Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History

Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions

Parole Administrative Appeal Documents

December 2020

Administrative Appeal Decision - Lozano, Jaime (2019-06-28)

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad

Recommended Citation

"Administrative Appeal Decision - Lozano, Jaime (2019-06-28)" (2020). Parole Information Project https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/187

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

	Name:	Lozano, J	laime	Facility:	Washington CF		
	NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	12-107-18 B		
	DIN:	15-A-319	96	11.0			
	Appearances;		Scott Otis Esq. P.O. Box 344 Watertown, New York 13601				
	Decision appealed:		December 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 months.				
	Board Member(s) who participated:		Berliner, Davis		, .		
	Papers considered:		Appellant's Brief reco	Appellant's Brief received April 16, 2019			
	Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation						
Bo				Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.			
	Final Deter	mination	The undersigned deter	rmine that the de	cision appealed is hereby:		
1	Amm	sioner	AffirmedVac	ated, remanded for	de novo interview Modified to		
(Comm	issioner	Affirmed Vac	ated, remanded for	de novo interview Modified to		
/	linef		AffirmedVac	ated, remanded for	de novo interview Modified to		
	Comm	issioner					

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 6/36/19 66.

1

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

(

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Lozano, Jaime	DIN:	15-A-3196
Facility:	Washington CF	AC No.:	12-107-18 B

<u>Findings</u>: (Page 1 of 5)

Appellant challenges the December 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 12-month hold. Appellant's instant offense involved him possessing and spreading child pornography on his computer. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board ignored his EEC and its presumption of release. 3) the Board ignored the minimum sentence of the court and illegally resentenced him. 4) the Board ignored his Deportation Order. 5) the decision was predetermined and a result of bias. 6) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, and the 2014 regulations, in that the focus is now on rehabilitation. Also, the COMPAS has an error on it.

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). Whereas here the inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society. Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. <u>Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision</u>, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Gordon v. Stanford</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017).

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. <u>Matter of Davis v. Evans</u>, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Lashway</u>

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Lozano, Jaime	DIN:	15-A-3196
Facility:	Washington CF	AC No.:	12-107-18 B

<u>Findings</u>: (Page 2 of 5)

<u>v. Evans</u>, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of McKee v. New</u> <u>York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

[T]here is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect by considering insight. <u>Matter of Silmon v. Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000). Insight is relevant not only to rehabilitative progress but also to whether release would deprecate the severity of the offense. <u>Matter of Phillips v. Dennison</u>, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 2007).

The record further shows inmate attempted to minimize his role during the interview. <u>Matter of</u> <u>Serrano v. New York State Exec. Dep't-Div. of Parole</u>, 261 A.D.2d 163, 164, 689 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept. 1999); <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018).

The Board may cite the failure of the inmate to acknowledge the impact of the criminal conduct on the victim. <u>Gaito v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 238 A.D.2d 634, 655 N.Y.S.2d 692 (3d Dept 1997); <u>Romer v Dennison</u>, 24 A.D.3d 866, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872 (3d Dept. 2005).

The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Porter v. Alexander</u>, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); <u>Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 218 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); <u>Matter of Confoy v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); <u>Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).

Receipt of an EEC does not preclude denial of parole. <u>Matter of Milling v. Berbary</u>, 31 A.D.3d 1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2006); <u>Matter of Romer v. Dennison</u>, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (3d Dept. 2000), <u>lv. denied</u>, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001). An EEC does not automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate consideration of the statutory factors including the instant offense. <u>Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); <u>Matter of Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006). Moreover, the Board is not required to give each factor equal weight. <u>Matter of Corley</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818; <u>Matter of Pearl</u>, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006). Moreover, the Board is not required to give each factor equal weight. <u>Matter of Corley</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818; <u>Matter of Pearl</u>, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817. The Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Lozano, Jaime	DIN:	15-A-3196
Facility:	Washington CF	AC No.:	12-107-18 B

<u>Findings</u>: (Page 3 of 5)

inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society. Correction Law § 805; <u>Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); <u>Matter of Salcedo v.</u> <u>Ross</u>, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); <u>Matter of Walker v. Russi</u>, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), <u>appeal dismissed</u>, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). The Board acted within its discretion in determining other considerations rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and rendered discretionary release inappropriate at this time. <u>See generally Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole</u>, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Wade v. Stanford</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Neal v.</u> <u>Stanford</u>, 131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 342 (3d Dept. 2015); <u>Matter of Singh v. Evans</u>, 107 A.D.3d 1274, 1275, 968 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649-50 (3d Dept. 2013).

There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative factfinders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed from such bias. Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), <u>lv. denied</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); <u>see also Matter of Gonzalvo v.</u> Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); <u>Matter of Grune v. Board of Parole</u>,41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007). Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied with its duty. See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. <u>Matter of Burress v. Dennison</u>, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); <u>Matter of Cody v. Dennison</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), <u>lv. denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Lozano, Jaime	DIN:	15-A-3196
Facility:	Washington CF	AC No.:	12-107-18 B

Findings: (Page 4 of 5)

The existence of a final deportation order does not require an inmate's release, but is merely one factor to consider. <u>Matter of Delrosario v. Stanford</u>, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016); <u>Matter of Lackwood v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 127 A.D.3d 1495, 8 N.Y.S.3d 461 (3d Dept. 2015); <u>People ex rel. Borrell v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 85 A.D.3d 1515, 925 N.Y.S.2d 922 (3d Dept.), <u>Iv. denied</u>, 17 N.Y.3d 718, 936 N.Y.S.2d 75 (2011); <u>Matter of Samuel v.</u> <u>Alexander</u>, 69 A.D.3d 861, 892 N.Y.S.2d 557 (2d Dept. 2010). Although the Board's determination did not specifically reference the deportation order, the Board plainly was aware of its existence and, in any event, was 'not required to assign equal weight to or discuss every factor it considered in making its determination. <u>Matter of Abbas v. New York State Division of Parole</u>, 61 A.D.3d 1228, 877 N.Y.S.2d 512 (3d Dept. 2009).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. <u>Hodge v Griffin</u>, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing <u>Romer v Travis</u>, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. <u>Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. <u>Ward v City of Long Beach</u>, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. <u>Siao-Paul v. Connolly</u>, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); <u>Hanna v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant's claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. <u>Dolan v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); <u>Tran v Evans</u>, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); <u>Boccadisi v Stanford</u>, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).

Appellant's contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 Amendments to the Executive Law is likewise without merit. Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented a fundamental change in the legal regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on forward-looking factors, this proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Lozano, Jaime	DIN:	15-A-3196
Facility:	Washington CF	AC No.:	12-107-18 B

<u>Findings</u>: (Page 5 of 5)

change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. The Board still must conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); <u>Matter of Montane v. Evans</u>, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014). Thus, even where the First Department has "take[n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]", it has nonetheless reiterated that "[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every factor equal weight" and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize "factors which emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors". <u>Matter of Rossakis v.</u> New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).

Appellant failed to raise the issue of an alleged error on the COMPAS during the interview, thereby waiving the issue. <u>Matter of Morrison v. Evans</u>, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Vanier v. Travis</u>, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000).

The 2014 regulations were repealed in 2017 and were not in effect at the time of this interview. **Recommendation:** Affirm.