Protecting the Mickey Mouse Ears: Moving Beyond Traditional Campaign-Style Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China

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Cover Page Footnote
J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2017; B.A., Politics & East Asian Studies, New York University, 2014; photographer, filmmaker, and writer. I would like to thank my family and friends for their enduring support throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank my professor Mark Cohen, along with Professor Eric Priest, Attorney-Advisor at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Conrad Wong, National Program Manager at the National Intellectual Property Rights Center, Man Fung Tse, the 20th U.S.-China IP Cooperation Dialogue participants, and my Fordham Law China IP Law Spring 2017 classmates for their feedback and enthusiasm for this Note. In addition, I am grateful for the experts who frequently assisted me with understanding Chinese enforcement mechanisms. Finally, I would like to thank the editors of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, and Senior Writing & Research Editor Jillian Roffer, for their help in publishing this Note.
Protecting the Mickey Mouse Ears: Moving Beyond Traditional Campaign-Style Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China

Adela Hurtado*

Multinational corporations often struggle to protect their intellectual property rights in China. The Walt Disney Company, which has a long relationship with China, knows this all too well. In fact, counterfeit Mickey Mouse ears—along with numerous other Disney character goods—are now sold in plain sight at the new Shanghai Disneyland Resort. In an attempt to combat counterfeiting, companies such as Disney rely on a traditional method of enforcement of intellectual property rights: government campaigns. Campaigns are short periods of time during which multiple raids and government enforcement actions occur to crack down on counterfeiting. The irony of Disney’s situation is that less than a year before the Shanghai Disneyland Resort opened Disney was part of a high-profile campaign to protect its trademarks and prevent counterfeiting at the new park. However, the results of the Disney campaign are not surprising. Campaigns as practiced are generally ineffective, with counterfeit goods manufacturers and

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sellers returning to their businesses within days. Herein lies the issue: While campaigns are marked with a high volume of enforcement, in the long-term they are ineffective for combating intellectual property rights infringement. This Note uses Disney as a case study to illustrate the present usage of campaigns as an attempt to alleviate the infringement, despite their long-term ineffectiveness. Though rarely used, there are new opportunities for multinational corporations to incorporate civil litigation into their anti-counterfeiting strategy as a means to move away from depending heavily on campaigns and provide long-term change. Additionally, a comparison to the United States version of a campaign provides a new model for multinational corporations which can be used to push for more effective practices that not only benefit them, but also China. It is time for a new strategy to combat infringement. By changing course, multinational corporations and the government can strengthen intellectual property rights in China.

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INTRODUCTION

Waiting on line for a Shanghai Disneyland ride can entail some on-the-go shopping.¹ A salesman will sneak through the lines and approach those innocently waiting to offer a pair of Mickey Mouse ears.² The seller will have them stashed in a black bag, with headgear ranging from plain Mickey Mouse ears to his counterpart’s Minnie Mouse ears that come with bows in a variety of colors.³ The ears will fetch a bargain price of 20 Renminbi (“RMB”), equivalent to 3.11 USD, compared to the officially licensed ears sold throughout the park ranging from 75 RMB (roughly 12 USD) to 180 RMB (roughly 28 USD).⁴

The blatant disregard for intellectual property rights at the heart of the park is a symptom of a larger problem plaguing The Walt Disney Company (“Disney”) and other multinational companies when conducting business in China. Globally, levels of intellectual property infringement have significantly risen.⁵ Most infringing goods seized by U.S., European Union, and Japanese customs authorities originate from East Asia, with China as the top producer—accounting for over seventy percent of counterfeit goods production and eighty-six percent when combined with Hong Kong.⁶ Companies from each market segment and industry

¹ Based on author’s observations and personal experiences during three trips to the park in October, November, and December 2016. Specific instances are described in Section II.B.1 [hereinafter Author’s Experiences].
² The term “salesman” is used loosely here as this person is not an actual salesman, but rather someone in plainclothes attempting to sell the Mickey ears.
³ Author’s Experiences, supra note 1.
⁶ See id. at 16, 19.
experience billions of dollars in losses along with damage to their brands’ reputation as a result of counterfeit production. The total global economic value of counterfeit and pirated goods is as much as 1.13 trillion dollars. The already billions of dollars in losses are anticipated to multiply significantly in the years to come. However, companies that do business with and within China need a way to cope with this reality. To cope, these companies primarily rely on government agency campaigns, especially the raids they include.

Part I of this Note highlights the heavy reliance on campaigns in China to enforce intellectual property rights, and uses Disney’s recent campaign in China as an example of a company with a long history in China that depends on the campaign approach. Part II details the short-term advantages and long-term ineffectiveness of the campaign approach, foreign companies’ rare use of civil litigation to enforce their rights, and obstacles to effectively using criminal prosecution. Part III argues that foreign companies should stop relying on campaigns to enforce their rights and take advantage of ample new opportunities in civil litigation. Part III additionally proposes a model, using examples from campaigns and corporate alliances in the United States, for a new type of Chinese campaign approach. In sum, this Note aims to provide alternative strategies for multinational corporations to move away from solely using a traditional method of enforcement that will never fully accomplish their goals to eradicate—or at least reduce—infringement of their intellectual property rights in China.

9 See id.
10 See generally Part II.
I. THE CHINESE CAMPAIGN AND DISNEY’S LONG STRUGGLE TO COPE WITH INFRINGEMENT IN CHINA

Knowing who is charged with enforcing intellectual property rights and where they stand in the context of the Chinese government is important when exploring how multinational corporations enforce their rights in China. First, Section I.A provides an overview of and defines the powers of the Chinese government and its intellectual property agencies. Section I.B explains the campaign approach the government uses to combat infringement in China. Section I.C then details the history of Disney in China. Finally, Section I.D discusses the special government campaign executed to protect Disney’s intellectual property rights.

A. The Chinese Government Structure and Its Agencies

The Chinese government structure has several government bodies that generally operate under the Chinese Communist Party.11 According to China’s Constitution, the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) is China’s legislative body.12 Among its roles, the NPC elects the President and Vice President of the People’s Republic of China.13 The NPC also introduces and drafts legislation.14 The judicial system’s highest bodies are The Supreme People’s Court and The Supreme People’s Procuratorate.15 The Supreme People’s Court supervises lower courts.16 The Supreme People’s Procuratorate is charged with supervising regional and special procuratorates, and investigating and prosecuting cases.17

The most relevant governing body for this Note is the State Council, which carries out the Chinese government’s laws and administrative functions.18 It is composed of ministries and

12 See id. art. 2.
13 See id. art. 62, § 4.
14 See id. art. 62, §§ 1–3.
16 See XIANFA art. 127.
17 See id. art. 133; People’s Procuratorates, supra note 15.
18 See XIANFA arts. 85, 91.
commissions and is led by the Premier, Vice Premiers, State Councilors, Ministers, Auditor-General, and the Secretary General, who are decided by the National People’s Congress. The State Council can adopt administrative measures, enact administrative regulations, formulate tasks and responsibilities for lower bodies, create national economic plans, and exercise other powers. Its lower bodies include key intellectual property enforcement agencies—such as the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”); General Administration of Customs; National Copyright Administration; and the State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”), China’s patent office.

The SAIC is in charge of market supervision and regulation in China. As part of its mission, the SAIC strives to protect the "legitimate rights and interests of businesses and consumers by carrying out regulations in the fields of enterprise registration, competition, consumer protection, trademark protection and combating economic illegalities." To carry out this mission, the SAIC consists of over ten departments and bureaus that focus on specific issues. For example, the overwhelming majority—over seventy-eight percent—of the SAIC’s cases involve products sold that infringe on registered trademarks. One bureau, the

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20 See XIANFA art. 62, § 5.
21 See id. art. 89 (defining these and other powers such as directing urban and rural development, education, family planning, public security, foreign affairs, etc.).
22 See China’s State Organizational Structure, supra note 19.
24 Id.
Trademark Office, is in charge of these cases, along with trademark registrations, and trademark disputes.27

B. Campaign-Style Enforcement in China

It is impossible to discuss intellectual property rights enforcement in China without focusing on campaigns, or zhuanxiang xingdong, which roughly translates to “special campaigns.”28 Campaigns, primarily used against copyright and trademark infringement, are short periods of time during which an agency or several agencies perform a series of quick raids and enforcement actions against infringers.29 The campaign lasts between one and two weeks, with a decision issued within a couple of months.30 Campaigns are the most common type of intellectual property rights enforcement action in China and usually the first response to counterfeiting issues.31 The SAIC and its local counterparts have the administrative power to conduct campaigns on behalf of trademark holders.32 This agency, or another such as

27 See Departments, supra note 25.
30 Huang & Lin, supra note 29.
32 See Huang & Lin, supra note 29. Other agencies can also join the SAIC in a campaign so responsibilities can be shared among them. See DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 187. The SAIC’s local counterparts are local bodies that carry out the SAIC’s operations on the provincial, county, and municipal levels. See Trademark Registration in China, PATH TO CHINA (last updated Jan. 3, 2018), http://www.pathtochina.com/reg_tm.htm [https://perma.cc/R8CJ-HK25].
SIPO, creates an “Action Plan” or “Implementation Plan” which authorizes and coordinates intellectual property campaigns.33

