December 2020

Administrative Appeal Decision - Vergara, Jorge (2019-06-28)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Vergara, Jorge **Facility:** Watertown CF

NYSID: [redacted] **Appeal Control No.:** 12-042-18 B

DIN: 18-R-1209

Appearances: Jorge Vergara (18R1209)
Watertown Correctional Facility
23147 Swan Road
Watertown, New York 13601

Decision appealed: October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.

Board Member(s) who participated: Smith, Demosthenes.

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received April 9, 2019

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

_____ Commissioner — ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

_____ Commissioner — ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

_____ Commissioner — ✓ **Affirmed** ___ **Vacated, remanded for de novo interview** ___ **Modified to** _____

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 6/26/19 CG.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold.

Appellant is serving a term of imprisonment of 1⅔ to 5 years after having been convicted of Grant Larceny 1st. Over an 8-year period, Appellant in concert with his wife stole over $3.6 million from his employer.

Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious; (2) Appellant's letters of support, receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate (EEC), disciplinary record, and certain COMPAS scores were not given sufficient consideration by the Board; (3) the Board did not consider Appellant's sentencing minutes; (4) the Board's decision lacked sufficient detail; (5) the Board's decision was tantamount to a resentencing of Appellant; and (6) the 24-month hold was excessive.

As to the first two issues, Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477. Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17. In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128.

Appellant's receipt of an EEC does not automatically guarantee his release, and it does not eliminate consideration of the statutory factors including the instant offense. Matter of Milling v. Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2006); Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d

775, 776 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001). Where an inmate has been awarded an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society. Correction Law §805; Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). The standard set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) requiring consideration of whether the inmate's release will so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law does not apply in cases where an EEC has been awarded.

In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(a). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the applicable substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with applicable statutory factors. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). Furthermore, declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).

As to the third issue, where the Board had made good faith efforts to obtain the sentencing minutes from the sentencing court, but was unsuccessful, and Appellant failed to produce documentation that the sentencing minutes contained a recommendation as to the suitability of his possible release to parole supervision, the Board's failure to consider the sentencing minutes did not prejudice Appellant and amounted to harmless error. Matter of Matul v. Chair of the New York State Board of Parole, 69 A.D.3d 1196, 894 N.Y.S.2d 200 (3d Dept. 2010); Matter of Midgette v.

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New York State Division of Parole, 70 A.D. 3d 1039, 895 N.Y.S.2d 530 (2d Dept. 2010). Furthermore, when the sentencing minutes are unavailable at the time of the interview, Appellant is not entitled to a presumption that the sentencing minutes contained a favorable parole recommendation. Matter of Geraci v. Evans, 76 A.D.3d 1161, 907 N.Y.S.2d 726 (3d Dept. 2010); Matter of Midgette, 70 A.D.3d 1039; Matter of Lebron v. Alexander, 68 A.D.3d 1476, 892 N.Y.S.2d 579 (3d Dept. 2009).

As to the fourth issue, the Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law §259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

As to the fifth issue, Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. See Executive Law §259 et seq.; Penal Law §70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). Appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

As to the sixth issue, the Board has discretion to hold an inmate for a period of up to 24 months. Executive Law §259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.3(b); Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013). Therefore, the hold of 24 months was not excessive or improper.

Recommendation: Affirm.