Administrative Appeal Decision - Rukaj, Gjelosh (2019-05-23)

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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Rukaj, Gjelosh  Facility: Otisville CF
NYSID: [redacted]  Appeal Control No.: 11-053-18 B
DIN: 98-A-3155

Appearsnces: Steven Zeidman, Esq.
CUNY School of Law
2 Court Square West
Long Island City, New York 11101

Decision appealed: October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 months.

Board Member(s) who participated: Alexander, Drake, Davis

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received March 13, 2019

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board’s determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit’s Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate’s Counsel, if any, on 3/23/19.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant’s Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (11/2018)
Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 12-month hold.

Appellant is serving an aggregate indeterminate term of imprisonment of 20 years to Life after having been convicted of the crimes of Murder 2nd, CPW 2nd, and Assault 2nd. Appellant shot his two victims multiple times causing their deaths.

Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious and irrational, made in violation of applicable legal authority, and relied too heavily upon the serious nature of Appellant’s multiple crimes of conviction; (2) Appellant’s programming, positive accomplishments, rehabilitative efforts, letters of support, remorse, and certain COMPAS scores were not given sufficient consideration by the Board; (3) the Board’s decision was conclusory and lacked sufficient detail; (4) the Board should not have considered community opposition and Appellant is entitled to confidential letters of opposition; (5) certain issues were not discussed during the interview; (6) the Board’s decision was made in violation of Appellant’s due process rights; (7) the Board’s decision was tantamount to a resentencing of Appellant; (8) the Board’s decision was predetermined; and (9) the transcript of the interview was not accurate.

As to the first and second issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). “Although these standards are no longer repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their application.” Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. A conclusion that an inmate fails to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) is an independent basis to deny parole. See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to


Inasmuch as Appellant disputes the Board’s finding with respect to insight and remorse, it was well within the Board’s authority to make an assessment of Appellant’s credibility (Matter of
State of New York – Board of Parole

Appeals Unit Findings & Recommendation

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As to the fourth issue, the Board may receive and consider written communications from individuals, other than those specifically identified in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), opposing an inmate’s release to parole supervision. Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, --N.Y.S.3d-- (3d Dept. 2018) (“Contrary to petitioner’s contention, we do not find that [the Board’s] consideration of certain unspecified ‘consistent community opposition’ to his parole release was outside the scope of the relevant statutory factors that may be taken into account in rendering a parole release determination”); Matter of Clark v. New York Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 134 (1st Dept. 2018) (“the Board permissibly considered letters in opposition to the parole application submitted by public officials and members of the community”); Matter of Grigger v. New York State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 852–53, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (3d Dept. 2004) (recognizing 259-i(2)(c)(A)(v)’s list is not the exclusive information the Board may consider and persons in addition to victims and their families may submit letters), lv. denied, 4 N.Y.3d 704, 792 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2005); see also Matter of Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 447 N.Y.S.2d 44 (3d Dept. 1982) (letters from private citizens are protected and remain confidential); Matter of Rivera v. Evans, Index No. 0603-16, Decision & Order dated July 5, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Co.)(LaBuda A.J.S.C.) (recognizing “[c]onsideration of community or other opposition was proper under the statute” and the Board is required to keep identity of persons opposing release confidential), aff’d sub nom. Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53

As to the fifth issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166 (3d Dept. 2001); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).

As to the sixth issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence as a person's liberty interest is extinguished upon conviction. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

As to the eighth issue, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to have followed applicable statutory requirements and internal policies when making decisions regarding the suitability of an inmate’s possible release to parole supervision. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000). There is no evidence that the Board’s decision was predetermined. See Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899 (3d Dept. 2000).

As to the ninth issue, a corrected and final interview transcript was certified by a Registered Diplomate Reporter on February 21, 2019. Given this certification, it can be fairly assumed that the written transcript constitutes an accurate account of the colloquy that transpired between Appellant and Board Members Alexander, Drake, and Davis.

Recommendation: Affirm.