

Fordham Law School

## FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History

---

Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions

Parole Administrative Appeal Documents

---

December 2020

### Administrative Appeal Decision - Austin, Patrick (2019-02-14)

Follow this and additional works at: <https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad>

---

#### Recommended Citation

"Administrative Appeal Decision - Austin, Patrick (2019-02-14)" (2020). Parole Information Project  
<https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/341>

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [tmelnick@law.fordham.edu](mailto:tmelnick@law.fordham.edu).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE**

**Name:** Austin, Patrick

**Facility:** Great Meadow CF

**NYSID:** [REDACTED]

**Appeal Control No.:** 07-034-18 B

**DIN:** 90-A-9824

Appearances: Andre Sedlak  
11 Market Street  
Suite 205  
Poughkeepsie, New York 12601

Decision appealed: June 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12-months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Drake, Cruse


Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received December 5, 2018


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

  **Affirmed**     **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview**     **Modified to** \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

  **Affirmed**     **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview**     **Modified to** \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

  **Affirmed**     **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview**     **Modified to** \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

**If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.**

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 2/14/19 66.

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Austin, Patrick

**DIN:** 90-A-9824

**Facility:** Great Meadow CF

**AC No.:** 07-034-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 1 of 7)

---

Appellant challenges the June 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 12-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues in a lengthy and repetitive brief: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. The Board ignored his institutional record and only looked at the instant offenses. 2) the Board failed to make required findings of fact or to provide any detail. 3) the decision lacks future guidance. 4) the decision illegally resentenced him. 5) the decision violated the due process clause of the constitution. 6) no aggravating factors exist. 7) the prison term for all but one of the instant offenses have expired. 8) the Board failed to review his sentencing minutes. 9) the Board ignored his youth at the time of the crime, per the Hawkins decision. 10) the decision was due to a political policy of the Governor to deny parole release to all violent felons. 11) by having only two Commissioners, bias was present. 12) information was not properly furnished to his attorney on appeal, in violation of the right to counsel and 6<sup>th</sup> amendment confrontation clauses of the constitution. 13) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that no TAP was done, the COMPAS was ignored, and the statutes are now present/future focused. And the COMPAS has an error on it. 14) the 12 month hold is excessive.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Austin, Patrick

**DIN:** 90-A-9824

**Facility:** Great Meadow CF

**AC No.:** 07-034-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 2 of 7)

---

Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017).

The Board may consider an inmate's need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying parole. See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001).

The Board may consider an inmate's failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole. See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).

Appellant had some negative COMPAS scores. The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).

That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.” Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute. Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Austin, Patrick

**DIN:** 90-A-9824

**Facility:** Great Meadow CF

**AC No.:** 07-034-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 3 of 7)

---

v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. Matter of Francis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).

Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any aggravating factors. Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).

An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

Completion of the minimum term of the sentence still does not create any protected liberty interest. Motti v Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 1114, 1115 (3d Dept. 2008).

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Austin, Patrick

**DIN:** 90-A-9824

**Facility:** Great Meadow CF

**AC No.:** 07-034-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 4 of 7)

---

Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. Duettel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria. Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). The due process clause is not violated by the Board's balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013).

The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board's determination was affected by a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

That the term for one of the instant offenses has expired does not mean he has completed that sentence. Per Penal Law 70.30(1)(a) all maximums of concurrent multiple indeterminate sentences merge and are satisfied by the discharge of the term which has the longest unexpired term to run. People v Buss, 11 N.Y.3d 553; Lynch v Smith, 123 A.D.3d 1279, 999 N.Y.S.2d 219 (3d Dept. 2014). Per Penal Law §70.30(1)(b), the minimum and maximum sentences of the two indeterminate consecutive sentences are added to form aggregate minimum and aggregate maximum wholes. Thus, per Executive Law S259-i(3)(d)(iii), an inmate's eligibility for parole release and appearance before the Board are governed by the legal requirements of the new indeterminate sentence. Santiago v Alexander, 80 A.D.3d 1105, 916 N.Y.S.2d 529 (3d Dept.

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Austin, Patrick

**DIN:** 90-A-9824

**Facility:** Great Meadow CF

**AC No.:** 07-034-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 5 of 7)

---

2011). Per Penal Law 70.30(1), concurrent sentences and consecutive sentences yield single sentences, either by merger when concurrent, or by addition when consecutive, and they then aggregate into a single sentence. People v Brinson, 90 A.D.3d 670, 933 N.Y.S.2d 728 (3d Dept. 2011), Charles v New York State Department of Correctional Services, 96 A.D.3d 1341, 948 N.Y.S.2d 172 (3d Dept. 2012); Baez v Superintendent Queesnboro Correctional Facility, 127 A.D.3d 110, 5 N.Y.S.3d 216 (2d Dept. 2015). Thus, NYSDOCCS aggregates the sentences into a single, combined sentence, and the inmate is not sequentially completing his punishment for each particular conviction. People v Almestica, 97 A.D.3d 834, 949 N.Y.S.2d 425 (2d Dept. 2012). Per Penal law 70.30(1)(b), the inmate is subject to all the sentences that make up the merged or aggregate sentence he is serving, and the Parole Board may consider the facts of those crimes for those sentences that would have otherwise expired if not for the merger. Dawes v Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014).