Raids, a key component of campaigns, involve the SAIC and law enforcement authorities sweeping through a market that sells counterfeit goods or a factory that produces them.34 During the raid, the authorities confiscate the counterfeit goods and arrest workers and sellers.35 Once rights holders are notified about the counterfeit goods, they begin a raid by petitioning the SAIC with documentation on the trademark and on the infringer.36 After the SAIC processes the documentation, it will conduct the raid with the help of law enforcement within one to two weeks of the petition if it decides to do so.37 Once the raid is completed, if the SAIC finds that infringement did in fact occur, it can “order[] the infringer to cease the infringing conduct, confiscat[e] or destr[oy] counterfeit goods, [or] impos[e] fines” on the infringers.38 The SAIC does not have the power to give monetary compensation to the rights holders, as that is in the courts’ jurisdiction.39

The Disney campaign this Note focuses on in Section I.D embodies much of the typical Chinese campaign.40 The Disney

35 See, e.g., Lu & Riley, supra note 34.
36 See Huang & Lin, supra note 29. The owner of the intellectual property needs to show proof of ownership of their rights and any materials they have on the infringement, which can include trademark registration certificates and samples of infringing products. See id.
37 See id.
38 See IPKEY, ROADMAP FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA 15 (2015), www.ipkey.org/en/ip-law-document/download/3356/3805/23 [https://perma.cc/2YS4-MW7G]. Fines imposed can be up to five hundred percent of the profits gained from the counterfeit goods or up to the limit of 250,000 RMB (38,000 USD). CHEN, supra note 33, at 806 (alterations in original).
39 IPKEY, supra note 38, at 13.
40 Affirming the similarities between campaigns, Simone Intellectual Property Services firm (“SIPS”), a leading Hong Kong law firm serving multinational corporations in China, stated that the Disney campaign was similar to initiatives of other short-term campaigns occurring from time to time, such as the 2008 Olympic Games anti-counterfeiting campaign. See Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks,
campaign consisted of the SAIC announcing the campaign’s start and subsequent enforcement efforts. The campaign was also relatively long, lasting nearly a year.

C. Disney’s Life in China

The Walt Disney Company was founded in 1923 and is based in the United States. It is primarily in the filmmaking and television businesses, but also builds its own theme parks around the world and licenses its logos, films, and characters. Disney’s repertoire includes its large intellectual property portfolio of over five thousand trademarks and over one thousand patents—one of their trademarks being Mickey Mouse and his ears, registered in a variety of forms to ensure the character’s protection. Disney generates billions of dollars in revenue annually through merchandising, licensing, and selling consumer products of its intellectual property. As of 2016, its numerous ventures created a
top brand valued at 39.5 billion USD. Therefore, the issue of counterfeiting in China is particularly important to the company, as it has invested an enormous amount of time, resources, and capital into expanding its business in the country.

Disney’s relationship with China began on unfriendly terms when the Mickey Mouse character and all Disney films were banned in 1949 as part of a larger ban on foreign films when the Communist Party rose to power. In 1986, Disney was “rehabilitated,” and the company in that year signed a licensing agreement to supply cartoons for China’s national network. Disney then resumed its operations in China, only to have its films banned again in the 1996 when the company released Martin Scorsese’s “Kundun,” a film on the Dalai Lama’s life, through its subsidiary Touchstone Pictures. The ban continued until 1999, when the government allowed the release of Disney’s “Mulan” in exchange for agreements to hire Jackie Chan as a voice actor for Disney Brands Generate Record $40.9 Billion from Licensed Merchandise in 2013, VARIETY (June 17, 2014), http://variety.com/2014/biz/news/disney-brands-generate-record-40-9-billion-from-licensed-merchandise-in-2013-1201221813/ [https://perma.cc/JW8D-D5YS]; Natalie Robehmed, The ‘Frozen’ Effect: When Disney’s Movie Merchandising Is Too Much, FORBES (July 28, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2015/07/28/the-frozen-effect-when-disneys-movie-merchandising-is-too-much/#22ca8ce22ca8 [https://perma.cc/R8KR-5HDS].


Chandler, supra note 49.


property infringement through online and physical markets, as counterfeitors flood China with pirated Disney products.\(^\text{60}\)

**D. Disney Turns to the Campaign Approach**

The irony of recent infringement under Disney’s “nose” is highlighted by Disney’s path to eliminate this infringement. While the current infringement situation in China is challenging, Disney continued to cultivate its relationship with China and developed a coping strategy.\(^\text{61}\) So far, the company’s primary strategy appears to be to “keep a close relationship with local government officials and to cry out loudly and often to get their ear.”\(^\text{62}\) Disney’s strategy led to the SAIC launching a year-long campaign (the “Disney Campaign”) to “crack down” specifically on Disney trademarks.\(^\text{63}\) The SAIC called this campaign a “special action” to protect Disney in anticipation of Shanghai Disneyland Resort’s grand opening in June 2016, perhaps due to Disney’s joint venture with the Shanghai government firm.\(^\text{64}\) In addition to protecting the Disney brand, the SAIC declared that this campaign also sought to protect

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\(^{64}\) See Gough, *supra* note 63.
the future development of the Shanghai Disneyland Resort and to “uphold China’s international image for safeguarding intellectual property rights.”

The Disney Campaign entailed numerous actions to crack down on Disney counterfeits. The SAIC declared it would establish a “key protected area” around the Shanghai Disneyland Resort and strengthen patrols in this area. The enforcement efforts in this protected area were to be significantly increased to “comprehensively eliminate” infringement. The SAIC then created “emergency teams” (similar to teams that carry out raids) to watch for counterfeits, whether on sale online or elsewhere, and to coordinate efforts among national and local officials. The SAIC charged local SAIC divisions and authorities with inspecting wholesale distributions, production factories, and where trademarks are printed. The SAIC also called for local agencies to carry out “collective rectification” against local infringers. Additionally, the SAIC encouraged authorities nationwide to strengthen enforcement and narrow opportunities for people to infringe Disney’s trademarks. Edward Chatterton, a Hong Kong intellectual property lawyer, commented at the time, “I don’t think I’ve seen a specific brand being protected in this sort of comprehensive way before.” These moves, focusing solely on Disney products and its trademarks, were unprecedented.

Results soon came in. Within two months, officials seized a large batch of counterfeit Disney children’s clothing in

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65 Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks, supra note 40.
66 Yuen Yeuk-laam, Counterfeits ‘Feel No Pressure’ Despite China’s Crackdown on Disney Copyright Infringement, GLOBAL TIMES (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/952354.shtml [https://perma.cc/MV36-ZRBD].
67 See id.
68 See Jie, supra note 62; Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks, supra note 40.
69 See Jie, supra note 62; Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks, supra note 40.
70 See id.
Hangzhou, a city about one hundred miles from Shanghai. In addition, officials fined five fake Disney hotels built near where the Shanghai Disneyland Resort was to be built. The SAIC reported that during the campaign period it handled a total of one hundred and twelve Disney trademark infringement cases. The Disney seizures and raids that were featured in various news outlets were subsequently seen by the media as promising signs that Disney will be successful in enforcing its rights. The rapid results may seem impressive at first glance. However, by using the ineffective campaign approach, Disney would not achieve its goal of combating infringement against its trademarks, or even reducing it.

II. THE CAMPAIGN TRAP: IT IS INEFFECTIVE, BUT IS THERE A WAY OUT?

Despite its repeated use, the campaign approach has not worked. Part II focuses on how the campaign strategy has rarely worked to successfully combat infringement in its current form for multinational companies or for intellectual property rights in general. Section II.A discusses incentives to using the campaign approach while Section II.B examines its overall ineffectiveness, details the problems with multinational corporations’ present use...
of civil litigation, and explores the obstacles to using criminal prosecution.

A. The Short-Term Advantages of Campaigns

Campaigns are used because multinational corporations and other rights holders prefer the cheapest and fastest method to solve their counterfeiting issues. Campaigns have some short-term tangible effects. During the campaign period, factories and stores are closed down, large amounts of counterfeit goods are confiscated, and counterfeiters are arrested. People selling counterfeits on the streets are removed quickly. The volume of enforcement is also high during campaign periods. Agency officials and law enforcement officers work overtime investigating rights holders’ claims. Raids performed during the campaign period are also inexpensive and fast, and the rights holder receives results quickly. The temptation to obtain this type of enforcement is understandable for these reasons, and may explain why it is often used.

