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#### STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE

## **ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE**

Name:	Jones, Jeren	my	Facility:	Coxsackie CF
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	09-041-18 B
DIN:	15-A-3405		•	
Appearan	<u>ces</u> :	Thomas G. Soucia, E. Franklin County Publ 355 West Main Street Malone, New York 12	lic Defender t, Suite 228	
Decision	appealed:	August 2018 decision months.	, denying discre	tionary release and imposing a hold of 24
Board Me who partie		Alexander, Davis.		
Papers con	nsidered:	Appellant's Brief rece	eived January 30	, 2019
Appeals L	<u>Init Review</u> :	Statement of the Appo	eals Unit's Findi	ngs and Recommendation
<u>Records</u> re	elied upon:			role Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case
Final Dete	mination:	The undersigned deter	rmine that the de	cision appealed is hereby:
comm	1. Maria Maria Mar Maria Maria Mar	Affirmed	ated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to
Den forme	issigner	Affirmed Vac	ated, remanded for	de novo interview Modified to
Ů	issioner	Affirmed Vac	ated, remanded for	de novo interview Modified to

# If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 3/22/19/66.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

#### STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

## **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

Name:	Jones, Jeremy	DIN:	15-A-3405
Facility:	Coxsackie CF	AC No.:	09-041-18 B

**<u>Findings</u>**: (Page 1 of 3)

Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold.

Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious, made in violation of lawful procedure, and placed too much emphasis on the serious nature of the crimes committed; (2) Appellant's institutional achievements, certain COMPAS scores, and rehabilitative efforts were not provided sufficient weight by the Board; (3) the Board did not discuss certain issues during the interview; (4) the Board's decision was tantamount to a resentencing of Appellant; (5) the Board's decision was made in violation of Appellant's due process rights; and (6) the Board's decision lacked sufficient detail.

As to the first and second issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); <u>accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). "Although these standards are no longer repeated in the [Board's] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their application." Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. A conclusion that an inmate fails to satisfy **any one** of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an independent basis to deny parole. <u>See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); <u>Matter of Robles v. Fischer</u>, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 (4th Dept. 2014); <u>Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268; <u>Matter of Phillips v. Dennison</u>, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477. Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17. In

#### STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

## **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

Name:	Jones, Jeremy	DIN:	15-A-3405
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**<u>Findings</u>**: (Page 2 of 3)

the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel. Herbert</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128.

In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(a). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). Furthermore, declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).

As to the third issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166 (3d Dept. 2001); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 1997).

As to the fourth issue, Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray

### STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

## **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

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**Findings:** (Page 3 of 3)

v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Crews v. New York State</u> <u>Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). Appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of</u> <u>Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

As to the fifth issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence as a person's liberty interest is extinguished upon conviction. <u>Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex</u>, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); <u>Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); <u>Matter of Vineski v. Travis</u>, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. <u>Matter of Russo</u>, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; <u>see also Barna v. Travis</u>, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); <u>Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

As to the sixth issue, the Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law §259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Little v. Travis</u>, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Matter of Davis v. Travis</u>, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); <u>People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Recommendation: Affirm.