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December 2020

### Administrative Appeal Decision - Tuszynski, David (2019-04-15)

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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE**

**Name:** Tuszynski, David

**Facility:** Cayuga CF

**NYSID:** [REDACTED]

**Appeal Control No.:** 09-027-18 B

**DIN:** 08-B-0403

Appearances: Ryan Muldoon Esq.  
WHMB P.C.  
11 Court Street  
Auburn, New York 13021

Decision appealed: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.


Board Member(s) who participated: Coppola, Demosthenes


Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received January 2, 2019


Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.

Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

  Affirmed  Vacated, remanded for de novo interview  Modified to \_\_\_\_\_  
Commissioner

**If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.**

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 7/15/19 66.

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Tuszynski, David

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Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. The appellant is serving a prison sentence of 7-20 years. His final convictions were for 40 counts of Criminal Sexual Act 2<sup>nd</sup> Degree, 52 counts of Incest, and 12 counts of Rape 2<sup>nd</sup> Degree. [REDACTED]

Appellant alleges the following: 1) the Board decision failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. Appellant contends he has an excellent institutional record and release plan, but all the Board did was to look only at the instant offenses. 2) no aggravating factors exist. 3) the Board ignored the presumption created by his EEC. 4) the Board ignored his COMPAS.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.” Correction Law 805. accord Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

There is no requirement in the law that the board place equal or greater emphasis on petitioner’s present commendable conduct than on the gravity of his offense. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 133, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983). The record reflects that the Board took into consideration the relevant factors, including.... The Board was not required to give each factor equal weight and could place greater emphasis on the gravity of the inmate’s offense. Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Furman v. Annucci, 138 A.D.3d 1269, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).

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The Board “properly took into account the extremely serious nature of petitioner's crimes, which was not outweighed by his apparently exemplary record of accomplishments while incarcerated.” Matter of Anthony v. New York State Div. of Parole, 17 A.D.3d 301, 301, 792 N.Y.S.2d 900, 900 (1st Dept. 2005) *lv. denied*, 5 N.Y.3d 708, 803 N.Y.S.2d 28 (2005). “The Parole Board’s determination denying petitioner parole was rationally based on the seriousness of petitioner’s crimes.” People ex rel. Watson v. Hollins, 302 A.D.2d 279, 280, 753 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1st Dept. 2003).

The Board could cite the deviant nature of the offense. Matter of Wellman v. Dennison, 23 A.D.3d 974, 975, 805 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (3d Dept. 2005).

The Board may cite the failure of the inmate to acknowledge the impact of the criminal conduct on the victim. Gaito v New York State Board of Parole, 238 A.D.2d 634, 655 N.Y.S.2d 692 (3d Dept 1997); Romer v Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872 (3d Dept. 2005).

The Board was not required to give each factor equal weight or explicitly discuss each factor and was entitled to, and properly did, place greater emphasis upon the egregious and protracted nature of petitioner’s crimes involving sex offenses against a female relative and his lack of insight. Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), *lv. denied*, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).

The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any aggravating factors. Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).

Receipt of an EEC does not preclude denial of parole. Matter of Milling v. Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), *lv. denied*, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2006); Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (3d Dept. 2000), *lv. denied*, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001). An EEC does not automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate consideration of the statutory factors including the instant offense. Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006). Moreover, the Board is not required to give each factor equal weight. Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817. The Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not

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compatible with the welfare of society. Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). Appellant’s receipt of an EEC did not preclude the Board from considering and placing greater emphasis on the serious nature of his crime. See, e.g., Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Furman v. Annucci, 138 A.D.3d 1269, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Feilzer v. New York State Div. of Parole, 131 A.D.3d 1321, 1322, 16 N.Y.S.3d 341, 341 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dept. 1992).

There is no merit to Appellant’s claim that a favorable COMPAS instrument gives rise to a presumption of rehabilitation and release. Since 1977, the Board has been required to apply the same three-part substantive standard. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). The 2011 amendments require the Board to incorporate risk and needs assessment principles to “assist” in measuring an inmate’s rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release. Executive Law § 259-c(4). The statute thus does not clearly create a presumption of rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and needs assessment, let alone a presumption of parole release requiring the Board to provide countervailing evidence. Indeed, while the Board might, for example, find an inmate sufficiently rehabilitated to satisfy the first prong of the standard—that the inmate will “live and remain at liberty without violating the law,” the Board could also find, in its discretion, as it did here, that the inmate’s release would be incompatible with the welfare of society or would unduly deprecate the seriousness of a crime. The text of the statute therefore flatly contradicts the inmate’s assertion that even uniformly low COMPAS scores create a presumption of release. See Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397. The COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for purposes of deciding whether the two standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1108; accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d at 1061. This is exactly what occurred here. The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory factors. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

**Recommendation:** Affirm.