Results from campaign-related raids make headlines in national and international papers. For example, in February 2017, a raid resulted in seized counterfeit Chanel, Christian Dior, and other brand-name cosmetics worth 120 million USD. In May 2017, the

79 DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 189.
80 See supra Section I.B; infra Section II.B.
81 See supra Section I.B; infra Section II.B.
82 See supra Section I.B.
85 This raid occurred in Taizhou, an eastern city in China, and was initiated in response to reports of related counterfeit goods sold online. See Adam Jourdan, Chinese Police Seize $120 Million of Fake Cosmetics, Reuters (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-cosmetics-fakes-idUSKBN15V02Y [https://perma.cc/2DD7-6K52].
media reported the largest raid seizure of brand-name counterfeit sports shoes, with around five hundred thousand pairs taken. The Disney Campaign in China, especially the raids and seizures resulting from it, similarly achieved headlines in multiple news outlets. The Chinese government also publicizes its campaigns through their websites and often point out items seized from raids. The China Chamber of International Commerce recently mentioned the Disney Campaign in a comment to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative as an example of China substantially improving its intellectual rights protection. Campaign results generate publicity and may create a sense that serious, effective action is being taken against counterfeiting, making campaigns attractive to multinational corporations.

B. The Long-Term Ineffectiveness of Campaigns

1. The Transient Effects of Campaigns

Experts often criticize campaigns as “incur[ring] high administrative cost[s] with transient effects.” Multinational corporations criticize the SAIC’s actions because shortly after a raid, even as soon as the next day, infringers return to selling counterfeit goods. After numerous raids, counterfeiting
operations move on to another town or factory, and continue to operate until they are subject to yet another campaign once companies request enforcement measures again.\textsuperscript{92} One notable example of the transient effects of campaigns is the 2008 Olympic campaign. Leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Chinese government made several decrees establishing a campaign to protect the Olympic symbols and other trademarks related to the games.\textsuperscript{93} Tens of thousands of government personnel across China worked overtime to crack down on counterfeits.\textsuperscript{94} However, counterfeit 2008 Olympics goods were still easy to find, during the campaign and afterwards.\textsuperscript{95} Vendors selling counterfeit Olympics goods continued to plague tourists.\textsuperscript{96} Pirated versions of the opening ceremony popped up frequently in markets, even as close as two weeks after the ceremony itself.\textsuperscript{97} Despite the campaign and the high volume of enforcement actions, the sale of counterfeit merchandise was still widespread across China.\textsuperscript{98}

Another high-profile example of an ineffective campaign was the 2011 month-long campaign to eradicate imitation Apple Inc. (“Apple”) stores and unauthorized sellers of Apple products.\textsuperscript{99} The campaign began when an imitation Apple store found in Kunming, China made headlines around the world.\textsuperscript{100} Upon further search of the city, over twenty other imitation Apple stores were found.\textsuperscript{101}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{92} DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 14–15.
\textsuperscript{93} YU, supra note 83, at 262–63.
\textsuperscript{94} Id. at 263.
\textsuperscript{95} Id. at 264.
\textsuperscript{96} Id. at 264–65.
\textsuperscript{97} Id. at 265.
\textsuperscript{98} Id. at 264.
\textsuperscript{99} These are physical retail stores imitating Apple Inc. stores. This campaign differs from the Disney Campaign as it did not focus on the Apple trademark, but rather physical stores and counterfeits generally, because of the international attention the Kunming imitation Apple stores received. The campaign was also not as comprehensive or as long as the Disney campaign. See Xu Wei, Unauthorized Apple Retailers Face Logo Ban, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-08/08/content_13071315.htm [https://perma.cc/9W7V-JD8M].
\textsuperscript{101} See Chinese Authorities Find [Twenty-Two] Fake Apple Stores, supra note 100.
\end{flushleft}
Several of these stores were shut down in Kunming.\textsuperscript{102} Imitation stores in Beijing’s technology district Zhongguancun were ordered to stop using the Apple logo, but many stores remained open after the campaign.\textsuperscript{103} Beijing store managers were slow to respond, with one stating: “If you come back a few days later, everything will be back as it was.”\textsuperscript{104} Imitation Apple stores even thrived in anticipation of a new phone’s launch.\textsuperscript{105} The number of imitation Apple stores has decreased over the years, but its decline could be credited to factors such as Apple’s increased physical presence in China, and a growing preference for locally-made technology, instead of the anti-counterfeiting campaign.\textsuperscript{106}

As a final example, Disney counterfeit goods are also alive and well, even inside the Shanghai Disneyland Resort itself.\textsuperscript{107} During 2016 and 2017, visitors reported seeing counterfeit Minnie Mouse ears and Mickey Mouse hats sold in plain sight.\textsuperscript{108} One visitor


\textsuperscript{103} \textit{See Wei}, supra note 99.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{See Yimou Lee, China’s ‘Fake’ Apple Stores Thrive Ahead of New iPhone Launch, REUTERS} (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-china-idUSKCN0RN2EF20150924 \[https://perma.cc/QYS2-ADEP\].


\textsuperscript{107} \textit{See Author’s Experiences, supra note 1; see also Cathy Wu, Fake Disney Hotel Website Scrapped After Exposé, THAT’S MAGS} (June 7, 2016), https://www.thatsmags.com/shanghai/post/13980/fake-disney-hotel-website-scrapped-after-exposure \[https://perma.cc/4BUN-MADQ\] (exposing a related incident where a fake Shanghai Disney Resort website was created to swindle unsuspecting customers).

stated: “People are selling counterfeit merchandise from back packs all over the park.” Alternative described numerous people “selling fake Disney items, raincoat[s,] and even cigarettes.” On July 15, 2017, one traveler wrote there were people “walking up and down INSIDE the queues selling fake Disney merchandise (e.g., light-up toys, keychains, etc.).” The traveler went on to state that “[t]he first time it happened to us, I stared at the person in shock and she interpreted it as my interest to purchase something from her.” On September 1, 2017, another traveler similarly wrote: “[T]here [is] a black market, people [are] selling the same as the shops in the Disney street cheaper.” Six days later a visitor stated there were “[h]awkers selling (counterfeit?) swag all over the place, especially in the lines.” A disappointed visitor singled out Shanghai Disneyland Resort: “[O]nly here we can find people selling unauthorized merchandise [at] a lower price than [in the] official store.” More examples of Disney counterfeits are abundant.
For a campaign that specifically set out to eliminate Disney counterfeits, these results are dismal. Despite the campaign’s promises to protect the Shanghai Disneyland Resort area with emergency teams and strengthened patrols, counterfeits remain prevalent in the park.\textsuperscript{117} Just as in other campaigns, there were short term improvements, but no lasting change.\textsuperscript{118}

2. The Overuse of Campaign-Style Enforcement

Despite its transient effects, the campaign approach is the tool of choice for solving infringement problems in China. At first, campaigns against infringement generally coincided with visiting foreign intellectual property or trade delegations, but since then campaigns have become a common government action.\textsuperscript{119} For the past several years, the annual agency “Action Plan” or “Implementation Plan” specifically coordinated the use of intellectual property-related campaigns.\textsuperscript{120} For example, one of these intellectual property campaigns, “Special Campaign to Combat IPR Infringement and the Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeit and Shoddy Commodities,” lasted nine months.\textsuperscript{121} The Chinese government declared it a “huge success,” drawing attention to the high number of cases handled during campaign, even though counterfeit goods production is rising with China as the top culprit.\textsuperscript{122} In 2013, the government announced a six-month


\textsuperscript{117} See Jie, supra note 62; Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks, supra note 40.

\textsuperscript{118} See discussion supra Section II.B.1.

\textsuperscript{119} CHEN, supra note 33, at 803; see also Danielle Mihalkanin & Brad Williams, China’s Special Campaign to Combat IPR Infringement, CHINA BUS. REV. (Oct. 1, 2011), https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/chinas-special-campaign-to-combat-ipr-infringement/ [https://perma.cc/BF6Z-3LBC].

\textsuperscript{120} CHEN, supra note 33, at 803–04.

\textsuperscript{121} See Mihalkanin & Williams, supra note 119.

\textsuperscript{122} Id.; see also supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
campaign to combat counterfeit pharmaceutical products. In 2014, the government created another campaign promising to fight intellectual property infringement online and elsewhere, such as websites advertising counterfeit products. Another 2015 government campaign, “Red Shield Net Sword,” similarly focused on purging counterfeits in online sales and lasted five months. Every year the government carries out campaigns, yet counterfeit production is still rising in China.

Multinational corporations reinforce the use of government campaigns (especially the raids that come with them) by relying on them to enforce their rights. For example, similarly to Disney, other multinational corporations will establish close relationships

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126 For example, the State Council in 2017 announced it would create new intellectual property campaigns, along with several campaigns for other issues such as product quality. See Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Yinfa 2017 Nian Quanguo Daji Qinfan Zhishi Chanquan he Zhishou Jiamao Weilie Shangpin Gongzuozu Yaodian de Tongzhi (国务院办公厅关于印发 2017 年全国打击 侵犯知识产权和制售假冒伪劣商品工作要点的通知), Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Issuing the Key Points in the Work of 2017 National Crackdown on IPR Infringement and the Manufacturing and Sale of Fake and Shoddy Goods, ST. COUNCIL (May 16, 2017), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-05/31/content_5198504.htm [https://perma.cc/W6B6-M6ER].

