"Interest" and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance

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Abstract

In Sections 1 and 2, the article shall provide a brief introduction to various notions of Islamic law as they exist today, as well as the common-law nature of Islamic jurisprudence to establish the possibility of finding a compromise that renders minor modifications of the existing juristic positions coherent. In Sections 3 and 4, the article will provide translations of the entire Azhar Islamic Research Institute (IRI) fatwa, and large excerpts from the Council of the Islamic Jurisprudence Academy’s (IJA) rebuttal together with discussions of the juristic backgrounds of each opinion. In Section 5, the author will discuss the ideological roots of contemporary Islamic finance, which continue to shape Muslim views, both for jurists and lay people, regarding interest and permissible profit. In Section 6, the author will provide a brief survey of the most prominent Islamic financial instruments, illustrating the incoherence of juristic views that denounce “interest” and yet maintain that Islamic finance is “interest-free.” Lastly, the author will conclude by proposing a possible compromise between the two extreme views espoused by the IRI fatwa and the IJA rebuttal, which would allow for a coherent juristic and financial nexus in Islamic finance.
"INTEREST" AND THE PARADOX OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE

Mahmoud A. El-Gamal*

Often, the true grounds of legal decision are concealed rather than illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric of opinions. Indeed, legal education consists primarily of learning to dig beneath the rhetorical surface to find those grounds, many of which may turn out to have an economic character.1

[T]he manner in which an act was qualified as morally good or bad in the spiritual domain of Islamic religion was quite different from the manner in which that same act was qualified as legally valid or invalid in the temporal domain of Islamic law. Islamic law was secular, not canonical . . . Thus, it was a system focused on ensuring that an individual received justice, not that one be a good person.2

I tell you, truthfully and without pretense, . . . that we went beyond choosing the "bank" label [in "Islamic Banking"], to the point of adopting its central essence . . . Consequently, we failed to give our financial institutions any characteristics beyond simple financial intermediation. This is accomplished through Islamic banks' favorite investment modes that are essentially a hybrid between loans and investment; which hybrid carries most of the characteristics of usurious loans . . . 3

INTRODUCTION

Almost all contemporary writings in Islamic law and Islamic finance proclaim that Islamic law [Shari'ah] forbids interest. This statement, however, is paradoxical in light of the actual practices of Islamic financial providers over the past three decades. In fact, the bulk of Islamic financial practices formally base rates of return or costs of capital on a benchmark interest

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rate such as the London Inter-bank Offer Rate ("LIBOR"), and would easily be classified by any Masters of Business Administration ("MBA") student as interest-based debt financing. Nevertheless, jurists on the payrolls of Islamic financial providers continue to proclaim all forms of interest as 
\textit{riba} [usury], which is subject to the most severe Qur'anic prohibition. As this Article will illustrate, the dual role of jurists (who both condemn conventional interest-based financing and support and personally profit from its "Islamic twin") is supported through an excessively formalistic interpretation of Islamic law.

Minority opinions, which permit modern forms of interest, have surfaced from time to time and are occasionally championed by holders of highly respectable (though, often politically appointed) religious posts. Perhaps the oldest such pronouncement was made by Ebussud Efendi, the 
\textit{Mufti} of Istanbul between 1545 and 1574 C.E., and holder of the title 
\textit{Seyhiilislam}, towards the end of his tenure. Ebussud defended the act of interest-taking, especially by \textit{awqaf} [pious foundations], as a practical matter of necessity.\textsuperscript{4} As expected, this minority opinion, while sanctioned by the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman, was rejected by the majority of Muslim scholars around the Arab world who continued to favor interest-free lending and traditional partnership forms of finance. Consequently, European modes of banking only became commonly practiced in the Islamic world during the eighteenth century. Even then, the widespread adoption of Western banking practices appears to have been driven by external forces.\textsuperscript{5}

Most recently, Sheikh-al-Azhar Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi re-iterated a \textit{fatwa} [an issued opinion in response to a question regarding Islamic law] that he had issued in 1989, and published in the semi-official newspaper, \textit{Al-Ahram}, when he was the \textit{Mufti} [an official expounder of Islamic law] of Egypt.\textsuperscript{6} This most recent \textit{fatwa}, carrying the support of the Azhar Islamic Research


\textsuperscript{5} See \textsc{Sevket Pamuk}, \textit{A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire} 78-82 (2000).

\textsuperscript{6} See \textsc{Chibli Mallat}, \textit{Tantawi on Banking Operations in Egypt, in Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas} 286 (Muhammad Khalid Masud et al. eds., 1996) (discussing 1989 fatwa). Numerous Islamic writers attacked Tantawi for this \textit{fatwa}, which was dismissed by the Pakistani Shari'ah Appellate Court as "the solitary opinion of Dr. Tantawi of Egypt." (court document on file with author); see also, \textsc{Ali Al-Salus}, \textit{Al-Iqtisad al-Islami wa al-Qadaya al-Fiqhiyyah al-Mu 'asirah} 356-410 (Dar al-
Institute ("IRI" or [Majma' al-Buhuth al-Islamiyyah]), of which Tantawi was Rector, differed little substantively from its predecessors. Indeed, parts of its text seem to be copied verbatim from a book on banking operations that Tantawi published well before the elicitation of this recent fatwa by the Chairman of a bank's board of directors.

One interesting aspect of the two opinions of Tantawi and the IRI is that they both exclusively deal with the relationship between bank depositors and banks, without addressing the nature of banks' assets. The essence of the fatwa is that bank depositors should be viewed as passive investors and banks should be viewed as their investment agents. The problem of interest on bank deposits is thus reduced to one which permits pre-specifying the "profits" to which depositors are entitled as a percentage of the capital, instead of specification as a percentage of actually realized profits. This constitutes a violation of the classical rules of the silent partnership contracts known as mudarabah or qirad.

Semi-official Egyptian press hailed the fatwa as "declaring bank interest licit," even though the authors of the fatwa clearly exerted effort in its wording and conceptualization to avoid using the term "interest" [fa'ida, or fawa'id in plural form]. Supporters of Islamic finance were outraged by the fatwa and despite numerous earlier rejections of its substance, demanded a prompt official rebuttal by the largest possible Islamic juristic body. A month later, in January 2003, the Council of the Islamic Jurisprudence Academy ("IJA" or [Majma' al-Fiqh al-Islami]) issued a rebuttal, reiterating many of the points made by its members and numerous other jurists in rejecting the Islamic legitimacy of all forms of bank interest.

Such scholarly debates are abundant in every religious tradi-

Thaqafah 1998) (exemplifying numerous personal attacks against Tantawi based on questioning Tantawi's knowledge, piety, and incentives).

7. Many have correctly noted that both opinions were issued during periods when the Egyptian government was worried about lack of saving mobilization. However, this Article focuses on the concepts and methods invoked by the opinions' proponents and opponents, rather than the incentives of each.

8. These terms are analogous to the Medieval European commenda contract and the Jewish heter isqa.

tion. What is puzzling in this instance, however, is the very nature of the brand of "Islamic finance" that the majority of jurists support as an alternative to the forbidden interest-based financial model. In fact, the IJA arguments correctly illustrate the incoherence of the IRI's fatwa. The IRI fatwa focuses on the liabilities (deposit) side of banks and ignores the fact that the bulk of conventional banks' assets (or, in their language, investments) take the form of interest-bearing loans. However, all jurists, including Tantawi and others at Al-Azhar who supported the fatwa — denounce interest-bearing loans as forbidden riba. On the other hand, the IJA's own position, which is in accordance with the majority of jurists who denounce conventional interest-based finance, yet support the contemporary "Islamic" alternative, also seems incoherent upon further examination of the practices of Islamic financial institutions on both sides of the balance sheet.

In Sections 1 and 2, I shall provide a brief introduction to various notions of Islamic law as they exist today, as well as the common-law nature of Islamic jurisprudence to establish the possibility of finding a compromise that renders minor modifications of the existing juristic positions coherent. In Sections 3 and 4, I provide translations of the entire Azhar IRI fatwa, and large excerpts from the IJA's Council rebuttal together with discussions of the juristic backgrounds of each opinion. In Section 5, I discuss the ideological roots of contemporary Islamic finance, which continue to shape Muslim views, both for jurists and lay people, regarding interest and permissible profit. In Section 6, I provide a brief survey of the most prominent Islamic financial instruments, illustrating the incoherence of juristic views that denounce "interest" and yet maintain that Islamic finance is "interest-free." Lastly, I will conclude by proposing a possible compromise between the two extreme views espoused by the IRI fatwa and the IJA rebuttal, which would allow for a coherent juristic and financial nexus in Islamic finance.

1. Questions of Authority: A Hierarchy of Islamic Laws

In contemporary Muslim societies, one may speak of a number of different Islamic laws. The lack of a widely accepted contemporary legal codification based on Islamic jurisprudence makes it difficult to speak with any authority regarding the Islamic permissibility or prohibition of any given transaction.
Ironically, it is precisely this legal vacuum that allows many individuals to authoritatively speak on those subjects. The source of this authority may be a post to which the speaker was politically appointed, academic credentials sanctioned by a community of scholars, or public support from the laity.

