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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Scharff, Lewis

Facility: Otisville CF

NYSID: [REDACTED]

Appeal Control No.: 10-214-18 B

DIN: 95-A-5219

Appearances: Adabelle Ekechukwu Esq.
Four Times Square
24th Floor
New York, New York 10036

Decision appealed: October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Agostini, Demosthenes, Davis


Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received April 16, 2019


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____
Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____
Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____
Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 6/28/19 66.

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Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant's instant offense involves him stabbing to death the daughter of his estranged wife, and then hiring somebody to kill a witness to the crime. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is irrational bordering on impropriety in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors, as all of the evidence demonstrates appellant is entitled to release. 2) the decision lacks details. 3) the decision was due to Commissioner bias and was predetermined. 4) community opposition is prohibited, much of it advocates penal philosophy, and addresses were improperly redacted. 5) the decision illegally resentenced him. 6) the DA letter was not turned over. 7) the transcript has been altered. 8) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the COMPAS was ignored, and no reason for departure was given.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Although the Board placed particular emphasis upon the violent nature of petitioner's offenses, it was not required to discuss or give equal weight to every factor it considered in denying petitioner's request” - Matter of Yourdon v. New York State Div. of Parole, 32 A.D.3d 1065, 1066, 820 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 801, 828 N.Y.S.2d 292 (2007);

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Matter of Wise v. State Div. of Parole, 54 A.D.3d 463, 464, 862 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (3d Dept. 2008).

The Board may consider the inmate's prior fleeing the area after the commission of his crime. Larmon v Travis, 14 A.D.3d 960, 787 N.Y.S.2d 918 (3d Dept 2005).

The Board can give greater weight to statements made in the sentencing minutes. Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 114 A.D.3d 992, 979 N.Y.S.2d 868 (3d Dept. 2014). The Board is entitled to rely on the sentencing minutes. Platten v New York State Board of Parole, 153 A.D.3d 1509, 59 N.Y.S.3d 921 (3d Dept. 2017).

The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).

As for community opposition, the Board may receive and consider written communications from individuals, other than those specifically identified in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A), opposing an inmate's release to parole supervision. Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, 91 N.Y.S.3d 308, 311 (3d Dept. 2018) ("Contrary to petitioner's contention, we do not find that [the Board's] consideration of certain unspecified 'consistent community opposition' to his parole release was outside the scope of the relevant statutory factors that may be taken into account in rendering a parole release determination"), appeal dismissed, 2019 N.Y. LEXIS 622 (Mar. 28, 2019); Matter of Clark v. New York Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 134 (1st Dept. 2018) ("the Board permissibly considered letters in opposition to the parole application submitted by public officials and members of the community"); Matter of Grigger v. New York State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 852–53, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (3d Dept. 2004) (recognizing 259-i(2)(c)(A)(v)'s list is not the exclusive information the Board may consider and persons in addition to victims and their families may submit letters), lv. denied, 4 N.Y.3d 704, 792 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2005); see also Matter of Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 447 N.Y.S.2d 44 (3d Dept. 1982) (letters from private citizens are protected and remain confidential); Matter of Rivera v. Evans, Index No. 0603-16, *Decision & Order* dated July 5, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Co.)(LaBuda A.J.S.C.) (recognizing "[c]onsideration of community or other opposition was proper under the statute" and the Board is required to keep identity of persons opposing release confidential), aff'd sub nom. Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter

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of Hamilton v. New York State Bd. of Parole, Index # 3699-2013, *Order and Judgment* dated October 25, 2013 (Devine J.S.C.)(Albany Co. Court)(no showing of prejudice by allegedly false information in PBA online petition where Board acknowledged public opposition during interview), *aff'd*, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); cf. Krebs v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. 9:08-CV-255NAMDEP, 2009 WL 2567779, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) (public and political pressure “are permissible factors which parole officials may properly consider as they relate to ‘whether ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to undermine respect for the law’”); Morel v. Thomas, No. 02 CV 9622 (HB), 2003 WL 21488017, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2003) (same); Seltzer v. Thomas, No. 03 CIV.00931 LTS FM, 2003 WL 21744084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (same). The same has also long been recognized as true with respect to letters supporting an inmate’s potential parole release. See, e.g., Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1273, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Gaston v. Berbary, 16 A.D.3d 1158, 1159, 791 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (4th Dept. 2005); Matter of Torres v. New York State Div. of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 128, 129, 750 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1st Dept. 2002); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 362, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1st Dept. 1998); cf. Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (1st Dept. 2007) (Board permissibly determined offense outweighed other positive factors including letters of support from, among others, victim’s mother). Indeed, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2) refers to the security of letters either in support of or in opposition to an inmate’s release.