127 See FN Staff, supra note 91.
with enforcement agencies, such as the SAIC, to induce enforcement measures. After the SAIC conducts a raid, the foreign company may treat the SAIC officials and investigators to dinner and karaoke, and give them public recognition for their role. If corporations cannot obtain SAIC’s help, they can hire independent local “providers,” or private investigators, to conduct raids as a quick way to get goods off the market. Providers can be one-man operations or large companies that cater to multinational corporations in need of enforcement. Multinational corporations fall into the temptation of using the campaign approach to solve their intellectual property problems, which feeds into the government’s continued use of campaigns.

Companies occasionally initiate their own anti-counterfeiting actions, but these ultimately resemble the Chinese campaign, as they are short term attempts to combat infringement. For example, in 2006, Disney gave customers the opportunity to enter contests for free Disney prizes if they mailed in the hologram stickers on official Disney merchandise. Microsoft initiated its own anti-counterfeiting actions as well. One action in 2008 consisted of causing a black screen to display every hour for users of pirated versions of Windows XP. Microsoft then began a “Keep it Real” anti-counterfeiting effort in 2012 after purchasing 169 computers

129 Id.
130 See Youill, supra note 31. An example of the inability obtain the SAIC’s assistance is the lack of sufficient evidence that infringement took place. See CHINA IPR SME HELPDESK, ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 2 (2013), http://www.china-iprhelpdesk.eu/sites/all/docs/publications/EN_Enforcement_Aug-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6NV-WSJH].
131 See Youill, supra note 31.
132 See FN Staff, supra note 91.
135 See id.
from shops in China, and finding that all were installed with pirated versions of Windows.\textsuperscript{136} As part of this effort, it notified sixteen Beijing sellers, who repeatedly sold these computers with pirated software, to stop.\textsuperscript{137} In 2015, still facing massive pirating, Microsoft took a different course by simply offering free upgrades to Windows 10 to all Windows users, whether or not they were running genuine copies of the software.\textsuperscript{138} Just as with government campaigns, these efforts by multinational corporations are short-term and bring little long-term effects. Both the government and foreign companies have become heavily reliant on short-term actions, whether in the form of campaigns or general anti-counterfeiting efforts.

3. Conflicts of Interest and Corruption Within Campaigns

Campaigns are also rendered ineffective due to conflicts of interest and corruption. A major conflict of interest is the local government’s incentive to keep the local economy thriving, as local government authorities from different districts compete with each other for investment and growth, versus true enforcement of rights.\textsuperscript{139} Although top government authorities, such as the SAIC and the State Council, may coordinate campaigns, local government officials may not always carry them out correctly.\textsuperscript{140} Incentivized to protect local economic activity, local officials impose light fines and lax enforcement on local counterfeiters, even in the face of orders from high officials.\textsuperscript{141} For example, a factory producing counterfeits at times can be the “largest single employer in the province,” so a government official will call the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{137} See id.
\textsuperscript{138} See Paul Carsten & Bill Rigby, Microsoft Tackles China Piracy with Free Upgrade to Windows [Ten], REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-china-idUSKBN0ME06A20150318 [https://perma.cc/8MBK-8VH7].
\textsuperscript{140} Id. at 48–51.
\textsuperscript{141} Id. at 48.
\end{footnotesize}
police and stop the ordered agency raid from occurring. A local agency may also accept bribes from both rights holders and counterfeiters, and will conduct—or fail to conduct—enforcement actions depending on which bribe is higher or depending on whether the counterfeiters contribute significantly to the local economy. Enforcement becomes selective, with agencies focusing on “easy” cases, such as counterfeits being sold in a store, rather than finding and closing down whole enterprises that produce the counterfeits. Raids, although the traditional method used by foreign companies as part of campaigns, merely become “propaganda show[s],” or illusions that action is being taken, instead of genuine enforcement. Despite numerous raids, counterfeit items are still common in China partly due to conflicting interests within the Chinese government itself.

Independent local providers hired by corporations to conduct enforcement actions can also be corrupt, even working with counterfeiters to manufacture counterfeit goods and then “seize” them, and also create other obstacles to enforcing rights. As these providers are paid on commission, counterfeit seizures mean higher fees, creating an incentive to work with counterfeiters or manufacture their own counterfeit goods. For example, in 2015, the Associated Press released an investigative report that found

142 TIM PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS 64 (1st ed. 2005).
143 See DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 186.
144 Id. at 187.
145 LIN, supra note 139, at 48; see also Kathy Chu, In the Fight Against Counterfeits, Even the Raids Can Be Fake, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-the-fight-against-counterfeits-even-the-raids-can-be-fake-1449171005. For example, along with the corruption noted earlier, counterfeiters have found ways to evade consequences, such as hiding evidence before authorities arrive based on tip-offs, so when a raid does occur it is ineffective. See id.
“anti-counterfeiting investigators were widely involved in copying products of their own western customers.”149 In another example, a company hired an investigator to track down counterfeit anti-dandruff shampoo in China.150 Instead of conducting the investigation, he instead set up a factory to produce the shampoo himself which he then seized, calling it a successful raid.151 As a final example, Gucci brought an intellectual property case to court against a Chinese infringer relying on its investigator’s documents stating that two thousand counterfeit Gucci eyeglasses were found during a raid.152 The court dismissed Gucci’s case, finding that the documents may have been forged.153 Alexander Theil, an investigator who supervised thousands of raids for counterfeit goods mostly in China, stated that in many raids, “numbers are faked, documents are faked or there is something fishy.”154 Conflicts of interests and corruption are rampant in raids, but the government and multinational corporations continue to rely heavily on them, whether as part of campaigns or as part of general anti-counterfeiting measures.

4. The Responsive Nature of Campaigns

As campaigns in China are responsive by nature, they are not dedicated to solving the root cause of intellectual property infringement. They are measures designed as a “rapid resolution of a major problem,” done in response to pressure by a company or government authority as well as in crisis situations.155 Pressure from government authorities to look good in the face of massive infringement, or a company’s board of directors looking for a fast solution to the situation in China, can also drive these short-term solutions.156 For example, when China began its quest to join the World Trade Organization, it turned to campaigns to crack down on counterfeits, leading to these campaigns’ characterization as

149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See Chu, supra note 145.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 4.
156 See FN Staff, supra note 91.
“political and diplomatic” measures to respond to foreign pressure rather than true enforcement of intellectual property rights.\textsuperscript{157} Customs enforcement of intellectual property rights also fluctuated depending on the level of U.S. government pressure.\textsuperscript{158} Provinces that are more dependent on foreign investment have significant amounts of enforcement actions against counterfeiters, while provinces that do not have foreign investment have little to none.\textsuperscript{159} Overall, campaigns come about if there is pressure or financial incentive, whether it is to combat criticism or drive investment, and not out of the true need for intellectual property enforcement itself.\textsuperscript{160}

5. Foreign Companies’ Rare Use of Civil Litigation

Campaigns are used very often, which creates the impression that there must be no other possible method of effective intellectual property rights enforcement.\textsuperscript{161} This is not the case, but corporations are neglecting alternative avenues. Disney has brought few intellectual property infringement cases in China since 1994—only three—when compared to its vast number of cases handled in the United States.\textsuperscript{162} Disney’s over 3,500 intellectual


\textsuperscript{158} See DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 79.

\textsuperscript{159} See id. at 57.

\textsuperscript{160} DEZAN SHIRA & ASSOCS., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 29 (Chris Devonshire-Ellis et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011).

\textsuperscript{161} See supra Section II.B.2.

\textsuperscript{162} This data is based on the Chinese version of IPHouse, a database of over 200,000 criminal, administrative, and civil cases filed in China. IPHouse, http://en.iphouse.cn/ [https://perma.cc/TJ7C-2F66]. To reach this number, the author searched IPHouse to find the total number of IP civil litigation cases brought by Disney since 1980, and confirmed that no other cases were brought prior to 1994. To conduct this search query: (1) Select “Roles” on the IPHouse homepage; (2) then select “Litigant” under the “Roles” section; and (3) enter the Mandarin character name for Disney (“迪士尼”) into the search bar. Three names—two versions of “The Walt Disney Company” (“迪士尼企业公司” and “迪士尼公司”) and the third, Disney China (“华特迪士尼((中国))有限公司”)—appear with results under each name. For each of the three names: (1) Select the respective named hyperlink; (2) scroll down to the bottom of the page and follow the “See more” hyperlink; and finally, (3) filter the results by limiting the query to cases after 1980. This
property matters in the United States alone consist of more than 1,457 copyright, 1,760 patent, and 362 trademark cases, motions and filings. The lack of Chinese civil litigation cases, although having a high win rate, mirrors the trend for multinational corporations in general in China.