Officially "Islamized" States, such as Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, produce a codified variant of Islamic law that plays a central role in the legitimacy of ruling regimes. These laws constitute the first position in the hierarchy of Islamic law. In the area of finance, for example, this issue has been most prominent in Pakistan, which in the past two decades has witnessed a series of banking laws, and Shari'ah Appellate Court rulings (most recently overruled by the Supreme Court), all aiming to "eradicate interest." The financial systems in those States are therefore politically mandated to operate on an interest-free basis despite the lack of a coherent demarcation between what is "interest-based" and what is "interest-free." Many of the early innovations in Islamic finance (e.g., alternatives to government bonds) were advanced in those countries. However, the recent growth of Islamic finance has been mainly driven by advances made in Malaysia and the Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC") countries, most recently with the assistance of multinational financial behemoths like Citigroup and HSBC.

The second hierarchical level of Islamic law is represented by the Islamic law of Muslim States, some of which have long declared Islamic law as their source of legislation. In the area of finance, Islamic sources of transaction law continue to rely heavily on Majallat al-Ahkam al-'Adliyyah. Even in countries where the Majallat was never enforced, like in Egypt, its general juristic rules continue to be quoted by official judges and jurists of all schools. Of course, the actual civil codes in most Muslim countries owe less to Islamic jurisprudence than to European civil codes. Turkey based its civil codes on Swiss law in 1926 while

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10. See GCC Countries, available at http://www.sheikhmohammed.co.ae/english/history/history_arabia.asp (noting that the Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC") was founded on May 26, 1981 in order to achieve unity between member States which include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates).

11. These States include Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, etc..

12. This codification of Islamic jurisprudence was commissioned and imposed by the Ottoman Empire in its final days (1869-1926 C.E.) and based on Hanafi jurisprudence.
Egypt, Syria and Iraq implemented predominantly French-based civil codes.\textsuperscript{13}

Paralleling increased general levels of religiosity in Muslim societies, the late twentieth century witnessed a revival of Islamic law at the official, governmental level. Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, amended in May 1980, stated that all subsequent laws and legislations must be derived from Islamic law. This constitutional requirement was further strengthened through the following Egyptian Constitutional Court’s ruling:

It is therefore not permitted that a legislative text contradict those rules of Shari'ah whose origin and interpretation are definitive, since these rules are the only ones regarding which new interpretive effort (\textit{ijtihad}) is impossible, as they represent, in Islamic Shari'ah, the supreme principles and fixed foundations that admit neither allegorical interpretation, nor modification. In addition, we should not contemplate that their meaning would change with changes in time and place, from which it follows that they are impermeable to any amendment, and that it is not permitted to go beyond them or change their meaning. The authority of the High Constitutional Court in this regard is limited to safeguarding their implementation and overruling any other legal rule that contradicts them.\textsuperscript{14}

In Saudi Arabia, there have been a number of lawsuits in which one counter-party refused to pay interest or delayed penalty payments on the basis of the prohibition of \textit{riba}, despite the fact that such payments were contractually stipulated. A number of lawsuits between non-Saudi and Saudi counterparties are currently underway, and precisely revolve around whether or not Islamic law forbids interest payments or late payment penalties.\textsuperscript{15}

The revival of a manifested (if not real) desire to implement Islamic law at the official level gave rise to international juristic councils most notably:

- The Institute of Islamic Research [\textit{Majma' Al-Buhuth Al-Isl-}

\textsuperscript{13} See OUSSAMA ARABI, STUDIES IN MODERN ISLAMIC LAW 21, 39-42, 63-65 (2001). Egypt and Syria implemented such civil codes in 1949 while Iraq implemented its own in 1953.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Id.} at 196.

\textsuperscript{15} Since those cases are still in progress, it is premature to disclose their counterparties or document the arguments used by each side.
lamiyyah] at Al-Azhar University, established in Cairo in 1961

- The Islamic Jurisprudence Institute [Al-Majma‘ Al-Fiqhi Al-Islami] of the Islamic League [Rabitat Al-'Alam Al-Islami], established in Mecca in 1979

- The Fiqh Institute or Academy [Majma‘ Al-Fiqh Al-Islami] of the Organization of Islamic Conference ("OIC": [Munazammat Al-Mu'tamar Al-Islami]), established in 1984 with a home in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. This is currently the most widely cited jurisprudential council, which is comprised of representatives from Islamic members of the OIC

Members of these institutes are appointed by their respective governments. Consequently, the third level of the aforementioned hierarchy, Islamic law pronouncements by those institutes are to some extent rooted in official status.

The Islamic law pronouncements at the three official levels (i.e., Islamized national level, Islamic law within Muslim Nations, and international institute level) often contradict one another. For instance, the Malaysian Islamic banking laws allowed for trading in debt [bay‘ al-dayn], which allowed them to develop a relatively sophisticated “Islamic money market.” By contrast, jurists from Muslim States and jurisprudence institutes, most of whom were from the Arab world and Pakistan, rejected this type of debt-trading. Consequently, Malaysian Islamic finance has recently moved in the direction of increased conservatism (if only in formalistic terms), in order to build an international Islamic money market for the Nation’s bonds and other financial instruments. Simultaneously, innovations in the Arab world permitted so-called ijara [leasing] and salam sukuk [bonds] which can serve as an alternative basis for the Islamic money market.

A fourth category, labeled “Islamic law,” adds another level of complexity to Islamic finance. This category has been endorsed by popular jurists who frequently rely on medieval literature in Islamic jurisprudence and frequently quote canonical texts to support these earlier opinions. The influence of these jurists has increased exponentially in recent years through satellite television channels and internet forums. Their following accepts the maxim that “Islam is for all times and places,"\(^6\) thus

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16. With sufficient flexibility in the definition of what constitutes Islam, this statement would be rendered tautological. With sufficient rigidity, it would be rendered
giving those medieval texts, which were mostly driven by the contemporary concerns of their authors, current authoritative.

Some of the "fathers" of Islamic economics (the ideological dogma that gave rise to contemporary Islamic finance) belonged to this class of popular religious figures who had significant followings during their lifetimes which grew even larger posthumously. Contemporary popular jurists mainly follow in the footsteps of the founders of this populist view of "Islam as a way of life" and its manifestation in Islamic finance.

A fifth and final category of Islamic law, embodied by the views espoused by amateur jurists, is responsible for the existence and growth of Islamic finance. Despite the clergy-like status granted to popular jurists and in certain circles also granted official and semi-official jurists, Islamic jurisprudence does require the questioner to seek knowledge directly. While large portions of the Muslim populations of various countries are willing to accept the opinions of a particular jurist or institute blindly, a growing number of lay people seek to educate themselves about the various opinions and their bases in classical Islamic law. This is facilitated in large part by the affordability and availability of classical Islamic texts in print and electronic media. In fact, many of the "scholars" serving on the "Shari'ah boards" of various providers of Islamic financial instruments have no formal degrees in Islamic transactions law. Rather,

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17. Claims like those of the Egyptian Constitutional Court quoted above — professing that the canonical texts are immutable, eternally applicable, and can easily morph into claims that are classical interpretations of those texts, or majority interpretations thereof — are equally authoritative. See, e.g., KHALED M. ABOU EL FADL, AND GOD KNOWS THE SOLDIERS (2001) (providing analysis of contemporary problems regarding authoritativeness in Islamic discourse).

18. For example, this group includes Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, Baqir al-Sadr, and Sayyid Qutb, who also, and perhaps unsurprisingly, fathered contemporary political Islam in their respective countries and beyond.

19. Contemporary popular jurists include Taqi Usmani in Pakistan, with close ties to Mawdudi's Jamaat-i-Islami and Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Qatar, with close ties to Qutb's Muslim Brotherhood in his native Egypt, etc.
these "scholars" are mostly self-educated lay people and generalist jurists who have helped facilitate a difficult discourse between bankers on the one hand, and religious law texts on the other. The bridges now built by those amateur jurists may assist formally trained Islamic legal scholars to understand the basics of contemporary finance, and help them build the much needed transition from classical books of jurisprudence to a contemporary, relevant, and coherent jurisprudence of financial transactions. Unfortunately, as the recent episode discussed in this Article illustrates, the rhetoric used by amateur and professional jurists continues to obscure the relevant facts and keep that much-desired goal beyond reach.

2. Islamic Transactions Law as Common Law

Even though contemporary writings on Islamic transactions law always cite canonical texts (the Qur'an and the prophetic Sunnah) to support their opinions, Islamic transactions law is a common law system at heart. Indeed, by the admission of the very jurists working in this field, contemporary developments in Islamic finance owe more to contemporary juristic understandings of the canonical texts and previous juristic analyses, than they owe to the canon itself:

It must be understood that when we claim that Islam has a satisfactory solution for every problem emerging in any situation in all times to come, we do not mean that the Holy Qur'an or the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (SW) or the rulings of the Islamic scholars provide a specific answer to each and every minute detail of our socio-economic life. What we mean is that the Holy Qur'an and the Holy Sunnah of the Prophet . . . have laid down broad principles in the light of which the scholars of every time have deduced specific answers to the new situation arising in their age. Therefore, in order to reach a definite answer about a new situation the scholars of Shari'ah have to play a very important role. They have to analyze every new question in light of the principles laid down by the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah as well as in the

20. The current context of Islamic law and finance, which evolves through fatwa (plural of fatwa) instead of formal codification, is particularly problematic for the desired coherence opinions. It is the nature of fatwa to be given for a specific time and specific set of circumstances. Therefore, a collection of fatwa is highly unlikely to exhibit any degree of internal consistency and coherence.
light of the standards set by the earlier jurists, enumerated in the books of Islamic jurisprudence. This exercise is called Isinbat or Ijtihad ... [T]he ongoing process of Isinbat keeps injecting new ideas, concepts and rulings into the heritage of Islamic jurisprudence ... .

