

Fordham International Law Journal

Volume 20, Issue 4

1996

Article 5

Rules, Risks, and Rifts in the Transition to Democracy in Haiti

Georges Anglade*

*

Copyright ©1996 by the authors. *Fordham International Law Journal* is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). <http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj>

Rules, Risks, and Rifts in the Transition to Democracy in Haiti

Georges Anglade

Abstract

As the title of this introduction implies, there are few traces of hope and optimism to be found in Haiti's current situation. If the unavoidable problems of rural communities in a nation of peasants such as Haiti are left unaddressed, and if the nation continues to rely on the standards of the old police state as a model for the new national police, Haiti's transition toward democracy will be off to a bad start. There must be the immediate desire to straighten out this tangled web if Haiti is not to miss this window of opportunity. This Article analyzes this transition, charting the narrow path to democracy and development from which Haiti may still benefit.

ARTICLES

RULES, RISKS, AND RIFTS IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN HAITI

*Georges Anglade**

INTRODUCTION: FIVE LANDMARKS FOR ORIENTING THE DISCUSSION

I. THE SITUATION

I begin this article with a political anecdote about the transition to democracy in Haiti. It is the story of someone who throws himself from the top of the only skyscraper in Port-au-Prince and who is heard to say as he passes each floor, "so far, so good." While it is true that Haiti's transition to democracy seems to have progressed well until now, October 5, 1996, the question remains: how long can such progress continue?

On July 28, 1915, the U.S. Marines landed in Haiti and began an occupation of the Caribbean nation that would last nineteen years.¹ Through this occupation, the United States would force Haiti into the twentieth century's pattern of systemic centralization. The occupation left Haiti to furnish the United States' sugar plantations in Cuba and the Dominican Republic with labor, and it erected the Haitian military-police state system that would assure the stability of the *Pax Americana*. The occupation would also put an end to the nineteenth century Federation of Provinces² which had lingered through the death throes of

* Professor of Political Geography, University de Québec à Montréal (UQAM) since 1969. The author is associated with the Haitian Democratic Movement. He was the principle editor of *La Chance qui Passe*, the platform of Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide in December 1990. Professor Anglade was adviser to President Aristide throughout the negotiations of the Governor's Island Accords (July 1993-October 1994), which set up Aristide's return to Haiti in October 1994. Professor Anglade was the President of the January 1994 Miami Conference, which first pointed towards the victory of the restoration of democracy to Haiti. He was also Minister of Public Works, Transport, and Communication under the government of Smark Michel in 1995, and advisor in the inner cabinet of President René Préval after February 1996. In 1996, he was Visiting Scholar and Research Associate at the University of California at Berkeley.

1. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI: COUNTRY STUDIES (Richard A. Haggerty, ed., 2d ed. 1991) 224-27; PAUL FARMER, THE USES OF HAITI 90-101 (1994).

2. GEORGES ANGLADE, ESPACE & LIBERTÉ EN HAITI (1982).

inter-regional warfare.

On September 19, 1994, the U.S. Marines again landed in Haiti, this time ending the centralized military state and decentralized police system that had been the hallmarks of the island's politics since 1915, and ushering in the current, more fashionable, period of "Democratic Transition." The previous era of Haitian politics had endured for eighty years. We are able to date the beginning and end of the historical periods by the abrupt intervention of armed force: July 28, 1915 and September 19, 1994. *So far, so good.* But what power can meet the dangers that are now threatening to crush this process of democratic transition?

The two questions postulated above define the boundaries of the position taken throughout this Article. As the title of this introduction implies, there are few traces of hope and optimism to be found in Haiti's current situation. If the unavoidable problems of rural communities in a nation of peasants such as Haiti are left unaddressed, and if the nation continues to rely on the standards of the old police state as a model for the new national police, Haiti's transition toward democracy will be off to a bad start. There must be the immediate desire to straighten out this tangled web if Haiti is not to miss this window of opportunity. This Article analyzes this transition, charting the narrow path to democracy and development from which Haiti may still benefit.³

3. This situation raises a question about the connection between the two landings of U.S. Marines. Both landings took place when the dominant structures of Haiti were in transition. From regionalization to centralization at the beginning of the century (i.e., from micro to macro levels of political concentration), and from centralization to polycentralism at the end of the century (i.e., from the macro level to what seems to be the micro level of political concentration, which is the indispensable foundation of democracy). Direct usurpation of control and the subsequent rise of one of the provinces, Port-au-Prince, over all of the others, subverted the dominant structure of nineteenth century regionalization that had transformed Haiti into a federation of eleven relatively autonomous provinces. This new structure came at the expense of all that was outside of Port-au-Prince, most notably the provincial oligarchies that had previously been able to raise large peasant armies. This centralization eroded in the 1980s due to the detachment of the capital Port au Prince from the rest of the country as a sort of new urban republic. This process had the effect of returning to the provinces some of the autonomy that they had lost at the turn of the century, giving to the shantytowns political status equivalent to that of urban and rural areas, targeting of the locality as the new basis of political activity, the basis, in particular, of democratization with its attendant focus on local electoral representation. It is no coincidence that the tutor always intervenes at the moment of transition from one structure to another in order to

A. *From the Haitian Case to the General Theory of Transitions*

In the ten years from 1986 to 1996, the decade that began with the end of the thirty-year Duvalier dictatorship,⁴ democratic transitions have been the subject of a vast number of publications.⁵ The rules and dangers of democratic transition have become one of the most important questions of our time, especially in the Americas. To do justice to Haiti's status as a test case in this global era of democratic transition, my analysis of the last ten years will look to recent trends, with an eye toward expanding the general theory of transitions to democracy. It will not be a question of chronicling Haiti's transition process or, even less, of making political statements, but rather of problematizing frames of reference and reproblematising the principal

ensure that the "proper" path is taken. One non-anecdotal explanation for the different reception received by the U.S. Marines from the Haitian people, who fought intervention in 1915 and welcomed it in 1994, is that at the start of the century, centralization would prove more oppressive of the peasantry than regionalization, while at the end of the century, the emergence of the locality as a center of political life opened opportunities for civilian participation and liberty. See GEORGES ANGLADE, *SUR LA PERTINANCE DE L'ECHELLE DE LA REGIONALIZATION, LE CAS DE HAÏTI* (discussing situation at start of century); GEORGES ANGLADE, *POUR UNE REARTICULATION DE LA GEOGRAPHY SOCIALE DANS LE TIERS MONDE: REFLEXIONS POUR UNE RECHERCHE* (discussing situation at the end of century).

4. Jean-Claude Duvalier's government fell on February 7, 1986. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAÏTI: COUNTRY STUDIES *supra* note 1, at 325.

5. One unmistakable indicator of the importance which social scientists ascribe to a particular issue at a given time is the inventory of monographs and anthologies that university presses devote the issue. Each of the publishers has released numerous volumes on the transition to democracy. This abundance of academic works on the subject has been evident for the last ten years, 1986-1996, the period under scrutiny in this article. See TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Guillermo O'Donnell, et al., eds., 1986); AUTHORITARIANS AND DEMOCRATS: REGIME TRANSITION IN LATIN AMERICA (James M. Malloy & Mitchell A. Seligson eds., 1987); ALFRED STEPAN, *DEMOCRATIZING BRAZIL: PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION* (1989); GIUSEPPE DI PALMA, *TO CRAFT DEMOCRACIES: AN ESSAY ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS* (1990); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, *THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY* (1991); ELITES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND SOUTHERN EUROPE (John Higley & Richard Gunther eds., 1992).

In addition, the relationship between development and democracy in Latin America is a sub-topic that has been widely covered in the literature. Even the Caribbean has its own annual reader on the subject. See DEMOCRACY IN THE CARIBBEAN: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES (Jorge I. Dominguez et al. eds., 1993); DEMOCRACY IN THE CARIBBEAN: MYTHS AND REALITIES (Carlene J. Edie ed., 1994).

For this reason, one must look to work that provides the most information from the most perspectives. With regard to Haiti, one must look to LES TRANSITIONS DEMOCRATIQUES: ACTES DU COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL DE PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAÏTI (Laennec Hurbon ed., 1996).

questions on the basis of first-hand observations made from a unique perspective. This will be followed by a general overview of the characteristics that can be found in almost all democratic transitions, with ground rules for contextualizing and evaluating concrete experiences, and a list of organizational priorities, actions to be undertaken, difficulties to be found, and the hidden traps, which are the attributes of the long road to democracy.

B. *From An Emblematic Situation to a Problematic Transition*

The first half of the 1990s saw most North American, South American, and Caribbean countries choosing their governments by universal suffrage. Across the Americas, the new era signaled the end of authoritarian government. In the midst of this era of regional change, the Haitian transition to democracy is unique. It began with a national crisis,⁶ which in turn precipitated a storm of international activity. The transition also became an issue of domestic politics within the United States, a key issue of the United Nation's regional policy, and the reference point for the new agenda of the Organization of American States.⁷ This, of course, is to say nothing of the myriad sub-issues that became intertwined in the crisis, from the Congressional Black Caucus to broader issues of Washington politics.⁸ Suffice it to say that one

6. Aristide was deposed on September 29, 1991. See FARMER, *supra* note 1, at 177-96 (describing coup and its aftermath).

7. See Richard J. Bloomfield, *Making the Western Hemisphere Safe for Democracy? The OAS Defense-of-Democracy Regime*, 17 WASH. Q., No. 2, 157 (Spring 1994).

8. See Seven A. Holmes, *With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti Policy*, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1994, at A10.

It will be necessary to wait for the new era of democratic transition to reach maturity before the academics will be able to fully contextualize the events in Haiti during this period. We might, however, note that the number of articles written about Haiti during the 1000 days of the crisis and published in U.S. and Canadian newspapers is approximately five thousand, a sizable number.