Even more troubling, the number of foreign intellectual property cases is actually shrinking. In 2013, foreign cases comprised 1.9% of all intellectual property cases in China. In 2014, the number of foreign intellectual property cases dropped to 1.8%. This number shrank further in 2015 to a mere 1.2%. In contrast, the number of total intellectual property cases in China is generally rising. Chinese courts received 133,863 cases in 2014, 130,200 cases in 2015, and a record number of 152,072 in 2016.

Mandarin name search revealed two civil suits where Disney was the plaintiff: One of the suits is the 2016 case discussed infra Section III.A.2, and the other is a suit from 2003. Additionally, the author returned to the “Litigant” page and entered the English version of the name “Disney” into the search bar. This revealed one litigant name, “Disney Enterprises, Inc.” Similar to the Mandarin search: (1) Follow the named hyperlink; and (2) scroll down to select “See more.” This search query yielded only one result, a 2005 civil suit brought by Disney, where it again was awarded damages. In total, three cases have been brought by Disney since 1994. Disney is also known as a strong trademark enforcer in the United States. For an overview of a few of its latest trademark cases see, Chelsea Wold, Big Mouse in the House: Disney Trademark Oppositions, LAWINSPIRING.COM (Jan. 19, 2017), http://lawinspiring.com/2017/01/19/disney-trademark-oppositions/ [https://perma.cc/A236-ST6P].


Summarizing the SPC’s 2015 White Paper, supra note 164.

Id.

Id.

Based on the data, it seems local Chinese companies have much less hesitancy to use the civil litigation system than their foreign counterparts.

Foreign companies make up a miniscule percentage of the civil litigation docket, but it is unclear why, as there are no explanations from the companies themselves. Instead of using the courts, Disney chose the campaign approach. Companies may see civil litigation, despite its advantages and improvements discussed in Part III, as costly and time-consuming to bring for intellectual property infringement when counterfeits are abundant. However, civil trademark and copyright cases generally take an average of four months to complete and have enduring consequences, unlike the campaign approach. The hesitancy could also be a matter of unfamiliarity with the Chinese court system. Whatever the reason, the civil litigation system is severely neglected by foreign companies.

6. Obstacles to Using Criminal Prosecution Effectively

Criminal prosecution is another way to enforce intellectual property rights in China, but one fraught with difficulties. Intellectual property infringement is expressly prohibited under the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Chinese Criminal Law”). Companies can bring cases directly to the Public Security Bureau (“PSB”) or administrative bodies such as

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Record Number of IP Cases in 2016, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/24/content_29059335.htm [https://perma.cc/7TSS-YVW6]. The 2015 number includes 101,324 civil litigation cases, but breakdowns for each year are not available. See Summarizing the SPC’s 2015 White Paper, supra note 164.

169 See supra Section I.D; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text.


the SAIC will transfer the cases to the PSB. In either option, if there is sufficient evidence, the PSB will then hand the case over to a people’s prosecutor for criminal prosecution. However, several challenges make criminal prosecution difficult.

Criminal prosecution for these cases comes with high thresholds. A trademark infringer is punished if the case is of a “serious” nature, and in the case of an “especially serious” nature, the time of imprisonment lengthens. Knowingly selling trademark-infringing merchandise with a “relatively large” sales volume can be punished with imprisonment, criminal detention, and fines. Forging or manufacturing of a “serious” nature is punished the same way. If the amount of the illicit income for forging or manufacturing is “especially serious,” then the time for imprisonment is extended. The Supreme People’s Court interpreted the above trademark thresholds to mean that trademark infringement is punishable if the illegal business volume is 50,000 RMB (7,496 USD) or above, or if the amount of illegal profits is at least 30,000 RMB (4,552 USD). Thresholds are applied to other types of intellectual property infringement; copyright infringers are punished if “the amount of illegal gains is relatively large” or if there are “other serious circumstances,” and patent infringers are similarly punished when the “circumstances are serious.”

Each type of illegal activity is only illegal if the circumstances are “serious,” which may overlook one-man infringers and infringers with small to medium scale operations, entirely in favor of only catching the big fish. The thresholds focus on the volume of the enforcement instead of the intellectual property right itself, implying the notion that people can infringe intellectual property

173 See id.
174 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 213 (EN).
175 Id. art. 214.
176 Id. art. 215.
177 Id.
rights in certain cases. The United States brought these thresholds under scrutiny when it made a request for consultations to the World Trade Organization, claiming that the thresholds do not follow article 61 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which the two countries promised to follow. Article 61 states: “Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.”

Member countries found that China’s “quantitative thresholds would not capture counterfeiting activities of limited value or smaller quantities,” and that these small scale illegal activities are “clearly meaningful,” as they contribute to the chain of infringement. The panel formed to investigate the claim further noted the lack of criminal procedures and penalties for crimes falling below the thresholds. Eventually, the panel found that China’s criminal measures do exclude some copyright and trademark infringement because of the thresholds, but also found that article 61 does not require member states to criminalize all copyright and trademark infringement.

As a result, Chinese criminal law remains unchanged to the detriment of rights holders. Only a select group of rights holders are protected. Evidencing this selectivity, a 2015 study of 376 Chinese intellectual property criminal cases, the United States’ official statistics on about half of these cases, official U.S. and Chinese statistics on IP criminal and administrative enforcement in

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180 See BLAKENEY, supra note 178.
183 Id. ¶ 7.438.
184 See id. ¶¶ 7.444–46.
both countries, and in-depth interviews with intellectual property law practitioners in China, revealed that those who successfully brought criminal infringement cases were in a “handful of economically or politically powerful companies in a few particular industries.” The study found that state-owned enterprises comprised 49% of these companies and 44% were companies with controlling foreign shareholders or foreign intellectual property rights, such as multinational corporations or corporations that hold foreign brands. A mere 6.7% of Chinese criminal infringement cases involved domestic private and collective companies. The majority of criminal infringement cases are also concentrated in a few companies with well-known brands, with at least 89.7% of all criminal infringement cases, whether foreign or domestic, falling into this category.

As it stands, only cases involving the biggest brands, or that seriously undermine the socialist market economy, are prosecuted, whether foreign or domestic. The opposite is the case for administrative petitions, such as those to the SAIC requesting raids, whose petitioners belong to a variety of industries and brands. Overall, the Chinese criminal system handles a very small amount of infringement cases, with the vast majority of them being handled by administrative agencies. The deficiencies in the current Chinese criminal law lead to less cases prosecuted, less companies protected, and less opportunities for intellectual property holders to enforce their rights. They also lead to companies turning to campaigns, as the thresholds limit criminal

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187 See id. at 154.
188 See id. at 155.
189 See id. at 156–57.
190 See id. at 156–57, 172.
191 See id. at 167.
192 See id. at 168.
193 See id. at 165, 186. Enforcement against online counterfeiting operations also suffers from the high thresholds; police only begin investigations into operations if there is a strong possibility the thresholds can be met. See INTA ANTICOUNTERFEITING COMM. CHINA SUBCOMM., ONLINE COUNTERFEITING ISSUES AND ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 7 (2015), https://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/2015/Online%20Counterfeiting%20Issues%20and%20Enforcement%20in%20China.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CTL-CWP2].
This is worrisome as campaigns generally have only temporary effects.

However, when it comes to engaging the criminal justice system, these companies fall into a trap just as they do when it comes to campaigns. Their routine strategy is to build rapport with officials and pay fees for officials to investigate their claims, thereby securing the prioritization of their cases from local criminal law enforcement. This strategy is noted, just as for campaigns in general, as leading to piecemeal and ineffective enforcement. The current pattern leads to criminal prosecution only when the biggest foreign companies plead enough to instigate action from officials. This creates yet another unnecessary responsive enforcement regime.

In conclusion, the campaign approach as currently practiced is inherently weak and ineffective, and multinational corporations are reinforcing its use by nearly exclusively using campaigns. Upon announcement of the Disney Campaign, Jack Clode, the co-founder of Blackspeak Group, a firm working on trademark enforcement issues in China, correctly asked: “Authorities will keep Disney happy and will get a few wins against counterfeiters—but the question is, [w]hat sort of long-term effect will this have?” This question conveys the crux of the problem with the current campaign approach: A campaign is a short-term solution for a long-term problem. As the results of campaigns have shown, the answer to his question is very little.

194 See Liu, supra note 186, at 163 (noting how companies “seek criminal . . . processing when cases reach prosecution thresholds”).
195 See id. at 163–64.
196 See id. at 164.
197 See id. at 164.
198 See id. at 165.
199 See id.
199 Gough, supra note 63.
III. MOVING BEYOND: INVESTING IN CIVIL LITIGATION, MODIFYING THE CAMPAIGN APPROACH, AND CREATING PRODUCTIVE ALLIANCES

In September 2017, the State Council’s Ministry of Commerce, the ministry in charge of domestic and foreign trade, announced yet another campaign to attack intellectual property rights infringement. The campaign has the hallmarks of the classic Chinese campaign: it is responsive to external pressure, as it was created to increase foreign investment, and will last for a short period of time, from September to December 2017. With these hallmarks, it is highly likely this will be another campaign with transient effects. Lance Noble, Policy Director for the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, seemed to recognize this and commented: “As welcome as further public commitments to protecting [intellectual property rights] are, this cannot be achieved through a campaign-style approach.” He stated that instead, there needs to be “sustained commitment” to enforcement.

