#### Fordham Law School

## FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History

Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions

Parole Administrative Appeal Documents

December 2020

Administrative Appeal Decision - Macedonio, Carl (2019-03-22)

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad

#### **Recommended Citation**

"Administrative Appeal Decision - Macedonio, Carl (2019-03-22)" (2020). Parole Information Project https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/60

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

# ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Macedonic	o, Carl	Facility:	Fishkill CF	
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	09-010-18 B	
DIN:	72-A <b>-</b> 0476	5			
Appearances:		Glenn Bruno Esq. 11 Market Street Suite 221 Poughkeepsie, New Y	ork 12601		
Decision appealed:		August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months.			
Board Member(s) who participated:		Crangle, Smith, Berlin	ner		
Papers considered:		Appellant's Brief received December 31, 2018			
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation					
Records relied upon:		Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.			
Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:  Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to  Commissioner  Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to  Commissioner  If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.					
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 3/3/19/66.					
the I diele Board, it dily, were maned to the inflicte and the inflicte a country, it dily, on Jistiff [35].					

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

### APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:Macedonio, CarlDIN:72-A-0476Facility:Fishkill CFAC No.:09-010-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 1 of 7)

Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 24-month hold. The brief raises the following issues: 1) the Board decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the appellant has an excellent institutional record and release plan, and is rehabilitated, but all the Board did was to look only at the instant offenses/criminal history. 2) the decision illegally resentenced him. 3) no aggravating factors exist. 4) the decision lacks detail. 5) the decision was predetermined. 6) the decision is virtually identical to all prior decisions. 7) the Board failed to make required findings of fact. 8) the decision lacks future guidance. 9) appellant also has medical issues and should be granted medical parole. 10) his submissions were not reviewed. 11) the DA letter and community opposition were not turned over, and the Parole Board Report is deficient when compared to the old Inmate Status Reports. 12) the decision was due to the Governor's political agenda to deny parole release to all violent felons, which is proved by statistics. 13) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, and the 2014 regulations, in that the laws are now present/future based, and the COMPAS was ignored. and 14) the 24 month hold is excessive.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

The Board is permitted to consider the brutal and heinous nature of the offenses, which involved appellant raping two separate women, and killing one of them. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(a);

### APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:Macedonio, CarlDIN:72-A-0476Facility:Fishkill CFAC No.:09-010-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 2 of 7)

Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 1259, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept.), Iv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014); Matter of Marcus v. Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 476, 476, 862 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Wellman v. Dennison, 23 A.D.3d 974, 975, 805 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

The Board's determination that the petitioner's positive achievements were outweighed by the brutal nature of the offense, as well as the petitioner's limited insight into why he committed the homicide, was rational and within its discretion." Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002). The Board permissibly found the inmate's institutional and educational achievements were outweighed by the brutal nature of the crime, as well as his lack of insight. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 266 A.D.2d 296, 297, 698 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d Dept. 1999), aff'd 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000).

The Board properly placed great emphasis on the violent nature of the crimes. <u>Matter of Wise v. State Div. of Parole</u>, 54 A.D.3d 463, 464, 862 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (3d Dept. 2008).

The Board may take note of the inmate's disregard for the life of another human being. <u>Hakim v Travis</u>, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); <u>Angel v Travis</u>, 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept 2003).

The Board may consider the lack of insight. <u>Crawford v New York State Board of Parole</u>, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016); <u>Silmon v Travis</u>, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).

The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).

The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 2164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Porter v. Alexander</u>, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); <u>Matter of Walker v. Travis</u>, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of Walker v. New</u>

### APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:Macedonio, CarlDIN:72-A-0476Facility:Fishkill CFAC No.:09-010-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 3 of 7)

<u>York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); <u>Matter of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); <u>Matter of Confoy v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); <u>Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).