This is the third time that this country finds itself in such a critical position: first, between 1492 and 1515, the island of Hispaniola served as the test case for continental conquest, complete with its "black legend" and genocidal method; secondly, between 1791 and 1803, when Haiti's war of independence ushered in the era of Latin-American independence; and finally, the present period. In all three instances we find Haiti subject to the same over-exposure to contemporary public opinion, the same myth resurrected, the same general taxonomic definitions and globally significant attributes, the same emblematic situation, which goes beyond the actual events. It signifies, on a larger scale, the colonizations of the sixteenth century, the nineteenth century movement toward independence, and now what appears to be the twentieth century's movement toward democracy. It is quite possible that this country is, as a result of its peripheral position and its extremes, the groundhog of the Americas, the herald of new sea-

of the few foreign leaders mentioned in the first U.S. presidential debate in October 1996 was Haitian President René Prével, and that one of the few countries the candidates mentioned was Haiti.⁹ This is a great deal of attention for what the Haitian military and their U.S. tutors had believed to be a minor and inconsequential local *coup d'état*. That perception of the coup denotes a serious misunderstanding by the international community, which was witnessing the birth of a new era in which the militaristic states of Latin America no longer had a role. This perception of the coup also constituted a serious misunderstanding of Haiti's national politics in which the centralization of the past century was giving way to a new system in which the people of the provinces, the shantytowns, and the Haitian Diaspora¹⁰ would once again have a voice in national affairs. In a word, democracy.

Where exactly does this emblematic transition to democracy now find itself? What is the substance of this transition and what options are open to it over these next four years, which will lead to the next century and presidential elections in both Haiti and the United States in November 2000? This essay addresses the choices facing Haiti's democracy and the prospect of finding and way out of this quandary.

C. Temporal Parameters: The Situation before November 5, 1996

The possibility of a transition to democracy in Haiti was a gift from the United States, at least up until the U.S. elections in 1996.¹¹ In a certain sense, these elections held Haiti hostage.¹²

sons, always first over five centuries to arrive at the threshold of emerging historical trends. Despite the abundance of literature on Haiti, we still lack global interpretations of these questions of the type produced by the Haitian intellectuals of the turn of the century. Perhaps this is because of the synchronic difficulties in situating this country at the crossroads of the linguistic and political currents of which it is part and of simultaneously positioning it diachronically in different periods of the five centuries of the histories of the Americas.

9. See Richard L. Berke, *THE INAUGURATION: The Overview; Era of "Peril and Promise" Is Ahead, Clinton Says*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1993, at A1.

10. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI: COUNTRY STUDIES, *supra* note 1, at 246-48.

11. It is rather unusual to comment on the date on which a scholarly article is submitted for publication. In this particular case, however, it is necessary. I have, thus, given this article the submission date of November 5, 1996. This is the date of the most recent U.S. presidential election - this elections having the greatest impact on the prospects for Haiti's transition toward democracy. The ascription of this date is essential for orienting this analysis based on the situation as it existed before those elections. The

Only time will tell if this benefitted Haiti's transition to democracy. It is clear, however, that following the U.S. elections and the establishment of a new administration, or adjustment of the old one, the Haitian situation will move in three directions. On the international front, stability will no longer have the same importance for the tutors in Washington, and thus there will be a greater danger of instability. With regard to the transition to democracy, there will be an acceleration of the process as a number of issues that have been artificially kept in suspension will have to be answered. This too will raise greater prospects of instability. On the political balance sheet, there will be further instability from the Subjects, the principal actors of the dynamic, who had been temporarily excluded, and whose return will undercut the power of the leaders of the transition. This too will raise the danger of greater instability. It is this set of dangers that gives rise to the need for an analysis of the games and gambits that led up to election day of November 6, 1996, just before the thawing of a situation that up to that point had been kept in frozen immobility.

D. *Haiti's Hidden Face and the Need for a New Paradigm*

Haiti is a country with a hidden face, but it is a fool's secret. The name of this country implies "the most miserable of mis-

point is that the political situation in Haiti was sought after, imposed, and maintained so that nothing would occur that might tarnish the image of the new order. Any risk of political agitation had to be contained and the method by which reconciliation was imposed on the Haitian people has never permitted the disarming of the henchmen of the previous regime, or a response to the cries for justice raised by their victims.

12. DONALD SCHULZ, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, *WHITHER HAITI?* (1996). The literature reveals the existence of different conditions before and after the U.S. presidential elections of November 5, 1996. We might ascribe, in general terms, a tactical victory to the before period, and to the period after, a strategic deadlock that will cause a regression of the progress made during the first period. Six days before the U.S. elections, a front page article in the *WALL STREET JOURNAL*, made light of the electoral impact of U.S. soldiers constructing a road of 7.5 miles in length as compared with the 1200 miles of roadway constructed by the marines of the 1915 occupation. Carla Anne Robbins, *Social Insecurity: Haiti Tastes Freedom, But Efforts to Rebuild Run Into Roadblocks*, *WALL ST. J.*, Oct. 30, 1996, at A1. The general perception is that the effort made by the U.S. administration to hunt down the coup plotters in defiance of congressional will, the U.S. public's lack of interest in Haiti, and the possibility of a mutiny in the National Security Establishment do not auger well for the future. Robert E. White in *Cosmos: A Journal of Emerging Issues* 1996, Vol. 6, at 82-87. The Haitian people, thus, will have to make the right choices. Above all, they will take their own situation in hand rather than extend that hand to the United States.

eries" of all the Americas. The preferences of the wealthy dictate everything that this country produces.¹³ Thus, despite its popular rhetoric, Haiti, like the international institutions that provide it with financing, has always had an elitist budgetary orientation, territorially biased against the rural regions and the slums.

13. In the developed countries poverty is perceived as the lowest level of the human condition. The comfort of the varying degrees of the middle classes rests above this, and at the top of the hierarchy, we have the various tiers of the rich. These three categories reflect the statistical realities of the socio-economic structures of first-world countries. See Maryse Gaudier, *Poverty. Inequality, Exclusion, New Approaches to Theory and Practice* (1993) (providing excellent bibliographical revue of one thousand most important works of last ten years). The very definition of poverty, however, is as yet unsettled and it is common that the literature will confuse, confound, and thoughtlessly commingle terms like poverty, indigence, and misery in trying to differentiate between levels, tiers, and strata of poverty, as well as in measuring its scope and magnitude, and by defining poverty with words such as extreme, absolute, and relative. In short, the need to arrive at a definite vocabulary is a theoretical necessity. Oyen Else, *Some Basic Issues in Comparative Poverty Research*, 134 INT'L SOC. SCI. J., 615-626 (1992).

In countries like Haiti, it has been necessary to categorize the levels of wealth existing below "poverty" by adding "indigence" and "misery." The actual distribution of wealth in Haiti finds eighty percent of the population living in misery, ten percent living in indigence, five percent living in poverty, four percent living in relative ease, and one percent living in luxury. Poverty, as the relative measure of Haitian standards of living, has been the object of theoretical reassessments and empirical research seeking to give it an exact definition. The precise definition being, "the satisfaction of essential needs" and "citizen participation" within an environment of "basic service collectives," as well as a "capacity to reproduce oneself without regression." See GEORGES ANGLADE, IN PRAISE OF POVERTY (containing concise critique of negative image ascribed to notion of poverty as it is confounded with indigence and misery, recognition of its solidarity, living and surviving know-how, and its epistemological rehabilitation).

Whereas the poor have been given a privileged status in the liberation theology's central theme of God's special relationship with the oppressed, the concept of government by the poor is altogether different, although part of the same conceptual family. Government by the poor refers to the goal of a society in which the vast majority of people can aspire to that basic standard of living that has been reserved for those defined in socio-economic terms as "poor." Government of the rich is the other paradigm, that of being perpetually in the service of the consumption of wealth, of an ownership infrastructure of bourgeois culture and the collection of rents. Government of the rich is, in other words, to act as though the fate of this country was purely a question of meeting the needs of those classes living in ease and luxury. It is for this reason that Haiti can be characterized as one of the most extreme cases of global apartheid and exclusion. What camouflages this general understanding of poverty, the government of the poor as opposed to the government of the rich, is simply the bad connotations of the word "poverty." On September 18 and 19, 1995, at the first summit of the Iberian-American Ministers of Public Works and Transport in Madrid, which had been sponsored by the Spanish government and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), I neither scandalized nor surprised my colleagues by espousing the argument that international organizations are signing us to a "government of the rich" rather than leading us to a "government of the poor." See ACTS OF THE SUMMIT OF THE IBERIAN-AMERICAN MINISTERS OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT 226-35 (1996).

Sectoral policies discriminate against agriculture and rural education and social policies discriminate against women, landless peasants, and the destitute. Moreover, there are few places in the world today where survival is so dependent on a profound change in the basic policy outlook of the state. The state must change and the paradigm must change. Although the middle class in Haiti and around the world talk incessantly of Haiti's problems, they go to great lengths to avoid confronting the real issues. Nothing alters the fact that more than eighty percent of the Haitian population consists of peasants living in misery. One would expect that the future of this society of outcasts would be the focus of all concerns. Nothing could be further from the truth. The vast body of knowledge developed with regard to this hidden face of Haiti over the last twenty-five years is simply not part of the calculus of decision makers and the political class. The problem is so serious that as long as adequate measures are not taken to address it, this country will always be in a transition toward democracy. In the short run, we may be able to allow ourselves the luxury of passing over this evidence and avoiding change. But the day will come when this will no longer be possible. In the meantime, Haiti, in all of its deeper aspects and future possibilities, will remain vastly different from the way it is generally portrayed.

The new system will be ineffectual if it is founded on the mistakes of the past — ignoring the peasant problem, underestimating the dictatorial police system, trivializing the problem of poor women, underestimating the uses of emigrated workers, misunderstanding the environmental issue, and mismanaging the public sector. The Haitian crisis is a classic case of a “government of wealth” that should become a “government of poverty.” The latter still has great difficulty in imposing its will on the national political elite and its international counterparts.