This campaign was also critiqued at the section 301 Investigation and Hearing that the U.S. Trade Representative conducted on October 10, 2017. This investigation examined

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204 McDonald, supra note 203.
205 See Initiation of Section 301 Investigation; Hearing; and Request for Public Comments: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
China’s actions and policies regarding technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. Mark Cohen, a Senior Counsel at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office who has over thirty years of experience handling intellectual property issues in China, served as a panel member at the hearing. He noted the campaign’s time period of only three months and asked: “Many scholars think that these short campaigns have limited duration and effect . . . So I’d like to know why is this particular program any different from other ones before it? Why not extend it or make it permanent? Or perhaps should the focus be on judicial reform or other areas?”

This Part will provide some answers to Cohen’s questions on how to improve enforcement and how multinational corporations can participate. Multinational corporations need to do their part in changing the enforcement paradigm, and work towards a long-term solution instead of falling into the campaign trap. This can occur in several ways. Section III.A examines recently-created tools and developments in the civil litigation system, such as the new intellectual property courts, the long-term effects of recent rulings on Chinese intellectual property law, and recent successes with preliminary injunctions. Section III.A also urges companies to take advantage of these opportunities through new and increased use. Section III.B then proposes modifications to the existing Chinese campaign approach using examples from campaigns in the United States and multinational brand alliances. Instead of relying heavily on campaigns and their raids, multinational corporations should

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See id.


Section 301 Investigation and Hearing, supra note 207, at 164–65.

Id. at 164–66.
incorporate elements of the mechanisms above into a comprehensive, long-term strategy.

A. Opportunities in Civil Litigation

1. Establishment of the New Intellectual Property Courts

The Chinese government looks to the civil litigation system as a place to combat infringement. To develop more protection for intellectual property rights, in 2014 the government developed several intellectual property courts ("IP Courts") in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. These courts handle intellectual property cases and over time they have become more specialized in the subject matter. Other characteristics of the intellectual property courts are important to note. Although China is a civil law country and its courts are not required to follow precedent, the highest IP Courts have issued "guiding" cases and model rulings to inform lower courts on key issues. For example, they have issued guiding cases on evidence preservation and preliminary injunctions, allowing these methods to become possible options for intellectual property owners. The Beijing IP Court has cited prior cases in its rulings, making for a more uniform rule of law.

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regarding intellectual property rights. The IP Courts are also now publishing their decisions on a database for the public, creating more consistency and transparency as older cases are easier to find for judges deciding new ones.

In 2017, the government established new specialized circuit intellectual property tribunals (“IP Tribunals”) in Nanjing, Suzhou, Chengdu, and Wuhan, which will spread opportunities for intellectual property rights enforcement to other areas of China for national and foreign companies. IP tribunals are “attached” to the existing people’s courts in those cities. These tribunals resemble the IP Courts in the sense that they exercise jurisdiction over intellectual property cases, and have judges with extensive experience with intellectual property litigation. Unlike the IP Courts, they have cross-regional jurisdiction, meaning they can handle cases from a variety of cities in a region. Overall, the civil litigation system for intellectual property rights is greatly improving, and foreign companies should not hesitate to use them.

2. High Win Rates for Foreign Companies

Civil litigation is the key way companies can combat infringement for long-term change. Chinese law, such as the Chinese Trademark Law (“Trademark Law”), gives companies the right to sue infringers. Disney was one of the first foreign companies to see the advantages of civil litigation when it brought

214 See Cohen, supra note 212.
216 See Li et al., supra note 213.
217 Id.
218 See id.
219 See id.
an intellectual property infringement case in 1994 in Beijing.\(^{221}\) The Beijing court in *Walt Disney Co. v. Beijing Press and Xinhua Bookstores* ruled against three Chinese publishing and distribution companies for their production of children’s books based on Disney’s animated films and characters without the company’s approval.\(^{222}\) Disney received a 227,000 yuan judgment against the Chinese companies.\(^{223}\) Disney’s latest intellectual property infringement civil case in 2016 was another win for the company.\(^{224}\) The Shanghai IP Tribunal levied a 194,440 USD judgment against two infringing companies who created characters, titles, and posters substantially similar to those from Disney and Pixar’s “Cars” and “Cars 2” films.\(^{225}\)

Foreign companies in general have a high win rate for intellectual property-related civil litigation and even “had a 100% win rate” against counterfeiters in the Beijing IP Court in 2015.\(^{226}\) For all copyright infringement cases, whether foreign or domestic, across China there is still a high 85% win rate in court.\(^{227}\) The win rates for copyright cases in the Beijing and Shanghai courts are 82% and 92%, respectively.\(^{228}\) Trademark cases across China boast

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\(^{223}\) See *Analysis of Walt Disney of the United States v. Beijing Publishing Press*, supra note 222.

\(^{224}\) *Walt Disney Wins Copyright Infringement Case Against Chinese Companies*, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 3, 2017), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-01/03/content_27844721.htm [https://perma.cc/P3J2-XQVP].

\(^{225}\) See id. The Shanghai IP Tribunal is administered by the Shanghai Pudong New Area People’s Court and was established specifically for the Shanghai Pudong area. See *Dispute Settlement System*, SHANGHAI MUN. PEOPLE’S GOV’T (Sept. 13, 2017), http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node27118/node27818/u22ai87437.html [https://perma.cc/7RYK-ZPVX].

\(^{226}\) Patent Litigation, Local Protectionism and Empiricism, supra note 164.

\(^{227}\) CIELA COPYRIGHT: ALL COURTS, supra note 170. These figures are as of 2015.

a 91% win rate.\textsuperscript{229} The Beijing and Shanghai courts have win rates of 88% and 87%, respectively, for trademark cases.\textsuperscript{230} The consistently high win rate, as well as their successes over the years in Chinese courts, should show foreign companies that the Chinese civil litigation system is more reliable to stop infringers in the country than the campaign approach.

3. Civil Litigation’s Long-term Effects on Chinese Law

Civil litigation also has long-term effects on Chinese law. For example, as a result of several cases, the Trademark Law was revised with tougher restrictions on infringement.\textsuperscript{231} In 2011, Danjaq LLC, the U.S. company that produces the James Bond films, brought one such case that changed this law.\textsuperscript{232} Danjaq LLC brought a civil case against a Chinese condom maker who used the Chinese characters for “James Bond, 007” and the name in English as the trademark logos for its products.\textsuperscript{233} The condom producer argued that its trademark was valid and its products were in an unrelated business.\textsuperscript{234} However, the Beijing High People’s Court ruled that the condom producer “violated the ‘principle of good faith’ required under China’s trademark law when a trademark is registered.”\textsuperscript{235} It also ruled that trademarks cannot infringe on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[	extsuperscript{229}] The principle of good faith is violated when a trademark applicant knows of the existence of a person’s prior use of an unregistered trademark, and proceeds to apply to register that same trademark. See Li Yunquan, \textit{China’s New Trademark Law Strengthening Good Faith Requirement in Trademark Registration and Use}, Wanhuida Pek sung, http://www.wanhuida.com/en/.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
existing rights. Consequently, the government created a new regulation as part of the Trademark Law taking effect in 2017 to protect well-known characters, including those in books and movies. The regulation stated that those characters and titles of works protected by copyright law cannot be used as trademarks by any entity that does not hold the copyright, unless the copyright holder grants permission.

This new regulation, created from a civil intellectual property case and not from a campaign, is useful for companies such as Disney who rely largely on its characters for business. Setting precedent through civil litigation makes it easier for companies to protect their trademarks, and to prove infringement in future civil cases. If a foreign company uses the civil litigation system, not only will they likely have a successful result, but also will likely permanently change laws in favor of intellectual property rights holders.

4. Higher Damages Awarded for Intellectual Property Civil Cases

The amount of damages won against infringers has risen, with the Beijing IP Court in a case between plaintiff Beijing Watchdata Data Systems Co. Ltd. and defendant Hengbao Co. Ltd. issuing its highest award for its jurisdiction to date, approximately 7.5 million USD, in December 2016. This civil case is also notable because it was the first time an award included an order for compensation

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236 See Trademark Law Set for Major Shakeup, supra note 231.
238 See id.
239 See id. at pmbl.
for litigation expenses, including attorney fees. Foreign companies are slowly but surely winning higher damages in court as well. In November 2015, the Beijing IP Court awarded 470,000 USD to the Italian company Moncler for trademark infringement it suffered from a Chinese company. In August 2017, New Balance won 1.5 million USD in damages in the Suzhou IP Tribunal against the Chinese company New Boom, which produced and sold shoes with New Balance’s trademarked logo. This landmark decision has the highest damages award for a foreign company in a trademark infringement case in China to date. It was also noted as a victory for foreign companies attempting to enforce their rights in the Chinese civil courts. Intellectual property experts viewed New Balance’s pursuit of enforcement in civil courts as a proactive, successful strategy, one that other foreign companies should implement in China. These recent results for both domestic and foreign companies should encourage foreign companies to see civil litigation as a worthwhile investment to combat infringement.