In other words, Islamic jurists, by "injecting new ideas, concepts and rulings," make law in a manner very similar to common law judges presiding over cases that lack common law precedents. In addition, it is worthwhile to note that the process of ijtihad, discussed above, is restricted mainly to reasoning by analogy (juristic rather than logical), following the rules of Islamic legal theory as established by Al-Shaf'i and widely followed in all juristic schools:

1323 - He said: What is analogy (qiyas)? Is it the same as ijtihad, or are they two separate notions?
1324 - I (Al-Shaf'i) said: they are synonyms.
1325 - He said: So what is in common between them?
1326 - I said: Everything which was revealed for the Muslims contains either a binding command, or a legal proof upon which future rulings can be based to uphold truth and justice. Thus, if revelation gave us a direct ruling [regarding the matter at hand], Muslims must follow that ruling; and if revelation did not make a ruling on this specific matter, then a proof for the just and true ruling must be sought via ijtihad. And, ijtihad is qiyas.

This emphasis on precedent and reasoning by juristic analogy gave rise to a body of transactions law that is very similar to contemporary common law traditions. Lawrence Rosen stated that "[i]n the course of studying Islamic law in its everyday practice I have been increasingly struck with its similarities to the common law form in which I have also been trained in the United States."

Misunderstandings regarding this common law feature of Islamic transactions law have caused significant problems in recently Islamized States:

[I]n Pakistan and the Sudan the simple use of Islamic law as

21. MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE 237 (1988) [hereinafter USMANI].
an arm of the [S]tate has slipped through the fingers of those at the center. The reason, I believe, is that these regimes have been trying to apply a common law variant as if it were a civil law system.24

Thus, while Islamic jurisprudence has in fact evolved as a common law system, the rhetoric of opinions utilized by jurists suggests a civil/canon law procedure of interpreting legal texts. I shall now illustrate this tension through an analysis of a fatwa issued by the Azhar’s Islamic Research Institute in December 2002 and the reaction it has elicited. Of particular interest is the fact that both the text of the fatwa (and its supporting arguments in other sources), and the rejection by the IJA jurists on the other, each focus on the canonical nature of the law, even when the application of a particular text to the practical issue at hand is very far-fetched.

3. The Azhar Islamic Research Institute Fatwa (December 2002)

The second and penultimate paragraphs of the Al-Azhar fatwa25 hinted at the common objection to fixing profits in the Islamic silent partnership contract [mudarabah].26 As we shall see below, jurists often claim that there is a consensus that the principal’s profit share must be specified as a percentage of total profits, rather than a fixed percentage of the capital. The text of the fatwa hints at the view that this opinion was only an artifact of the historical thought of Islamic jurists who developed the principle and does not rely on any direct injunction in canonical Islamic texts.

Elsewhere, Tantawi elaborated on the fatwa’s justification of fixing the profit share as a percentage of the partnership’s capital on moral hazard considerations. In his book, Tantawi stated that “non-fixity of profits [as a percentage of capital] in this age of corruption, dishonesty and greed would put the principal under the mercy of the agent investing the funds, be it a bank or

24. Id. at 64.
25. See infra Appendix A, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Rector of Al-Azhar Islamic Research Institute, Fatwa, Investing Funds with Banks that Pre-Specify Profits. I am grateful to Dr. Anas Al-Zarqa for sharing a scanned version of the official fatwa. The official fatwa (in Arabic) is reproduced in the Appendix since the author has received many requests by email from readers who wished to read the Arabic original and study its specific wording. An English translation of its full text follows it.
26. See infra Appendix B at Section D.
otherwise.” Tantawi also cited similar opinions by highly respected earlier jurists, including Abdul-Wahhab Khallaf, Ali Al-Khafif, and others. One of the most notable statements is the following:

When one gives his money to another for investment and payment of a known profit, this does not constitute the definitively forbidden riba, regardless of the pre-specified profit rate. This follows from the fact that disagreeing with the juristic rule that forbids pre-specification of profits does not constitute the clear type of riba which ruins households. This type of transaction is beneficial both to the investor and the entrepreneur. In contrast, riba harms one for no fault other than being in need, and benefits another for no reason except greed and hardness of heart. The two types of dealings cannot possibly have the same legal status (Hukm).

The juristic condition for validity of mudaraba[h], that profits are not pre-specified is a condition without proof (dalil). Just as profits may be shared between the two parties, the profits of one party may be pre-specified. Such a condition may disagree with jurists’ opinions, but it does not contradict any Canonical Text in the Qur’an or Sunnah. The only objection for this dealing is the condition of validity of mudaraba[h], that profits must be specified as percentage shares, rather than specified amounts or percentages of capital. I reply to this objection in the following manner: first, this condition has no proof (dalil) from the Qur’an and Sunnah. Silent partnerships follow the conditions stipulated by the partners. We now live in a time of great dishonesty, and if we do not specify a fixed profit for the investor, his partner

27. MUHAMMAD SAYYID TANTAWI, MU’AMALAT AL-BUNUK WA-AHKAMUHA AL-SHAR’IYAH 131 (Nahdat Misr. 2001) [hereinafter TANTAWI].
28. See id. at 94-104.
29. See id. at 165-204.
30. See id. at 204-11.
31. Id. at 95. This quotation was attributed to Abdul-Wahhab Khallaf’s two articles on riba, in LIWA’ AL-'ISLAM, Vol. 4 (1951), who in turn attributed these statements to Rashid Rida’s article, in 9 AL MANAR 332 (1906), which quoted Ustadh Muhammad Abduh. Similar arguments were made by Rashid Rida, Ma’ruf Al-Dawalibi and Abdul-Razzaq Al-Sanhuri in various forms. Their arguments were based, respectively, on restricting the strict Qur’anic prohibition to post hoc charging of interest, charging interest on consumption (as opposed to production) loans, and charging compound interest. The current opinion of Tantawi is quite different, in that it takes the issue away from one of interest-bearing loans to one of investment with pre-specified profits.
32. TANTAWI, supra note 27, at 95-96. This quotation was attributed to Abdul-Wahhab Khallaf’s two articles on riba, in 4 LIWA’ AL-'ISLAM, (1951), at 11.
will devour his wealth. Second, if the mudaraba[h] is deemed defective due to violation of one of its conditions, the entrepreneur becomes a hired worker. Thus, what he takes is considered wages. Let that be as it may, for there is no difference in calling it a mudaraba[h] or an ijara: It is a valid transaction that benefits the investor who cannot directly invest his funds, and benefits the entrepreneur who gets capital with which to work. Thus, it is a transaction that benefits both parties, without harming either party or anyone else. Forbidding this beneficial transaction would result in harm, and the Prophet (P) forbade that by saying: “No harm is allowed.”

We now note again that this fatwa is focused on the liabilities side of banking, and even then addresses the issue from the point of view of depositors. Indeed, Tantawi argued that the depositor/bank relationship should neither be viewed as one of depositor/depositary nor lender/borrower. He admits that either characterization of the relationship would render any interest payment a form of forbidden riba. In contrast, he argued, that savers take their funds to banks to invest on their behalf. Therefore, the relationship is one of principal and agent in an investment agency, and the juristic problem discussed above only relates to the permissibility of fixing profits as a percentage of capital in such an investment agency. As we shall see shortly, the rebuttal, representing the views of most jurists around the world, insists that the relationship is initially one of deposit. Once the depositary uses the funds deposited therein, classical jurisprudence suggests that the depositary has thus violated the simple safekeeping duties of a fiduciary deposit and must thus guarantee the funds for the depositor. The deposit contract is one of trust rather than guaranty. For example, the depositary only guarantees funds against its own negligence and transgression, not unconditionally. Therefore, the classical juristic argument concludes that the contract can no longer be viewed as a deposit and must be viewed as a loan, the latter being a contract of guaranty. Indeed, Tantawi devotes much of his arguments to stating that deposits at banks do not fit the classical jurisprudential definition of “deposits” [wadi’ah] and rejecting their characterization as loans.

33. TANTAWI, supra note 27. This quotation was attributed to Abdul-Wahhah Khal-laf’s two articles on riba, in LIWA’ AL-‘ISLAM, Vol. 4 (1951), at 12.

34. See generally TANTAWI, supra note 27.
4. Rebuttal by the Islamic Fiqh Institute in Qatar (January 2003)

In the conclusions of the Fourteenth Session of Majlis Majma' Al-Fiqh Al-Islami\(^3\) in Duha, Qatar on January 11-16, 2003, the Azhar IRI's characterization of dealings with conventional banks as a legitimate investment vehicle was rejected. This opinion contains four main arguments against the correctness and relevance of the IRI \textit{fatwa}:

1. The \textit{fatwa} refers to banks with permissible investments, but banks are forbidden from investing in any instruments other than interest-bearing loans and financial instruments.
2. Characterizing the depositor/bank relationship as one of investment agency is incorrect. The correct classical characterization is one of lender/borrower.
3. There is a consensus that all forms of bank interest are forbidden \textit{riba}.
4. Even if the relationship was to be considered an investment agency (silent partnership), pre-specification of profits in such partnerships must be in terms of a percentage of total profits, not a percentage of capital. The moral hazard argument is ignored and the principle of return being justified by risk is highlighted.