The interpretation of the statute being urged by appellant would violate the First Amendment to the Constitution. Per the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” The right of petition found in the First Amendment is one of the freedoms protected by the Bills of Rights, and the courts cannot impute to the Legislature an intent to invade these freedoms. This philosophy governs the approach of groups of citizens to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive). Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the government. California Motor Transport Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed2d 642 (1972). To adopt the approach advocated by petitioner is basically rendering the First Amendment as being meaningless by ordering the Parole Board not to entertain constitutionally authorized activity.

Submissions by private citizen are protected and remain confidential pursuant to 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2). Matter of Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 447 N.Y.S.2d 44 (3d Dept. 1982); Matter of Murphy v. Annucci, Index No. 6736-16, *Decision & Order* dated July 31, 2017 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (Raymond J.S.C.). So the redactions were proper.

Appellant’s claim about a lack of evidence to support the decision is incorrect, as this is an interview, and not an evidentiary hearing. The enabling statutes for parole release determinations

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are Executive Law 259-i(2)(a)(i) and (6)(a)(i), and they use the term “interview” and not “hearing”. So any use by the legal community of these two terms interchangeably in the context of parole release matters must be stopped. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018). A parole release interview is not a full adversarial type proceeding. The nature and extent of the interview and attendant release considerations is solely within the discretion of the Parole Board. Matter of Briguglio v New York State Board of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704, 710 (1969). It is not an adversarial proceeding, and there are no charges or disputed issues of fact. Menechino v Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1970); cert. den. 400 U.S. 1023, 91 S.Ct. 588, 27 L.Ed2d 635 (1971). There are no substantial evidence issues in a Parole Board Release Interview. Valderrama v Travis, 19 A.D.3d 904, 905, 796 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dept. 2005); Tatta v Dennison, 26 A.D.3d 663, 809 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dept. 2006) lv.den. 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 N.Y.S.2d 750; Harris v New York State Division of Parole, 211 A.D.2d 205, 628 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dept. 1995). A substantial evidence issue arises only where a quasi-judicial hearing has been held and evidence has been taken pursuant to law. If no hearing was held, the issue does not arise. Horace v Annucci, 133 A.D.3d 1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). A proceeding to determine whether an inmate should be released on parole is not a quasi-judicial hearing. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).

There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative factfinders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed from such bias. Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of Grune v. Board of Parole, 41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007). There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000). Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied with its duty. See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985).

The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013);

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Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board's determination was affected by a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

At the time the request was made, an inmate had no right to the letter from the District Attorney to the Parole Board. Grigger v New York State Division of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dept. 2004); Matter of Ramahlo v Bruno, 273 A.D.2d 521, 708 N.Y.S.2d 206 (3d Dept. 2000) lv. den. 95 N.Y.2d 767 (2000); Mingo v New York State Division of Parole, 244 A.D.2d 781, 666 N.Y.S.2d 245 (3d Dept. 1997).

The interview transcript has not been altered. Allegations of an altered tape/off the record comments is not significant enough to warrant judicial review. Graham v New York State Division of Parole, 269 A.D.2d 628, 702 N.Y.S.2d 708, 710 (3d Dept 2000), leave to appeal denied 95 N.Y.2d 753, 711 N.Y.S.2d 155 (2000).

The Board considered the COMPAS instrument and did not depart from it. That is, the decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. For

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example, the Board did not find a reasonable probability that Petitioner will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law but rather concluded, *despite* low risk scores, release would be inappropriate under the other two statutory standards. This is entirely consistent with the Board's intention in enacting the amended regulation.

. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); *see also* Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board's regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. *See* Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); *accord* Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); *see also* Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

Recommendation: Affirm.