting unclean hands defense because use of “fictitious name” to license and sign agreements to procure the defendant’s allegedly infringing product, “although not condoned,” “was taken not to copy the . . . [software] for some competitive advantage but rather to resort to self-help to determine to what extent, if at all . . . [the defendant] had copied and was using . . . [the plaintiff’s] trade secrets”).}

Deceptive precautions thus risk inviting an unclean hands defense, but the unclean hands doctrine does not undermine the RPR’s recognition or potential mandating of certain deceptive precautions, including lies. This risk simply underscores the need for legal counsel in designing deceptive precautions—which raises its own difficulties.\footnote{See infra Part IV.}

\textit{Criminal Law.} Many lies are criminalized.\footnote{See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 517–18 (2001).} More lies, in fact, than most are aware.\footnote{See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 502 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As now construed, § 1014 covers false explanations for arriving late at a meeting, false assurances that an applicant does not mind if the loan officer lights up a cigar, false expressions of enthusiasm about the results of a football game or an election, as well as false compliments about the subject of a family photograph. So long as the false statement is made ‘for the purpose of influencing’ a bank officer, it violates § 1014.”).} Federal offenses “include[d] 100 separate misrepresentation offenses” approximately twenty years ago,\footnote{See Stuntz, supra note 272, at 517 (citing Wells, 519 U.S. at 505 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).} and that number has almost certainly increased. Such offenses, like our focus here, “criminalize not only lying but concealing or misleading as well” and are not limited to lies that are material.\footnote{Id. at 517–18 (citing Wells, 519 U.S. at 505–06 & nn.8–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (noting that over half the federal misrepresentation statutes lack a materiality requirement).} There may be particular concern that various deceptive precautions in cybersecurity, especially if they continue to be lumped in with or characterized as “hackbacks,” run afoul of criminal statutes like the CFAA.\footnote{See The Hackback Debate, STEPTOE: CYBERBLOG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/11/02/the-hackback-debate/ [https://perma.cc/63WE-2ST3].}

But common sense suggests that there is likely some daylight to be found. It would be odd to suggest that a “Beware of Guard Dog” sign (when there are none) is ill-advised merely because of the breadth of codes criminalizing lies. There is considerable prosecutorial discretion, and many commentators bemoan criminal law enforce-
ment’s inability or refusal to reach many pervasive and harmful lies.277 Further, it is not clear that all such statutes would survive a First Amendment challenge.278

The potential for criminal liability for certain deceptive precautions creates risk. The real question that emerges is not whether one can lie to protect a trade secret in satisfaction of (or as required by) the RPR, but how to lie so as to avoid these particular and complicated constraints.279

Torts. Even if not illegal, the critic might insist that deceptive precautions—even those that appear innocuous—inevitably carry some risk that an innocent party will rely on the deception to their detriment, and so deceptive precautions should not satisfy the RPR.

This criticism is misplaced. Many reasonable precautions risk harm to others and even open the firm to civil liability. Guard dogs and barbed wire fences are generally considered reasonable precautions against trespassers, though they risk harm to nontrespassers for which a firm would be liable.280 The mere possibility that a particular deceptive precaution involves these risks does not affect whether it can satisfy the RPR. Risks alone do not make a precaution unreasonable; the question is whether the risk is reasonable.281

A critic might counter that the risky-but-reasonable nondeceptive precautions identified involved small risks: well-trained dogs are unlikely to attack except when appropriate, and children rarely need to hurdle a wall to escape greater danger.282 But this assumes—incorrectly—that reasonable nondeceptive precautions always pose small risks and that deceptive precautions always pose large ones. Guard dogs may be very risky: they may be vicious, or poorly trained and poorly secured. If they are—and if they cause harm—the firm faces liability. Yet these vicious guard dogs might still be a reasonable precaution, and the firm may not be liable if the dogs attack a wrongdoer.283 Policing the care with which a firm undertakes its precautions

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277 See, e.g., Manta, supra note 54, at 210–12.
279 See infra Part IV.
280 See Rossi v. DelDuca, 181 N.E.2d 591, 592–94 (Mass. 1962) (holding the dog owner liable for harm done to girls who came onto his property to escape danger); Woodbridge v. Marks, 45 N.Y.S. 156, 160 (App. Div. 1897) (denying recovery where dog not “unusually or unnaturally vicious”).
282 See, e.g., Rossi, 181 N.E.2d at 591.
283 For example, a court denied relief where the plaintiff strayed from the path. Woodbridge, 45 N.Y.S. at 159. In distinguishing from spring guns, which are prohibited, the court
is not within the purview of trade secret law; that is the purview of torts, when and if damages arise, and of regulations, for harms that must not be risked.

To be sure, some deceptions impose great risk. Were engineers to rely on information that had been obscured by deceptive precautions, the engineers could develop false beliefs about a device’s parameters leading to devastating results. The risks posed might be unjustifyably great, perhaps providing ground for refusing to accept the deceptive precaution in satisfaction of the RPR. But it should not be assumed that because some deceptions pose an unreasonable risk that all do. And tort law and business regulations are almost certainly better suited than trade secret law for deterring such unjustifiably risky precautions. Moreover, a limitation on precautions that satisfy the RPR is unlikely to discourage a firm from taking such measures; if legal and cost-effective, companies will still take such precautions, even if they do not later cite them in court. The law needs to target the risk (and its consequences) directly. In sum, unless deception is somehow “special,” mere risk of civil liability or individualized harm alone does not provide reason to find that deceptive precautions involving such risk cannot satisfy the RPR.

The Theranos case underscores this point, that nondeceptive precautions can be just as dangerous as deceptive ones. In addition to deceptive precautions, Theranos used common nondeceptive precautions to protect its purported trade secrets: nondisclosure agreements, tinted windows, guards, fingerprint scanners, and surveillance cameras. But the precaution that contributed most directly to Theranos’s fraudulent scheme was not a deceptive precaution. It was Theranos’s aggressive enforcement of nondisclosure agreements—a precaution so commonly recognized as reasonable that it is one of the few required despite frequent abuse.

D. Incentives and Expression, Depth and Breadth

I want to make a distinction here to clarify the nature of my claim. I have argued that trade secret law legitimizes lying. This is an argument about expressive force. But it is easy to confuse my claim

Observed that guard dogs are usually used to frighten off an intruder, which is permissible, despite the risk that they might “attack and bite any stranger who insisted upon forcing his way onto the locality [the dog] was set to guard.” Id. at 160.

284 See, e.g., Carreyrou, supra note 63, at 297.

285 See, e.g., id. at 296–97; see also supra note 149. The abuse of nondisclosure agreements and trade secret law to silence whistleblowers had become so common that the DTSA created an express exception to trade secret liability for whistleblowers. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833.
with the view that the RPR incentivizes lying. Whether the law incentivizes lying is also concerning, but my claim is not about incentives.\(^{286}\) My claim is about what the law accepts. This is one of the reasons that the trade secret case is so useful as a starting point for probing the depth of the law’s response to permitted lies: it cuts directly to what the law approves.

I have assumed that the deceptive precautions at issue are cost-effective for the firm. Some subset of these are also already permitted.\(^{287}\) If they are cost-effective, and permitted, companies (if they are smart) will use these precautions anyway, regardless of what trade secret law has to say about it. The incentive to use them comes from the precautions being cost-effective for protecting valuable assets, not from the RPR’s recognition thereof. This is true even for those limited precautions that the RPR effectively requires: most are so basic—e.g., passwords—that if they are cost-effective, we should expect companies to take them anyway.\(^{288}\) Indeed, a common criticism of the RPR is that, if it is meant to induce precautions, it is either redundant or wasteful.\(^{289}\) And if the point is to induce innovation, the RPR’s effect likely remains minimal: in most cases, the main issue is whether cost-effective precautions are available (innovate), not whether the law will recognize them.\(^{290}\)

The situations in which the RPR would incentivize deceptive precautions is quite limited. There may be an effect if a less expensive deceptive option and a slightly more expensive nondeceptive option

\(^{286}\) Cf. William N. Eskridge, *Law and the Production of Deceit*, in *Law and Lies*, supra note 2, at 254. Eskridge discusses the law’s encouragement of lies, largely through the lens of regulations in the LGBTQ and immigration contexts that leave those regulated little choice but to lie to the government about who they are. Many of the lies he identifies are “required” in the sense of having no alternative to evade the law’s consequences, even if the lies themselves are maintaining a legal fiction. This differs from the sense of “required” used here, in which the law requires a lie to someone else. But he raises an interesting question about whether “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” comes very close to being a policy of lying that would raise similar expressive concerns. *Id.* at 282, 285–88.

\(^{287}\) See supra Section II.C.

\(^{288}\) See supra Section II.B.4; see also supra Section II.A.2 (explaining that the RPR is a fact-intensive inquiry that, with few exceptions, does not require particular precautions be taken). One might think that the moral valence of lies would give companies pause, such that such precautions would not be taken unless required; the explosive growth of deception technology and the prevalence of phishing simulations provides empirical evidence to the contrary. See supra Section II.B.2. In any event, the full scope of required deceptive precautions remains for future work.