The first point is clearly valid. One can easily see that by focusing on the liabilities side of banking, the IRI \textit{fatwa}, and its predecessors ignored the nature of bank assets, which are legally interest-bearing loans and forbidden by all jurists as a form of \textit{riba}. This renders the IRI \textit{fatwa} irrelevant for conventional banks, wherein investments are deemed impermissible.

On the other hand, as we shall see in Section 6 and noted in the Introduction's quote by Saleh Kamel, Islamic financial institutions have managed to find permissible alternatives to bank loans that are functionally equivalent to interest-bearing loans.\(^3\) On the other hand, "depositors" at those institutions are not entitled to any rate of return and "investment account" holders are exposed to unnecessary levels of moral hazard and adverse selection due to their exposure to losses. This problem has been

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\(^3\) See \textit{infra} Appendix B, \textit{Majlis al Fiqh Al-Islami} [Islamic Jurisprudence Council] 14th Sess., Dec. 133(7/14) 20-24 (2003). A lengthy quotation from the official conclusions of the meeting summarizes the contemporary overwhelming majority view on conventional banking among jurists and appears in Appendix B.

\(^3\) See Kamel, \textit{supra} note 3.
practically solved in Islamic finance by selling shares in closed-end "murabahah funds," essentially securitized claims to the stream of fixed payments of principal, plus interest (mark-up), in which the only source of risk is default risk (as in the case of interest-bearing loans). While this solution provides some of the banking functions of pooling the resources of many savers and diversifying the portfolio by financing multiple projects/purchases, it falls short of addressing all the prudential regulation standards to which banks are subjected.

I shall return to those issues in the Conclusion, where I argue that the combination of lax opinions that Islamic bank jurists have adopted and the IRI opinion on pre-specification of profits as a percentage of capital can provide a coherent framework for Islamic financial intermediation. Furthermore, this adaptation can reduce current agency costs in the industry. Before turning to that issue, however, we need to briefly review the background and practice of Islamic finance.

5. Ideological Roots of Islamic Finance: Islamic Economics

Islamic finance was conceived in the 1970s as the brain-child of contemporary "Islamic economics." The latter began to take shape in the 1950s, based primarily on the writings of Muhammad Iqbal and Abu Al-A'la Al-Maududi, from India and Pakistan respectively, and Baqir Al-Sadr and Sayyid Qutb, from the Arab world. Timur Kuran noted the importance of the concurrent emergence of a political independence movement to Islamic finance, with its accompanying emphasis on national and religious identities. He argued convincingly that it was this ideology that gave rise to Islamic economics, which was still socio-politically (and not scientifically) based on religion.

Over the course of three decades, Islamic economics morphed into a sub-field of economics as suggested by contemporary leaders of the field:

Islamic economics . . . has the advantage of benefiting from


the tools of analysis developed by conventional economics. These tools, along with a consistent world-view for both microeconomics and macroeconomics, and empirical data about the extent of deviation from [normative] goal realization, may help . . . 39

[Islamic economics] is the Muslim thinkers' response to the economic challenges of their times. In this endeavor they were aided by the Qur'an and the Sunnah as well as by reason and experience. 40

Therefore, while Islamic economics was initially conceived as an independent Islamic social science, it quickly lost that emphasis on independence and identity. "[Islamic economics] failed to escape the centripetal pull of Western economic thought, and has in many regards been caught in the intellectual web of the very system it set out to replace." 41

Similarly to the convergence of Islamic economics with mainstream economic thought, Islamic finance quickly turned to mimicking the interest-based conventional finance it initially set out to replace. However, writings in Islamic jurisprudence, economics, and finance continued to assert that conventional interest-based banking and finance were forbidden riba. Thus, popular Islamic discourse continues to refer to conventional banks as "ribawi banks," 42 and to assert that the Islamic alternative is "interest-free." It is this divergence between the fiction of


Islamic finance and its reality that gave rise to the paradox addressed in this Article.

At its inception, Islamic banking was theoretically conceived on the principle of profit and loss-sharing through a two-tier silent partnership (mudarabah), in place of the ribawi, deposit/loan-based commercial banking system. Providers of funds would be viewed as principals/silent-partners extending their funds to an Islamic bank, viewed as an entrepreneur or investment agent. The Islamic bank would thus invest funds on the principals' behalf in exchange for a share in profits. If investments were not profitable, the bank/agent would lose only its effort, and the principals would bear all financial losses. In turn, the bank would invest the funds by acting as a principal in other investment agency contracts (silent partnerships) with its various customers.

This two-tiered, profit-sharing form of financial intermediation, which was potentially supplemented with legal stratagems [hiyal] in order to fix profits as a percentage of capital was hardly new. Indeed, Avram Udovich dubs this practice, used in medieval Mediterranean trade as "bankers without banks." The basic profit-sharing principle also bears a very close resemblance to the Jewish legal concept of the heter isqa [partnership clause] contract; a silent partnership profit-sharing arrangement used to avoid the Biblical prohibition of ribit. Like heter isqa documents, Islamic bank documents avoid the use of any terms that may result in a charge of violating the prohibition of riba, such as "loan," "interest," "borrower," "lender," etc.

Later refinements of the heter isqa allowed profits received by the principal to be a fixed percentage of the partnership's

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46. In an interesting fatwa for HSBC Amana Finance in New York, two active Islamic bank jurists signed a document that stated that such language (including the terms "borrower," "interest," and "loan," etc.) was only mandated in HSBC documents by New York State, but further noted that the contract was nonetheless essentially interest-free.
capital, as a solution to the inherent moral hazard of silent partnerships. The fundamental argument underlying the December 2002 ruling of Al-Azhar's Islamic Research Institute revolves around the same issue of fixing the silent-partner's profit percentage to solve moral hazard problems. However, this attempt to justify interest as a fixed profit rate in an investment relationship has been met with violent opposition by the Islamic juristic community. The paradox, however, is that this same community has been supportive of an Islamic finance movement that is, at best, an economically inefficient replication of the conventional finance for which it purports to be a substitute.

6. The Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Finance

Scanning any news article on Islamic finance, one is almost certain to read that "Muslims are forbidden to pay or receive interest." On the other hand, one need not read much further before facing our paradox. For instance, in a recent *FORTUNE* magazine article dealing with Islamic auto-finance, the author cited a case study wherein a customer of one Islamic bank chose a car that he wished to purchase on credit and negotiated its price with the dealer. The customer then asked the Islamic bank to purchase the car at its cash price from the dealer and then to sell it to him on credit. The credit prices charged by Islamic banks include a pre-specified profit-margin (mark-up) that parallels the market interest rates for auto loans with similar characteristics. Reflecting on the transaction, the author of the article exclaimed that the "result looked a lot like interest, and some argue that *murabahah* is simply a thinly veiled version of it; the mark-up [bank's name] charges is very close to the prevailing interest rate. But bank officials argue that God is in the details." The bulk of Islamic finance operations today involve this type of mark-up credit sales, or more sophisticated lease-to-purchase transactions with similar built-in mark-ups designated

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47. Interestingly, English versions of the Qur'an frequently translated *riba* as "usury." With the advent of Islamic economics, translations substituted "interest" for "usury" and *riba*. Mahmoud El-Gamal, *An Economic Explication of the Prohibition of Riba in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence*, in *PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD HARVARD UNIVERSITY FORUM ON ISLAMIC FINANCE* (Harv. Islamic Fin. Info. Program et al. eds., 2001) (comparing and contrasting concepts of *riba*, "usury," and "interest").

48. J. Useem, *Banking on Allah*, *FORTUNE*, June 10, 2002 (illustrating that cynical "God is in the details" is particularly distasteful in light of formalistic "details" documented later in this Section).
as rent. Moreover, the mark-up is explicitly based on a market interest rate such as LIBOR, and jurists have defended this practice on the basis of LIBOR serving "only as a benchmark."