E. The Democratic Agenda and the Legacy of the Dictatorship

1. The Principal Haitian Question: A Country of Impoverished Peasants

Every day, four to five million Haitian peasants sink further into misery. Everything has been taken from them, from their

land to the their black pigs.¹⁴ There remains only the hope that in the aftermath of the U.S. elections, rural poverty will be recognized as the heart of the Haitian problem. The daily lives of the peasants today are based on the open conflicts that began in 1975, when the old order that had been put into place by the American occupation in 1915 went to pieces. On the basis of Port-au-Prince's centralized power, a new economic, social, and political order was established forcing all the peasants and merchants to produce and sell food for export, for which they received less than ten percent of its value, while the food for local consumption was maintained at the lowest possible price in order to perpetuate the condition of the impoverished peasantry. Between 1920 and 1930, the enormous trade in rural manual labor and the export of workers pushed nearly a quarter of the population onto the sugar plantations in the Dominican Republic and Cuba, and served as an outlet for local problems caused by the peasants' war¹⁵ and the establishment of a new order. In the meantime, the state exacted its (confiscatory) taxes, the bankers their interest, the import-export merchants their (substantial) profit margins, and the landowners their (comfortable) rents without worrying too much about how or why this manna fell from the skies, and even less about the extreme exploitation of the peasants upon whom the whole economic structure stood. This extreme plundering, the radical exclusion of the public sector, and the repressive violence, fractured society in the mid-1970s and caused divisions that have yet to be healed twenty years later. The present problem is not the multitude of small agricultural projects, the large projects, or the distribution of several parcels of state lands to some regions. It is a problem of recognizing that this country is above all a country of impoverished peasants, and of acting to make this question the organizing principle of national public policy. This does not mean that the country's vocation should only be agricultural, but it does mean that entering the modern world requires a policy that accounts for the future of four to five million peasants still living in the countryside. The current crisis of thinking, in which dozens of contributors have participated since the 1970s,

14. BRIAN WEINSTEIN & AARON SEGAL, *HAITI: THE FAILURE OF POLITICS* 84-85 (1992).

15. From 1915 to 1919 U.S. Marines fought Haitian armed resistance. See FARMER *supra* note 1, at 90-98.

is a result of a coalition of local interests which has ferociously opposed recognizing the fact that Haiti is a country of peasants. Their project is to build a country for the five percent capable of participating in the international market. Nothing is said of the other ninety-five percent of Haitians. This policy will immediately lead to instability and waves of migration.

2. Migration Pressures that only Democracy Can Reduce

To recognize that Haiti is a country of peasants and to discuss the policy options that result from this realization is far from a revelation. The Haitian peasants have been moving towards any opportunity to emigrate, they have exerted pressure on all classes of society, and their condition constitutes the heaviest legacy of the Duvalier regime. In the last ten years, more than ninety-five percent of Haitians would have emigrated if they had the opportunity. Doubtless this is not the only example in history of an entire people who would be ready to leave their country when the conditions for a particular minority and survival for the great majority have become intolerable. In the Caribbean at the end of the century, however, the case is unique. This is the concrete problem Haiti presents to the majority of its neighbors, and especially to the largest among us, the United States. The nightmare for some Americans is to see "a flotilla of thousands of rafts boarded by some one hundred thousand boat people flying multicolored sails heading towards Florida under the command of a peasant-fisherman admiral. . ." ¹⁶ This dramatic threat will continue until someone addresses the cause of the problem. This concern with emigration has forced national and international actors to conclude that only freedom and the democratic movement can keep Haitians in Haiti. The United States was so concerned with the success of democratic processes that it removed the military from public affairs and pushed for a constitutional return of democratic movements. The same logic underlies aid provided by international agencies under U.S. influence. For the Americans, the policy must be fixed before the U.S. presidential elections, by providing the Haitian population with nebulous micro-projects while waiting to put in place a

16. This is the picturesque image that I took away from the comments of Florida elected officials presented at the Miami Conference in January 1994 on the return of democracy to Haiti.

broad intermediate term policy whose primary purpose would be to keep the Haitian population in Haiti. However, only a successful transition could guarantee that.

3. A Constrained and Financed Country Waiting for a Policy of "Zero Migration"

Haiti is a besieged country. Around it are floating barriers to prevent the release of migratory pressures. During the transition to democracy one hopes for a reversal of migration patterns, and a policy of "zero migration" in which not a single person would risk their life in a desperate flight. This will only happen with a new national policy. One needs to point out the common interests involved, because this policy would include neighbors and agencies that would encourage Haiti to develop and democratize as a way of keeping Haitians at home.

As the migration crisis intensified, a group of so-called "four friendly countries of Haiti"¹⁷ was formed to advise the U.N. Secretary-General. These states, despite their common interests, also have their differences that must be underlined to explain the international solicitude towards Haiti and the risk that some day it will be exhausted and come to treat Haiti as a dead end. It is in Haiti's interest to initiate as rapidly as possible this comprehensive plan on "zero migration." Inasmuch as it is designed to contain immediate migratory pressure, it is made up of a myriad of local micro-projects administered by newly-invented organizations created to disguise the manner in which work is distributed to local companies. For the time being, this seems to be everything we could hope for outside of a coherent national policy.

4. From a Low-Intensity War to the Truce of an Interventionist Army

In a country of exploited peasants, the control of Haiti's rural space and rural population have been the center of the confrontations of the last half century. The Government controlled the countryside through Area Chiefs,¹⁸ from which all executive,

17. The group included Canada, the United States, France, and Venezuela which were the four principal countries with the greatest Haitian emigrant population. The Dominican Republic was a fifth country equally concerned with this emigration problem, but could not be maintained as part of the group.

18. A "Chef de Section" commanded as many adjutants as there were *bourg-jardin* under him. Each adjutant had as many aides as the size of the *bourg-jardin* required.

judicial, legislative, commercial, police, and civil power is derived and used to govern the rural level. Peasants support the Section Chief and his entourage because the Chief's troop is not remunerated by the state. This clanging in the countryside is a machine making war on the daily lives of the peasants. The machine was in high gear at the time of the 1991 coup. In the three years following, it was reported that 5000 people were killed and between 200,000 and 300,000 persons displaced. People fled from one *bourg-jardin*¹⁹ while trying to avoid the ubiquitous police only to find a hiding place in another. This rural warfare and its counterpart in the city slums varied in intensity, however, so as not to alert the international community and the Haitian Diaspora by continuous and overly systematic destruction.

The departure of the army that has stood between the torturers and their victims will create serious problems that will require immediate attention after the November 5, 1996 elections. Notably, the former soldiers have not been disarmed, and the new national police force is not up to the task of protecting lives and property while preventing the resurgence of conflict that could lead to civil war. This is true even if the question of ethnic wars currently breaking apart 20th century regimes in Europe and Africa does not apply to the Haitian case, and one does not gloss over the basic questions as did the Jeanclaudism of 1975-1985.²⁰ One must still guard against the emergence of regionalism of the local wars of the 19th century and the kinds of revolts that mired the term of Jean-Claude Duvalier. We do not yet know where the return to a focus on local politics, and the emergence of new political parties based strictly on a regional level will lead us. We cannot foresee all the consequences of the withdrawal of foreign forces. Nevertheless, the price paid between 1991 and 1994 is high enough that an impulse to restore the Macouto-militarists²¹ would immediately be met by armed popu-

19. The Haitian countryside is divided into 7500 *bourg-jardin*, which each contain approximately 500 to 750 inhabitants and is about 100 to 150 *cases* in size. The police system of the dictatorship was organized around the *bourg-jardin*.

20. Jeanclaudism was the Duvalierism of "Baby Doc" Duvalier, the son of "Papa Doc." Unlike his father, Baby Doc financed his programs through the international community. His fatal mistake was in not confronting fundamental issues of the peasantry and liberalizing Haiti without addressing basic social problems.

21. Tontons Macoutes were the private force of armed thugs created and used by Papa "Doc" Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude, to strike fear into the Haitian people.

lar resistance. This return is therefore unlikely. The most obvious threat is terrorist destabilization. The current situation can only be a temporary truce because the underlying reasons for this war are still unresolved. The foreign forces work hard to save face and impose superficial forms of democracy. By freezing the situation, however, we are putting off the hard choices until later. In the meantime, the Haitian peasant continues to be enclosed in his *bourg-jardin*, his market, his rural section, still denied agricultural reform and other basic changes that would permit him to survive, and is forbidden to escape by an armada off his coast. He survives during the truce while resisting, knowing that things must change in the Haitian countryside. Even if new issues are perplexing because the worst seems imminent, he can, nevertheless, hope for a second chance at democracy that would not be wasted by its supporters and subverted by its enemies.

5. The Dissolution of the Military-Security Apparatus and the Inadequacies of the New National Police

When the U.S. occupation forces withdrew in 1934, they left behind the Haitian National Guard as a local tool of political surveillance and control. The Guard was created as an internal police force and structured to control the countryside through corps of local police located in rural sections. This two-tiered organization allowed the Government to reduce the number of uniformed forces to one per 1000 people, while in the countryside there was only one rural agent for 25 to 50 people.²² During crises, the number could increase dramatically. These numbers were effectively doubled by the VSN militia, or the *Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale*, which was the *Tonton Macoutes* of the Duvaliers. The VSN was always five to ten times the size of the army it monitored. There were also a myriad of other ephemeral paramilitary groups functioning as terrorist death

22. The current desire is for a new police force made up of 5000 to 7000 people, creating a ratio of one police officer for every 1000 to 1400 civilians. It makes no sense to replace the old system under the pretext that the Haitian Armed Forces contained 7000 men. A police system so decentralized cannot be reduced solely to a number, however variable, of officers. It is from this that originates the most perfect illustration of the truly Haitian manner of the occupation of this territory by the *bourgs-jardins*. See 1 GEORGES ANGLADE, *CARTES SUR TABLE* 28-35 (1990) (giving most complete definition of this concept). This analysis of the decentralized police system must precede its replacement by a different system.

squads: *fraph*, *zenglendos*, *attachés*, *ninjas*, *brassards rouges*, *zimbaboués*.²³ The police developed through the seizure of political, economic, and judicial functions, and ended with the creation of a State within the State. The police became the final recourse for dealing with commerce or industry, with public finance, with administration of the State, and with judicial affairs. The police became the backbone of society, and in the ways of a police system, affected all activities from the largest to the smallest. Thus, in ten years, the military security apparatus no longer has a legal existence even though its former officers may still be wealthy, powerful, and well-armed. Its dissolution was its death-blow.

