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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Phillips, George

Facility: Woodbourne CF

NYSID: [REDACTED]

Appeal Control No.: 10-154-18 B

DIN: 00-A-2299

Appearances: Jocelyne Kristal Esq.
19 Court Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Decision appealed: October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Coppola, Alexander, Davis


Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received January 29, 2019


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____
Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____
Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____
Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 3/20/19 66.

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Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors, especially his claim of innocence. 2) the Board failed to make required findings of fact. 3) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the statutes are now present/forward/future based. 4) the Board used the COMPAS from 2017, and not 2018. 5) the 2018 COMPAS is in error as some scores changed for no reason. 6) the Board ignored the COMPAS when it said the document doesn't work for sex offenders (appellant is convicted of raping numerous females in different counties). 7) the 24 month hold is excessive, when considering the fact the prior panel only imposed an 18 month hold.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

The serious nature of the crimes for which the [inmate] was incarcerated and his prior criminal record are sufficient grounds to deny parole release. Matter of Scott v. Russi, 208 A.D.2d 931, 618 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2d. Dept. 1994); see also Matter of Singh v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 1209, 987 N.Y.S.2d 271 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 906, 995 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2014); Matter of Thurman v. Hodges, 292 A.D.2d 872, 873, 739 N.Y.S.2d 324 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746

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N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); Matter of Wright v. Travis, 284 A.D.2d 544, 727 N.Y.S.2d 630 (2d Dept. 2001).

The Board's recognition that petitioner's criminal conduct was not only serious, but also an escalation of prior criminal behavior, was grounded in fact... [I]n light of the truly dreadful facts of these crimes, there is no question that the record supports a determination that the extremely serious nature of the crime so outweighs petitioner's impressive accomplishments while in prison as to warrant a denial of parole. Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

The Board placing particular emphasis on the callous nature of the offense does not demonstrate irrationality bordering on impropriety. Olmosperez v Evans, 114 A.D.3d 1077, 980 N.Y.S.2d 845 (3d Dept. 2014).

Although the Board placed great emphasis on the violent nature of the crimes and petitioner's criminal history, it was not required to discuss or give equal weight to each statutory factor. Matter of Wise v. State Div. of Parole, 54 A.D.3d 463, 464, 862 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (3d Dept. 2008). The Board permissibly denied parole release as incompatible with the welfare of society based upon the violent nature of the instant offenses and escalation of prior criminal conduct. Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003).

The Board was "not required to give each factor equal weight and could place greater emphasis on the gravity of petitioner's crimes. Matter of Moore v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412, 413 (3d Dept. 2016).

The Board may cite the failure of the inmate to acknowledge the impact of the criminal conduct on the victim. Gaito v New York State Board of Parole, 238 A.D.2d 634, 655 N.Y.S.2d 692 (3d Dept 1997); Romer v Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872 (3d Dept. 2005).

It is not the Board's role to reevaluate a claim of innocence. Matter of Copeland v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 (3d Dept. 2017).

The Board provided its statutory rationale for denying parole. Compare Matter of Vaello v. Parole Bd. Div. of State of New York, 48 A.D.3d 1018, 1019, 851 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746-47 (3d Dept. 2008) (annulling determination that did not identify any of the standards set forth in the statute but merely noted crimes and stated inmate was poor candidate for release), with Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale).

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That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.” Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute. Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute. Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015).

Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 Amendment and amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) do not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for release decisions. This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4).

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The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815. Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).

The 2017 COMPAS did in fact have errors, but they were in the appellant’s favor. To the extent the Board may have used the 2017 COMPAS instead of the 2018 COMPAS, it would be harmless error at most such that no new proceeding is required. See Matter of Rossney v. New York State Div. of Parole, 267 A.D.2d 648, 649, 699 N.Y.S.2d 319 (3d Dept. 1999), lv. denied, 94 N.Y.2d 759, 705 N.Y.S.2d 6 (2000).

Appellant mischaracterizes the statement by the Commissioner during the interview. The Commissioner merely stated the COMPAS document has its limits in some areas, one of them being sex offenses. The Commissioner still reviewed it and gave it due consideration. However, there is no requirement that the Board consider additional risk assessments beyond the COMPAS instrument. Matter of McCarthy v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Index No. 3664/18, Decision/Order/Judgment dated Oct. 18, 2018, at 3 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (Ceresia, S.C.J.).

The Board may impose a 24 month hold, even though the prior Board panel had imposed only an 18 month hold. See Matter of Padilla v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 284 A.D.2d 685, 726 N.Y.S.2d 298 (3d Dept.) (“We are unpersuaded by petitioner’s assertion that respondent’s decision to impose a 24-month hold despite having imposed a 12-month hold following his 1998 appearance demonstrates that respondent’s determination was affected by a ‘showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety’”) (citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 97 N.Y.2d 649, 736

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N.Y.S.2d 307 (2001). In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed. Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold).

Recommendation: Affirm.