The same paradox can also be observed at the macroeconomic level. In June 2002, Bank Negara Malaysia issued US $500 million in "global sukuk," described as an "Islamic treasury bond," which operates on "Islamic interest-free financial and investment principles."49 The current Islamic bond market in Malaysia is estimated to be worth US$20 billion.50 In August 2002, the Bahrain Monetary Agency announced its third issuance of Islamic leasing sukuk worth US$80 million and paying a "four percent annual profit."51 Thus, such news articles paradoxically report on "interest-free" financial instruments and shortly proceed to report their interest rate. Calling such instruments "interest-free" is particularly problematic in light of attached government guarantees. Bahrain's Islamic leasing sukuk issue of US$80 million in August 2002, which was 2.1 times oversubscribed was declared (along with earlier issues in September 2001) to be "... directly and unconditionally guaranteed by the government."52

Islamic banks have kept to the generally accepted principle of profit and loss-sharing on their liabilities side, at least in prin-

49. The singular of sukuk is bakk, meaning a written documentation of financial liability. Most historians maintain that the Arabic term bakk is the root of the French/English cheque or "check." See generally Muhammad ibn Mukarram ibn Manzur, Lisan al-'Arab (1992); see also Muhammad Rawwas Qal'ahji et al., Mu'jam Lughat al-Fuqaha (1996). Indeed, one of the most popular English-Arabic dictionaries translates the English word "bond" as both sanad (the conventional Arabic word for government and corporate bonds and its plural form: sanadat) and sakk. Cf. Munir Ba'Albaki & Ruth Ba'Albaki, Al-Mawrid (1998). Earlier attempts to provide bond alternatives through jurist-approved issues profit-sharing alternatives in Jordan and Turkey were limited in success and scope due to the principal not being guaranteed. Cf. Vogel & Hayes, supra note 42, at 169-70, 191-93. Pakistani "participation certificates" and earlier experiments in Malaysia with "government investment certificates" (in which the principal was guaranteed) failed to gain acceptance among jurists in other countries, especially within the Arab world. See generally Mahmoud El-Gamal, Involving Islamic Banks in Central Bank Open Market Operations, 41 Thunderbird Int'l Bus. Rev., Nos. 4, 5, at 501-21 (1999).


ciple if not in practice. Thus, depositors in Islamic banks do not earn any return on their deposits while those holding "investment accounts" earn a share of the profits and are exposed to potential losses. In practice, Islamic banks use special accounts to smooth the profit distribution to their investment account holders (thus keeping profit distributions close to market interest rates).53

On the assets side, Islamic banks avoid the risks of profit and loss-sharing investment arrangements by engaging mostly in cost-plus trading and lease financing. As noted by Saleh Kamel in the introductory quotes, both forms of finance mimic conventional bank financing to a very high degree, with few technical details. One of the most active jurists in the area of Islamic finance is Justice Muhammad Taqi Usmani, who has served on numerous Shari'ah boards of Islamic banks. He summarized the generally reluctant attitude of toleration towards cost-plus financing as follows:

*Murabahah* is not a mode of financing in its origin. It is a simple sale on cost-plus basis. However, after adding the concept of deferred payment, it has been devised to be used as a mode of financing only in cases where the client intends to purchase a commodity. Therefore, it should neither be taken as an ideal Islamic mode of financing, nor a universal instrument for all sorts of financing. It should be taken as a transitory step towards the ideal Islamic system of financing based on *musharakah* or *mudarabah*. Otherwise its use should be restricted to areas where *musharakah* or *mudarabah* cannot work.54

Nostalgic references to the ideological roots of Islamic finance aside, Usmani explains the formalist legalistic nature of the distinction between interest-based loan financing and cost-plus-based financing as practiced by Islamic banks in the following passage:

If in cases of genuine need, the financier appoints the client his agent to purchase the commodity on his behalf, his differ-

54. *Usmani*, supra note 21, at 151.
ent capacities (i.e., as agent and as ultimate purchaser) should be clearly distinguished. As an agent, he is a trustee . . . . After he purchases the commodity in his capacity as agent, he must inform the financier that, in fulfilling his obligation as his agent, he has taken delivery of the purchased commodity and now he extends his offer to purchase it from him. When, in response to this offer, the financier conveys his acceptance to this offer, the sale will be deemed to be complete, and the risk of the property will be passed on to the client as purchaser. At this point he will become a debtor . . . .

Justice Usmani's conclusion of this long passage highlights the unease with which this mode of financing has been widely adopted in Islamic finance:

It should be noted with care that murabahah is a border-line transaction and a slight departure from the prescribed procedure makes it step on the prohibited area of interest-based financing. Therefore, this transaction must be carried out with due diligence and no requirement of Shari'ah should be taken lightly.\(^{56}\)

However, the same formulaic development is maintained in the official murabahah formula endorsed by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions.\(^{57}\) If Islamic bank jurists declare certain transactions to be permissible, it seems at best naive, and at worst disingenuous, to call for restricting the use of those instruments. A more realistic approach would be to conclude that Islamic transactional products differ from their conventional counterparts in the same manner that kosher water bottles differ from most other bottled water—certification by certain religious figures.

Coming under attack as mere window dressing for conventional bank interest-based financing, Islamic banks shifted some of their assets from murabahah (cost-plus sale) modes to ijara [lease] financing modes. In cost-plus sale financing, the fixed rate of return earned by the Islamic bank was designated as a mark-up of the deferred price over the spot price of the financed property. In lease financing, the fixed rate of return is designated as rental payment for the underlying property. Hence,
the property must have a legitimate usufruct, which is an easy requirement to meet for financing real estate, auto, and equipment purchases.\textsuperscript{58} Needless to say, the rent component of lease financing is used by Islamic banks to mimic market interest rates. Again, the formalist-legalistic approach to this issue is evident from Justice Usmani's discussion of the matter:

\ldots [T]hese contracts use the interest rate of a particular country (like LIBOR) as a benchmark for determining the periodical increase in the rent.

This arrangement has been criticized on two grounds: The first objection raised against it is that, by subjecting the rental payments to the rate of interest, the transaction is rendered akin to an interest based financing. This objection can be overcome by saying that, as fully discussed in the case of \textit{murabahah}, the rate of interest is used as a benchmark only.\textsuperscript{59}

In both Islamic cost-plus and lease financing, the distinction jurists make is that the Islamic bank bears the direct risk associated with the financed property. Islamic banks bear the risk throughout the life of the lease in the case of leasing, and during the period between purchasing the property and reselling it to the customer in the case of cost-plus financing. Thus, jurists can accommodate (with unease) those fixed rate-of-return forms of finance, while maintaining the prohibition of conventional interest-based financing. Traditionally, their argument rested on two main distinctions. First, a physical asset that is the subject of financing must exist. In the case of lease financing, that asset must be sufficiently durable, and must have legitimate usufruct. Thus, many jurists affirmed in the past that Islamic finance is "asset-based" or that it is based on "money-for-assets" exchanges as opposed to the supposed "money-for-money" nature of conventional finance. Second, the financier must bear risks associated with this asset for some period of time, thus justifying a rate of return on the basis of this risk exposure.

The first distinction is easily rendered vacuous. Some Islamic banks (e.g., the Kuwait Finance House) have long engaged in the transaction known as \textit{tawarruq} [literally "monetization"] in

\textsuperscript{58} Surprisingly, however, education loan alternatives were recently proposed on the basis of lease financing, "education" being seen as the usufruct of a college or university. It is not yet clear how well this innovation will be received.

\textsuperscript{59} Usmani, \textit{supra} note 21, at 169.
order to accommodate their large customers' liquidity needs. They would identify a commodity (asset) with stable historical price behavior, buy the commodity from a third party at its spot price, sell it to the customer at a higher deferred price, and the customer would then sell the commodity to the third party (or any other) at the spot price. The net result is that the customer receives the needed cash immediately and has a debt to pay the larger deferred price to the bank. This three-way exchange bypasses the two-party sale resale procedure known as *bayʿal-ʿina*, and forbidden explicitly in a prophetic tradition. *Tawarruq* is permitted by a minority opinion in the Hanbali school. Recently, the National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia and Al-Shamil Bank in Bahrain offered *tawarruq*-based consumer loans under the names of *al-taysir* and *tamwil al-shamil*, respectively. Consequently, the "asset-based" distinction seems inconsequential.

The second distinction listed above addresses the risk or guarantee/ *daman* issues that played a central role in classical Islamic jurisprudence. It does so in a trivializing and highly formulaic manner. Consider for instance a cost-plus financing arrangement wherein the customer is appointed as purchasing agent for the Islamic bank as described by Usmani. The actual time period during which the bank is exposed to ownership-risk can be made infinitesimal while the fixed rate of return for extending credit to the customer is set equal to the market-determined price of credit (interest rate). The credit-risk component of the financing is infinitely more important than the formulaic risk borne from the time the agent purchases the item on behalf of the bank until he sells it to himself, also on behalf of the bank. However, as we have seen from Usmani's statement above, it is the latter risk that distinguishes between Islamic and conventional finance.

Beginning in the late 1980's, Islamic finance moved beyond the simple Islamic banking model of paying investment account

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60. Despite thousands of references to the legal maxim, *al-kharaju bi-l-daman* [return must be justified by guaranty/risk], in the Islamic Jurisprudence and Finance literature, I have yet to read a single satisfactory explanation of what it means. If we include credit risk in the formula, then the statement is merely tautological, saying basically that there is no arbitrage opportunity (or free lunch). If we insist that *daman* must refer to commodity or asset risk, then we are inviting the legal stratagems described in this section. In either case, it is difficult to understand the substance of this oft quoted maxim.
holders a variable profit or loss share (which nonetheless tended to mimic market interest on deposits). This procedure does remain the core business of Islamic banks, but deposit alternatives have ceased to be an important source of funds for the latter. With the advent of securitization technology in the mid-1980s, market-oriented Islamic finance models were quickly devised. In devising "Shari'ah arbitrage" or methods resembling the regulatory arbitrage methods of contemporary structured finance, "Islamic financial engineers" marketed securitized products to Shari'ah scholars as legitimate investments in physical assets, thus entitling owners to collect rent. Simultaneously, the actual legal structures employed by this movement in structured Islamic finance had to meet local (e.g., American or British) regulators' requirements, which often render the security a mere claim to the accounts receivable. Thus, a bankruptcy-remote Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV") or Entity ("SPE") is created and Islamic investors may buy shares. The SPV may be a subsidiary of a conventional bank, receiving a credit line from the bank, for which it pays conventional interest. The SPV's role is to insulate the Muslim investor, through a single degree of separation, from the interest-bearing debt transaction. Islamic finance jurists have concluded that the most important matters for juristic purposes are the relationship between Muslim investors and the financial provider, regardless of the source of funds and the provider's other transactions. Needless to say, this has created a lucrative structured Islamic finance industry, wherein Shari'ah arbitrage profits can be collected in various forms by banks, lawyers, and jurists.

