

Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History

Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions

Parole Administrative Appeal Documents

December 2020

Administrative Appeal Decision - Lane, Rakeem (2019-05-10)

Follow this and additional works at: <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad>

Recommended Citation

"Administrative Appeal Decision - Lane, Rakeem (2019-05-10)" (2020). Parole Information Project
<https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/358>

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Lane, Rakeem

Facility: Gowanda CF

NYSID: [REDACTED]

Appeal Control No.: 08-030-18 B

DIN: 18-B-0960

Appearances: Charles Greenberg Esq.
3840 East Robinson Road
#318
Amherst, New York 14228

Decision appealed: July 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 15 months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Coppola, Demosthenes, Drake

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received February 22, 2019

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

 Affirmed ___ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview ___ Modified to ___

Commissioner

 Affirmed ___ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview ___ Modified to ___

Commissioner

 Affirmed ___ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview ___ Modified to ___

Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 5/10/19 66.

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Lane, Rakeem

DIN: 18-B-0960

Facility: Gowanda CF

AC No.: 08-030-18 B

Findings: (Page 1 of 6)

Appellant challenges the July 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 15-month hold. Appellant's instant offense is for drunk driving. Appellant raises the following claims: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the decision violated his constitutional liberty interest in release. 3) the decision lacks details. 4) no aggravating factors exist. 5) the Board releases inmate with far worse records. 6) the decision illegally resentenced him. 7) the decision was predetermined. 8) the interview was conducted in a hostile and biased manner. 9) the decision is based upon erroneous information in the COMPAS and the Parole Board Report (how many prior felonies, and not on parole/probation when committing the instant offense). 10) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that a fully completed TAP was not done, and, the statutes are now future focused.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Lane, Rakeem

DIN: 18-B-0960

Facility: Gowanda CF

AC No.: 08-030-18 B

Findings: (Page 2 of 6)

That inmate's prior criminal record and nature of offenses for which incarcerated resulted in parole denial does not reflect irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Singh v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 1209, 987 N.Y.S.2d 271 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 906, 995 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2014). The Board is obligated to consider the inmate's prior criminal record. Matter of Partee v Evans, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014); Applewhite v New York State Board of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, 91 N.Y.S.3d 308 (3d Dept. 2018). The Board may put more weight on the inmate's criminal history. Bello v Board of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Hall v New York State Division of Parole, 66 A.D.3d 1322, 886 N.Y.S.2d 835 (3d Dept. 2009); Davis v Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Jones v New York State Parole Board, 127 A.D.3d 1327, 6 N.Y.S.3d 774 (3d Dept. 2015); Wade v Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate's criminal history, and not to an alleged positive institutional adjustment, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. Matter of Ortiz v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 735, 465 N.Y.S.2d 341 (4th Dept 1983); Peo. ex rel. Yates v. Walters, 111 A.D.2d 839, 490 N.Y.S.2d 573 (2d Dept. 1985); Matter of Ristau v. Hammock, 103 A.D.2d 944, 479 N.Y.S.2d 760 (3d Dept. 1984) lv. to appeal den. 63 N.Y.2d 608, 483 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1984); Torres v New York State Division of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 128, 750 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1st Dept 2002); Lashway v Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1420, 973 N.Y.S.2d 496 (3d Dept. 2013).

The Board may cite an inmate's prior history of irresponsible driving in its decision. Confoy v New York State Division of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept 1991); Wade v Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). [REDACTED] Mclain v New York State Division of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629, 630 (2d Dept 1994).

The Board may consider an inmate's need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying parole. See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001).

There is no evidence the Board's decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000).

There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative factfinders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept.

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Lane, Rakeem

DIN: 18-B-0960

Facility: Gowanda CF

AC No.: 08-030-18 B

Findings: (Page 3 of 6)

2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).

There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed from such bias. Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of Grune v. Board of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007). No such support exists in this case.

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Lane, Rakeem

DIN: 18-B-0960

Facility: Gowanda CF

AC No.: 08-030-18 B

Findings: (Page 4 of 6)

at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also *Barna v. Travis*, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); *Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole*, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest in parole release. *Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole*, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); *Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole*, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (3d Dept. 2003); *Matter of Vineski v. Travis*, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).

Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. *Duемmel v Fischer*, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria. *Haymes v Regan*, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). The due process clause is not violated by the Board's balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be second guessed by the courts. *Mathie v Dennison*, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); *MacKenzie v Cunningham*, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to conditions imposed by the state legislature. *Banks v Stanford*, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).

The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any aggravating factors. *Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole*, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).

As for other inmates, there is no entitlement to parole based upon comparison with the particulars of other applicants. Rather, each case is sui generis, and the Board may give each case a unique weighted value. *Phillips v Dennison*, 41 A.D.3d 17, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dept. 2007).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. *Hodge v Griffin*, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing *Romer v Travis*, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. *Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole*, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. *Ward v City of Long Beach*, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. *Siao-Paul v. Connolly*, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board's determination was affected by a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. *Matter of Silmon v Travis*, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); *Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole*, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Lane, Rakeem

DIN: 18-B-0960

Facility: Gowanda CF

AC No.: 08-030-18 B

Findings: (Page 5 of 6)

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Concerning alleged errors on the COMPAS and the Parole Board Report, none of these items appear in the final Board decision. Erroneous information, if not used in the decision as a basis for parole denial, will not lead to a reversal. Matter of Khatib v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Restivo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1096, 895 N.Y.S.2d 555 (3d Dept. 2010) [status report]; Matter of Grune v. Bd. of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007)[status report]; see also Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017) [misstatement by commissioner in interview that inmate did not correct]; Matter of Perea v. Stanford, 149 A.D.3d 1392, 53 N.Y.S.3d 231 (3d Dept. 2017) [erroneous information in PBR which inmate corrected during interview]. Nor did appellant raise these matters during the interview, thereby waiving them. . Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000); See Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017).

Appellant's contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 Amendments to the Executive Law is likewise without merit. Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented a fundamental change in the legal regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on forward-looking factors, this proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. The Board still must conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014). Thus, even where the First Department has “take[n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]”, it has nonetheless reiterated that “[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every factor equal weight” and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize “factors which emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors”. Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Lane, Rakeem

DIN: 18-B-0960

Facility: Gowanda CF

AC No.: 08-030-18 B

Findings: (Page 6 of 6)

In making a parole release decision, the Board must consider the most current case plan that may have been prepared by DOCCS. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(b). Correction Law 71-a specifically directs DOCCS, and not the Parole Board, to develop the Case Plan. Rivera v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014). Due to appellant's short time in prison before becoming immediately parole eligible, a TAP/Case Plan could not be prepared.

Recommendation: Affirm.