\(^{290}\) See id. at 227–29.
are incompatible, or if using both would be superfluous. If the RPR only recognizes the nondeceptive option, the company may choose the nondeceptive option to preserve its ability to litigate. But if the RPR recognizes both, the company will choose the deceptive option. In that sense, the RPR may, at the margin, incentivize lying (and free up capital for innovation).291

But if the nondeceptive precaution is insufficiently protective or the deceptive precaution is extremely effective (e.g., deception technology), the company will still adopt the deceptive precaution to preserve its information asset, regardless of what the RPR says.

Interestingly, the RPR’s main incentive effect is not on the choice about whether to use cost-effective deceptive precautions, but about what additional nondeceptive security measures to take. If the law accepts the deceptive precaution in satisfaction of the RPR, then the company will adopt only the deceptive precaution and not the nondeceptive precaution. But if the law does not accept the deceptive precaution in satisfaction of the RPR, then the company will adopt both the deceptive and nondeceptive precautions (or forego litigation). That is, if the RPR does not recognize deceptive precautions, some companies will spend more on security than they otherwise would.292

Permitting deceptive precautions is thus consistent with a primary goal of trade secret law, minimizing overinvestment in security.293 And, given the difficulty of sustaining a ruse over the long term, the reliance on deceptive precautions may ultimately contribute to the leakiness of secrets, something that is cited as another advantage of the trade secret regime.294 The behavior that is incentivized—avoiding wasteful expenditure—is (arguably) good; to get there, the law must recognize lying as a legitimate option.

Although most focus on the law’s incentives, the expressive force in this realm is more stunning: It reveals the depth of law’s treatment of permitted lies. And it is of particular concern for theoretical reasons. We turn to these issues in Part III.

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291 In this sense, there is an incentive story to tell. But it is about innovation, and not about incentives to lie.

292 See Lichtman, supra note 289, at 230.

293 See id. at 230–31.

294 See Lemley, supra note 141, at 332–37 (“[T]rade secret law actually encourages broader disclosure and use of information, not secrecy.”).
III. RESISTING LIES

The claim that law legitimates lying may elicit a strong reaction that the law cannot be this way. Although some scholars have argued that the law, de facto, incentivizes lying by placing people in impossible situations\textsuperscript{295} or by permitting lies where efficient or difficult to stop (rightly or wrongly),\textsuperscript{296} my claim takes it a step further. My claim is that the law de jure recognizes lying by accepting certain lies in satisfaction of a legal requirement. It is not, or at least not merely, about incentives.\textsuperscript{297}

Skepticism about the law’s ability to legitimize lies tends to take one of several forms. The first move is to deny that these deceptive practices are in fact lies. This strategy fails: the case study’s examples present or imply falsehoods in warranting contexts and so are lies on almost any definition, including \textit{Black’s Law Dictionary}.\textsuperscript{298} But even if the strategy succeeds, it does so only in a trivial way: I will still have shown that the law de jure accepts \textit{the fact that deception was used} as fulfilling a legal requirement.

The other skepticisms are more theoretical. One proceeds by suggesting the law’s legitimization of lies conflicts with the law’s commitment to truth. Yet another appeals to a natural-law style Argument from Morality. Finally, an entirely different sort of skeptic, about the import of my claim, might wonder why anyone would find the claim anything but obvious, or at least anything but an incremental contribution to the efficiency story about permitted lies.

This Part challenges the bases for these theoretical skepticisms. Exploring their limits shows that the case study is not a niche curiosity. The phenomenon of law legitimizing lies has much broader implications about the law’s response to lying, including why it may be good that so many resist recognizing certain examples as lies.

A. The Law’s Commitment to Truth

A belief in the law’s commitment to truth is almost universal, at least as an ideal of what the American legal system is or aspires to be

\textsuperscript{295} Cf. Eskridge, \textit{supra} note 286, at 254, 256.
\textsuperscript{296} See, e.g., Levmore, \textit{Theory of Deception}, \textit{supra} note 18, at 1369; Simon-Kerr, \textit{supra} note 60, at 2175.
\textsuperscript{297} See \textit{supra} Section II.D.
\textsuperscript{298} See \textit{supra} Sections I.B, II.B. The objection that some of the examples do not invite reliance confuses warranting contexts with the existence of reliance interests. See \textit{infra} Section III.B.
This commitment has often been invoked in the wake of the January 6, 2021 Capitol riots, highlighting its importance, actual or perceived. But what should we think about this commitment, if the law sometimes legitimizes lies?

The most immediate question is what the phenomenon of law legitimizing lies can tell us about what the commitment means for theorizing the law’s response to lying. Because lies and deception often undermine the truth, a commonly assumed corollary of the law’s commitment is that the law generally disfavors lies and deception, making exceptions only for reasons of administrability, immateriality, or the First Amendment (the “anti-lie corollary”). This anti-lie corollary is somewhat controversial and perhaps unlawful, but the trend favors the corollary. It comes down to defaults: Is law’s default setting to disfavor lies, and make exceptions by permitting certain ones? Or is the law generally neutral, despite its supposed commitment to truth, picking out certain lies and deceptions to police? And which default should the law adopt given the commitment to truth?

The anti-lie corollary has strong intuitive appeal as a descriptive and normative matter. Criminal prohibitions of deception are staggeringly plentiful. Most jurisdictions recognize a common law tort for misrepresentation. Civil causes of action for various types of de-

299 See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (“There is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system.”); Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 986 (2008) (“Nevertheless, truth is surely relevant to legal proceedings, for we want, not simply resolutions, but just resolutions; and substantial justice requires factual truth.”); see also Sandra L. Lynch, Constitutional Integrity: Lessons from the Shadows, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 623, 636 (2017).


301 See Spaulding, supra note 2, at 96 (“If deception is not condemned, it is denied, and when it can’t be denied it is framed either as a necessary evil or a deviant practice of bad lawyers.”); MacIntyre, supra note 41, at 311–12; Porat & Yadlin, supra note 24, at 624.

302 See, e.g., Porat & Yadlin, supra note 24, at 624.

303 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“Absent from those few categories where the law allows content-based regulation of speech is any general exception to the First Amendment for false statements.”).

304 See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 26, at 123; HASKAY, supra note 26, at 20; Manta, supra note 54, at 216; Smith, supra note 26, at 214; cf. Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 2166, 2216 (2015).

305 E.g., Porat & Yadlin, supra note 24, at 624 (observing the “almost-general prohibition of lying”).

306 See Stuntz, supra note 272, at 517–18.

307 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (Am. L. Inst. 1977); Restatement (First) of Torts § 525 (Am. L. Inst. 1939).
ception abound, whether about people (e.g., defamation) or products (e.g., false advertising). Deception satisfies the “improper conduct” elements for some torts, including trade secret misappropriation. The law often deprives deceivers of advantages gained through deception: fiction is copyrightable, but fiction presented as facts is often not, and fraud vitiates consent, consent which would otherwise be available as a defense to torts like battery or trespass.

There are, of course, exceptions. The tort of misrepresentation was originally very narrow, and courts have been slow to extend it, especially in noncommercial settings. Some courts declined—at least for a time—to find liability for misrepresentations concerning HIV status or birth control. Similarly, the law sometimes “give[s] effect to consent procured by fraud,” as where seduction is “effected by false promises of love” (not battery) or where “testers” document “evidence of housing discrimination” by “posing as prospective home buyers” (not trespass). Patent law, which long excluded deceptive inventions, now accepts them, and patents themselves are often deceptive, with some permissibly claiming inventions that do not yet exist.

What makes the difference? A few themes make for plausible exceptions. One might argue that courts make exceptions and permit

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309 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UTSA) § 1(1)–(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985) (misappropriation includes procurement by fraud).

310 See generally Smith, supra note 26.


312 See Laura Barke, Case Note, When What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Third Party Liability for Fraudulent Misrepresentation in Non-Commercial Settings after Doe v. Dilling, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 201, 202–04 (2009); see also United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 711 n.26 (1961); cf. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, REMEDIES FOR MISREPRESENTATION, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 85, at 701–03 (1941) (explaining how while “[m]isrepresentation runs all through the law of torts,” in most cases it has “merged . . . with other kinds of misconduct,” and so courts have generally not found it necessary to expand the common law tort of deceit beyond commercial settings).


