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# Administrative Appeal Decision - Henderson, Anthony (2019-08-23)

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### ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name:	Henderson	, Anthony	Facility:	Ulster CF
NYSID:			Appeal Control No.:	12-134- 18 B
DIN:	96-B-0722			
Appearan	ces:	Marshall Nadan P.O. Box 4091 Kingston, New York	12402	
Decision a	appealed:	December 2018 decis months.	ion, denying dis	cretionary release and imposing a hold of 24-
Board Me who partic		Berliner, Drake, Shap	viro	
Papers con	nsidered:	Appellant's Brief rece	eived May 24, 20	019
Appeals U	<u>Init Review</u> :	Statement of the Appo	eals Unit's Findi	ngs and Recommendation
Records re	elied upon:			role Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case
Final Dete	rmination:	The undersigned deter	rmine that the de	ecision appealed is hereby:
Comm	hissioner	AffirmedVac	ated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to
Den	the	Affirmed Vac	ated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to
Comm	issioner			
I mal	~		ated, remanded for	r de novo interview Modified to
Comm	issioner			
Te de Eine	1 Determinin	-tion is at working as	ith Findings on	d Decommendation of Anneals Unit written

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination <u>must</u> be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on  $\frac{S/319}{66}$ .

Distribution: Appeals Unit – Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File P-2002(B) (11/2018)

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# APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name:	Henderson, Anthony	DIN:	96-B-0722
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**<u>Findings</u>**: (Page 2 of 5)

The Board discussed the statutory factors and applicable principles as per New York Executive Law §259-i and 9 NYCRR 8002.2. Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

As the weight to be assigned each statutory factor is within the Board's discretion, it committed no error by emphasizing the severity of the inmate's offense over the other factors it properly considered. <u>See Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty.</u> <u>Supervision</u>, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); <u>Matter of King v. Stanford</u>, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); <u>Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis</u>, 5 A.D.3d 385, 772 N.Y.S.2d 540 (2d Dept. 2004); <u>Matter of Walker v. Travis</u>, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998).

# APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

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**<u>Findings</u>**: (Page 3 of 5)

Although the appellant complains that about the negative scores of the COMPAS, he is alleging that the Board ignored the positive points of the COMPAS. Appellant's additional contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is likewise without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to "assist" the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law § 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). This is encompassed in the Board's regulations. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a). However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense. The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). That is exactly what occurred here.

The Board may consider a district attorney's recommendation to deny parole. <u>Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); <u>Matter of Porter v. Alexander</u>, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); <u>Matter of Walker v. Travis</u>, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); <u>Matter of Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995). Even in the sentencing minutes, the Court noted that the facts and circumstances of the victim's death and the appellant's "callous disregard" for her "shocked the conscience of the community and the court."

Insight and remorse are relevant not only to rehabilitative progress but also to whether release would deprecate the severity of the offense. <u>Matter of Phillips v. Dennison</u>, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 2007). "[T]here is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect by considering remorse and insight." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95

# **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

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**<u>Findings</u>**: (Page 4 of 5)

N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000). A review of the transcript shows that there was very little insight into the appellant's bizarre actions. Furthermore, the appellant didn't show much remorse for the death of someone who, according to the Pre-Sentence Report, was his fiancée. In fact, on pages 4 and 5 of the transcript, when the Board asked if he considered calling 911 when he saw her body, the appellant admits that it was not an idea and he "ended up opening the window and tossing her body out."

There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. <u>See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky</u>, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); <u>People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. <u>See Garner v. Jones</u>, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).



Appellant's assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; <u>Matter of Murray v. Evans</u>, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); <u>Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit</u>, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). The Board was vested with discretion to

# **APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

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**<u>Findings</u>**: (Page 5 of 5)

determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court. <u>Matter of Burress v. Dennison</u>, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); <u>Matter of Cody v. Dennison</u>, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), <u>lv. denied</u>, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). The appellant has not in any manner been resentenced. <u>Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole</u>, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).

**Recommendation:** Affirm.