The dictatorship required an average police-to-citizen ratio of 1/100. The ratio necessary to maintain a democracy is certainly much lower, taking into account the general mobilization that drives the democratic process and the solidarity that was re-born with the eradication of the local strongmen. This result, like all the conditions necessary for the transition to democracy, came at a high price. Can the number of police fall to between 1/1000 and 1/1400 with the deployment of a police force of between 5000 and 7000 people? My answer is a categorical, No. The interposing foreign troops have fudged the local numbers, and when they leave, things will become clear. By that time, however, it may be too late. The inadequacies of the new police force are obvious. The training of officers in ten to fifteen weeks is an absurdly short period if one hopes to overcome the culture of military-police violence inherited not only from *duvalierisme* but also from Haitian history. By being unwilling to arm democratic movements with a competent police force, we have not produced a pseudo-institution of Keystone Kops, incapable of as-

23. Under the old system, there were approximately 70,000 police agents, one policeman for every 100 people. This is comparable to other similar police systems: the Dominican Republic has one approximately one policeman for every seventy-five people. In the rural sections, the numbers varied but were below 1/100, generally between 1/40 and 1/80. The system of rural police had at least 30,000 agents in 600 sections for four or five million people. There were at least 30,000 *Tonton Macoutes*, and at least 10,000 members of the armed forces and their civilian colleagues in the towns and cities.

It makes no sense to call for a new police force of 5000 to 7000 men (a ratio of one policeman to 1000 to 1400 people) to replace a system that purportedly had 7000 policemen.

sureing stability²⁴ at the top of society, and unable to ward off chaos at society's base.

II. *THE GOVERNMENT OF POVERTY*

A. *The Object of the Transition: Justice through Law*

It has been particularly instructive these last ten years to observe the popular demands that arise in a case such as Haiti's. Some demands remain absolute, and others become secondary. Contrary to what one would expect from a situation in which all the elementary needs of eliminating poverty are unsatisfied, amelioration of material conditions has almost never been mentioned. Instead, the need for justice, the end of "*macoutisme duvalierien*" as a system of repression, and the problems caused by a lack of security have largely dominated popular demands. In the presence of an inhuman spectacle of misery and its urgent material needs, one tends to forget that the primary needs of people are liberty, justice, and security. Because a pauper also needs justice, the object of a transition to democracy becomes the modern organization of justice in a State of law. This demands destruction of the old military-police apparatus in order to give birth to another organization in charge of public order. It also requires that the institutions of justice and the body of functionaries that make them work be reconsidered so as to produce a "just justice" and in order to guarantee a "free freedom." Haiti must reconstruct judicial power separate from the executive power, which too often has controlled judicial power. Justice by law is thus the initial goal in the transition to democracy as well as the object of the transition itself. It is essentially through the achievement of this goal that Haiti can unite a country broken in two, and create a single people from two profoundly antagonistic factions. Economic analysis also poses justice as a preliminary condition necessary to development.

Following the work in Haiti of a commission of national and international justice, the need to ensure that the horror never returns remains. One must take judicial actions, even if merely

24. Error in method or refined perversion? Certainly, I lean toward the second hypothesis, for the general negotiator was a brilliant American academic who had read his classics and who understood that only oversimplification of the problematic would not give the Haitian democratic movement an apparatus that gives it too large a margin of autonomy.

symbolic, to ensure that the old military police never return, and to document the abuses that took place. Thousands of victims have identified their torturers and call for this exorcism. In the electoral route to stability, the current reconciliation was imposed whole cloth, and it has created more problems than it has solved. Justice must be allowed to follow its own course. If there is an area in which the Subjects' voice will be heard after Election Day, it is in the call for justice. The first step was taken by establishing a society without an army.²⁵

B. Expectations at the Summit: Changing of the Guard or New Rules for the Game?

A military State that has just lost its central organization leaves orphaned all the groups that depended on it.²⁶ The question now is how all the non-police functions of the old apparatus, an apparatus whose function extended far beyond the simple protection of goods and lives, will be assumed. What is the new equivalent in the new emerging order? Will it consist of a single institution as before, or will there be several new centers of power? The habits of corruption will not disappear merely by decree.

The commercial, industrial, and financial middle class, accustomed to buying protection for their privileges, must now seek a new godfather (or a new godmother) or, if conditions demand it, new rules of the game. The contraband and drug organizations, traditionally protected by the military chiefs, are searching for new partners. The commands of the international

25. See Dan Coughlin, *Haiti-Politics: Aristide Calls Abolition of Army Irreversible*, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 26, 1996, at 62.

26. The Haitian centralized military State was a Latin-American variation of military States, whereas the decentralized Haitian police system is a unique entity, based on the autonomy of rural chiefs. It is this characteristic that permitted the Haitian Armed Forces to maintain only a small number of soldiers, one twelfth the number of the Dominican army, but nevertheless to have an identical police system. This is why the FADH, *Forces Armées d'Haiti*, disbanded so easily. The Haitian bourgeois had an army that it did not have to support (having allowed it to exist as a rural satrap living off the inhabitants) and now witnesses the elimination of the police apparatus that protected its privileges. For an analysis of the circumstances surrounding this problem, we return to Georges Anglade, *Le Monde Rural Haitien, la Guerre de Basse Intensité*, REVUE SCIENCES HUMAINES, No. Spéciale Monde Rural, espaces enjeux, Mar. 1994, and the point of departure of our work on Police and Space in Haiti in GEORGES ANGLADE, L'ATLAS CRITIQUE D'HAÏTI (1982); GEORGES ANGLADE, CARTE DU CONTRÔLE POLITIQUE 63, and its commentary, LES MYTHES FONDETEURS DU POLITIQUE.

guardians, formerly conveyed by the army, no longer have their messengers. The State must overcome the inertia that will restore the old practices. Merely changing the guard will weaken a democratic movement that came to power without having created a new conceptual framework for the state. An ineffectual new government will allow racketeers to construct new "families."²⁷ One hopes for a different result in a government of poverty. For the moment, stability is assured by the forces imposed from abroad. The game is not over and the question remains: how and by what means will all the functions not directly related to the police, those previously assumed by the military-police apparatus, be replaced in the transition to democracy?

C. Impasses at the Base: The Rural World and the Threat of Chaos

The current reading of the Haitian reality is a direct threat to the rural world. The rural sectors best define the exclusionary boundary of Haitian society with the dominated on one side and the dominating on the other. The powers shared elsewhere in this society where the executive, judiciary, legislative, and police institutions dominate are all in the hands of the rural strongmen who administer, arbitrate, and sanction in public and private spheres. The collapse of the government of the rural sectors was managed with a bias toward ignorance,²⁸ allowing the administration of the base of society to drift.

It is urgent to articulate the objectives and the stages of integration of the rural into national life, and to consider the treatment of the migratory masses that will emerge in the years to come. The structure of replacement foreseen in articles 62 to 65 of the Constitution of 1987 reconsiders the traditional notion

27. The word "family" in Haiti designates the dozen private groups having accumulated colossal fortunes in the span of a generation, each united around a godfather (or godmother), sharing the lucrative businesses of the country, regardless of which military or civilian regime is in place.

28. The expression "bias toward ignorance" is not too strong when one takes into account the positions of the leaders of this current democratic movement, positions that consciously neglect the peasant question, incorporating just a little economic jargon to camouflage the fact that they are in the service of the movement's managerial staff and dominant classes. A second attitude, which is no better, is that of intervention in order to make an ostensibly charitable gesture of granting a few plots of land here, of assistance there, to gestures without serious significance, as though the dimensions of the problems to be tackled could be satisfied with the intermediary solution of political gestures. The problem is theoretical and universal, and thus demands reproblematising.

that "[t]he rural section is the smallest administrative territorial entity of the Republic," because any understanding of the rural sections during the post-war period has shown the falsity of such an assertion, the sociocentrism of its vision, and the exclusion it confers. The most probable result is that the legitimate expectation of an elected management of three members per rural Section, and even of its assistance by a Section Assembly, will only serve to grant three or four articles to the bases of society and almost three hundred articles to the formal administration of the country! The "Rural Constitution" also anticipates three hundred central precedents from a judicial tradition of jurisprudence outside the Napoleonic tradition. The modernization of the judicial framework of codes and laws should take into account the two antagonistic spheres of the dominating and the dominated, which have different judicial traditions. A transition to democracy cannot succeed by ignoring from the outset the ways and customs of the Subjects of the transition: those who were excluded under the old order. Thus, the transition is on the Ministry of Justice that has been conferred twenty percent of the national budget, the largest single part. We are awaiting the revival of November 5, 1996!

D. *The Subject of the Transition: A New Citizen Voice*

The first large political demonstration following the fall of the Duvaliers was on April 3, 1986, when 30,000 women arrived in Port-au-Prince from all over the country to make known their refusal to continue to be mothers, spouses, companions, sisters, or daughters of the those who were tortured or disappeared. They carried signs with slogans demanding the improvement of their working conditions. I still recall the clergy's confusion in dealing with this different kind of Subject. What could this unexpected occurrence signify? One knew how much freedom of speech and the exercise of speech characterized the end of public and private oppression. But, between such a realization and its massive presence in the form of specific demands, there was research to be done. It required five years²⁹ to gain a theoretical

29. The key texts of this projection for the ten years under observation begin with MIREILLE NEPTUNE ANGLADE, *L'AUTRE MOITIÉ DU DÉVELOPPEMENT* (1986). In *La Chance qui Passe*, the proclamation of the democratic movement for the elections won in December 1990, the theory of the control of the changes by the great compassion for the situation of women is developed at length in a political perspective. See *La Chance qui*

understanding of the role of women in poverty. One actively researched aspect was the analysis of the role of the feminine condition as a litmus test in the transition to democracy. "As goes the situation of women, so goes the transition" is a bar placed high in male cultures. This is how the question is now phrased. That which is reclaimed is nothing less than the feminization of the transition to democracy. The overall improvement of the condition of women will be the measure of the overall improvement produced by the transition. In Haiti, the general situation is so lamentable for the great majority of people that one will have to choose which Subjects to work for in a transition. One thinks notably of the peasants, or of the young.³⁰ But it is not that the women as a class demonstrate that by the sum of the characteristics they claim to be the pre-eminent Subject. This is a methodological position that may be remembered as the major contribution of the Haitian events from 1986 to 1996. But the policy rejecting the "government of poverty" could only face a question of this scale in the anecdotal: a ministry of the feminine condition and the laws of women was created. But there was no clear policy to follow. Actions were tentative. People capitulated to inexperience and forecasted the closing of the ministry.³¹ The cycle is complete in less than a year!