5. The Rise of Preliminary Injunctions

Preliminary injunctions are an additional useful tool for foreign companies. They are also known as “Conduct Preservation” or “Interim Injunctions” in China. See Zhen Feng & Suyu Yuan, How to Obtain Interim Injunctions in China, INT’L
party to perform or not perform an act. They were formally introduced to the civil litigation system in amendments to the Chinese Civil Procedure Law of 2012. China’s preliminary injunction requirements closely resemble those of the United States. The court considers: whether the applicant has the likelihood of winning the case on the merits; whether the applicant’s rights are valid; whether there may be irreparable harm to the applicant; whether the harm caused by the injunction to the respondent is greater than harm caused to the applicant if no action is taken; and whether the injunction would harm the public interest. Additionally, the applicant must post a sufficient bond, or a specified amount of money, to be paid if the applicant fully or substantially loses the case or if the issuance of the injunction is a mistake. The bond is then used to offset the defendant’s losses in these situations.

Their formal introduction was seen as a positive step for intellectual property rights holders, as they now had a new opportunity for enforcement. Companies in general are requesting preliminary injunctions for intellectual property

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249 See id.


251 See supra note 245.

252 See id. art. 18.

infringement purposes more often in the last few years. For example, in 2015, the Guangzhou IP Court granted a preliminary injunction for copyright infringement in favor of Blizzard Entertainment, a California video game company, against Chengdu Seven Games Limited (“Seven Games”). Seven Games created “Everyone WarCraft,” which infringed Blizzard’s World of Warcraft game. The Guangzhou IP Court ordered Seven Games and the website used to host the games to cease reproduction, distribution, and online dissemination. In August 2016, the Beijing IP Court granted an injunction for trademark infringement in favor of Dutch company Talpa, the owner of the intellectual property rights in “The Voice” singing competition franchise, against a Chinese company that began producing a series named “The Voice of China.” A few months later, the Fujian IP Tribunal granted an injunction for U.S. clothing company Under Armour against Chinese company Uncle Martian, with the underlying trademark infringement case resulting in 300,000 USD in damages awarded to Under Armour. In 2017, the Beijing IP Court granted a permanent injunction for Iwncomm, a Chinese internet technology company, against a foreign company, Sony.


256 SINA, supra note 255.

257 Id.


Corporation ("Sony"), for standard essential patent infringement when Sony used Iwncomm’s patent without authorization.\(^{260}\) The court also ordered Sony to pay 8.62 million RMB (1.25 million USD) in damages to Iwncomm.\(^{261}\) Expanding the use of preliminary injunctions to patents, the Guangzhou IP Court granted the first preliminary injunction for patent infringement on June 22, 2016 for Christian Louboutin Ltd. against Guangzhou Benefit Cosmetics Co., which had manufactured and sold infringing lipsticks.\(^{262}\)

The cases above are the few examples of foreign companies using preliminary injunctions, demonstrating they are certainly not the go-to response for combating infringement. This is the case despite high grant rates. In Beijing and Shanghai, courts granted injunctions against trademark infringement 97% of the time.\(^{263}\) Across China, injunctions were granted in 96% of cases where there was a finding of trademark infringement.\(^{264}\) The injunction rate for copyright infringement is similar, with 90% and 88% granted in Beijing and Shanghai courts, respectively, and 89% granted across China.\(^{265}\) The minimal use of injunctions must change. Preliminary injunctions are a powerful tool for multinational companies if these companies invest their time in securing them rather than pursuing ineffective campaigns.


\(^{261}\) An Injunction Based on a Standard Essential Patent Is Happening in China, supra note 260.


\(^{263}\) See CIELA TRADEMARK: BEIJING, supra, note 230; CIELA TRADEMARK: SHANGHAI, supra, note 230.

\(^{264}\) CIELA TRADEMARK: ALL COURTS, supra note 170. These figures are as of 2015.

\(^{265}\) CIELA COPYRIGHT: BEIJING, supra note 228; CIELA COPYRIGHT: SHANGHAI, supra note 228; CIELA COPYRIGHT: ALL COURTS, supra note 170. These figures are as of 2015.
6. China’s Commitment to Improving Its Civil Litigation System and What This Means for Foreign Companies

Multinational companies need to change their strategies on civil litigation. Companies should pressure the government to focus not on quick enforcement, but on long-lasting deterrence that comes with civil litigation.\(^\text{266}\) The government itself has recently intensified its focus on the civil litigation system. On November 27, 2016, the State Council released a statement entitled: “Opinion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (C\([\text{P}]\)C) and the State Council on improving the property rights protection (PRP) system and lawfully protecting property rights.”\(^\text{267}\) It was the first time the government set out guidelines regarding intellectual property rights for lower government bodies across China, such as the IP Courts.\(^\text{268}\) The Chinese government statement openly admitted that intellectual property protection in China is “weak.”\(^\text{269}\)

Among other improvements, section 9 of the guideline calls for raising damages and for the implementation of a new punitive damages system for serious violations.\(^\text{270}\) Along with the recent decisions in the Beijing Watchdata and New Balance cases, these moves counter prior criticisms that damages awarded were too low to make civil litigation worth the effort.\(^\text{271}\) In addition to these

\(^\text{266}\) See DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 28.
\(^\text{268}\) See Mueller, supra note 267.
\(^\text{269}\) Compare, e.g., Eric Priest, Copyright Extremophiles: Do Creative Industries Thrive or Just Survive in China’s High-Piracy Environment?, 27 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 467, 477 (2014) (“Damages awarded in civil infringement cases are often far too low to deter lucrative infringing activities.”), with Booth & Zhang, supra note 240 (noting increasing

\(^\text{271}\) Id.
changes, in 2017 the State Intellectual Property Office announced a two-year arbitration mediation pilot program for intellectual property disputes in key areas such as Beijing and the Shanghai municipality. As shown above, China has made great strides with its civil litigation system. As civil litigation—and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms—improve over time, these will most likely become the frontline in combating intellectual property infringement.

However, with the multinational companies’ low use of civil litigation, there is wasted potential. It is clear that campaigns are not working. To improve intellectual property enforcement in China, companies should take the opportunity to enforce their rights more often in this channel. This does not mean that companies should bring any case to make a point, only that they ought to bring winning cases and bring them more often. Companies should also substantially increase requests for preliminary injunctions, as it is a new and effective avenue for remedying infringement. Disney led the way with its first civil judgment in 1994 and—along with other multinational corporations—should substantially increase its use of civil litigation and preliminary injunctions as part of its China strategy to bring more attention to its rights, shape the law, and shut down counterfeiting operations.

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273 See DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 15.

274 See supra Section III.A.5.

275 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
B. *Changing the Chinese Campaign Approach Itself*

Despite the problems with the campaigns described in this Note, campaigns need not be eradicated altogether. It would be more cost-efficient to modify campaigns, as China develops intellectual property campaigns every year. Fortunately, there are examples of more effective campaigns. The examples come from the United States, where campaigns are also carried out to combat counterfeit goods, but are implemented differently than Chinese campaigns. These examples will illustrate how campaigns can run more effectively. This Section features examples of multinational corporate alliances that combat counterfeiting, and recommends corporate alliances for those doing business in China.

If done in an effective way, campaigns can have long-term results. They could also then be a more fruitful part of a multinational corporation’s strategy. Perhaps one day a multinational corporation may be able to balance both effective campaigns and civil litigation, obtaining the benefits of both systems, as part of a comprehensive scheme to battle infringement.

1. A New Model for Campaigns: The U.S. “Operation”

Counterfeit automotive parts have become a growing problem in the United States.276 The vast majority—between eighty-five and ninety-five percent—of these counterfeit parts are imported from mainland China or transferred to Hong Kong and then shipped abroad.277 Counterfeit parts range from brakes to airbags.278 The parts are untested and sub-quality, leading potentially to consumer deaths.279 For example, some counterfeit airbags were found to contain explosive elements that explode in

278 *See id.*
279 *See id.*
the victim’s face during an accident.\textsuperscript{280} Online sales have spurred the counterfeit operations, making it easier for counterfeiters to reach consumers abroad with their cheaper products.\textsuperscript{281}

Automotive-manufacturing companies reported these counterfeit airbags to the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (“IPRC”).\textsuperscript{282} The IPRC is the administrative body created to focus solely on intellectual property theft and enforcement.\textsuperscript{283} Led by a director from the Department of Homeland Security, and deputy directors from the same, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the IPRC also works with enforcement groups including Interpol, the World Customs Organization, and representatives from foreign countries.\textsuperscript{284} The IPRC is further divided into three units: the Intellectual Property Unit, Outreach and Training Unit, and the HSI Commercial Fraud Unit.\textsuperscript{285} Of the three, the Intellectual Property Unit starts and maintains operations such as Operation Team Player, which targets the sale and trafficking of counterfeit sports merchandise and apparel in the United States.\textsuperscript{286} The Intellectual Property Unit also collaborates with industry partners, such as companies and partner agencies.\textsuperscript{287} For example, in addition to the IPRC receiving reports from car companies, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) discovered a counterfeit airbag shipment from China at a DHL facility en route to Tennessee.\textsuperscript{288} As counterfeit automotive parts are a health and safety concern, along with a growing intellectual


\textsuperscript{282} See AUTOBODY NEWS, supra note 277.