As for community opposition, the Board may receive and consider written communications from individuals, other than those specifically identified in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A), opposing an inmate's release to parole supervision. Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, --N.Y.S.3d-- (3d Dept. 2018) ("Contrary to petitioner's contention, we do not find that [the Board's] consideration of certain unspecified 'consistent community opposition' to his parole release was outside the scope of the relevant statutory factors that may be taken into account in rendering a parole release determination"); Matter of Clark v. New York Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 134 (1st Dept. 2018) ("the Board permissibly considered letters in opposition to the parole application submitted by public officials and members of the community"); Matter of Grigger v. New York State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 852-53, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (3d Dept. 2004) (recognizing 259-i(2)(c)(A)(v)'s list is not the exclusive information the Board may consider and persons in addition to victims and their families may submit letters), lv. denied, 4 N.Y.3d 704, 792 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2005); see also Matter of Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 447 N.Y.S.2d 44 (3d Dept. 1982) (letters from private citizens are protected and remain confidential); Matter of Rivera v. Evans, Index No. 0603-16, Decision & Order dated July 5, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Co.)(LaBuda A.J.S.C.) (recognizing "[c]onsideration of community or other opposition was proper under the statute" and the Board is required to keep identity of persons opposing release confidential), aff'd sub nom. Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Bd. of Parole., Index # 3699-2013, Order and Judgment dated October 25, 2013 (Devine J.S.C.)(Albany Co. Court)(no showing of prejudice by allegedly false information in PBA online petition where Board acknowledged public opposition during interview), aff'd, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); cf. Krebs v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. 9:08-CV-255NAMDEP, 2009 WL 2567779, at \*12 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) (public and political pressure "are permissible factors which parole officials may properly consider as they relate to 'whether 'release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to undermine respect for the law"); Morel v. Thomas, No. 02 CV 9622 (HB), 2003 WL 21488017, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2003) (same); Seltzer v. Thomas, No. 03 CIV.00931 LTS FM, 2003 WL 21744084, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (same). The same has also long been recognized as true with respect to letters supporting an inmate's potential parole release. See, e.g., Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1273, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Gaston v. Berbary, 16 A.D.3d 1158, 1159, 791 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (4th Dept. 2005); Matter of Torres v. New York State Div. of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 128, 129, 750 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1st Dept. 2002); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 362, 676

### **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

Name:Macedonio, CarlDIN:72-A-0476Facility:Fishkill CFAC No.:09-010-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 4 of 7)

N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1st Dept. 1998); <u>cf. Cardenales v. Dennison</u>, 37 A.D.3d 371, 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (1st Dept. 2007) (Board permissibly determined offense outweighed other positive factors including letters of support from, among others, victim's mother). Indeed, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2) refers to the security of letters either in support of or in opposition to an inmate's release.

The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

That the Board "did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion." Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 2012). The language used by the Board was "only semantically different" from the statute. Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release as "contrary to the best interest of the community").

Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

### APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:Macedonio, CarlDIN:72-A-0476Facility:Fishkill CFAC No.:09-010-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 5 of 7)

The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any aggravating factors. <u>Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).

All submitted documents were read by the Board. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).

There is no evidence the Board's decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000).

As for an alleged similarity to prior Board decisions, since the Board is required to consider the same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, it follows that the same aspects of the individual's record may again constitute the primary grounds for a denial of parole. <u>Matter of Hakim v. Travis</u>, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept. 2003); <u>Matter of Bridget v. Travis</u>, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept. 2002). The Board is required to consider the same factors each time he appears in front of them. <u>Matter of Williams v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept.), <u>Iv. denied</u>, 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2010).

As for Appellant's complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future. Matter of Francis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff'd, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. <u>Hodge v Griffin</u>, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing <u>Romer v Travis</u>, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. <u>Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole</u>, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255

### **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

Name: Macedonio, Carl DIN: 72-A-0476

Facility: Fishkill CF AC No.: 09-010-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 6 of 7)

A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel.</u> Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

As for appellant's medical condition, the appellant is perfectly free to apply for special medical parole release – an option he has apparently chosen not to pursue. Executive Law §§ 259-r, 259-s. It is a discretionary decision by the Commissioner of Correction whether to certify an inmate to the Board of Parole for medical release. Matter of Ifill v. Wright, 94 A.D.3d 1259, 941 N.Y.S.2d 812 (3d Dept. 2012).