Passé 74-80; See also *GENDER AND POVERTY IN INDIA* (1991); *THE FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY: ONLY IN AMERICA?* (Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg & Eleanor Kremen, eds., 1990)

30. "The general Subject is certainly the people/actor in all its component parts but in situations of extreme poverty, one must still separate it into its component parts until reaching an irreducible transcendent entity." See JACQUES RANCIÈRE, *LA MÉSENTENTE: POLITIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIE* 139-43 (1995) (discussing three aspects of people in democracy). The feminine in poverty is more than a social class, more than an age group, more than a socio-professional status. It is the obligation to survive through times of catastrophe in poverty that stamps the feminine as a pre-eminent Subject.

31. Until recently women had only organized into traditional groups. But anticipating a thaw following November 5, 1996 there is now a league dedicating to advancing the political participation of women in elected posts. This opens an entirely new chapter of feminism in poverty specifically addressing female poverty. While the feminine is the Subject among Subjects that emerges in this conjecture, the shanty-town is the place among places. In the short term, especially if nothing serious is done, the rural populations will again find itself there. The near future of Port-au-Prince can easily see a climb between two and three million shanty-towns for less than 500,000 people in the city proper. The challenge of the coming century will be its capacity to develop the shantytowns, in which will live three quarters of the population of Latin America. Moreover, the location of the Diaspora has revealed itself as an amplifier of popular demands and as a sanctuary for democracy reclaimed. The overall interpretation that I will advance for the Diaspora is that it is an escape valve used by the "government of wealth." The Diaspora is on the outside, while actually living a real-time fiction

Yet that did not exhaust the question, and certainly did not overcome it. It will endure as long as general poverty endures, along the high and low points of the transition toward democracy in the coming century.

E. The Erruption of Words from Unexpected Places: Provinces, Shanty-Towns, and Diaspora

The new voices are as vital to the transformation as the general mobilization of the people. This demands a reproblematicizing of the organization of the space capable of accounting for the new places from which voices have emerged. Provinces that the harsh centralization of the twentieth-century had rendered inarticulate are suddenly beginning to speak again. Shanty-towns forced into the silence of the grave during the dictatorships now find their turn to speak. A faraway and detached Diaspora that was one thought lost is settling in to the heart of the process in order to speak for itself. The core of the metropolis became so important that it detached itself from the rest of the country in order to live in a quasi-independent manner. The old urban hierarchy, having lost its leadership, has left parties with the autonomy that the provinces will now use for their renewal. The shantytowns, marginalized at their beginnings, have with time become entirely separate categories so that one must now recognize, next to the urban and the rural, this new third category that will soon be the vessel of more than fifty percent of the populations of Latin America. The coming century will be more shanty-town than urban. As for the Haitian Diaspora, it has awoken as a national force, and one must think of it as one thinks of the nine other departments of the country. The metaphor of the tenth department by which it has been designated since 1986 has come to represent its role in the national dynamic. In short, a new special model with multiple centers has replaced centralization, giving importance to the local level, there where the protectors of the citizenry will be able to exercise their electoral sovereignty.

of being on the inside in the "tenth department"; the Diaspora, predominantly of rural, provincial, and shanty-town origin, has placed itself outside of the ninety-five percent of the oppressed and outside of the reach of the "government of wealth" in order to accompany the emergence of the new paradigm of the "government of poverty."

F. The Plan of the Transition: Yes to the Market, Yes to the State

Once the democratic movement came to power, the mass of voters began to demand a decrease in the cost of living. Six years later, one still hears this demand to satisfy the basic needs of more and more people, as quickly as possible.

Economic change means adjusting the position of the majority of citizens on the five-rung economic ladder which in Haiti represents misery, indigence, poverty, comfort, and wealth. More than eighty percent of the population, the Subjects of this transition, live in abject misery because they cannot satisfy any of their basic needs. For them, poverty is still a goal, except when demagogues promise that everyone will be at the level of comfort or wealth. In an effort to prevent migration, the objective of the economic transition is to make the majority pass from misery to poverty, the latter level being the near-satisfaction of basic needs including a roof over one's head, health, education, rudimentary infrastructure, etc. Currently, ninety percent of Haitians are below poverty, less than five percent live in poverty, and five percent are above it. The transition from misery to poverty and the problem of achieving "zero migration" is modest, but it is the largest of all the revolutions possible in Haiti. This policy gives priority to dealing with the masses' poverty. The other policy gives priority to governing in the interest of the wealthy. One therefore comes back again to the ancient, twenty-five-century-old choice between democracy and oligarchy. Under certain conditions of social justice, the alternative to the current policy would institutionalize the state of right and recognize the preeminence of the market, while recognizing the strong need that local community government has for a state, for even in the economic sphere its regulatory presence is necessary to protect the weakest groups and the environment. This "Yes to the market, Yes to the State" dramatizes the real debate concerning the privatization of state enterprises, grants an indispensable role to the strong³² need for a state, and gives the market its own role in

32. The Haitian state is weak, and it is used to benefit those who get rich from the destruction of the country. One example that will clarify this matter is the use of non-biodegradable containers by several flourishing Haitian juice companies. The enrichment of the owners comes not only at the expense of the pollution of the environment, but also from the impoverishment of the Government, which annually invests millions of dollars through the Ministry of Public Works to treat these containers, which obstruct the sewers of Port-au-Prince each rainy season. The catastrophe is national, but the

economic growth and the resulting fall in the cost of living. This is the formula that we must find a way of applying.

D. *Agrarian Reform as Starting Point and Revival*

Our policy in the transition to democracy must encourage production, because in the past, Haiti has perished from not producing. One critical element in the framework for reviving production is a specific reform of the land and water. The other is the simultaneous implementation of an industrial network for the input of agriculture and the transformation of agricultural output. It is the double, converging influence of these two factors that will advance the production of goods and increase their value.

This is the starting point for a long series of complex transformations that must be followed by financial and economic requirements. The starting point clearly addresses the current peasant, rural, and agricultural questions of the country. Furthermore, it traces one possible solution to the problem of the shantytowns' abundant and under-utilized manpower. We must also admit that we do not know everything. We understand the general skills, enumerate the cultural particularities, and fully list the potentialities. We have already experimented with the scope and limits of diffusion of innovations.

It is essential, although perhaps unrealistic, to aim for the conversion of Haitian agriculture and to get 250,000 farms to increase their individual production each year until the end of the century. This would be a goal beyond expectation. The logistics of getting these master-gardeners to be able to exploit their theoretical and practical mastery require that the land be cultivated so as to be accessible and secure through prolonged

weak state lets it happen by governing according to the paradigm of wealth, and by turning the restoration of State authority into an activity which aggravates the poverty of the masses, street merchants and others, who are accused of polluting the streets with the plastic containers. One could gather together a hundred stories of this kind to illustrate why the trees are cut down, why garbage accumulates in Port-au-Prince, why the environment is destroyed, and those who enrich themselves by these tragedies. See ANDRE CORTEN *in* L'ÉTAT FAIBLE: HAÏTI ET REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE (1989) (studying characteristics and consequences of this weak state). The weak state is desired and maintained by the major participants in the economic sphere, except that they do not have the point of view of the working people who need to be protected. It is no longer the Government that needs to be regenerated. One comes back again to the ancient, twenty-five-century-old choice between democracy and oligarchy.

reclamation. To achieve this we have created a National Institute of Agricultural Reform (INARA), and expect, upon the renewal after the U.S. elections, a law effecting water and land reform and a restructuring that will curb fragmentation.³³ Land reform is not only necessary to effect the leap from misery to poverty, by far the most fundamental social change possible in Haiti, but also to guarantee a start to all the other sectors and stages of national life.

E. The Industrialization of Agriculture Upstream and Downstream

The agricultural restructuring will demand massive manpower to produce the necessary agricultural input. It is necessary to tie this to the increased capacity of value added through the transformation of agricultural products. It is by this double transformation of the input and output of agricultural production that the policy of giving priority to the poor will be put into effect. Haiti must determine which resources to possess and master³⁴ in order to raise production and revenues, and under which conditions the value added to agricultural products by the progress of industrial transformation become a factor increasing production and revenue for the great majority of the workers. There is no policy that can satisfy basic needs without finding a global strategy of production. It is necessary to increase the workers' resources in order to generate a gross consumer demand that the Haitian market would then satisfy. For this to happen, there must be a viable rural middle³⁵ class that expands from 50,000 to 250,000 rural households. At the same time, in

33. In holding the inauguration of the November 2, 1996 program of agrarian reform, in a grand ceremony at Pont Sonde in the low valley of the Arbonite, three days before the U.S. elections, President René Préal, in targeting this most important of symbols, has begun the thaw of positions. The INARA, which is the instrument of this central reform in the democratic project, the mechanism *par excellence* of the mechanisms of the revival, in charge of one and a half million cultivated parcels in the country, is completely undersized: it barely had a single employee the first year of its creation (July, 1995 - July, 1996).

34. Such resources include land, water, credit, resources, markets.

35. In Haitian society, there is a great debate about this notion of middle classes. This is all the more important in the transition toward democracy, in an era that announces itself as a continuous work of middle classes for which it will be necessary to provide the most precise economic, social and cultural contours possible. Can one speak, as I do, of a peasant middle class whose annual revenue per farm will be on the order of 80,000 in Haitian local currency in 1996? I think so, but that remains to be debated.

each province the transformation capacities must be implemented to add value to the products and to serve as an incentive to production. Finally, each province's central city must be endowed with the services and resources required in that particular region.³⁶

III. THE RULES OF TRANSITIONS

A. *The Rules of the Transitions to Democracy*

The experience of the transition to democracy in Haiti during the last ten years, and notably, the difference between the vision that has slowly ripened through democratic change during the post-war period, permits the formulation of a series of rules of transitions. The first of these rules is the general mobilization, which allows the authoritarian regime to be overtaken and the new regime to maintain its course if it has an overall vision. This mobilization arises from unexpected places. In Haiti, the provinces have been mute for a century, the shantytowns reduced to silence, and much of the population scattered in a Diaspora. Among the voices that demand to be heard in a frenzy of talk are those who were formerly excluded and now have become the new historical Subject. They express authentic