The one degree of separation principle of contemporary Islamic finance allows conventional banks and other banks to use conventional banking funds and provide "Islamic" products that cost the same as conventional ones. In some cases, banks may securitize the latter to provide investors with a fixed rate of return as an alternative to banking interest. The ability of conventional financial providers to market essentially conventional products as Islamic was summarized very clearly in an informational release from HSBC following its launch of an Islamic finance program. 61

Together with the one degree of separation principle, Shari'ah arbitrage requires a dual characterization of simple debt-finance structures to jurists and regulators to simultaneously obtain: (i) approval from regulators that the proposed transaction falls within the broad categories of conventional finance, and (ii) approval from jurists and the Muslim public that the proposed transaction is Islamic in nature, in the sense of being similar to medieval transactions described in classical books of Islamic jurisprudence. Accordingly, the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of the Controller of the Currency (which regulates all national banks in the U.S.) issued two letters of understanding on murabahah and ijara financing as practiced by Islamic banks (attention was initially paid to those contracts as practiced by United Bank of Kuwait in New York):

OCC #867, 1999: . . . lending takes many forms . . . [M]urabahah financing proposals are functionally equivalent to or a logical outgrowth of secured real estate lending and inventory and equipment financing, activities that are part of the business of banking. 62

OCC #806, 1997: Today, banks structure leases so that they are equivalent to lending secured by private property . . . a lease that has the economic attributes of a loan is within the business of banking . . . . Here it is clear that United Bank of Kuwait's net lease is functionally equivalent to a financing transaction in which the Branch occupies the position of a secured lender . . . .63

This allows "Islamic finance" providers to replace interest bearing loans on the asset side of their balance sheets with murabahah or ijara-based contracts which can be conjoined with other investment or commissioned to manufacture contracts. On the liabilities side, Islamic finance providers need to replace paying interest on loans and money market instruments with an Islamic securitization fiction. For instance, jurists profess that


there is a fundamental difference between an Islamic securitized lease and an interest-bearing instrument by viewing the investors' interest as direct ownership of the underlying asset:

It should be remembered, however, that the [lease] certificate must represent ownership of an undivided part of the asset with all its rights and obligations. Misunderstanding this basic concept, some quarters tried to issue *ijarah* certificates representing the holder's right to claim certain amount of rental only without assigning him any kind of ownership in the asset. . . . This type of securitization is not allowed in Shari'ah.64

In Islamic equity investment, a similar fiction is required for the marketing of Islamic mutual funds. Jurists have long maintained that ownership of common stocks in companies that engage in permissible activities is permissible, provided that the companies do not earn or pay substantial amounts of interest. This led to the creation of a universe of listed company stocks that qualify as "Shari'ah compliant." The screening criteria imposed by the Dow Jones Islamic Index ("DJII") have gained near-universal acceptance. Those screening criteria exclude companies whose primary business is unacceptable,65 companies with debt-to-market-capitalization ratios greater than one-third, and companies with accounts receivable exceeding forty-five percent of total assets. In addition, many screens put a limit on the interest income to total income, usually in the five to ten percent range. Islamic mutual funds usually start with the Islamic equity universe created by the DJII or similar set of screens, and then apply standard portfolio management criteria for creating mutual funds. Similar to their understanding of securitized leases, many jurists who are active in this field surprisingly continue to view ownership of shares in such mutual funds as direct ownership of the underlying assets (common shares) and allow ownership thereof based on that understanding.66

64. Usmani, supra note 21 at 179.
65. These include so-called sin industries such as breweries, tobacco, etc., as well as a number of other industries deemed un-Islamic.
66. The point of securitization is that the security is a share in the Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV") or Mutual Fund, not the underlying assets themselves (e.g., real estate properties or publicly traded company shares). I am not aware of any court cases regarding the legitimacy of claims of pass-through-ownership of underlying assets. In the meantime, it seems clear that Islamic debt instruments (e.g., lease-backed securities sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as those placed privately in GCC countries.
In summary, Islamic finance has thrived based on Shari‘ah arbitrage by creating an environment wherein jurists on the industry’s payroll denounce conventional financial products as subjects of the severest prohibition in Islam while facilitating the creation of twin-products. This is accomplished through the two factors allowing for Shari‘ah arbitrage: (i) the one degree of separation principle, and (ii) juristic fiction about the nature of structured Islamic finance products. In the meantime, traditional Islamic banks are forced to continue to deal with their investment account holders on a profit/loss-sharing basis.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: A COMPROMISE RESOLUTION?

We now return to the main topic of this paper — interest. We have seen that the fatwa of the IRI does not apply to conventional banks, as long as the latter continue to accumulate assets in the form of interest-bearing loans. On the other hand, the principal point of the fatwa — allowing for pre-specified profits as a percentage of capital in investment agency contracts — can apply, rather naturally, to the framework of Islamic banking.

We have seen in the previous section that Islamic banks invest most of their funds in fixed-interest cost-plus and lease financing, thus nearly perfectly mimicking the assets side of conventional banks, as admitted in the opening quote by Saleh Kamel. On the other hand, Islamic banks have not been able to mimic conventional banks’ interest-bearing deposit accounts, insisting instead on the profit/loss-sharing formula for investment account holders. This has led to the securitization-based Shari‘ah arbitrage opportunities discussed in the previous section which allow Islamic financial institutions to pay disguised interest to providers of funds who are characterized as buyers of lease certificates, murabahah fund shares, etc.. Needless to say, this is an inefficient solution due to the additional legal costs and fees paid to Islamic bank jurists that ultimately produce approximations of conventional products at a higher cost.

In the meantime, investment account holders in Islamic

by specialized Islamic finance outfits) are virtually identical to interest-bearing debt instruments. In theory, there may be some differences in risk allocation between Islamic instruments and their conventional counterparts. However, until cases are brought to test possible discrepancies between the juristic and the regulatory understandings of Islamic finance instruments, it is difficult to say whether those differences are substantive.
banks are exposed to significantly higher agency costs than their counterparts (depositors) in conventional banks. This is the case since Islamic bank investment account-holders lack the protection of being primary claimants as creditors of the bank and lack protection from moral hazard through representation on the board of directors of the bank. The latter represent the relatively wealthier owners of the Islamic bank, who in essence own a call option on the bank's portfolio. In this regard, investment account-holders absorb some of the portfolio risk and give the bank owners and management that answers to them an incentive to take even greater risks. This is clearly an unacceptable situation from a prudential viewpoint, which aims to protect the interests of small savers who are seeking a low-risk, low-return means of investing their funds.

It appears from Sections 3 and 4 of this Article that the argument against pre-specification of profits as a percentage of the capital in an acceptable investment agency is weaker than objections to other aspects of the fatwa, which as I have argued relate more to its relevancy to conventional banks. The quotations in Tantawi's book suggest that there is no textual basis for the classical consensus on profit and loss sharing rules. Indeed, some have argued for a basis in canonical texts but that point was not raised in the IJA rebuttal. The latter relied on the claimed consensus in Ibn Qudamah's Al-Mughni. Al-Mughni was in turn based on the view that pre-specifying profits to the principal in an investment agency may result in legal disputation since realized profits may be less than the specified amount and may in-

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67. On the website www.islamonline.net, Yusuf al-Qaradawi cited Prophetic traditions on the authority of Rafi' ibn Khadij that report a Prophetic prohibition of pre-assigned parts leased lands' produce for the owner. Al-Qaradawi argued by analogy that silent partnership profits should not be fixed as a percentage of the capital. See Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fatwa'id al-Bunuk wa al-Mudaraba al-Mashru'a [Bank Interest vs. Permissible Silent Partnerships], at http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/arabic/FatwaDisplay.asp?fatwaID=82025 (displaying al Qaradawi's fatwa in Arabic); see also http://groups.yahoo.com/group/IBGMalaysia/message/673?source= (translating Qaradawi's fatwa to English).

I requested a meeting at Al-Azhar in January 2003, in the Saleh Kamel Center for Islamic Economics, at which the Center Director Dr. M. Abdulhalim Umar was present, as well as Dr. Mabid Al-Jarhi (Director of IRTI at the Islamic Development Bank), and two faculty from Al-Azhar: Dr. Abdullah al-Najjar and Dr. M. Ra'fat Uthman. The latter two debated the authenticity and relevance of the Prophetic tradition to this case. See Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, The Recent 'Azhar Fatwa and the Possibility of Ribā-Free Banking, available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~elgamal/files/azharfatwa_files/frame.htm. (summarizing discussion provided in Power Point presentation on Azhar fatwa).
deed be negative, in which case fixed-profit distribution would violate the rules of investment. Tantawi and the scholars he quoted argue against that view by invoking the law of large numbers that is utilized through diversification and meticulous feasibility studies by banks to ensure that specified profits (interest) can be paid with a very high probability. If the agent claims that losses were realized, Tantawi argued, in the text of the fatwa, that the matter would be settled in courts in any case. On the other hand, the argument follows that in the vast majority of instances, the larger concern pertains to moral hazard — the agent’s incentive not to disclose the true profitability of his investments.