315 Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1351–53 (collecting cases).


deception, including affirmative misrepresentations, where necessary for socially valuable enterprises, like testers and investigative reporting.\textsuperscript{318} Alternatively, maybe courts permit deception where the truth teller and the deceiver look alike, like busybodies posing as prospective buyers at open houses.\textsuperscript{319} The law also narrowly construes lies so as to excuse deception where some amount of gamesmanship is inevitable (e.g., perjury).\textsuperscript{320}

Legitimizing lies creates an uneasy tension with this picture. Most of the above examples merely tolerate lies. They are true exceptions—excepting permitted lies from punitive consequences that would otherwise apply. Not so with the trade secret case study. It shows that the law can and does go beyond merely permitting. The lies at issue in the case study were already permitted; trade secret law takes the further step of legitimizing and possibly requiring them.\textsuperscript{321}

I mentioned that there is an alternative way to view these cases, and the phenomenon of legitimizing lies counts in its favor. Rather than beginning with the assumption that the law generally disfavors (or should disfavor) deception and asking why the law makes certain exceptions, one might begin with the opposite assumption: the law takes no principled stance on deception (the “neutral view”). Proponents of the neutral view believe that the anti-lie corollary gets the defaults wrong, as a descriptive or normative matter.\textsuperscript{322}

The neutral view has an appealing simplicity. Under the neutral view, when the law penalizes lying or deception, it is because the law has picked out that channel of communication to protect. Some protected channels are those where lies produce predictable harms: for example, lying about sexually transmitted diseases harms more than the target.\textsuperscript{323} Other channels involve social practices that depend, for their effectiveness, on truthfulness (e.g., perjury). Finally, misinformation in some circumstances generates waste. Many commercial deceptions do not add value, but merely transfer value from one party to another while increasing costs (parties must pay to defend against de-

\textsuperscript{318} See, e.g., Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353–54.
\textsuperscript{319} See id. at 1351, 1353.
\textsuperscript{320} See Stuntz, supra note 272, at 517–18.
\textsuperscript{321} But see supra Section II.C.
\textsuperscript{322} See, e.g., Levmore, Theory of Deception, supra note 18, at 1369–70, 1374–75; see also Desnick, 44 F.3d 1345 (Posner, J.); cf. Sunstein, supra note 33, at 406, 425 (arguing in favor of a “rebuttable presumption” that false statements are constitutionally protected “unless the government can show that allowing them will cause serious harms that cannot be avoided through a more speech-protective route”).
ception). And deceptive advertising not only harms deceived consumers, but also decreases the quality of goods available.

In all other situations, the law remains neutral about lying. As a normative matter, this reflects a judgment that other measures are better suited to protect against the harms of lies. Such justifications have a strong pedigree and are repeatedly cited: “[T]he remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” They are also practical: “a healthy skepticism is a better protection against being fooled . . . than the costly remedies of the law.”

But if these are the only justifications for the neutral view, the only real value added is its simplicity: the anti-lie corollary arguably permits roughly the same lies, by making exceptions for similar reasons. And some of these justifications for the neutral view—that more speech is the cure, that the marketplace of ideas will prevail—seem discredited by the infodemic and other misinformation online.

The trade secret case study presented here counts strongly in favor of the neutral view. Unlike the anti-lie corollary, the neutral view readily accommodates other responses to lying beyond the traditional dichotomy of penalizing and permitting. The neutral view is neutral, and so if it serves one of law’s aims to legitimize certain lies as “reasonable,” no tension is created if the law does so.

The trade secret case study provides a nice example of how, under the neutral view, the law can treat lying as a mere tool—i.e., a tool without any moral valence. Recall that one of the law’s aims is thought to be avoiding waste—avoiding transfers that impose costs without adding value. Both the neutral view and the anti-lie corollary can accommodate the law’s penalizing lies where they lead to

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324 Cf. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991) (characterizing trade secret law as deterring “efforts that have as their sole purpose and effect the redistribution of wealth from one firm to another”); Lemley, supra note 141, at 333–34.

325 See Klass, supra note 14, at 725–26.


327 Id. at 728 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).


330 See supra notes 323–25 and accompanying text.
waste, and permitting lies where they do not. And so both are consistent with the lies from the case study being permitted: lying to an employee about a codename or using fake data to stymy hackers does not—in the central case—cause a reliance that would lead to “mere transfer” of resources from the respective targets to those using deceptive precautions; that is neither the purpose nor the effect of any deception.

But these lies also help prevent waste. Avoiding such transfers is their precise aim. On the neutral view, the law can legitimize this use, and in so doing, strengthen the antiwaste measures: as discussed earlier, recognizing deceptive precautions as satisfying the RPR prevents wasteful overinvestment in security. The anti-lie corollary, by contrast, seems inconsistent with the express recognition.

Another example: Many of the deceptive precautions do not undermine channels of communication that the law has picked out as requiring protection. To the contrary, many of the deceptive precautions, like deception technology, proactively defend such channels by, e.g., securing the network and identifying bad actors. These practices sacrifice the reliability of some channels to promote the reliability of others. The neutral view can readily promote and reinforce this. The anti-lie corollary cannot, absent some further explanation.

The case study thus counts in favor of the neutral view, as a descriptive matter: it provides a data point best explained by the neutral view, and it demonstrates that the neutral view can be consistent with the commitment to truth—perhaps more so than the anti-lie corollary. The latter point—that the neutral view may be more consistent with the commitment to truth than the anti-lie corollary—might also provide a reason to favor the neutral view as a normative matter, insofar as the commitment to truth is a real value. Two, maybe three, strikes against the corollary, at a time when the main argument against the corollary—that the remedy for false speech is more speech—appears under attack.

B. Against the Argument from Morality

Some skeptics of the claim that law legitimizes lying may resist the conclusion through an appeal to commonsense morality (the “Argument from Morality”). The Argument from Morality fails, but evaluating why the argument fails demonstrates the potential breadth of

\[331 \text{ See supra notes 323–25 and accompanying text.} \]

\[332 \text{ See supra Sections II.A, II.D.} \]
The phenomenon—because it would fail against more than just protective lies like the case study—and provides some benchmarks for a theory moving forward.

The Argument from Morality is really a collection of arguments that, roughly, the law cannot legitimize lies because of lying’s moral status. It has the flavor of a broadly equitable objection. In its simplest form, the Argument from Morality contends that lies are immoral and therefore cannot constitute legitimate options for satisfying legal requirements. This version depends on two premises: (1) what is immoral cannot be legitimized by law (even if it might be permitted); and (2) all lies are immoral. Obviously, this is a strawman. No one seriously contends that the law does not legitimate immoral actions. And very few seriously contend that all lies are immoral. Still, the strawman version illustrates the general structure that arguments from morality will take.

The strawman Argument from Morality can be strengthened in various ways. The first premise, about what the law can and cannot legitimize, may be weakened. It could say that, in certain contexts, the law cannot legitimize what ordinary morality generally prohibits. Trade secret law makes for a good case study because trade secret law would have at least as strong a claim as any to being such a context. Though part of intellectual property, trade secret law is really a species of “unfair competition” and there is a long tradition of treating trade secret law as a codification of commercial good faith.

The strawman argument could also be strengthened by weakening the second premise. We could reject the extreme view that all lies are immoral, relying instead on ordinary morality’s general prohibition against lying.

But even so strengthened, the Argument from Morality still fails. The problem is that a general prohibition admits of exceptions or gray areas, and the trade secret case study offers numerous examples that fall within them. At minimum, the moral status of such precautions is open to question. And while the law might prohibit that which morality generally prohibits, the law is and generally should be cautious

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333 As contrasted with narrow equitable grounds, which do not foreclose the phenomenon. See supra Section II.C.

334 There is a cottage industry criticizing Kant on these grounds, else trying to save him from the absolutist view. KANT, supra note 43, at 605, 607, 611–15; Korsgaard, supra note 43, at 325–27.

335 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 141, at 312–14.


337 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM. L. INST. 1939).
about importing specific applications of purely moral principles, particularly where the moral status of a principle or its applications is disputed.

In evaluating the Argument from Morality, the moral question is thus more limited than the larger debate over whether lying and deception are generally wrong. Rather, the question is: Whatever the general moral status of lying or deception, what is the moral status of the particular deceptive practices at issue? Specifically, in these cases, is it permissible for the agent to cause, or take steps that will in part cause, the target (a) not to form a true belief (i.e., deny the target a relevant true belief); or (b) to have or form a false belief?

The project of this section is largely descriptive, not normative. The question is still: Can the law legitimize lying despite the Argument from Morality? That is, could the Argument from Morality ground any kind of broadly equitable objection that the law’s legitimization of lies is somehow legally invalid or that the decisions in the case study were wrongly decided? This is a descriptive question, even if it turns on normative questions about the moral status of lying. This Section does not address the questions: Should the law legitimize lying? Or should trade secret law be this way? Those “should” questions are normative—about whether such laws would be good ones. We begin turning to the normative in Section III.C.

1. **Methodology**

There are two general approaches to determining whether a specific lie or deceptive practice is (morally) permissible. The first considers what features, as a general matter, make deceptive practices wrong and evaluates whether those features (“wrongmakers”) are present in particular cases. This approach does not assume a general moral prohibition against lies or deceptive practices, even though (1) it may be the case that many, if not most, such practices are morally impermissible and (2) it may also be the case that it would be better for individuals to believe there to be such a general prohibition (even if there is not). The second approach takes deception to be generally prohibited, considers what features justify exceptions (if any), and evaluates whether particular practices fall within those exceptions.