36. The contents set forth in the preceding paragraphs have examined the boundaries that delimit the territory that we have called the "government of poverty." I believe that it is necessary to confront the fact that poverty will be Haiti's lot in the 21st century, as seen in its shantytowns, but also with its real wealth of solidarities. Should one want to combat poverty by the program of structural adjustment, to abolish poverty, to proclaim growth without poverty, as do the texts of the World Bank? See, e.g., *Structural Adjustment and Poverty: a Conceptual, Empirical and Policy Framework* (1989); *Implementing the World Bank's Strategy to Reduce Poverty: Progress and Challenges* (1993). Should one say that one can arrange a significant percentage of the people in comfort or wealth? Obviously not. It is irresistible for me to see in the case of Haitian poverty an analogy to the manner in which the "question of the black race," the racism of the inequality of the races, etc., has roused the Haitian scholars at the end of the 19th century. Because it is out of the question to change one's race, at least one can change the paradigm: the different courses of negritude that were born during the course of 100 years. Who, then, is afraid of the "government of poverty" in a country condemned to poverty for the next 100 years? We are instead condemned to revisit poverty - one which is far from the conceptions of charity or of patronizing women, but also far from the unrealistic promises, pious wishes, and other romantic promises. The word "poverty" actually creates more fear than the thing which is defined as access to the minimum of everything. IN PRAISE OF POVERTY, *supra* note 16, at 5. It is necessary to imagine a convivial society of citizens whose per capita income could be very modest but whose quality of life would be at an acceptable minimum, spanned by social networks of solidarity, political participation, of justice by right. This objective is, for the time being, within the political and scientific means of Haiti.

ruptures through their radical demands for justice, immediate expectation of the satisfaction of elementary needs, sovereignty of elected citizens, and subversion of civil liberties. These principal means for spelling this grammar of transitions all spring forth simultaneously on the radio, on the walls, and in the streets.³⁷ They create an atmosphere of permanent celebration that Henri Namphy, the General in charge of the Haitian Executive who was overwhelmed by the events that followed the overthrow of Duvalier, characterized 1986 as "democratic revelry." I do not see how a process of transition toward democracy could be characterized by the serenity of the Subject, of calm in the streets, and of moderation and responsibility in all things. Groups make use of the freedom to protest and the freedom to speak, fundamental rights that were won from the dictatorship, to take every opportunity possible to proclaim that repression is never to return.³⁸ There is a festive atmosphere in the expectations of a new epoch, so that, for his part, the U.S. ambassador serving in 1990, Alvin Adams, who was equally overwhelmed by

37. On the day of Duvalier's departure, on walls around the country, in the provinces as in the capital, one could see written in Creole, "A non-renewable, four-year mandate" for the presidency. The long nightmare of thirty years had to be exorcised. The walls were thus beginning to speak of the exercise of the population's right to vote. Further, the candidates for presidency, numerous in these first weeks, went on the radio to complain that the president's term was too short and the non-renewal was drastic. The Constitution of 1987 was going to retain this, but added a year to make it a five-year mandate, and consecrated the exercise of sovereignty by all citizens in elections at all levels. In this way the people were able to begin again after thirty years by subjecting each call to the presidential ballot-box to a total abstention of their massive vote: in November, 1987, they killed themselves out to vote for Gourgue; in January, 1988, they abstained for Manigat; in December, 1990, they rushed to elect Aristide; and Preval was elected with less than thirty percent voter participation in 1995. Thus it is essential that the exercise of sovereignty be consolidated through the choice of 2200 elected officials in Haiti, and that the Permanent Electoral Counsel, which the Constitution anticipated in Articles 191 to 199, reach the threshold of trust and legitimacy necessary to call the citizens to the polls every two years for elections.

I believe that the most accurate interpretation of the 1991 coup comes properly from reflexes overwhelmed by change: the democratic era of the U.S. people took flight in the Haitian experiment of the beginning of the 1990s, and the historical mandate was to describe how a caterpillar becomes a butterfly and not to block the mutation. Where one was waiting for a great chronicler, one saw a small firebrand. The international scandal that this coup provoked shows that the experiment that unfolded in Haiti and all of Latin America has been hugely underestimated.

38. The orderly management of this trial in the streets seems to me sufficiently linked to the need to oversee the transition, that one takes note of the festive aspect of the transitions as analogous to the political conventions and election periods elsewhere, including, notably, in the United States.

events that preceded the election of Aristide, characterized the events as "apres bal tambou lou," meaning "after the ball, the drums become heavy." This saying, is a well-known Haitian proverb whose equivalent must exist in all cultures, and in the revolutionary political tradition of the dream of a "Grand Soir" in which the Haitian experience is followed by the rude awakening of the "Petit Matin" of a country drained and fragile as it gets back on its feet.

B. *A General Mobilization and a Vision of the Whole*

Any politics that satisfies popular wishes must have the capacity to mobilize a large majority of the population to support the sequence of transformations during the transition. At the beginning of the process, there is not yet a tradition of respect for governmental legitimacy borne out of elections. Without a general mobilization, it is practically impossible to use force effectively, leaving behind the authoritarian status quo, destroying the central apparatus of the old regime, and constructing a real democracy. These moments of general mobilization are rare turning points in the history of a people because they are built on categorical rejections and entrenched grievances that constitute a "No" to lawlessness, exclusion, and exploitation, and a "Yes" to justice, participation, and the satisfaction of basic needs. Today, the general mobilization is the best means of putting into motion all classes of society for the overall benefit of the nation. This exceptional condition, however, is insufficient to accomplish all the changes by itself. It is still necessary to have a vision of the alternative that can be a fulcrum based on native skills and characteristics. Fifty years of seeking democracy in Haiti has cleared away superfluous demands. The search of supporters of democracy for a more just and more dignified society has created a tool. One of the peculiarities of the democratic tradition in Haiti is that it has combined, since its origin, two modes of existing. Its leading characteristic is that it is political, its function is organization and mobilization, while it is also intellectual, reproblemating, and exploring the routes to take.³⁹

39. I ask myself if in fact this classification of the democratic profiles is not related to this difference between organizers of the "Grands Soirs" and laborers of the "Petit Matins"? Hasn't it always been true that the rare combination of these two dimensions gives birth to the possibility of democracy? But the virtuoso performances by the "artistes du Grand Soir" taking control in 1991, losing it in 1994, reclaiming it in 1996, and

C. Radical Claims

Initially the new political Subjects make radical demands. This radical tendency takes many forms as the process evolves. In the beginning, there will be a symbolic settling of accounts. It will be reflected in destroyed homes, burnt cars, firing of civil servants, and, unfortunately, public executions of a few prominent henchmen of the old regime. The essential impact, however, lies deeper, in the change in colors, the replacement of the government, and the open path to transition. There are three orders of radical demands. It starts in justice as an object of transition, where the construction of the new state law demands the punishment of those accused of injustices. It is then in the Subjects of those transitions in which they have the right to speak, to vote, and to be given priority in political participation after years of deprivation. Finally, it is in the economic control of inflation and the end of the robbery of the state treasury. It is at this point that the people's radical demands will differ from the political organizers with whom the people have allied.⁴⁰ The middle class administration will advance pretexts based on expertise, pragmatism, and realism to moderate the radicality embedded in the new female⁴¹ and male speakers. These radical demands would be uprooted and thwarted. The political economy of this maneuver is so obvious, the fall of the transition would unquestionably follow in a short period. We risk finding ourselves within the power of the "petite elite" against the claims of all the people. The first signs of this final split between the base and the summit of the democratic movement would be easy

solidifying it in 2000, must contribute something to the "Petit Matins" of the country that constitute ninety percent of the poor peasants, miserable women, and sacrificed youth. The judgment of this missed opportunity by history would be terrible.

40. It is the great number of people on the platform and new female speakers who will maneuver this change. Everybody speaks out and makes claims in the beginning of the transition. Eventually it becomes discordant and indecent: even the army complained bitterly about the dictatorship for being the biggest victim of the purges. We may then pretend not to recognize the real Subjects of the transition which define their fresh and colorful demands, radical and immediate. First, the female speakers which present the state of the victimization of their gender or the duration of the centralization and their just fear that the transition will also be at their expense, and then the other speaker of serious things, the miserable peasants, from the provinces, from the city, or from the shantytowns. It is seven million poor Haitian peasants who tell the other twenty percent that the solution can not continue by this apartheid exclusion. No distancing of any economic maneuver may ignore the fate of the peasants.

41. The feminine voice has been so uncommon that now it rings out startlingly.

to recognize, as it is not the subject of a plot or conspiracy to tame the radicality of the people's demand. The day would come that the people would reclaim their role.

D. *Immediate Expectations*

The new political Subjects started with immediate political demands. The immediacy is a refusal to continue to be presently sacrificed for a better future. This once-familiar argument has disappeared of late, because it was always the same people who had to live on hope while others always enjoyed immediate benefits. Their impatience was clear, and we saw street demonstrations proclaiming the slogan "immediately." But there are limited means of immediately achieving anything significant. We must account for the poor, maintain a minimum critical sense, and suggest answers to interference from abroad. In this country, that is the most overanalyzed since the war, shot through with "twenty thousand expert reports,"⁴² everything ended in disaster. In this country, there is an obsession with foreign aid and a psychological expectation of abusing it⁴³ without any obligation to obtain results for the last five decades of development. It is time to try something else. The old practice of expecting everything of outside subsidies created a double problem. People were not required to live within their means and did as much as possible with what they had. It did not take into account local know-how or the people's actual needs as the preferred way of making immediate changes. There are numerous illustrations. In a rural world where movement and communication occurred along a dense network of footpaths, where improvements would have had an immediate effect on the economic opportunities of the poorest, money was spent on makeshift but lucrative maintenance work on the few roads that supported the economy of the rich. It is not a question of forsaking one network for another,

42. This has continued at a rate of one report per day for more than half a century!

43. One day we will have to go over what happened in Haiti between 1946 and 1996 in the chapter of international cooperation and the presence of foreign advisors. We tried an analysis of the problem in 1982 in *l'Atlas critique d'Haiti*, with card of the *Presence etrangere* and a commentary on *Les mystifications de l'aide*. L'ATLAS CRITIQUE D'HAÏTI, *supra* note 28; PRESENCE ETRANGERE 69; LES MYSTIFICATIONS DE L'AIDE 68-72. One of the most damaging results has been from successive governments preaching that the national dynamism is nothing but a liaison of those receiving from who are lending them.

but of acknowledging for the first time the different networks. What is needed is a wisdom for immediate and radical change; the two invented rules for the mobilization of the first step of the transition toward democracy.