Some of the quoted authors by Tantawi also argued that there is no need to classify contemporary transactions under the classical/medieval headings. Thus, even if the consensus on mudarabah is to be upheld, the current contract may be given a different name. Claims that this would amount to a legal stratagem used to circumvent a prohibition may be tolerated from an industry that holds itself to the highest standards of avoiding such stratagems. However, we have seen quite clearly that Islamic banks have no trouble replicating interest-bearing debt instruments on the asset side of their balance sheets. Moreover, as we have seen in the HSBC auto finance example, when interest-bearing deposits from Islamic banks are insufficient to finance interest (LIBOR-based) debt instruments on the asset side, banks are allowed to use interest-bearing sources that are not marketed as Islamic. It would only seem natural for the Islamic finance industry to accept a variant of the IRI fatwa as a first step towards mimicking conventional banks’ liabilities in the same manner that they have mimicked the latter’s assets. In contrast, the vehement rejection with which the IRI fatwa was greeted has only further contributed to the incoherence of Islamic bank jurists’ statements and makes the paradox of contemporary Islamic law and finance all the more impenetrable.
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

(استثمار الأموال في البنوك التي تحدد الربح مقدماً)

أرسل الأستاذ الدكتور حسن عباس زكي رئيس مجلس إدارة بنك
الشركة المصرفية العربية الدولية كتاباً بتاريخ 24/10/2000 إلى
فضيلة الإمام الأكبر الدكتور محمد سيد طنطاوي شيخ الأزهر وهذا
نصه:

"حضرتِ صاحب الفضيلة الدكتور محمد سيد طنطاوي
- شيخ الجامع الأزهر
- السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته وبعد:
فإن عملاء بنك الشركة المصرفية العربية الدولية يقدمون أموالهم
ومدخراتهم للبنك الذي يستخدمها ويستثمرها في معاملاته المشروعة,
مقابل ربح يصرف لهم ويحدد مقدماً في مدة يتفق مع العمل على
ونرجو الافادة عن الحكم الشرعي لهذه المعاملة.

رئيس مجلس الإدارة
توقيع
(دكتور حسن عباس زكي)

وقد ارفقي سباًتُه مع الخطاب نموذجاً لمستند التعامل الذي يتم بين
المستثمر والبنك – ونص هذا النموذج كالآتي:
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

التي

الشركة المصرية العربية الدولية

التاريخ / 2000 م

السيد / حساب رقم

تحية طيبة وبدء;

نحيط سيدكم علماً بالذالك وقد تم تجديد نصيكم طرفاً وقريناً 2000م (فقط

مانع أصل JSONObject لمصر لاذئ) عن الفترة من 12/12/2000 حتى 12/31

عائد 10% سنوياً والالعاده قدره 12000 جنيه مصري

المبلغ الجدد مضافة إلي العائد حتى 12/31/2002

وقد أحال فضيلة الإمام الأكبر الكتاب ومرقده للعرض على مجلس مجمع

البحوث الإسلامية في جلساتها القادمة.

وعقد المجلس جلساه في يوم الخميس 26 من شعبان سنة

1422 هـ الموافق 21 من أكتوبر سنة 2000 م وعرض عليه الموضوع المذكور

وبعد مناقشات الأعضاء ودراسة قرار مجلس: الموافقة على أن

استثمار الأموال في البنوك التي تحدد الربح مقدماً خلال شروعاً ولا بأس

به.

ولما لهذا الموضوع من أهميه خاصة لدى المواطنين للذين يريدون

معرفة الحكم الشرعي في استثمار أموالهم لدى البنوك التي تحدد الربح
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

معنى: وقد كثرت استفساراتهم عن ذلك فقد رأت الأمانة العامة لمجمع
البحوث الإسلامية أن تعد الفتوى بالأدلة الشرعية وخلاصة أقوال أعضاء
المجمع حتى تقدم للمواطنين صورة واضحة كاملة تطمئن إليها نفوسهم

وقد قام الأمانة بعرض نص الفتوى بصيغتها الكاملة على مجلس
مجمع البحوث الإسلامية في جلسته المنعقدة في يوم الخميس 22 من
رمضان 1422 ه الموافق 20 م نوفمبر 2001 م وبعد قراءتها
ومداخلات الأعضاء في صياغتها تمت موافقتهم عليها

وهذا نص الفتوى

الذين يتعاملون مع بنك الشركة المصرفية العربية الدولية - أو مع غيره
من البنوك - ويقومون بتقديم أموالهم ومدخراتهم إلى البنك ليكون وكيلا
عنهم في استثمارات في معاملاته المشروعة، مقابل ربح يصرف لهم

ويحدد مقدماً في مدة يتفق مع المتعاملين معه عليها 000

هذه المعاملة بنتلك الصورة خلال ولا شبهه فيها ، لأنه لم يرد نص في
كتاب الله أو من السنة النبوية يمنع هذه المعاملة التي يتم فيها تعدد
الربح أو العائد مقدماً، ما دام الطرفان يرضيان هذا النوع من المعاملة

قال الله تعالى: " ما أيا الذين أمنوا لا تأكلوا أموالكم بينكم بالباطل
إلا أن تكون تجارة عن تراض منكم " ( سورة النساء: الآية 29 )
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

{Arabic text}

ومما لا شك فيه أن تراضي الطرفين على تحديد الربح مقدما من الأمور المقبولة شرعا وعقلًا حتى يعرف كل طرف حقه.

ومن المعروف أن البنوك عندما تحدد للمتعاملين معها هذه الأرباح أو العوائد مقدما، إذا تحددها بعد دراسة دقيقة لأحوال الأسواق العالمية والمحلية والظروف الاقتصادية في المجتمع، ونظريات كل معاملة ولنوعها ولمتوسط أرباحها.

ومن المعروف كذلك أن هذا التحدد قابٌ للزيادة والنقص، بدلاً من أن شهادات الاستثمار بذل تحديد العائد 4% ثم أرتفع هذا العائد إلى أكثر من 5% ثم انخفض الآن إلى ما يقرب من 10%.

والذي يقوم بهذا التحدد القابل للزيادة أو النقص، هو المسؤول عن هذا الشأن طبقًا للتعليمات التي تصدرها الجهات المختصة في الدولة، ومن قواعد هذا التحدد لا سيما في زمننا هذا الذي كثر فيها الاحتراف عن الحق والصدق - أن في هذا التحديد منغطة لصاحب المال، ومنغطة أيضًا للقائمين على إدارة هذه البنوك المستثمرة للأموال.
فيه منفعة لصاحب المال، لأنه يعرف حقه معرفة خالية عن الجهلاء، ويعتبر هذه المعرفة منظمة حياة.
وفي منفعة للقائمين على إدارة هذه البنوك، لأن هذا التحديد يجعلهم يجدون في عملهم وفي نشاطهم حتى يحققوا ما يزيد على الربح الذي حددوه لصاحب المال، وحتى يكون الفائض بعد صرفهم لأصحاب الأموال حقوقهم، حقًا خالصًا لهم في مقابل جدهم ونشاطهم.
وقد يقال: إن البنوك قد تخسر فكيف تحدد هذه البنوك للمستثمرين أموالهم عندما الأرباح مقدما؟
والجواب: إذا خسرت البنوك في صفقة ما فإنها تربح في صفقات أخرى، وبذلك تغطي الأرباح الخسارة.
ومع ذلك فإن حالة حدوث خسارة فإن الأمر مرده إلى القضاء.
والخلاصة أن تحديد الربح مقدماً للذين يستثمرون أموالهم عن طريق الوكالة الاستثمارية في البنوك أو غيرها حالًا ولا شبهة في هذه المعاملة فهي من قبل المصالح المرسلة وليست من العقائد أو العادات التي لا يجوز التغيير أو التبدل فيها.
وبناء على ما سبق فإن استثمار الأموال لدى البنوك التي تحدد الربح أو العائد مقدماً خلال شرعا ولا بأمر الله أعلم.

شيخ الأزهر

(دكتور / محمد سيد طنطاوي)

1432 هـ، 2000م
Office of the Grand Imam, Rector of Al-Azhar

Investing Funds with Banks that Pre-specify Profits

Dr. Hasan Abbas Zaki, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Arab Banking Corporation, sent a letter dated 22/10/2002 to H.E. the Grand Imam Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Rector of Al-Azhar. Its text follows:

H.E. Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Rector of Al-Azhar:

Greetings and prayers for peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah,

Customers of the International Arab Banking Corporation forward their funds and savings to the bank to use and invest them in its permissible dealings, in exchange for profit distributions that are pre-determined, and the distribution times are likewise agreed-upon with the customer. We respectfully ask you for the [Islamic] legal status of this dealing.