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338 See, e.g., Sidgwick, supra note 41, at 488–90.
339 See, e.g., Bok, supra note 44, at 13–14, 18. The Kantian approach might be viewed under either lens but falls more naturally under the second. See, e.g., Korsgaard, supra note 43, at 341–48 (suggesting a double-level theory may forbid lying under ideal conditions but permit lying under nonideal ones). Shiffrin recently developed a similar Kantian framework but appears to take a different view.
This Article follows the first approach. However, before turning to that analysis, I address why the exception for “protective lies” does not straightforwardly apply to the case study.

2. The Exception for Protective Lies

At the outset, I set aside a notable and generally agreed-upon exception to the prohibition against lying: the exception for protective lies. I address it first both because deceptive precautions are protective lies of sorts, and because even stricter moral theories often recognize the exception. If the exception applies to a significant number of deceptive precautions, then the Argument from Morality almost certainly fails. But as will be discussed, the exception does not apply.

A defense of protective lies traditionally begins with the murderer at the door: A murderer at the door asks whether his intended victim “has taken refuge in our house” (they have) and we “cannot evade an answer of ‘yes’ or ‘no.’” May we lie to protect the intended victim? Kant infamously argued that, even under such extreme circumstances, the answer is still no: one is not permitted to lie. But this is an obviously inhumane result. The example is so compelling that Kant’s critics argue the result undermines his entire theory, while Kant’s defenders argue Kant made a mistake, that his theory is not in fact committed to such an extreme position.

The example has several features thought to warrant an exception. The murderer at the door is an evildoer. The information sought would be used to seriously harm another. Lying is necessary to conceal that information and so is necessary to protect the other person

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341 The existence of the exception is generally agreed, though its scope is not.

342 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 54, 162 & n.2 (discussing “the widespread moral belief and religious doctrine that lying sometimes is a morally justifiable response to others seeking information to which they have no right”); Shiffrin, supra note 26, at 153 (suggesting some claims made for privacy do not count as lies but without further explanation); Shiffrin, supra note 101, at 71, 79–81 (“[A]lthough their identification is a delicate matter, there seem to be some permissible cases of non-lying deception to protect one’s legitimate privacy.”).

343 Kant, supra note 43, at 611.

344 Id. at 611–15.

345 See id. Or, at least, this is what he has commonly been taken to argue. See Helga Varden, Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door . . . One More Time: Kant’s Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis, 41 J. Soc. Phil. 403, 406 (2010) (arguing that this “traditional interpretation” is “mistaken”).

346 See Korsgaard, supra note 43, at 326–28; see also Varden, supra note 345, at 405.
The murderer seeks to use the would-be liar as a tool for furthering the evil scheme and lying is the only way to avoid becoming complicit. These features are important on most views for explaining why lying under such circumstances is permissible and possibly required. But these features are critical for justifying the exception on stricter, nonconsequentialist views.

For example, Christine Korsgaard explains how even Kant’s otherwise unyielding theory can accommodate this example: Kant’s Formula of Universal Law requires that a person act only on maxims they could will to be universal law. Many commentators had thought this doomed Kant because they could not will a maxim of lying to a murderer at the door to be universal—the lie would no longer be effective. But as Korsgaard explains, the murderer would not reveal his motives. Rather, the murderer “must suppose that you do not know who he is and what he has in mind,” otherwise you would not help him. Because of this, your lie will work, even if anyone would lie under such circumstances: “the murderer supposes you do not know what circumstances you are in . . . that you do not know you are addressing a murderer—and so does not conclude from the fact that people in those circumstances always lie that you will lie.”

She concludes that, under the Formula of Universal Law, “[i]t is permissible to lie to deceivers in order to counteract the intended results of their deceptions, for the maxim of lying to a deceiver is universalizable.” But critically, this is because the murderer “has . . . placed himself in a morally unprotected position by his own deception.”

Korsgaard similarly reconciles the murderer at the door with Kant’s Formula of Humanity—the imperative that one treat others only as an end, never as mere means. On her telling, the Formula of

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347 Korsgaard, supra note 43, at 340; see also Bok, supra note 44, at 107–09; Shiffrin, supra note 26, at 35–36.
348 Korsgaard, supra note 43, at 340 (identifying self-respect as a second reason to lie to the murderer).
349 Id. at 327–30.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 329.
352 Id. Korsgaard fights the hypothetical. See id. at 330. As even she acknowledges, if “the murderer does, contrary to my supposition, announce his real intentions[,] [t]hen my arguments . . . do not apply.” Id. at 330 n.4 (“In this case, I believe your only recourse is refusal to answer (whether or not the victim is in your house, or you know his whereabouts).”). This does not affect our interest in the case, which is that the murderer’s bad actor status is critical to the existence of the exception.
353 Id. at 329–30.
354 Id. at 330.
355 Id.
Humanity best explains why Kant found lying “so horrifying”—“it is a direct violation of autonomy.” One can never assent to lying: either one does not know of the lie (e.g., a false promise to repay) and so cannot assent, or else does know, and so assents to what the liar seeks (a handout), not what the liar proposes (a loan). But for the same reason, the Formula of Humanity provides terms that can be used to “give an account . . . of what vindicates lying to a liar.” Specifically, “[t]he liar tries to use your reason as a means—your honesty as a tool.” And “[y]ou do not have to passively submit to being used as a means.” But again, critically, lying to the murderer at the door is a departure from the ideal because of the murderer’s own deception. In such circumstances, “but only then,” does ideal theory yield.

The difficulty is that trade secret law does not assume deceptive, or even bad, actors. Reasonable precautions must be taken to shield the trade secret from all actors. Fake source code is published to the world; false endings to a series to anyone who might look; car disguises to anyone who is passing by. These methods protect the secret as against illegitimate and legitimate corporate diligence alike. The exception for protective lies—for lying to a liar—does not straightforwardly apply and so does not provide an easy answer to our question about the moral status of these precautions. We are better looking elsewhere.

3. Against Global Wrongmakers

We turn to what makes lying wrong without assuming a more general prohibition against lying. One plausible explanation is that lies cause harm. Such harms fall into two categories: the first are harms caused by imparting false beliefs; the second are harms to trust. Each can affect more than the deception’s target: false beliefs may be shared and societal trust undermined. Whether a deceptive practice is wrong depends, at least in part, on whether it would lead to these harms, individually or in aggregate.

\[356\] Id. at 334.
\[357\] See id. at 332.
\[358\] Id. at 338.
\[359\] Id.
\[360\] Id.
\[361\] Id. at 349.
\[362\] See SIDGWICK, supra note 41, at 485. There is a third potential harm, namely, that the target might take offense (i.e., “feel bad”) if they discover that they were deceived or duped. But, for better or worse, the law generally does not protect against purely emotional harms.
\[363\] This manner of reasoning, based on the effects of a particular action, is generally considered consequentialist. But considering harms is also central to many other styles of ethical rea-
Another plausible explanation is the Kantian one—that lying and deception use others as mere means. This explanation has force and may be a reason why the law should not legitimize lying. But this type of explanation generally does not support the Argument from Morality. The law is generally not so strict—it is not Kantian—and importing non-harm-based moral reasons is generally cabined to those areas of the law that directly involve dignitary harms (and even then, is regrettably controversial).

Before addressing particular deceptive practices, and whether they present these wrongmakers, it is worth sketching briefly why we should not assume that deceptive practices (or, more particularly, lying) always generate these harms or have an aggregate effect that warrants a rule against such acts. I do not aim to prove why there is not a general prohibition against lying; I have assumed that there is not. But these arguments are common enough that it may be helpful to gesture at common mistakes underlying them before turning, in Section III.B.4, to why wrongmakers are not present or might be mitigated with respect to particular deceptive precautions.

a. Harms from False Beliefs

A false belief will not always harm a target, unless false beliefs are always bad. But it is not clear that all false beliefs have such dis-value; that would, in part, depend on true beliefs being intrinsically good. Although knowledge is often recognized as an end in itself,
this does not mean that all knowledge is valuable. Some true beliefs are trivial, like the knowledge that Miley Cyrus’s favorite color is purple.\textsuperscript{370} For most people, such knowledge is morally irrelevant, unless instrumental to some further end, like the pleasure of celebrity gossip. Indeed, the internet makes painfully clear that not all knowledge is valuable.

The more plausible claim is that false beliefs are instrumentally bad because an individual acting on false beliefs makes worse decisions. But this claim is also false: some false beliefs are instrumentally good, like beliefs in false deadlines (for spurring writing) or in lucky charms (for instilling courage). Other false beliefs are instrumentally neutral. And some true beliefs are instrumentally bad, as where a patient’s recovery could be jeopardized by learning the truth about their situation.\textsuperscript{371}

Whether a false belief harms the target, then, is contingent. It depends on the moral significance of the belief’s content; any emotional reaction to the belief; and the number and significance of the decisions to which the belief is relevant (what the law calls “materiality”).