IV. *RISKS AND RIFTS OF TRANSITIONS*

A. *Glory and Misery of the Long March of Democracy*

Since the end of the Second World War, the Haitian democratic movements have had fifty years of development. In 1990, they coalesced for an overwhelming accession to power. Now, the biggest threat comes from inside the organization, which must build and reinforce itself in order to overcome inherent organizational problems.⁴⁴ This is the glory and the misery of the long path of democracy. The first task is to structure the sensibilities of the political parties. Here there are three apparent difficulties: first, the people have an inherent distrust of the political parties. Second, there is no rival for the charismatic leadership of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Third, the social class of the party leaders is a problem. In this country of extreme exclusions, all the party functionaries come from the dominant class and depend on the state for their living, when what is required is a real rupture in standard conceptions, orientations, and practices in order to benefit eighty percent of the population. Briefly, in this country of rarity, when it is difficult to target everybody, one must see the hierarchy break with its traditional ways and the government of the rich become a government of the poor.

The third glory of the democratic government, created in the 1987 constitution, is four levels of representatives. But in this country of distortions, the radical claims and the urgency of the people's movements have difficulty being carried by the representative structure. Participation risks being strangled, and is threatened by a familiar syndrome: advisors who decide without

44. The biggest trap hidden in the obligation of representation, is the bureaucratic monopolization of representation that should be controlled by participants, citizens, and grassroots social movements. The recent history of the fall of the socialist state in the USSR of privileged parties is nothing more than the strangling of people by the machines of representation. At a moment when modern democracy commands these organizations, their risks and their rifts are as real as the people's mistrust of political parties. The Haitian tradition of political organization is laden with massive bureaucracies.

any other form of legitimacy and whose books and opinions have no connection with the nature of the country. The historical Subject of this country's transition has been excluded by the elected and by the advisors. For the last glory, and the last misery of the long walk of the democracy, we must continue the democratization, and not accept inaccurate categorizations that are limited to appearances and formal administration without content, beginning with the democratic parties who function undemocratically.

B. *Building Political Parties in a Land of Wary Subjects and Men of Destiny*

After years of experience, often underground and only partly successful, the democratic political organizations find themselves ready to operate in the open. Years of open resistance to dictatorship from abroad, and a long series of reorganizations within the ranks have now come to fruition throughout the country and in the Tenth Department. This moment in 1996 belongs to the political parties and we cannot help but rejoice in the advent of a future modern era. The Haitian political tradition, however, has also produced from this fertile land, men of destiny, who the party organizations look upon suspiciously, because the people have clearly rejected the traditional saviors, who now win merely one percent to three percent of the vote. The charismatic leadership of Aristide, however, is a different question, because he is truly a representative of the people. He continues to embody their hopes and he may well be President again in the year 2000. But it is through the structure of the democratic political parties that institutions must live. Through voting and political debate and through the rotation of power, daily administration is separated from the executive in a democracy. In the future, Haiti will probably swing between the different political parties that resulted from the 1990 convergence, *Lavalas*. In the absence of strong political parties, the weight of a leader like Aristide is too strong to allow the political culture to share other visions and other means of daily administration. This charismatic leadership could coexist with the construction of diverse democratic parties if the masses were not so wary of the political parties that they have left the organizations

with nothing but party bureaucrats.⁴⁵ The construction of political parties that are truly democratic and popular, with people of upper and lower middle class, presents a serious problem of popular representation. At present, people do not feel themselves represented in the majority that supposedly represents them in the 46th legislative assembly. These elected representatives do not affiliate themselves with the party under whose banners they were elected in the democratic movement. This is a troubling development in the democratic institutions. The key question then is, given the charismatic leadership of Aristide, and the mistrust of the people toward the parties, how can we make these half-dozen organizations sufficiently democratic and popular so that it will not be the work of one man?

C. Modernity of the Political Parties and the Nomenclature Origins

The progressive growth of political parties is followed by social projects, government policies, and political platforms that reflect the opinion of the groups. The establishment of the platforms follows debate within the party. The shared vision embodied in the platform is the foundation of the parties' modernity. We do not follow a traditional leader with unknown beliefs and uncertain positions, but collectively apply rules that we agree to respect. The modernization in the parties is thus accomplished without sacrificing the personal touch essential to politics. Each member is bound by their adherence to a set of publicly known beliefs, to which allegiance to an individual leader is secondary. It is sad that the actual leadership of the main parties that share in official democratic representations are, without exception, from the leading class, which is made up mostly of the middle class. These leaders are not in a position⁴⁶ to accept the de-

45. Until now, intellectuals have not come to grips with the mistrust of the last ten years in the country and in the Diaspora. The mass movements and grassroots organizations lack a traditional hierarchy. Perhaps the understanding we seek will arise only by linking shantytowns with the countryside. It is clear that the present analytical tools will not help us much in understanding the disillusion of the people with the parties and organizations. We then saw Duvalier fall from attacks from shantytowns, but we have not accounted for the lack of traditional leaders and party ranks. The same phenomenon has continued over the last ten years.

46. This political attitude comes from what Jacques Ranciere called the misunderstanding, *La Mesentente*, which is not of the order of simple mistrust or of voluntary ignorance. RANCIÈRE, *supra* note 34. "By mistrust we understand a special type of spoken situation. Where one of the speakers, hears and does not hear, what the other is

mands of the ideas of the transition that come from poor peasants and poor women whose voices are from the shantytown.

There is a risk in treating basic problems in a political fashion with fiction and anecdotes. Daunting problems requiring complex solutions are handled with vague and ineffectual gestures. In the name of militancy, the most acute questions receive trivial answers. Anything not emanating from one's clan is undercut. Even worse, the tools available to those various factions who depend on their proximity to the State for their existence are used to de-legitimize the issues surrounding the vast majority of the population and to justify exclusion of these new Subjects who threaten the privileges of the state bureaucrats. One ridicules every disturbance, without realizing that the function of the petty bourgeoisie is to protect itself from what it fears. It is terrified of the fact that Haiti is a country of poor peasants, of poor women, and therefore, a country of footpaths, markets, market women, rural administrative units, and boat people. It is not the country that the small bourgeoisie envisions in its complacent introspection.

D. *The Elected, the Excluded, and the Experts*

The 1987 Constitution provided for more than 2200 elected positions that had incumbents who would be members of communal, municipal, departmental, and national assemblies. This breakdown into political groupings would guarantee the representation of the people and a voice for their local concerns and demands. Furthermore, pursuant to the Constitution, the gov-

saying. The misunderstanding is not between the one who says white and the one who is saying black, it is the conflict between the one who says white and the other who says white but does not hear at all the same thing or does not hear the other say the same thing under the name white." *Id.* at 12. This gathers all the drama of the ranks who bring disaster to the basis of the political organizations in this land of apartheid.

Even if the educated people of this country take part in the political parties of the middle and lower middle classes, there has been little scholarly work done, and even less public debate on other possible approaches. Everything follows the first rule of politics: stay in power as long as possible. In the book, *Dans Haïti quel développement*, the architects of the regroupement *Collectif Paroles* explored around 1976 a project for the low, oppressed middle class, the PBO - *petite bourgeoisie opprimée*, by this fact differentiating it from the golden middle class, the PBD - *petite bourgeoisie dorée*, which we will find in the majority of the Lavalas. *DANS HAÏTI QUEL DEVELOPPEMENT* (E.Olivier, CL. Moïse, CH Manigat, eds.) Even though it is a raw instrument of work, it presents a first distinction between the PBO and PBD which present a certain account of belonging to the ranks.

ernment would come from the majority of the Senate and the House of Representatives. This would reinforce the institutions that Democracy needs to maintain itself as a process. In this country of failed Apartheid, however, the distance between the elected and the excluded is so great that the latter will always feel sufficiently underrepresented that they will request the right to participate directly. The elected incumbents therefore receive their mandates from demonstrations in both urban and rural areas. Add to this the contributions of experts from the civil service⁴⁷ and expatriate experts who make their decisions independently of the elected and the excluded who stifle all advocacy for change. In moments of political indecisiveness, the technocracies of local administrations have fallen into the habit of governing with their interests in mind and with no connection to the elected political incumbents. It is well known that an unstable situation in Haiti provides foreign experts with the best ammunition to influence national politics. A return to normal implies that the experts will have a clear vision of the problem and will be extremely active. The portrait of this classic situation is the beginning of a process by which the three partners, the excluded, the elected, and the experts, are separate from one another. The ultimate objective is to bring the three actors closer so that they can eventually work together. This will take a long time in a society divided into two unequal parts including a vast majority of illiterate peasants living in abject poverty, and an educated, urban, well-to-do minority with a knowledge of assemblies and political representation. In order to fully grasp the extent of the necessary changes, the urgency that the demands be truly radical, and the need for expectations to be immediate so that there is a glimmer of hope for democracy, one needs to refer constantly to the five financial levels of the Haitian population: abject poverty (eighty percent), indigence (ten percent), poverty (five percent), comfortable means (four percent) and wealth (one percent).

47. The civil service is the State institution that operates and manages all the required transformations. Currently, only a quarter of its employees are indisputably qualified to work. Reforming the corps of civil servants, a prerequisite to the re-launching of Haiti, raises the issue of what to do with the remaining three-quarters of the sinecurists who have no other employment opportunities. The famous slogan "Change the State" which means change the paradigm, also means changing the civil service and many other things: it will be the redeployment of the government, expected at the end of 1996.

E. The Democratization of Democracy

While the September 1994 Haiti operation, Restore Democracy, set in motion a process of change, it also impeded political transformation so that Haiti would not become an issue in the 1996 U.S. elections. It might have been a good strategy. It has been, however, a long twenty-five months for the Americans in charge of stabilizing the situation. The extensively supervised democracy of the last two years has taken the required positions and made the minimal gestures, especially regarding elections, reconciliation, retaining the population, and extending the mandate. There have been a few problems with the policy of containment, particularly in the case of privatization. The people have good reason to wonder if privatization only serves to strengthen the oligarchy that has been duping them for two centuries. The moment of truth has finally arrived with the democratization of democracy.⁴⁸ Now the concern should be that the Haitians might find themselves alone, without having been allowed to create the necessary instruments to manage the processes of change. The evolving situation will carry with it all chances of succeeding and all the possibilities of veering out of control.⁴⁹ Justice, the primary factor in any aspiration to create a democracy, will be at stake. The absolute and integral reconcili-

48. The greatest threat to democracy is the acceptance of a bastardized version. But a cheapened democracy might seem more appropriate to a situation of such poverty. Reactionaries most frequently use the argument that democracy is incompatible with a country of illiterates, as if the population could not know what is good for it! The sought-after formula would consist of certain formal appearances, especially with respect to elections (usually overturned or ignored by the constituents who are less naive than one might think), but also of maintaining the wealth paradigm. One aspect would nonetheless entail leaving to the leaders of the political parties the representation in the Senate, the House, and the assemblies in exchange for the continuity of the State. The fundamental problem is that it is impossible to name an oligarchic paradigm a democracy; it would defy twenty-five centuries of definitions.

