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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Wronski, J	ohn	Facility:	Mohawk CF	
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	12-170-18 B	
DIN:	99-B-1897				
Appearances:		John Wronski 99B18 Mohawk Correctiona 6514 Route 26 P.O. Box 8451 Rome, New York 13	l Facility	*	
Decision appealed:		November 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.			
Board Member(s) who participated:		Drake, Coppola			
Papers considered:		Appellant's Letter-brief received February 4, 2019			
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation					
Records relied upon:		Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.			
Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:					
Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to					
C RA	duc_		ated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to	
Commissioner		AffirmedVac	cated, remanded fo	r de novo interview Modified to	
Comn	nissioner				

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 4/24/19 66.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant challenges the November 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the he has an excellent institutional record and release plan, and should be released. 2) the Board has penalized him for maintaining his innocence. 3) the Board decision failed to apply the proper standard. 4) the decision is the same as prior decisions. 5) the decision contains bias against sex offenders. The instant offense consisted of the petitioner repeatedly sodomizing and sexually abusing his then 9 year old son.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017).

Although the Board placed particular emphasis upon the violent nature of petitioner's sex offenses, which involved a vulnerable victim, it was not required to discuss or give equal weight to every factor it considered in denying petitioner's request. <u>Matter of Yourdon v. New York State</u>

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<u>Div. of Parole</u>, 32 A.D.3d 1065, 1066, 820 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (3d Dept. 2006), <u>lv. denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 801, 828 N.Y.S.2d 292 (2007). The Board may consider the vulnerability of the victim. <u>Bockeno v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 227 A.D.2d 751, 642 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (3d Dept. 1996); <u>Romer v Dennison</u>, 24 A.D.3d 866, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872 (3d Dept. 2005). <u>Matter of Karlin v. Cully</u>, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Wellman v. Dennison</u>, 23 A.D.3d 974, 975, 805 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (3d Dept. 2005).

The Board may consider an inmate's failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole. See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).

The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).

There is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect by considering remorse. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000). The Board may consider the inmate's lack of remorse, even if he has maintained his innocence since the beginning. Jones v New York State Division of Parole, 24 A.D.3d 827, 804 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2005). Pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and 259-k(1), the Board is required to obtain official reports and may rely on the information contained therein. See Billiteri v U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976); Lee v U.S. Parole Commission, 614 F.Supp. 634, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Carter v Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1031, 916 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dept. 2011) lv. app. den. 16 N.Y.3d 712, 923 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2011).

That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); <u>accord Matter of Reed v. Evans</u>, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. <u>Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d

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Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as "contrary to the best interest of the community").

The Board decision does not contain any bias against sex offenders. Flecha v Russi, 221 A.D.2d 780, 634 N.Y.S.2d 225 (3d Dept 1995), leave to appeal denied 87 N.Y.2d 806, 641 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1996). There is no merit to a claim the decision to deny parole was predetermined by an unwritten policy to deny parole to sex offenders who are at moderate or high risk of reoffending. Bush v Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017). There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. People ex.rel. Johnson v New York State Board of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept 1992); Withrow v Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed2d 712 (1975). And, Courts presume the Parole Board follows its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. Garner v Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 1371, 146 L.Ed2d 236 (2000). There must be support in the record to prove the alleged bias, and proof that the outcome of the Board's Release Decision flowed from the bias. Hughes v Suffolk County Department of Civil Service, 74 N.Y.2d 833, 546 N.Y.S.2d 335, motion to amend remittur granted 74 N.Y.2d 833, 550 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1989); Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Hernandez v McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept 2000), Iv. app. den. 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); Mays v Stanford, 150 A.D.3d 1521, 55 N.Y.S.3d 502 (3d Dept. 2017). No legitimate offer of proof exists in this case.

As for an alleged similarity to prior Board decisions, since the Board is required to consider the same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, then it follows that the same aspects of the individual's record may again constitute the primary grounds for the denial of parole. Hakim v Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); Nelson v New York State Parole Board, 274 A.D.2d 719, 711 N.Y.S.2d 792 (3d Dept 2000); Bridget v Travis, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept 2002). Per Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), the Board is required to consider the same factors each time he appears in front of them. Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept. 2010) Iv.den. 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143.

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. <u>Hodge v Griffin</u>, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing <u>Romer v Travis</u>, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. <u>Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason

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or regard to the facts. <u>Ward v City of Long Beach</u>, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. <u>Siao-Paul v. Connolly</u>, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Recommendation: Affirm.