\textsuperscript{284} See id.

\textsuperscript{285} See id.

\textsuperscript{286} See id.

\textsuperscript{287} See id.

In particular, the IPRC launched Operation Engine Newity (“Operation”)—a campaign with American characteristics—focusing on countering “the threat of counterfeit automotive, aerospace, rail, and heavy industry related components that are illegally imported and distributed throughout the United States.” Some of its strategies include: educating industry stakeholders and the public, investigating and prosecuting counterfeiters and traffickers, and barring and confiscating counterfeit goods at places such as ports of entry. As the IPRC works with members of different federal agencies, the Operation also relies on members of different agencies, and coordinates efforts with these agencies. For example, it shares information with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to discover and halt any incoming counterfeit goods. Through its efforts, the Operation successfully stops counterfeits at the border, uncovers counterfeit goods, and criminally prosecutes both small and large operations.

One of the Operation’s features is its collaboration with the industry. With the assistance of the IPRC, multinational corporations created the Automobile Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, which meets four times per year, and exchanges information on its members’ counterfeiting experiences with federal agencies, such as the IPRC. This is similar to other corporate alliances, such as the U.S. Golf Manufacturers Anti-Counterfeiting Working Group, which is a collaboration of U.S. multinational corporations.

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289 See id.
291 See id.
292 See id.
293 See id.
294 See id.
297 See AUTobody NEWS, supra note 277.
golf manufacturing companies working against the counterfeiting of golf products in China. As part of the Operation, corporations coordinate with law enforcement and other agencies—they exchange information with the IPRC and other federal agencies involved through regularly scheduled conference calls and other types of frequent communication. Companies have also created their own anti-counterfeiting operations through commercials and by notifying their consumers. For example, Hyundai and Honda created advertising campaigns through websites and commercials depicting the differences between counterfeit and authentic car parts, and illustrating the dramatic disparities between the two products should the consumer ever experience a car accident.

2. Key Differences Between U.S. Operations and Chinese Campaigns

There are key differences between Chinese and U.S. campaigns. The first is the presence of a dedicated team focusing on counterfeits. The IPRC has both the Intellectual Property Unit, which is dedicated to its continuing IP operations, and members from different federal agencies and governments coordinating these efforts. In China, different agencies join a campaign, but they are not coordinated. This leads to a lack of information sharing, commitment only when a campaign is launched, and a

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300 See About the IPR Center, NAT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS COORDINATION CTR., https://www.iprcenter.gov/about-us [https://perma.cc/X5FR-TPFF] (last visited Nov. 22, 2017). This was also stated to the author during a visit to the IPRC in Washington D.C. on April 7, 2017.
301 See id.
302 See DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 15.
waste of resources when some infringers are raided repeatedly or a single case is reported multiple times. The lack of coordinated effort additionally leads to shirking of duties. Agencies have different priorities, complicated by their local branches who might take into account the economic well-being of their locality, and will let a counterfeiting operation continue for the revenue—especially when the campaign is left uncoordinated.

The second difference is that the IPRC’s efforts do not stop until the problem is solved. Unlike the majority of Chinese campaigns, operations do not end after a few weeks or months. Investigations, seizures, and raids continue for years, and the protection of intellectual property rights is an ongoing effort. Also, its operations are not responsive in nature. While reports from automotive companies were coming in, the IPRC was already conducting an investigation into counterfeit goods when the counterfeit airbags were discovered by the CBP on their way to Tennessee. In contrast, Chinese campaigns only start after mounting government or company pressure, or if a crisis occurs, giving rise to inconsistent and temporary enforcement to appease groups. If China wants to improve its enforcement against infringement, it will need to modify its campaigns to bring lasting change.

3. Multinational Corporation Alliance Opportunities

Where does this leave multinational corporations? So far, multinational corporations in China seem to be working mostly on their own. Occasionally, there are corporate alliances and information sharing. For example, Disney is a member of the Quality Brands Protection Committee (“QBPC”) with other

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303 See id.
304 See id. at 186.
305 See id.
307 See id.
308 See id.; see also Nat’l Intellectual Prop. Rights Coordination Ctr., supra note 288.
309 See supra Section II.B.4.
multinational corporations. The QBPC organizes meetings and seminars with corporations. The QBPC’s mission is “[t]o strengthen cooperation with China’s central and local government agencies, institutions, enterprises,” and other organizations to promote “the improvement of China’s IP legal system, the IP administrative [and] judicial enforcement, the guiding role of judicial protection, the construction of a fair and orderly legal environment for economic growth and scientific [and] technological innovation for global interconnection and intercommunication.” Yet this broad statement does not focus on a particular mission or issue—such as a type of counterfeit good or intellectual property—and instead groups multiple issues together.

Additionally, the QBPC’s membership spans across different industries, from clothing stores, food, electronic goods, toys, cosmetics, films, to car manufacturers. Its Industry Working Groups, which bring similar companies together, also make it difficult for a company that may not fit into only one group to work into this framework. For example, Disney could easily fit into the Creative, Diversified, Sports, Fashion and Life Style, and Toys and Licensed Goods working groups, but it would be difficult to invest time into every group to work with members who may not share or understand Disney’s priorities. The QBPC’s mission and groups are so broad that the alliance may not focus on the individual needs of companies, the intellectual property laws that apply to different industries, or different priorities. While the QBPC alliance membership is a positive step for a corporation to take, it may not ultimately be the most efficient or effective.

313 See QBPC Membership List 2017, supra note 310.
315 See id.
Multinational corporations such as Disney should not only take advantage of the civil litigation system more often, but also form smaller and more specific alliances related to intellectual property infringement in China, similar to the one Operation Engine Newity created. Disney and other foreign animation or film studios—such as DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc. (“Dreamworks”) and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. (“Warner Bros.”)—should come together and share information instead of working alone. These companies have similar goals and issues in China. All want to conduct business in China, with Warner Bros. signing a new deal this year to license hundreds of its films with the popular Chinese streaming company iQiyi, and DreamWorks creating a joint venture with a Chinese animation studio to develop more films.

All only take a twenty-five percent share of box office revenue due to China’s revenue cap and are subject to Beijing’s quota system, which allows thirty-four foreign films to be imported annually. Any foreign films released in China are assigned limited theatrical release dates, limiting any profits in China further. All experience infringement of their trademarked and copyrighted characters, logos, names, and films.

These companies have also successfully brought cases in China. For example, DreamWorks brought a civil case to oppose a person attempting to trademark “KUNG FU PANDA,” and this

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316 See supra notes 290–99 and accompanying text.
case led to the creation of prior merchandising rights, a new tool that companies can use to protect their trademark rights.\textsuperscript{321} These companies can share information on infringement, lobby governments for better laws (such as lowering the threshold for criminal prosecution), and create a strategy with effective enforcement actions. They can also create their own long-running non-government campaigns, taking cues from the IPRC’s “operations,” that not only have dedicated staff, but also engage their audiences and encourage them to participate in the anti-counterfeiting effort. Disney did this once before with the 2006 hologram sticker campaign, which actually caused Chinese consumers to report counterfeit goods to Disney.\textsuperscript{322} Perhaps new, united, long-term efforts can spark even more of these results. If similarly-situated companies can come together and coordinate their actions, then there can be positive, enduring change in China.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

It is difficult for a multinational corporation to protect its intellectual property rights in China. Often under pressure to bring immediate results to a dire situation, the corporation will fall into the campaign trap. Disney knows this all too well as it attempts to protect its rights in China. After experiencing counterfeiting, the company turned to the campaign approach for help. However, the government campaign intended to protect Disney’s rights, just as campaigns in the past, had only transient effects. This is because campaigns are short-term solutions for a long-term problem. Instead of focusing its efforts on bringing short-term campaigns, multinational corporations such as Disney should focus on long-term solutions that will deter infringers and bring transformative effects. Companies should continue taking action, but outside of the context of a traditional Chinese campaign. A comprehensive strategy of civil litigation, criminal prosecution, and productive industry-specific alliances will help bring positive change. The


\textsuperscript{322} See Fowler, \textit{supra} note 133.
Chinese government should also continue to improve its civil litigation and criminal prosecution systems, and create coordinated campaigns with dedicated teams that are ongoing for long periods of time. With the efforts of both multinational corporations and the government, lasting protection of intellectual property rights can continue to grow in China.