49. On Sunday November 3, 1996, two days before the U.S. elections, Jean-Bertrand Aristide inaugurated his own political party, bringing to four the number of parties claiming their origins in the *Lavalas* movement of 1990. It is a sign of the times that, as the floodgates open following the U.S. elections, the undisputed leader of Haiti's political and social crossroads subscribes to this requirement of modernization with the slogan "democratization of democracy." The new delimitation of the various democratic organizations soon will be determined in the senatorial elections scheduled for December 1996 but which in all likelihood will be postponed until the spring of 1997. The procedures used to select candidates and the eventual withdrawal mechanisms available in the second round of elections will illustrate the degree of maturity attained by the different democratic factions.

ation that was imposed has still not allowed the horror to be excised. The new institutions that are crucial to stability, notably the national police, are troubling in their present state. The judiciary should be disbanded, as the army was, so that it can be rebuilt with a clean slate. The Government's options regarding economic growth, which are currently restrained in the interest of equity, are either to focus on wealth (an oligarchy), or focus on poverty (a democracy). The people, the Subjects revealed by the political climate, demand the freedom given to citizens, notably participation in politics and in the elections, in order for democracy to become the factory that creates the middle class and extricates the people from the accelerating misery. All this must be done now, for democracy is not a defined gradation or a fixed stage. Democracy establishes itself here, in the present. As a means of advancement, it destroys any incompatible element. Democracy is always accompanied by forward motion, immediacy, the here and now. In the end, General Namphy's "democracy spree" was not such a bad reading! It is understandable why the first rule is the general mobilization. Without mobilization, the bet is not even worth placing, while with mobilization, nothing is any less certain, but the opportunity passes.⁵⁰

CONCLUSION

A. *The Transition as Reputation: A Global Interpretation*

The global interpretation with which I conclude is that as a transition succeeds, it mutates and causes a basic change in perception. It is all the more significant that the transition is an end in itself. The objective sought is a transition to democracy, a virtual-state that was never established once and for all. The case is reborn as another, with a different name. The upheavals that accompany these transformations, the economic miracle of such-

50. The twenty-five months dating from September 19, 1994 to November 5, 1996 will probably be the source of many future works as an exceptional opportunity in a national history. On the one hand, there emerges a desire to turn Haiti into an U.S. success story for obvious election purposes. On the Haitian side, the dissimulation of objective sought and the vagueness of the resulting strategy, led to an erratic game that resulted in missing a chance at establishing a democracy, despite significant advances, such as the elimination of the very small formal army and of the large number of unofficial satraps. The last chance of this global conjunction of the 1990s lies in the conceptualization of the national policy based on the November 5, 1996 elections. After that it will be another decade, even another century!

and-such, the green revolution of such-and-such, determines the reputation, the public image of whether it fits with the democratic tradition.⁵¹ Up until now this process of re-naming has been rare. It seems that democratic transitions are difficult, if not miraculous, given the importance of the necessary combination of clear-sightedness, determination, and other favorable factors. In Haiti's case, there needs to be a significant change in the common perceptions of Haiti. Currently they are all negative. The democratic transition in Haiti would be all the more stunning if it also managed to reverse these perceptions. A tactical short-term victory may have paved the way for democratic legitimacy, but nearly everyone fears a mid-term strategic failure, particularly because following the elections the international community will not be inclined to provide the means for a clean break and an authentic solution to the crisis. This is despite the threat of the recurring harsh emigration and the obligation of having to stem the migrations. The eventual success of a democratic transition in Haiti can only come from a national initiative to take charge of the overall vision and of the general politics that would adhere to a "government of poverty" policy capable of containing the Haitian population. The next step would be to recommend to Haiti's allies that they modify tactics to help Haiti down this path, the only one that can possibly succeed.

B. *A Poor, Dispossessed, and Beggarly Country? The Alternative Exists*

Haiti is frequently described as a poor and dispossessed country, with material resources ravaged, and human resources wasted and illiterate. There is even the reiterated phrase: *the poorest country of the Americas and the only least-developed country of the continent*. Even though it may be difficult to provide any simple counter-argument to this, two facts undermine the seemingly irrefutable assertion. The Haitian Diaspora, as an element of

51. We are entering an era that seems to be taking on all the qualities for it to be called the age of Democracies, just as there existed a prior era called the age of Colonization or of Independence. This era is proceeding under various signs: 1) at a macro level, the end of the East/West polarization; 2) at the intermediate level, the end of military States to contain the crises; and 3) at the micro level, the access to power through elections of democratic movements. It is there that a democratic reputation plays a vital role: it establishes itself by day to day advances, through the desire to live up to its image.

the country, is an exceptional concentration of human resources capable of contributing to the life of the country, and the unique coping mechanisms of poverty, could be used as the impetus for Haiti's renewal. These two categories of resources have been extensively researched and analyzed. There currently exists a group of proposals and an entire bibliography that could be used as the foundation of a new, original, and efficient policy. A poor country?⁵² Yes, but certainly not as dispossessed as one might generally think, because the two native keys needed for a solution to the crisis already exist: the know-how and the human resources. One must immediately add that the initial perceptions of Haiti also include that of a beggarly country held at arms length. It would be a country incapable of taking control, a country that will always be begging for alms. It is true. It is also true that the succession of governments in the post World-War II era only thought of foreign aid and subsidies, of projects originating from the outside, and of remittances from the Diaspora. In short, there was never any effort to think up ways of mobilizing local resources. The idea of actually taking control of the country's fate seemed absurd. Recently, however, it appears likely that the international political climate will reduce considerably the funds available to countries such as Haiti, and that sooner or later Haiti will have to attempt to live within its means. At that point Haiti, by necessity, will have to rely on local abilities, and we will finally have to ask, what is Haiti? It will have to be debated as external aid will cross the line and become a contribution and not a substitution. The problem is that in the interim, we are witnessing a systematic destruction of the means to create an authentically local policy. The democratic transition should determine if it can alter that first group of perceptions by taking paths other than the traditional routes that have always led to failure. An alternative exists, as tenuous as it may be.

52. I think that presently the research concerning Haiti should focus on democracy and poverty. The political overexposure Haiti has received in the early 1990s because its request for democracy should be followed by a concern to expose its poverty to theoretical debates. It does not seem normal to continue prioritizing the race for external aid, and the ensuing contortions for its disbursement, without any attempt of rethinking and reconfiguring the problem of one's poverty. See *DÉMOCRATIE ET PAUVRETÉ* (J.C. Caillaux & L. Join-Lambert eds., 1991).

C. *A Divided and Violent Country, Embattled by Corruption and Trafficking? The Light at the End of the Tunnel*

People claim Haiti is a violent and divided country, with irreconcilable political divisions. The endless, frustrating conflicts, however, mask the Haitians' shared democratic ideals. It is rare to see a country as unified as Haiti, with seventy or even ninety percent of the population capable of voting for the same policy. This is because the excluded constitute more than ninety percent of the population. Haiti is not divided, for the dispossessed are all of the same opinion and aspire to democracy as a means for establishing political participation, economic growth, and justice. There is, however, a minority that traditionally has blocked the democratic and modernization processes. Certain profiteers have emerged from this wave of democracy and now claim the right to do as those before them did, as if there had been no change in the nature of political power. Is Haiti a divided country? Yes, between a very small minority of masters, never representing more than five percent of the population, and a multitude of slaves reaching ninety percent, a throwback to colonial Saint-Domingue on the eve of the Revolution. Is Haiti a divided country? No. When the apartheid is as blatant, the country can no longer be qualified as a divided one but rather one whose people are in search of their lost nation. Is Haiti a violent country? Most certainly, as the direct violence of repression and the indirect violence of an exclusionary order are needed to build such an inegalitarian order. Haiti, however, can be given back to the majority. The urban area of Port-au-Prince now consists of growths of slums and of brutal occupations preceding the imminent arrival of more slums where fifty percent of the Haitian population will soon be living. An already deplorable situation will be turned into a huge canker surrounding the center of Port-au-Prince. More and more, it seems that only a few principal thoroughfares of Port-au-Prince are worthy of the civil service's attention. The provinces, which will be the source of two million more refugees flowing to Port-au-Prince over the next decade, will be noticed only because of the stubborn demands of local politicians in the assemblies. In effect, Haiti is becoming more anarchic and contorted, and the threat of implosion will grow once the chaos spreads. Only a successful democratic transition will be able to bring the country back to

normal by reversing the current trend and dispelling this negative perception. Is there any hope or future for Haiti? Is there any hope for a country that has missed every opportunity for democratization and development, a country regularly pillaged by every new ruling group, a country that only gets the leaders it deserves?⁵³ It is enough to point out that all these assertions are floating around and would stop in the event of a successful democratic transition. The indelible impression left from the series of events, however, is that the country is running away, and no one really knows where to. One follows international events and injunctions, without any desire to deal with them or reorient them. Will the inability to resort to local knowledge and know-how finally be exorcised? Can the tradition of obscurantist policies come to an end? A transition in the process of succeeding should give this country hopes and plans based on detailed, viable, and realistic policies. Will we someday see the light at the end of the tunnel? I will conclude this Article by saying that it is not so much the light that is lacking in this maze but rather that the end of the tunnel is difficult to reach. *So far so good!*

53. It is true that steps need to be taken to prevent the plunder of government coffers. The move toward democracy is in the process of doing so despite rumors to the contrary. There is also, however, a rigorous eradication that is less obvious to complete, notably that of corrupt practices and conflicts of interests. In other words, all the illicit sources of enrichment from which stem so many monopolies, large properties, and successful businesses. The reputation of a country finally straightened out would make a large difference.