Appellant was over the age of 18 when he committed this crime. Contrary to Appellant's claim, Matter of Hawkins v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 140 A.D.3d 34, 30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 400 (3d Dept. 2016) – which requires consideration of youth and its attendant characteristics for inmates serving a maximum life sentence for crimes committed as juveniles – does not apply whereas here the inmate was an adult when he committed the instant offense. Matter of Cobb v Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1500, 59 N.Y.S.3d 915 (3d Dept. 2017) (Hawkins inapplicable to offender who was over 18 at time of offense); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (distinguishing juveniles under 18 from adults).

There is no merit to the claim the Board failed to consider the sentencing minutes, as they are included in the record, and the Board mentioned them during the interview. Shark v New York State Division of Parole Chair, 110 A.D.3d 1134, 972 N.Y.S.2d 741 (3d Dept. 2013).

Per the cited regulation, only two Commissioners are required to conduct the Board interview. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative factfinders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed from such bias. Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of Grune v. Board of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007). No evidence of any bias exists.

There is no merit to the claim that the Board decision was predetermined based on an alleged

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Austin, Patrick

**DIN:** 90-A-9824

**Facility:** Great Meadow CF

**AC No.:** 07-034-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 6 of 7)

---

executive policy to deny parole to violent felony offenders. Allegations that the Board has systematically denied parole to prisoners convicted of violent crimes have been dismissed repeatedly by the Courts. See, e.g., Matter of Cartagena v. Alexander, 64 A.D.3d 841, 882 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dept. 2009); Matter of Motti v. Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 1030, 831 N.Y.S.2d 298 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dept. 2007); Matter of Wood v. Dennison, 25 A.D.3d 1056, 1057, 807 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Ameyda v. Travis, 21 A.D.3d 1200, 800 N.Y.S.2d (3d Dept. 2005), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 703, 811 N.Y.S.2d 335 (2006); Matter of Bottom v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 1027, 773 N.Y.S.2d 717 (4th Dept.), appeal dismissed 2 N.Y.3d 822, 781 N.Y.S.2d 285 (2004); Matter of Lue-Shing v. Pataki, 301 A.D.2d 827, 828, 754 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (3d Dept. 2003), lv. denied, 99 N.Y.2d 511, 760 N.Y.S.2d 102 (2003).

The Parole Board Report complies with the statute. And as for the constitutional claims raised, parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851.

The name of the Transitional Accountability Plan was changed to "Offender Case Plan." The existing regulations already refer to and require consideration of the "case plan." 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(b). And a Case Plan was utilized.

The 2011 amendments still permit the Board to place greater emphasis on the gravity of the crime. Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dept.) appeal dismissed 24 N.Y.3d 1052, 999 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2014); Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); Moore v New York State Board of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412 (3d Dept. 2016). The Board can still consider the nature of the inmate's crimes, the criminal history, the prison disciplinary record, the program accomplishments and post release plans. Rivera v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014). The Board is obligated to consider the serious nature of the crime. Khatib v New York State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014).

Notably, the 2011 amendment did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole, namely (1) whether "there is a reasonable



STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Austin, Patrick

**DIN:** 90-A-9824

**Facility:** Great Meadow CF

**AC No.:** 07-034-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 7 of 7)

---

probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law”; (2) whether release “is not incompatible with the welfare of society”; and (3) whether release “will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Here, the Board relied on the second and third standards in denying release. Even uniformly low COMPAS scores and other evidence of rehabilitation would not resolve the broader questions of society’s welfare, public perceptions of the seriousness of a crime, or whether release would undermine respect for the law. Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result, and declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). The COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014).

Appellant never raised an alleged COMPAS error at the interview, thereby waiving the issue. Matter of Shaffer v. Leonardo, 179 A.D.2d 980, 579 N.Y.S.2d 910 (3d Dept. 1992); Boddie v New York State Division of Parole, 288 F.Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). If the inmate was given a chance to discuss the matter at the interview and didn’t mention it, the issue is without merit. Matter of Mercer v New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Index # 5872-13, *Decision/Order/Judgment* dated April 7, 2014 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.)(Ceresia J.S.C.); Matter of Cox v Stanford, Index # 228-14, *Decision and Order* dated June 17, 2014 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.)(McGrath J.S.C.). If the inmate fails to raise the issue of alleged COMPAS error at the interview, and the matter could have been corrected then, the issue is waived. Matter of Cox v Stanford, Index # 228-14, *Decision and Order* dated April 18, 2014 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.)(McGrath J.S.C.).

In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed. Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2006).

**Recommendation:** Affirm.