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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Rivera, Ar	ntonio	Facility:	Attica CF	
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	08-020-18 B	
DIN:	18-B-0360)			
Appearances:		Norman P. Effman, Esq. Wyoming Co. Legal Aid 18 Linwood Avenue Warsaw, New York 14569			
Decision appealed:		July 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 9-months.			
Board Member(s) who participated:		Cruse, Berliner.			
Papers considered:		Appellant's Brief received November 1, 2018			
Appeals Unit Review:		Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation			
Records relied upon:		Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.			
Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:				lecision appealed is hereby:	
Confinissioner		AffirmedVac	cated, remanded fo	or de novo hearing Modified to	
Apmmissioner (or de novo hearing Modified to	
Comm	tssioner	Affirmed Vac	ated, remanded fo	or de novo hearing Modified to	

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

¹³ Aubution: Appeals Unit = Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File (C. 2002)(B) (11 2018)

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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Appellant challenges the July 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 9-month hold.

Appellant raises the following issues in his brief submitted in support of his administrative appeal: (1) the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious and irrational and made in violation of applicable legal authority; (2) the Board failed to provide sufficient weight to Appellant's "educational and other achievements"; (3) certain scores contained in Appellant's COMPAS instrument should have been provided greater weight; (4) the 9-month hold was tantamount to a resentencing of Appellant; and (5) the Board's decision lacked sufficient detail.

As to issues one and two, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). "Although these standards are no longer repeated in the [Board's] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their application." Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. A conclusion that an inmate fails to satisfy **any one** of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an independent basis to deny parole. See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1273-74, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).

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In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. <u>Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert</u>, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole</u>, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); <u>Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); <u>People ex rel. Herbert</u>, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

As to the third issue, in 2011, the law was amended to further require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259-c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). Furthermore, declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).

Additionally, even certain low COMPAS scores would not have placed the onus on the Board to provide countervailing evidence to support its determination. Since 1977, the Board has been required to apply the same three-part substantive standard set forth under Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). The 2011 amendments require the Board to incorporate risk and needs assessment principles to "assist" in measuring an inmate's rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release. See Executive Law § 259-c(4). The statute thus does not clearly create a presumption of rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and needs assessment, let alone a presumption of parole release requiring the Board to provide countervailing evidence. Indeed, while the Board might, for example, find an inmate sufficiently rehabilitated to satisfy the first prong of the standard—

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that the inmate will "live and remain at liberty without violating the law," the Board could also find, in its discretion, that the inmate's release would be incompatible with the welfare of society or would unduly deprecate the seriousness of a crime. The text of the statute therefore flatly contradicts the inmate's assertion that certain low COMPAS scores create a presumption of release. See Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397. The COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1108; accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d at 1061. This is exactly what occurred here.

Finally, we note that Appellant did score as "medium" for risk of arrest, and for risk of absconding. He also scored as "Highly Probable" for re-entry substance abuse, and for re-entry employment expectations, and "Probable" for negative social cognitions, and for re-entry financial risk.

As to the fourth issue, Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). Appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

As to the fifth issue, the Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). The Board addressed many of the factors and principles considered in individualized terms and explained those that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations: that this is Appellant's second State bid; that the instant offense represents a continuation of Appellant's behavior causing risk to the community due to his use of alcohol while driving; that Appellant was on probation at the time of the instant offense; his less than satisfactory performance while being supervised in the community;

and his limited insight into the crimes he

committed.

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Recommendation: Affirm.