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## Administrative Appeal Decision - Leno, Donald (2019-02-27)

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## ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Leno, Dona	ald	Facility:	Clinton CF
NYSID			Appeal Control No.:	06-131-18 B
DIN:	90-A-8376			
Appearance	:e <u>s</u> :	Gail Rubenfeld Esq. 10 St. John Street P.O. Box 281 Monticello, New Yorl	k 12701	т. Д
Decision a	ppealed:	June 2018 decision, de months.	enying discretion	hary release and imposing a hold of 15-
Board Mer who partic		Crangle, Alexander, E	Berliner	
Papers con	sidered:	Appellant's Brief rece	ived December :	31, 2018
Appeals U	nit Review:	Statement of the Appe	eals Unit's Findin	ngs and Recommendation
Records re	lied upon:	-		cole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case
Final Deter	mination:	The undersigned deter	mine that the de	cision appealed is hereby:
Comm	Mui issioner //	AffirmedVaca	nted, remanded for	de novo interview Modified to
An	issioner	AffirmedVaca	ited, remanded for	de novo interview Modified to
Deren	them	AffirmedVaca	ited, remanded for	de novo interview Modified to
Comm	issioner			

# If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on  $\frac{2}{2}$ 

Distribution: Appeals Unit -- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

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## APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Leno, Donald	DIN:	90-A-8376
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**<u>Findings</u>**: (Page 1 of 4)

Appellant challenges the June 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 15-month hold. The brief raises the following issues: 1) the Board decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that all the Board did was to look only at the instant offenses/criminal history, and totally ignored his rehabilitation

. 2) the violated his constitutional liberty interest in a legitimate expectation of early release. 3) the decision violates the due process clause of the constitution. 4) the decision lacks detail. 5) the Board ignored the wishes of the sentencing court minimum sentence, and illegally re-sentenced him. 6) the decision was predetermined. 7) the Board ignored the positive portions of his COMPAS scores.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. <u>Matter of Davis v. Evans</u>, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Lashway v. Evans</u>, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

The Board may consider an inmate's failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole. See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d

## APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Dept. 2016), <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); <u>Matter of Karlin v. Cully</u>, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), <u>lv. denied</u>, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).

The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument. <u>Matter of Bush v.</u> <u>Annucci</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Wade v. Stanford</u>, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of</u> <u>Parole</u>, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) <u>lv. denied</u>, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).

Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. <u>Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not be given equal weight. <u>Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision</u>, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017).

The Board decision did not exhibit irrationality bordering on impropriety in case of crimes committed while on parole. <u>Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014).

The Board may consider inadequate release plans in denying parole. <u>See</u>, <u>e.g.</u>, <u>Matter of</u> <u>Delrosario v. Stanford</u>, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016) (concern about reentry plans in case immigration does not deport inmate); <u>Matter of Murphy v. State of New York Exec.</u> <u>Dep't Div. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 32825(U), 2010 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4926 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. Sept. 30, 2010) (Ceresia S.C.J.) (denial based in part on absence of legitimate release plan).

An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. <u>Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex</u>, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); <u>Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); <u>Matter of Vineski v. Travis</u>, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme "holds out no more than a possibility of parole" and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. <u>Matter of Russo</u>, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; <u>see also Barna v. Travis</u>, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); <u>Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005).

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Completion of the minimum term of the sentence still does not create any protected liberty interest. <u>Motti v Alexander</u>, 54 A.D.3d 1114, 1115 (3d Dept. 2008).

Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. <u>Duemmel v Fischer</u>, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria. <u>Haymes v Regan</u>, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).

The due process clause is not violated by the Board's balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be second guessed by the courts. <u>Mathie v Dennison</u>, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); <u>MacKenzie v Cunningham</u>, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to conditions imposed by the state legislature. <u>Banks v Stanford</u>, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); <u>Matter of Little v. Travis</u>, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); <u>Matter of Davis v. Travis</u>, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); <u>People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. <u>Matter of Burress v. Dennison</u>, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); <u>Matter of Cody v. Dennison</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), <u>lv. denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court, <u>Matter of Burress v.</u> <u>Dennison</u>, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); <u>Matter of Cody v. Dennison</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), <u>lv. denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).

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There is no evidence the Board's decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense. <u>Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford</u>, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); <u>Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000). There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. <u>People ex.rel. Johnson v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 180 A.D.2d 914, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept 1992); <u>Withrow v Larkin</u>, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed2d 712 (1975). And, Courts presume the Parole Board follows its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. <u>Garner v Jones</u>, 529 U.S. 244, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 1371, 146 L.Ed2d 236 (2000).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. <u>Hodge v Griffin</u>, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing <u>Romer v Travis</u>, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. <u>Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. <u>Ward v City of Long Beach</u>, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013).

The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board's determination was affected by a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. <u>Matter of Silmon v Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); <u>Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

**Recommendation:** Affirm.