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Administrative Appeal Decision - Garcia, Adrober (2019-02-14)

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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE

Name: Garcia, Adrober

Facility: Five Points CF

NYSID: [REDACTED]

Appeal Control No.: 10-048-18 B

DIN: 85-B-0592

Appearances: Adrober Garcia 85B0592
Five Points Correctional Facility
State Route 96
P.O. Box 119
Romulus, New York 14541

Decision appealed: September 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12-months.

Board Member(s) who participated: Alexander, Coppola

Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received November 23, 2018

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case Plan.


Final Determination: The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby:

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

 Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to _____

Commissioner

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto.

This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 2/14/12 66.

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Appellant challenges the September 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 12-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. Appellant contends the Board ignored his excellent institutional record and release plans, and only looked at the instant offenses. 2) no aggravating factors exist. 3) the decision is identical to prior Board decisions. 4) the Board did not have his sentencing minutes. 5) the decision violated the 8th amendment to the constitution. 6) the decision violated the “estoppel jeopardy” provision of the constitution. 7) the decision violated the due process clause of the constitution. 8) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, and with the 2017 regulations. That is because his COMPAS was ignored, no reason for departing from the COMPAS was given, and the laws are now rehabilitation and forward based.

Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).

Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime (murder), the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered. Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018).

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The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate's criminal history, as opposed to other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper. Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).

Appellant's COMPAS scores in History of Violence, and Prison Misconduct, were a cause for concern. The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument. Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); (Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).

The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any aggravating factors. Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).

As for an alleged similarity to prior Board decisions, since the Board is required to consider the same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, then it follows that the same aspects of the individual's record may again constitute the primary grounds for the denial of parole. Hakim v Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); Nelson v New York State Parole Board, 274 A.D.2d 719, 711 N.Y.S.2d 792 (3d Dept 2000); Bridget v Travis, 300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept 2002). Per Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), the Board is required to consider the same factors each time he appears in front of them. Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept. 2010) lv.den. 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143.

Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013).

In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

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If the Board makes a diligent effort to obtain sentencing minutes and/or the sentencing minutes are unavailable – whereas here, there is an affidavit from the court reporter indicating the minutes cannot be located – a new interview is not required. See Matter of Andreo v. Alexander, 72 A.D.3d 1178, 898 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691 (3d Dept. 2010) (court reporter affidavit); Matter of LaSalle v. New York State Div. of Parole, 69 A.D.3d 1252, 893 N.Y.S.2d 706 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 14 N.Y.2d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 142 (2010) (court letter); Matter of Santiago v. New York State Div. of Parole, 78 A.D.3d 953, 911 N.Y.S.2d 436 (2d Dept. 2010) (sufficient evidence of diligent effort); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff'd, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).

As for the Eighth Amendment, the denial of parole under a statute invoking discretion in parole determinations does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Carnes v. Engler, 76 Fed. Appx. 79 (6th Cir. 2003); Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 552, 555 (10th Cir.), cert den. 506 U.S. 1008, 113 S. Ct. 624 (1992), rehearing denied 507 U.S. 955, 113 S. Ct. 1374 (1993); Pacheco v. Pataki, No. 9:07–CV–0850, 2010 WL 3909354, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010). Appellant's maximum sentence is life imprisonment. The Board acted within its discretion to hold Appellant for another 12 months, after which he will have the opportunity to reappear before the Board.

An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest in parole release. Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).

Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria. Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).

The due process clause is not violated by the Board's balancing of the statutory criteria, and which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

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Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018).

There is no such thing as “estoppel jeopardy.” The Board did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution by giving consideration to actions for which Appellant has already been punished. The Board is obligated by law to consider the inmate’s crimes in every release decision. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c). The Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated because it applies to judicial proceedings, not parole matters:

A denial of parole is a decision to withhold early release from the confinement component. It is neither the imposition nor the increase of a sentence, and it is not punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause... [I]t is the original criminal sentence that is limited by the Double Jeopardy Clause, not the administrative decision to grant early release from confinement.

Alessi v. Quinlan, 711 F.2d 497, 501 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Bockeno v New York State Bd. of Parole, 227 A.D.2d 751, 642 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (3d Dept. 1996). In other words, a denial of parole has the effect of perpetuating the status quo, i.e., continued incarceration during the term of the sentence, and does not give rise to multiple punishment for the same offense.

Similarly, the Board’s decision did not violate the doctrine of collateral estoppel. This doctrine prohibits the relitigation by the same parties and determination of an issue of ultimate fact that has once been determined in a valid and final judgment. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194 (1970). But the Board is not seeking to relitigate the instant offense. A parole interview is not an adversarial proceeding and there are no disputed issues of fact. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 1023, 91 S. Ct. 588 (1971); Matter of Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 28, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704, 710 (1969); Matter of Banks v. Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 144, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515, 522 (2d Dept. 2018). Instead, the Board is accepting the underlying factual basis for the instant criminal conviction. As such, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is irrelevant.

Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017.

The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to

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conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018). The 2017 amended regulations don't create any substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase transparency in the final decision. Courts must defer to the Parole Board's interpretation of its own regulations so long as it is rational and not arbitrary nor capricious. Brown v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 2018).

The 2011 amendments still permit the Board to place greater emphasis on the gravity of the crime. Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866 (3d Dept.) appeal dismissed 24 N.Y.3d 1052, 999 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2014); Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); Moore v New York State Board of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412 (3d Dept. 2016). The Board can still consider the nature of the inmate's crimes, the criminal history, the prison disciplinary record, the program accomplishments and post release plans. Rivera v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014). The Board is obligated to consider the serious nature of the crime. Khatib v New York State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014).

As was stated previously, the Board cited two negative COMPAS scores when denying release. Thus, the decision is consistent with amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as there is no departure to explain.

Recommendation: Affirm.