But potential harm is not limited to the initial target. False beliefs spread. And poor decisions based on false beliefs can similarly cause harm. These harms must also be evaluated. Although similar considerations apply, the analysis is harder as it involves, inter alia, determining whether, how, and to whom the misinformation will spread.\textsuperscript{372} Even so, harm remains contingent. There are some false beliefs—like about Miley Cyrus’s favorite color—that are unlikely to be harmful.

One difficulty remains: even if harm is contingent, it is frequently objected that would-be liars are not well positioned to evaluate whether their lies are likely to produce harm, and, worse, may overestimate their predictive capacity.\textsuperscript{373} But the cost and likelihood of error

\textsuperscript{370} What Is Miley Cyrus’s Favourite Colour?, ANSWERS (2013), https://www.answers.com/redi-

tirectSearch?query=what%20is%20Miley%20Cyrus%E2%80%99s%20favourite%20colour&

\textsuperscript{371} This type of example has motivated the other major exception to a general prohibition—the exception for benevolent lies. See Saul, supra note 15, at 69–71; Thomas E. Hill, Autonomy and Benevolent Lies, 18 J. VALUE INQUIRY 251 (1984).

\textsuperscript{372} The manner of spreading (“how”) may matter because misinformation forwarded in “warranting contexts” is likely more harmful than if spread through “non-warranting contexts” like rumor mills.

is also contingent. And the question remains whether measures could be taken to reduce the cost and likelihood of error, as tort law arguably does for other (nondeceptive) precautions.374

b. Harm to Trust

Another commonly suggested reason why deception is generally morally problematic is that it undermines the trust needed for society to function. Recent events notwithstanding, there is reason to be skeptical of this claim.

First, empirical evidence about the actual pervasiveness of lying seems to count against this.375 If recent events suggest there is a breaking point, it has been a long time coming.376 And the trade secret case study provided many examples of lies that secure the reliability of channels—examples of lies that are trust enhancing.377

Second, it is also not necessarily a social bad for individuals to be wary of being deceived. As Henry Sidgwick points out, sometimes it is the desired result.378 Wariness is good where it deters would-be thieves. Similarly, in legitimately secretive enterprises, it might be better for individuals to be aware that information they receive may be incomplete or contain minor inaccuracies. Deception will only be effective where identifying the deceptions is difficult.379 But deceptive precautions, including lies, need not deceive to be effective,380 and

374 See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 Calif. L. REV. 772, 793–94 (1985); supra Section II.C.
375 See MacIntyre, supra note 41, at 318–22 (collecting statistics); see also Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy 85 (2002); Sidgwick, supra note 41, at 318.
376 It is difficult to summarize the current zeitgeist in a footnote. For the benefit of future readers, this Article was completed in the aftermath of the 2020 U.S. presidential election, in which President Joseph Biden was elected, then-President Donald J. Trump and many members of the Republican Party maintained that there was electoral fraud despite repeated debunking of these claims, and on January 6, 2021, a mob of Trump supporters overran the U.S. Capitol in an unsuccessful attempt to overturn the election by force. The political climate remains fraught, with both sides contending that the other misrepresents the facts and bemoans the spread of misinformation online. See, e.g., In re Rudolph W. Giuliani, 146 N.Y.S.3d 266, 272–80, 283 (App. Div. 2021) (per curiam) (“The seriousness of respondent’s uncontroverted misconduct cannot be overstated. This country is being torn apart by continued attacks on the legitimacy of the 2020 election . . . .”); Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, H.R. Res. 503, 117th Cong. (2021). For philosophical discussion, see Jeremy Waldron, Damned Lies (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 21-11, 2021).
377 See supra Part II.
378 Sidgwick, supra note 41, at 318.
379 See id. at 318–19 (explaining how deceit is “necessarily self-limiting”).
380 See supra Sections I.B, II.B.
where they do, such deception may be temporary. A general awareness that deceptive practices may be used could go a long way toward allowing individuals to protect themselves by tempering the reliance they place on information in making decisions.

4. Mitigated Wrongmakers

Having identified the primary wrongmakers—harm from false belief and harms from trust—and having gestured at why such wrongmakers are not present in all cases, we turn to whether there is a core set of legitimized lies that are likely morally unproblematic—or, at the least, whose impermissibility is sufficiently disputed. The goal is not to show that any legitimized lie is permissible. Rather, I argue that a core set is unlikely to lead to these harms, such that they are likely morally permitted or, at least, are not clearly impermissible. Neither judgment justifies treating the legitimized lies differently from other, nondeceptive practices that may play on another’s reason or otherwise risk harm. If enough such examples exist, then the gray area of deceptive practices is significant enough that the moral status of such acts cannot support the Argument from Morality against legitimizing them.

Our discussion uses examples from the trade secret case study but provides a framework that is generalizable moving forward. These examples share several features that affect whether a particular deceptive practice is likely morally permissible or at least within this gray zone: where the deceptive practice exhibits an entrapment structure; where the content of the deceptive practice is not material; where trust in a given context is inappropriate; where the target lacks a reliance interest in what is said or implied; and where signaling mitigates risk of harm. A deceptive practice need not have all these features to be permissible. Similarly, some deceptive practices may have all these features but still be impermissible. My goal is only to show that a sufficient number of deceptive practices are arguably permissible such that the Argument from Morality fails. It is important to emphasize that the question of this Section—whether the Argument from Morality succeeds or fails—is different from the all-things-considered questions of whether the law should legitimize lies and whether trade secret law should function this way, questions to which we return, briefly, in Section III.C.

381 See supra Section II.B.1.
a. Entrapment Structure

Begin with a common example: fake entries designed to catch copycats and moles. Sometimes called “Mountweazels”—after Lillian Virginia Mountweazel, a fictional photographer in The New Columbia Encyclopedia—this method of intellectual property self-help enjoys a long history that continues today.\(^{382}\) Recent examples include “equivalence,” which caught Dictionary.com copying The New Oxford American Dictionary, and “hiybbprqag,” which caught Bing copying Google search results.\(^{383}\) Variants on this precaution are increasingly common in computer security, including honeypots, honeynets, and increasingly sophisticated forms of deceptive technology.\(^{384}\)

Different variants have different targets: Some, like Mountweazels, are released to the world at large, and others, like fake authentication data, only to users on a company network. So let’s begin with a narrower, stylized version, targeting particular individuals through the use of fake codenames—a type of precaution sometimes called a “Canary Trap.”\(^{385}\)

Suppose that Yosef starts work on a top-secret project, for which Yosef (and only Yosef) is given the fake codename “Canary.” Other employees, who work separately from each other and Yosef, are each given their own codename (e.g., “Hummingbird,” “BlueJay”). If anyone leaks, the manager will know there was a leak—and its source. To avoid complications about whether mislabeling is a direct lie or merely misleading, we can consider two versions: one where a manager tells Yosef that “the product’s codename is ‘Canary,’” and one where no one tells Yosef the code name, but he reasonably infers it based on labels and actions (e.g., he is given files labeled “Canary”; his manager asks about “Canary’s status”). Call the first case, with a direct lie, “Canary,” and the second, “Canary*.”

The Canary cases exhibit an entrapment structure: they have been designed so that the only risk of harm from the false belief is to a bad

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\(^{383}\) Williams, supra note 382, at 16–18.

\(^{384}\) See id.; supra Section II.B.

actor through that bad actor’s own actions. Assuming that Yosef does not share that he is working on “Canary,” he is unlikely to be harmed by his false belief about the codename. Yosef’s false belief is only harmful if Yosef improperly communicates that false belief beyond his manager. And so any harm caused—unemployment, liability for breach and misappropriation—would be warranted by his actions; such harms would not be wrongful had management used nondeceptive means.

Because of the entrapment structure, ordinary morality and similar harm-based views will have difficulty defending the claim that Canary is wrong. To the extent the false belief generated by Canary causes harm, it only causes harm to bad actors. And any harm caused is justified by the bad actor’s bad actions. As discussed supra, the exception for lies to bad actors does not apply because many Canary cases’ targets are not bad actors. Indeed, the purpose of the deceptive practice is to distinguish good from bad targets. But the essence of that protective lies exception—that the wrong of lying be limited to bad actors in virtue of their bad acts—reinforces the permissibility of such a use. While a nonconsequentialist account of the wrong of lying that does not situate the wrong of a lie in the harm it causes might still conclude the practice is wrong because it involves or could involve lies to innocent targets, non-harm-based views are sufficiently disputed that whatever wrongness there may be does not support the Argument from Morality.386

b. Nonmateriality

The entrapment structure is not the only reason that Canary and similar precautions are unlikely to cause harm. Canary also has a low risk of harm because the false belief is not material—Yosef’s false belief about the codename is irrelevant to decisions beyond his decision to leak. If management had lied about something relevant to Yosef’s other decisions—like engineering parameters—then a resulting false belief could cause harm to others, and may even be very likely to do so. Such a deceptive practice would involve imparting a false belief that is material, and so is unlikely to be morally permitted.