An inmate has no constitutional right to the information in his parole file, Billiteri v U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976), and generally is not entitled to confidential material, Matter of Justice v. Comm'r of New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 130 A.D.3d 1342, 15 N.Y.S.3d 853 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Perez v. New York State Div. of Parole, 294 A.D.2d 726, 741 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d Dept. 2002); Matter of Macklin v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 821, 711 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (3d Dept. 2000). The Board may consider confidential information. Matter of Molinar v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214, 991 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dept. 2014). The Board may designate certain parole records as confidential. See Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (citing Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a), (f); Executive Law § 259-k(2); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8000.5(c)(2)(i)(a), (b)). Per Executive Law 259-i(2)(a)(i), this letter may be submitted in camera. Applegate v New York State Board of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018) and need not be turned over. Mingo v New York State Division of Parole, 244 A.D.2d 781, 666 N.Y.S.2d 245 (3d Dept. 1997); Grigger v New York State Division of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 783 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2004); Matter of Ramahlo v Bruno, 273 A.D.2d 521, 708 N.Y.S.2d 206 (3d Dept. 2000) lv. den. 95 N.Y.2d 767 (2000).

Submissions by private citizen are protected and remain confidential pursuant to 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2). Matter of Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 447 N.Y.S.2d 44 (3d Dept. 1982); Matter of Murphy v. Annucci, Index No. 6736-16, *Decision & Order* dated July 31, 2017 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (Raymond J.S.C.).

The Parole Board Report complies with all statutory requirements.

There is no merit to the claim that the Board decision was predetermined based on an alleged executive policy to deny parole to violent felony offenders. Allegations that the Board has systematically denied parole to prisoners convicted of violent crimes have been dismissed repeatedly by the Courts. See, e.g., Matter of Cartagena v. Alexander, 64 A.D.3d 841, 882 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dept. 2009); Matter of Motti v. Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 1030, 831 N.Y.S.2d 298 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dept. 2007); Matter of Wood v. Dennison, 25 A.D.3d 1056, 1057, 807 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (3d Dept. 2006);

### APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Macedonio, Carl DIN: 72-A-0476

Facility: Fishkill CF AC No.: 09-010-18 B

**Findings:** (Page 7 of 7)

Matter of Ameyda v. Travis, 21 A.D.3d 1200, 800 N.Y.S.2d (3d Dept. 2005), <u>lv. denied</u>, 6 N.Y.3d 703, 811 N.Y.S.2d 335 (2006); <u>Matter of Bottom v. Travis</u>, 5 A.D.3d 1027, 773 N.Y.S.2d 717 (4th Dept.), <u>appeal dismissed</u> 2 N.Y.3d 822, 781 N.Y.S.2d 285 (2004); <u>Matter of Lue-Shing v. Pataki</u>, 301 A.D.2d 827, 828, 754 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (3d Dept. 2003), <u>lv. denied</u>, 99 N.Y.2d 511, 760 N.Y.S.2d 102 (2003).

Statistical probabilities alone do not generate constitutional protections. <u>Connecticut Board of Pardons v Dumschat</u>, 452 U.S. 458, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2465, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981). Neither the mere possibility of release, nor a statistical probability of release, gives rise to a legitimate expectancy of release on parole. <u>Graziano v Pataki</u>, 689 F.3d 110 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 2012).

The 2014 regulations cited by appellant were all repealed in 2017. Appellant's contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 Amendments to the Executive Law is likewise without merit. Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented a fundamental change in the legal regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on forward-looking factors, this proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process. The Board still must conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014). Thus, "[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every factor equal weight" and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize "factors which emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors". Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).

The Board's decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the Board's discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), <a href="Iv-decision-left">Iv-denied</a>, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); <a href="see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans">see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans</a>, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months for discretionary release was excessive or improper.

**Recommendation:** Affirm.