[Signature]

He has also attached a sample documentation of the dealing between an investor and the bank. The sample reads as follows:

```
The International Arab Banking Corp.
Bank

Date  / / 2000 A.D.
Mr/______________  Account number _________
Kind Greetings

This is to inform you that your account with us, in the amount of L.E. 100,000 (only one hundred thousand Egyptian Pounds) has been renewed. For the period 1/1/2002 until 31/12/2002 A.D.

Rate of return 10% resulting in a return of
L.E. 10,000
Total of deposit + return on distribution date
L.E. 110,000

_____
New amount, including return as of 31/12/2002
L.E. 110,000
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His Excellency, the Grand Imam, has forwarded the letter and its attachment for consideration by the Council of the Islamic Research Institute in its subsequent session. The Council met on Thursday, 25 Sha'ban, 1423 A.H., corresponding to October 31, 2002 A.D., at which time the above mentioned subject was presented. After the members' discussions and analysis, the Council determined that investing funds in banks that pre-specify profits is permissible under Islamic law, and there is no harm therein.

Due to the special importance of this topic for the public, who wish to know the Islamic legal ruling regarding investing their funds with banks that pre-specify profits (as shown by their numerous questions in this matter), the Secretariat General of the Islamic Research Institute decided to prepare an official fatwa, supported by the Islamic legal proofs and a summary of the Institute members' statements. This should give the public a clear understanding of the issue, thus giving them confidence in the opinion.

The General Secretariat presented the full fatwa text to the Islamic Research Institute Council during its session on Thursday, 23 Ramadan 1423, corresponding to November 28, 2002 A.D. Following the reading of the fatwa, and noting members' comments on its text, they approved it.

Text of the Fatwa

Those who deal with the International Arab Banking Corporation Bank – or any other bank – forward their funds and savings to the bank as an agent who invests the funds on their behalf in its permissible dealings, in exchange for a profit distribution that is pre-determined, and at distribution times that are mutually agreed-upon . . .

This dealing, in this form, is permissible, without any doubt of impermissibility. This follows from the fact that no canonical text in the Book of Allah or the prophetic Sunnah forbids this type of transaction within which profits or returns are pre-specified, as long as the transaction is concluded with mutual consent.

Allah, transcendent is He, said: “Oh people of faith, do not devour your properties among yourselves unjustly, the exception being trade conducted by mutual consent . . .” (Al-Nisá: 29)

The verse means: Oh people with true faith, it is not permissible
for you, and unseemly, that any of you devour the wealth of another in impermissible ways (e.g., theft, usurpation, or usury, and other forbidden means). In contrast, you are permitted to exchange benefits through dealings conducted by mutual consent, provided that no forbidden transaction is thus made permissible or vice versa. This applies regardless of whether the mutual consent is established verbally, in written form, or in any other form that indicates mutual agreement and acceptance.

There is no doubt that mutual agreement on pre-specified profits is legally and logically permissible, so that each party will know his rights.

It is well known that banks only pre-specify profits or returns based on precise studies of international and domestic markets, and economic conditions in the society. In addition, returns are customized for each specific transaction type, given its average profitability.

Moreover, it is well known that pre-specified profits vary from one time period to another. For instance, investment certificates initially specified a return of 4%, which increased subsequently to more than 15% and is now returning to near 10%.

The parties that specify those changing rates of returns are required to obey the regulations issued by the relevant government agencies.

This pre-specification of profits is beneficial, especially in this age, when deviations from truth and fair dealing have become rampant. Thus, pre-specification of profits provides benefits both to the providers of funds, as well as to the banks that invest those funds.

It is beneficial to the provider of funds since it allows him to know his rights without any uncertainty. Thus, he may arrange the affairs of his life accordingly.

It is also beneficial to those who manage those banks, since the pre-specification of profits gives them the incentive for working hard, since they keep all excess profits above what they promised the provider of funds. This excess profit compensation is justified by their hard work.

It may be said that banks may lose, thus wondering how they can pre-specify profits for the investors.

In reply, we say that if banks lose on one transaction, they win on many others, thus profits can cover losses.
In addition, if losses are indeed incurred, the dispute will have to be resolved in court.

In summary, pre-specification of profits to those who forward their funds to banks and similar institutions through an investment agency is legally permissible. There is no doubt regarding the Islamic legality of this transaction, since it belongs to the general area judged according to benefits, i.e., wherein there are no explicit texts. In addition, this type of transaction does not belong to the areas of creed and ritual acts of worship, wherein changes and other innovations are not permitted.

Based on the preceding, investing funds with banks that pre-specify profits or returns is Islamically legal, and there is no harm therein, and Allah knows best,

[signed]
Rector of Al-Azhar
Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi
27 Ramadan 1423 A.H.
2 December 2002 A.D.
APPENDIX B: REBUTTAL BY THE ISLAMIC FIQH INSTITUTE

A. Conventional Bank Functions:
Banking laws forbid banks from dealing through profit and loss-sharing investment. Banks receive loans from the public in the form of deposits, and restrict their activities — according to lawyers and economists — to lending and borrowing with interest, thus creating credit through lending deposited funds with interest.

B. Conventional Bank Relationship with Depositors:
The religious law (Shari'ah) and secular law characterizations of the relationship between depositors and banks is one of loans, not agency. This is how general and banking laws characterize the relationship. In contrast, investment agency is a contract according to which an agent invests funds on behalf of a principal, in exchange for a fixed wage or a share in profits. In this regard, there is a consensus (of religious scholars) that the principal owns the invested funds, and is therefore entitled to the profits of investment and liable for its losses, while the agent is entitled to a fixed wage if the agency stipulated that. Consequently, conventional banks are not investment-agents for depositors. Banks receive funds from depositors and use them, thus guaranteeing said funds and rendering the contract a loan. In this regard, loans must be repaid at face value, with no stipulated increase.

C. Conventional Bank Interest is a Form of Forbidden Riba:
Banks' interest on deposits is a form of riba that is forbidden in the Qur'an and Sunnah as previous decisions and fatawa have concurred since the second meeting of the Islamic Research Institute in Cairo, Muharram 1385 A.H., May 1965 A.D., attended by eighty-five of the greatest Muslim scholars and representatives of thirty-five Islamic countries. The first decision of that conference stated: “[I]nterest on any type of loan is forbidden riba.” The same decision was affirmed by later decisions of numerous conferences, including: (a list of conferences and Institute opinions prohibiting bank interest).

D. Pre-specification of Investment Profits in Amount, or as a Percentage of the Invested Capital:
It is universally accepted that interest-bearing loans differ from legal silent partnerships (mudaraba). In loans, the borrower is entitled to profits and bears all losses. In contrast,
mudaraba is a partnership in profits and the principal bears financial losses if they occur, as per the Prophet's (P) saying: "Al-kharaju bi-l-daman profits are justified for the one bearing liability for losses . . . " (narrated by Ahmad and the authors of Sunan, with a valid chain of narration).

Thus, jurists of all schools have reached a consensus over the centuries that pre-specification of investment profits in any form of partnership is not allowed, be it pre-specified in amount or as a percentage of the capital. This ruling is based on the view that such a pre-specification guarantees the principal capital, thus violating the essence of partnerships (silent or otherwise), which is sharing in profits and losses. This consensus is well established and no dissent has been reported. In this regard, Ibn Qudamah wrote in Al-Mughni (vol. 3, p. 34): "All scholars whose opinions were preserved are in consensus that silent partnership (qirad or mudaraba) is invalidated if one or both partners stipulate a known amount of money as profit." In this regard, consensus of religious scholars is a legal proof on its own.

The council urges Muslims, as it declares this unanimous decision, to earn money only through permissible means, and to avoid forbidden sources of income in obedience to Allah (S) and his Messenger (P).
APPENDIX C: HSBC LAUNCHES ISLAMIC VEHICLE FINANCE — FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

2. How can a conventional (interest-based) bank offer a Shari'ah compliant financial service?  
Answer: Islamic law (Shari'ah) does not require that the seller of a product be Muslim, or that its other services be Shari'ah compliant as well. This is the considered opinion of our Shari'ah Supervisory Committee. Conventional banks charge and pay interest, and the HSBC Group, of which we are a part, is a conventional bank. But we are also a customer-driven institution, and we provide Shari'ah compliant products to serve a genuine financial need among Muslims. Of course, our Shari'ah compliant products are available for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

3. Since HSBC is an interest-based bank, what would be an acceptable source of funding for HSBC MEFCO? Are you going to mix conventional and Shari'ah compliant funds?  
Answer: The Shari'ah (Islamic law) does not require that the seller of a product be Muslim or that his/her own income be halal (permitted). We will therefore, initially use funds from conventional sources to finance Amanah Vehicle Finance. Muslims may be understandably concerned about mixing conventional funds with Shari'ah compliant funds. It is important, however, to understand where the two can and cannot meet according to Islamic law (Shari'ah). To open an account or invest money, funds must be segregated from interest-based funds so that returns are halal (permitted). To buy something or obtain financing, however, funds do not have to be from a halal source. The relationship with the seller must be in line with the Shari'ah — the seller’s relationship with other parties, however, is not the purchaser’s responsibility. This is the opinion of HSBC’s Shari’ah Supervisory Committee.

4. How do you calculate the price of Amanah Vehicle Finance? Are the payments similar to a conventional vehicle loan? If so, is this acceptable under the Shari’ah (Islamic law)?  
Answer: HSBC MEFCO determines the rates on Amanah Vehicle Finance using a fixed payment scheme that is competitive with conventional vehicle loans available in the market. As determined by our Shari'ah Supervisory Committee,
Shari’ah permits using the conventional market as a benchmark.
According to the Shari’ah, the profit rate in a murabaha transaction can be set at any value agreed between the buyer and seller. Also under murabaha financing, HSBC MEFCO is acting as a vehicle seller and not a moneylender. There is no particular reason why a vehicle financed Islamically should be any more or less expensive than a vehicle financed using a conventional vehicle loan. The criterion for acceptability by the Shari’ah is that the transaction be compliant with Shari’ah, regardless of the price of the good or how that price is determined.