Other intuitively permissible examples also exhibit nonmateriality. For example, recall the rumor that Apple monitors for leaks using

undercover security agents posing as bar patrons.\(^{387}\) That deceptive precaution operated on multiple levels: either the deception is the plainclothes security or the deception is the rumor. \textit{Neither} false belief is material to collateral decisions, other than whether to share information.\(^{388}\) The false belief is unlikely to lead to harm, and so the deceptive precaution is likely morally permissible.

This principle appears generalizable: when the number and significance of collateral decisions to which a false belief is relevant are minimal, the false belief is less likely to cause harm, and vice-versa—the greater the number or significance of collateral decisions to which a false belief might be relevant, the more \textit{material} any resulting deception and so the greater the likelihood of harm.\(^{389}\) Most intuitively benign deceptive precautions fit this bill. Coincidentally, or perhaps not so coincidentally, the law recognizes a similar materiality limitation on actionable falsehoods,\(^{390}\) though perhaps not as broadly as commonly assumed.\(^{391}\)

c. Trust and Secrecy

Entrapment and nonmateriality minimize harms from false beliefs; but what of harms to trust? Harms to trust can undermine reliable channels of communications and degrade working environments. But such harms do not necessarily undermine the permissibility of a lie, and when put in context, do not support the Argument from Morality.

First, precautions that lower workplace morale or degrade working environments are not necessarily morally impermissible. Many nondeceptive precautions reduce worker happiness, from windowless labs and fences to standard, nondeceptive monitoring. Unless taken to extremes, such precautions do not categorically raise moral problems. The same is true for deceptive precautions. There are always line-

\(^{387}\) \textit{See} Lashinsky, \textit{supra} note 176.

\(^{388}\) The case also exhibits an entrapment structure: those most likely to be harmed are precisely those who (wrongfully) share their secrets. If the ploy is a ruse, the target similarly cannot complain that they were harmed because they did not share information out of fear that their comrades were plainclothes security—they were prohibited from sharing the information in the first place.

\(^{389}\) “Relevant” is used in a loose sense, meaning something on which the listener is likely to rely in making the decision. Beliefs can affect decisions without being (rationally) relevant (e.g., as the law of evidence recognizes).


\(^{391}\) \textit{See}, e.g., Stuntz, \textit{supra} note 272, at 517–18; United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997).
drawing problems. But some reduction in workplace quality is permitted, and that is all that is needed to defeat the Argument from Morality, which is categorical in nature.

Second, not all harms to trust are impermissible, as the Apple rumor illustrates. Employees should be wary of trusting that fellow bar patrons are who they say. They should be particularly wary if they intend to discuss confidential information, but also about inconsequential details, which hackers leverage to defeat security.392

Critically, the harms to trust from these cases are not global. For example, even if Yosef were to learn about the lie, his mistrust is unlikely to extend beyond his manager. Companies should consider these costs but such costs do not necessarily constitute a wrong.

d. Reliance Interests and Channels

Entrapment structure and immateriality are explanatorily powerful for many seemingly permissible precautions. But these features do not fully explain others that are intuitively unproblematic.

Recall how a former car engineer and her team would put fake car parts on road-test vehicles to keep new features secret from competitors’ photographers.393 The fake car parts served as decoys—not just mere covers—so that the photographers would focus on the decoy and not the actual innovation. In this way, the “Car Costumes” were not merely designed to deny a true belief about the innovation, but to instill a false—if fleeting—belief about what to photograph.

This deception is intuitively permissible—so much so that some have called this example “uninteresting.” But it is difficult to explain why, which makes it, philosophically, very interesting.

The deception lacks an entrapment structure: The target photographer is not a bad actor. She does not breach any duty owed the manufacturer. She does not trespass. And the car is driven in public, without expectation of privacy from passers-by. If the team did not use a decoy, the photographer would not be liable for misappropriation—trade secret law protects only against illicit takings, not competitive research or reverse engineering.394

And the deception is material: the photographer is misled about how to focus when the car is in frame.

392 See generally, e.g., MITNICK & SIMON, supra note 225.
393 See supra Section II.B.1.
394 See supra Section II.A.
A commonly offered explanation is that the photographer does not have a right to the information. But this does not explain the intuition about this case: that someone lacks a right to some piece of information does not justify any means of withholding it from them. The public arguably did not have a right to know about President Clinton’s relationship with Monica Lewinsky, but that would not justify lying under oath.395

Other intuitively permissible precautions exhibit similar features as Car Costumes: posting fake source code following a breach to obscure which, if any, was real (“Fake Code”); and using multiple endings and mislabeled scripts to keep secret a series’ finale (“Fake Finale”).396 Both lack an entrapment structure. The misrepresentations in Fake Code may be material to, inter alia, coders making decisions about their own work or who might waste time on dead ends based on the putative source code. The misrepresentations in Fake Finale are material to many of its targets, including reporters, employees, and possibly even fans.397

Note an interesting feature of these cases: the deception only harms the target if she relies on the misrepresentation. There are two ways to avoid this harm: either the engineering team (or studio, or Cisco) does not use the deceptive precaution, or the targets do not rely on the deceptive precaution. A common assumption among those who advocate a strong prohibition on lying is that the interest in relying is, in some sense, primary: the default is that one is entitled to rely.398 But it appears that ordinary morality does not make this same assumption.399

A tradeoff must be made between the value of using the deceptive practice and the value of the respective targets’ interest in relying. In particular, the value of being able to shield information with falsehood must be weighed against the value of being able to rely on representations made in various contexts—on different “channels,” to borrow Shiffrin’s term.400 Where the balance tips in favor of reliance,

395 See SAUL, supra note 15, at 118–26, for a nuanced discussion of this case.

396 See supra Section II.B.

397 A false belief about the series finale may be very material to fans—they may have wagered a large sum based on it.

398 Cf. SHIFFRIN, supra note 26, at 9, 17–28 (discussing how reliance on deception lends support to the prohibition of lying).

399 Cf. SIDGWICK, supra note 41, at 318 (“[I]t is not necessarily an evil that men’s confidence in each other’s assertions should, under certain peculiar circumstances, be impaired or destroyed: it may even be the very result which we should most desire to produce . . . .”).

400 See SHIFFRIN, supra note 26, at 2–3.
there is a reliance interest. Where it does not, there is none; one relies on that channel at her own peril.

In the trade secret context, the value of the precaution can be great: it has value both for the trade secret owner and also for society, assuming trade secret law picks out information the secrecy of which it is socially valuable to protect. The precaution may also prevent wasteful expenditure on additional precautions and, if effective, stop a race to the bottom.401

In some of these cases, there would not seem to be a strong reliance interest on the other side. In Car Costumes, the balance tips against the photographer’s interest in relying on appearances on the street.402 And in Fake Code, it is hard to argue that there is a strong reliance interest in the veracity of random message board postings. Of course, there could be complications where a deceptive practice has multiple targets with different reliance interests (e.g., Fake Finale) or where a precaution, like Fake Code, excessively pollutes a channel with misinformation. These are important problems for future work about which channels to protect and how.403 But all that is needed for our purposes is that some plausible number of such precautions could be designed to avoid those complications, and it appears they can.

e. Channels and Signaling

Some precautions that might not otherwise be permissible could become permissible if done correctly. Fake Finale illustrates this complexity because the deceptive practices (filming multiple endings, mislabeled scripts) have diffuse targets who differ in morally significant ways. There are media outlets seeking a scoop; employees (production teams, actors, staff); and fans.

Spying media outlets do not raise problems: If they are bad actors who, for example, seek information in violation of nondisclosure agreements, then the precaution has an entrapment structure. Or, if

401 See supra Section II.D.

402 The visual aspect seemingly renders this obvious: “Appearances can be deceiving,” the saying goes, suggesting you rely on appearances at your peril. But photography’s seeming accuracy has made many forget the conventional wisdom. Deciding which visual channels to protect, and how, is increasingly important. See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 Yale J.L. & Humans. 1; Joshua Rothman, In the Age of A.I., Is Seeing Still Believing?, New Yorker (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/11/12/in-the-age-of-ai-is-seeing-still-believing [https://perma.cc/CH7G-YKWX].

403 See infra Part IV.
they merely observe public filming, there is no reliance interest as in Car Costumes.

Fans are similar: Their reliance interest on reports about the series’ finale are at best weak. Complaints about fake news in tabloids and entertainment circulars usually focus on the harm to the subjects of that news, not its audience. If one believes everything in Us Weekly, one has only oneself to blame.

But employees present a difficulty. Although some might be bad actors who would leak, others are not. A false belief about the finale is likely very material: employees have collateral decisions about career opportunities, to which the false belief is relevant (e.g., do they love the script?). And their reliance interest is strong, as employees cannot avoid such decisions or basing them, in part, on representations the studio makes. If there is no way to differentiate between these targets, the potential harm to employees would seem to count against the practice’s permissibility.

The moral difficulty is that the employees have a strong reliance interest, and so deceiving them—imparting a false belief—is likely wrong. But morality does not require the studio to disclose the truth, or even completely refrain from risking some harm. And the studio could mitigate the risk of harm, by reducing the risk of imparting a false belief or by weakening the reliance interest. If the studio sufficiently mitigates this risk, the deceptive practice is likely permissible.

How might such mitigation be achieved? By signaling to employees that communications and appearances relating to the finale (or other important plot developments) may not be reliable. Such signaling could be achieved through formal warnings in contract or employee guidelines, and informally through creative jokes. By signaling that certain communications may be unreliable, the studio does not deceive its employees as to the credibility of inferences they might make about certain subjects—about which channels of communications between them and the studio are reliable. If employees rely on such communications anyway, they do so at their own peril; but critically, they realize (or should realize) that it is at their own peril.

This signaling approach may not be appropriate in all circumstances. But that is not my claim. My claim is only that it is appropri-

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405 See GREEN, supra note 53, at 78–79. Reportedly, some actors prefer to be lied to in this manner; it relieves pressure of keeping the truth secret. See Tyler, supra note 169.
ate in this case, where the studio was already presumed to be excused from imparting true beliefs.

Something similar likely applies in other cases. Several deceptive precautions, like Mountweazels, use signaling to mitigate risk of harm from false beliefs by cautioning innocent targets against reliance, thereby creating or reinforcing an entrapment structure. Although hidden to trap wrongdoers, the signals become clear upon closer examination: Ms. Mountweazel’s work, titled “Flags Up!,” suggests caution.\footnote{Williams, supra note 382, at 22.} Further examination shows she was born in “Bangs, Ohio,” and died with pleasing symmetry “in an explosion while on assignment for Combustibles magazine.”\footnote{Williams, supra note 382, at 20–25.} These are “too neat a coincidence. Pop! goes the weasel, indeed.”\footnote{Williams, supra note 382, at 20–25.} There are more and less ethical ways to lie.

5. Direct Lies and Merely Misleading

There might remain a concern that, even if the deceptions involved are not problematic, deceptive precautions that require the use of a direct lie—affirmative, direct statements that are intentionally false—are prohibited. If that is so, then to the extent that one of the above deceptions depends on the use of a direct lie, the deceptive precaution should not be permitted even if the deception itself—the imparting of a false belief—would have been morally permissible. This might be troubling for two reasons: first, many of the precautions that are seemingly innocuous, such as phishing simulations and IP masking, seem to require a “direct lie” of sorts (taking the emission of an IP address to constitute a “statement”); and second, it may not always be clear how to draw the line between mere misleading and direct lies.\footnote{For instance, is IP masking correctly characterized as a direct lie? See Saul, supra note 15, for how existing philosophical theories about “what is said” are inadequate for distinguishing between direct lies and merely misleading.}

This concern ought be dismissed. As several philosophers have argued, the mechanism of deception—whether a direct lie or merely misleading—is generally \textit{not} morally significant to whether the conduct is permissible.\footnote{See, e.g., Saul, supra note 15, at 69–99; Williams, supra note 375, at 108; Sidgwick, supra note 41, at 317. But see generally Shiffrin, supra note 26.}
The most convincing argument for this position is a highly technical one in the philosophy of language. I will not repeat it here, except to suggest in broad strokes why the reader should not find the claim shocking—as many do.

The problem has to do with communications and with what the listener is entitled to believe based on what is said. Some have suggested that there is a difference between what is said and what is implied: listeners “are entitled to simply believe what is said . . . but if something is not said but merely communicated, we have no such entitlement.” Various reasons have been suggested for this principle of “caveat auditor” or listener beware: the speaker does not say what they merely imply and so cannot be responsible for the listener’s inferences; the listener makes the inference and so is the one responsible; or the listener could question or clarify what is implied and so fails to do so at his peril (unlike direct lies which permit of no questioning). But the difficulty is that for communications to succeed, listeners must assume that their interlocutors are playing by the same language rules, not only in what they assert but also in what they imply, and infer meaning accordingly. Merely misleading plays on the fact that the listener must make these inferences for communications to succeed. Bernard Williams explains this simply:

If the circumstances are those of “normal trust” . . . the hearer will take for granted as much what I imply as what I assert; if he has reasons to be suspicious, he is as free to apply his suspicions to what I assert as to what I imply.

Because lying is not morally worse than deception, where deceptions are permitted, so too might direct lies. That a deceptive practice involves direct lies does not necessarily render it impermissible. This is enough to defeat the Argument from Morality, though there may still be normative significance to the distinction, as I discuss next.

C. Lying About Legitimizing

A residual unease might remain: Even if lying is permissible, it is better if people do not believe that lying is permissible. If that is so,
then it is alarming that the law treats deception as a legitimate option for fulfilling legal requirements because, in legitimizing lies, the law legitimizes a principle that should be not be widely known or accepted.\textsuperscript{419} This charge has more force than the more permissive or neutral accounts usually give it credit, in part because the law’s toleration or even incentivizing of permissive lies does not raise the charge quite so squarely as does law’s legitimization of lies. Responding to it will reveal something further about the complex nature of law’s commitment to truth.

The charge has force because it is important that people are disposed to be sincere, even if they often fail to be truthful.\textsuperscript{420} Even Sidgwick, a consequentialist who doubted the prohibition on lying, agreed that “no one doubts that it is, \textit{generally speaking}, conducive to the common happiness that men should be veracious.”\textsuperscript{421} A failure to take this seriously is, perhaps, one of the strongest objections against traditions that do not prohibit lying or that collapse the distinction between lying and mere misleading.\textsuperscript{422}

It is sometimes thought that the reason this disposition matters has to do with the difficulty of cabining lying to those cases where it is warranted. This disposition is already precarious, as evidenced by the ease with which people resort to lies.\textsuperscript{423} The disposition might be destroyed if it were widely believed that deception is not only legally permissible, but often sanctioned by law. This seems to be the lesson of Silicon Valley vaporware and Theranos, and maybe modern politics: lying begets lies.\textsuperscript{424}

But that is not the only, or even the most valuable, part of the disposition. The important insight of Kant, or at least the view ascribed to him, is that the choice to lie reveals something fundamental about our attitudes toward others. Attempts at deception are at-


\textsuperscript{420} For interesting discussions, see Williams, supra note 375, at 84–122; Markovits, supra note 19.

\textsuperscript{421} SIDGWICK, supra note 41, at 485.

\textsuperscript{422} See Saul, supra note 15, at 86; Lynch, supra note 299, at 636.


\textsuperscript{424} See generally Bok, supra note 44.
tempts at using another’s reason—their ability to make autonomous, rational choices—as a mere tool, a lever to be pushed or pulled. In a word, lying is manipulative.

For this reason, on many readings of Kant, coercion and deception are regarded as “the most fundamental forms of wrongdoing to others—the roots of all evil.” Even if it were permissible to lie in some situations, believing this to be so—thinking of it as allowed—speaks volumes about how we view each other or think we should view each other. It is not just our disposition toward sincerity that might save us from lying in the wrong circumstances. It is really our disposition toward each other that honesty about lying puts at risk.

The law’s legitimizing lying is thus a real concern, not easily dismissed, and concerning in a way that the law’s toleration of lies is not. Toleration does not have the same expressive force as legitimizing—as treating lying as a legitimate option, the best option, the only option. These concerns are why those who might dismiss my claim as obvious, adding only incrementally to the story that law and economics has already told, are mistaken.

So what to do? There are two options. One might conclude that the law should not be this way, that it should not legitimize lies. Or one might conclude that the law should legitimize lies, but it would be better if no one believed that it did.

If it would be better that no one believed the law legitimizes lying, this project might seem doomed. Indeed, some philosophers think that moral theories that recommend they ought not be believed cannot be correct moral theories. But the law differs from morality in important ways, and this may be one.

For now, I observe only that the law already demonstrates it has a solution: the law lies about the problem. “Puffery,” “deflection,” “bluffing,” “legal fictions”—these are all terms that the law and legal theorists have used to suggest that permissible lies are somehow not lies. And in so doing, the law may walk a line between maintaining

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425 Korsgaard, supra note 43, at 331–33 (“The question whether another can assent to your way of acting can serve as a criterion for judging whether you are treating her as a mere means.”).

426 Id. at 333.

427 See supra Section II.D.

428 See, e.g., Sidgwick, supra note 41, at 485–92.

429 See Parfit, supra note 363, at 40–43.

430 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 50, at 1400–01 (puffery); Shifferin, supra note 26, at 153 (deflection); Robert A. Wenke, The Art of Negotiation for Lawyers 33 (1985) (bluffing); Fuller, supra note 98, at 366–68 (defining legal fictions). Whether this amounts to “legal hypoc-
a belief in a general prohibition and applying a more flexible, and possibly better, rule.

If this is a good solution (work for another time), then we have learned something else about the relationship between law and lying. Contrary to what others have argued, the law’s deception and apparent inconsistency is a feature, not a bug.

But if that’s the case, why unearth this feature? As we turn to next, there is something useful and urgent, for scholars at least, about not indulging this particular deception.

IV. TOWARD AN ETHICS OF DECEPTION

Once you see the phenomenon—that the law treats lying as a legitimate option and maybe sometimes the only option—you begin to see it everywhere. It appears in security debates about whether the government can require companies to leave up their warrant canaries once the canaries become untrue, in jury instructions that insist juries adhere to the law when they could nullify it, in privacy debates about criminal record expungement, in fiduciary duties, and ethical duties at the bargaining table. And then there are questions about how far these conclusions reach once the door is opened: Could
the failure to engage in certain protective lies open up criminal or tort liability under theories of aiding and abetting? If you refuse to lie to the terrorist at the door, have you offered him material assistance? Could an attorney really—ethically—advise their client to lie?

What might seem a niche question of trade secret law—an area of law itself no longer niche—is not so limited. Correcting our understanding of the relevant practices reveals the breadth of the law’s permission of lies, and the case study shows its depth. And that the law legitimizes lies has significant implications for understanding the law’s relationship to truth.

Is this reality a good thing? Should the law legitimize lies? I’m not convinced that this is the right question to ask. As argued in Section III.C, the law has resources for mitigating that harm: unlike an ethical theory, the law can lie. This means that the critical question is not about justification, but about practicality. Section IV.A turns to what that practicality involves. Section IV.B concludes by reflecting on its urgency.

A. Lying as Dual-Use Technology

This Article’s trade secret law case study offers an important insight about deceptive practices: they are just another tool in the security arsenal. Some deceptive practices are excluded, as exceeding the bounds of permissible conduct, much as some extreme security precautions (e.g., murder) would also not be recognized. But there are many precautions that clearly satisfy a requirement of trade secret law, though they risk harm. Like guns, guards, and nondisclosure agreements, deceptive practices can be used responsibly or illicitly. There is nothing special about them—to the law, lies are simply a dual-use technology.

The natural next question, then, is a practical one: How ought one to lie? What risks do different deceptive precautions create and how can the law mitigate them? How do we measure their costs, both internal to the company and external? And how do we minimize them?

I argued tort law is better positioned than trade secret law to address these questions. The normative upshot is we should spend time thinking about whether tort law is up to the task, and if not, how

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437 See supra Sections I.B, II, III.A.
438 See supra Part III.
439 See supra Section II.C.
to fix it. These are also issues for business and professional ethics to take up, to fill gaps the law cannot reach.

To this end, we need a better theory of how to lie—legally and ethically. The existing legal landscape is quite complicated, as Section II.C supra explained. The limits on lying are significant and the penalties potentially steep. Not all such limits would be enforced, and not all are enforceable under the First Amendment. Civil liability, both for taking or failing to take certain deceptive measures, is potentially large. And in some instances, the technology and cyberlaw governing it are quite complicated. I may disagree with those who have advocated for a unified theory of the law’s approach to deception. But I very much agree that deception is worthy as a discipline. As a practical matter, if nothing else, deception specialists are needed.

We made some progress on the ethical front in Section III.B.4, identifying features that make deceptive practices more or less acceptable. These features include entrapment, materiality, and the absence of relevant reliance interests. And we identified one method—signaling—for further reducing harm where reliance interests exist and materiality cannot be further minimized. This ethical analysis provides tools for practitioners: levers to pull as they design deceptive practices. For example, just because most phishing simulations are innocuous (“Your package has arrived!”) doesn’t mean that all would be (“Click for information about COVID-19”). The question is not whether to use this technology, but how to properly design it.

Changing the framing leads to these important practical questions. Recognizing that the law legitimizes certain lies brings us to a more neutral position. It snaps us out of the old debate of looking to justify a prohibition against lies or exceptions to it, out of arguing

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440 See, e.g., Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause, supra note 56, at 469–81 (evaluating advantages and disadvantages of three legal approaches for identifying the deceptive conduct to be regulated).

441 See Stuntz, supra note 272.


443 See supra Section III.C.

444 See Levmore, Theory of Deception, supra note 18; Klass, supra note 14; Craswell, supra note 18.

445 See supra Section III.B.4.

446 See supra Section III.B.4.

about whether the exceptions would undermine the rule, out of debating whether what someone did was in fact a lie and therefore wrong. At least momentarily, it snaps us out of panicking over deep fakes and misinformation on the internet and the urge to shore up what feels like a crumbling commitment to the truth. It focuses us on the question of how to use the tools at hand.

This is not to say we can’t make use of the old debates. One of the advantages of calling a lie a lie—at least in the scholarly hallways, but perhaps also back in chambers—is the wealth of resources that become obviously relevant. When lies are dismissed as mere “puffery,” for example, this can lend itself to an “I know it when I see it” approach. But puffery is not different because it is somehow a different category that can be seen; it comes down to, or should come down to, the harms at stake and whether the particular speech act creates them. Getting better at that analysis of harms is necessary for mitigating risks.

There is another advantage to recognizing lies as dual-use technology, instead of pretending deceptive precautions are somehow different in kind from their more nefarious counterparts: there is a whole literature on managing dual-use technologies, a concept here borrowed from security studies. You gain the resources for dealing with such dual-use practices. And some of the more sophisticated existing accounts of the practicalities of deception are in the context of war. It is time to bring them to bear in a civilian context.

B. The Surveillance Monster at the Door

Lies will also become increasingly important. Return for a moment to one of the trade-secret study’s examples: posting fabricated computer code online and misrepresenting its source to obscure which (if any) versions are authentic. While the Cisco example was ex post, coming after the misappropriation had already occurred, there is a question about whether such precautions should be taken preemptively. This question has been raised in the context of data privacy—about the protections companies should take to protect consumer

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448 Cf. Hoffman, supra note 50, at 1416.

449 See id.


451 For example, philosopher Cécile Fabre has a recently published book on the ethics of foreign espionage and counterintelligence. See Cécile Fabre, Spying Through a Glass Darkly (2022).

452 See supra Section II.B.2.
data for consumers’ sake. Indeed, negligence law does not wait for custom to catch up.

This misinformation practice would reduce the reliability of information communication channels that seek to trade in such information, which consequentialists and nonconsequentialists alike identify as a problem with lying. But is it? Must the reliability of all communication channels be maintained? Perhaps it is time to consider the practical wisdom of the law’s channeling function to different tiers of communication or types of communications.

The case study allows us to address these issues without the complications of individual privacy rights or personal relationships. But deceptive practices are of increasing importance in these and other spheres as well.

The age of big data has already shown that companies do not need to lie to manipulate you—to present accurate information in a way to which you will predictably respond, using your reason as mere means, or to bypass your reason entirely. If you do not take the extreme measure of opting out of connected society altogether (even assuming you could), you will have no choice but to disclose or to obfuscate. Many have already chosen the latter. And if lies are to be used as tools, we would do well to think carefully about how to use them, and how to regulate them, without fully curbing their use. We need a theory of how to lie.

**Conclusion**

This Article’s conclusion, that the law legitimizes lying, challenges commonly held assumptions about how the law addresses the truth. In

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454 See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.).
455 See Porat & Yadlin, supra note 24, at 624, 631–33; Shiffrin, supra note 26, at 1, 136–38.
456 Cf., e.g., Hasday, supra note 26 (describing deception in the context of personal relationships, the often horrific consequences, and how the law does not effectively protect people who have been deceived).
457 See Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 21–22, 29–34 (2019) (“Manipulation, therefore, need not involve outright deception; the truth can also be used to control our decision-making.”); cf. Julie E. Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Information Capitalism 95–97 (2019) (describing how accurate information like required labeling and disclosures can be manipulated to target likely consumers by “crafting appeals based on their habits and predilections”).
458 See supra note 423 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 431–35 and accompanying text.
shifting the conversation, problems with the traditional focus on prohibitions, exceptions, and justifications of lies become clear: the traditional focus obscures important practical questions that appear when one takes lying seriously as a protective tool, as the law of trade secrets does.

These practical questions—about how to lie ethically and legally—are of increasing urgency as society finds itself caught between online misinformation and pervasive surveillance. Deceptive precautions are already a standard part of cybersecurity and there is a nearly $2-billion-and-growing market for “deception technology.” The need for deception specialists is clear.

Raising these questions is an important first step. Answering them fully is the work of future scholarship. But this Article lays the foundation for doing so. Rebutting the Argument from Morality, in particular, foregrounds several features that mitigate the risks posed by lying: where the deception exhibits an entrapment structure, where the content of the deception is not material, where trust in a given context is inappropriate, where the deception’s target lacks a reliance interest in suggestions made or implied by the deceiver, and where the deceiver signals that its representations are less than reliable. These and other features need to be more fully developed. But moving away from the justification question and toward practical questions about managing what is, in fact, a dual-use security technology, is a good and necessary start.