Russia in Tomorrow’s Europe - Seen from Neighboring Norway

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Abstract

Seen from neighboring Norway, where we have a long tradition of brinkmanship, bordering on one superpower and being allied to the other, it seems likely that the new and looser Commonwealth of Independent States to our East will have to pass through several stages before finding a more permanent political identity. And even if the most optimistic scenario prevails, a restructuring of political and economic life in an empire historically unacquainted with democracy will be slow to come
ADDRESS

RUSSIA IN TOMORROW'S EUROPE—SEEN FROM NEIGHBORING NORWAY

John Bjørnebye*

There can be no doubt that the last two to three years will pass into history as the very turning point of the East-West relationship that we have lived with since World War II. We have witnessed nothing less than the end of the post-war era, the forty-five year long "Cold War"—or rather "Cold Peace"—on the European continent. The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the East European satellites, the divided Germany—however permanent these entities had come to be regarded—simply ceased to exist. It is of course all too early to predict with any certainty what these parts of the world will be like in the long term. From history, we know that the vacuum left by fallen empires takes a long time to fill with lasting structures of statehood, and the process may be both confusing and painful. Seen from neighboring Norway, where we have a long tradition of brinkmanship, bordering on one superpower and being allied to the other, it seems likely that the new and looser Commonwealth of Independent States to our East will have to pass through several stages before finding a more permanent political identity. And even if the most optimistic scenario prevails, a restructuring of political and economic life in an empire historically unacquainted with democracy will be slow to come.

The essence of all these dramatic changes is that we now have a unique chance to reshape Europe without the violence and horror that have accompanied other far-reaching transformations throughout history. But although we no longer live with a permanent threat of war, we know that the necessary economic reconstruction in the East will have enormous transition costs in the form of inflation, supply disruption, black markets, unemployment, and crime. The combined effects of

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increasing poverty, ecological disaster, and internal strife may very well result in social chaos and large-scale migrations that will be difficult for Western Europe to handle.

But though the Soviet Union has disappeared, Russia remains. Let us not forget that what we knew as the Soviet Union was not only an ideological power, a creation of Communism or Marxism-Leninism. Long before the Bolsheviks, Russia was a formidable geo-political power, and that is what it will continue to be. It may gradually become part of Europe and join the different European organizations for economic and political cooperation. But if history is of any guidance, it may also turn East, to its Asian past and roots, for consolidation and identity. And then history may take yet another, unpredictable turn.

It is questionable whether the term "superpower" will continue to apply to the Russian Federation. But that is not really the issue. With a territory spanning eleven time zones, Russia will always be big, at least to a neighbor the size of Norway. Or, to say it with the typical understatement of the former Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pertti Paasio, "The Russian bear is still a rather large animal." The sheer difference of proportion is a problem in itself, the way the United States will always be a problem to Latin America. Whichever political system Russia ends up with, Norway will have to deal with a great neighboring power promoting its own national interests that may not necessarily coincide with Norway's.

Still, a small neighboring country, which simply must relate to the Great Power on its eastern border at any time, has no alternative but to try to discern some long-term trends, make certain calculations of probability, independent of prevailing ideologies or individual rulers of the moment, in order to formulate its own policies and take a minimum of precautions. We too have our self-interest to look after. And it is clearly in our self-interest to avoid the Iron Curtain being replaced by a new separation, between a well-to-do Europe to the west and a poor Europe to the east. That would inevitably lead to political turmoil, further destruction of the environment, maybe civil war and uncontrolled mass movements of refugees across the borders. Realizing that these formidable problems can only be solved in an international context, we have given our full support, including financial pledges, to the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (the "EBRD"). In addition, we have advocated that the coordinating process for Western assistance to the new independent states, the theme of a conference convened by then President Bush in February of 1992, should be similar in scope and intention to the Marshall Plan which helped heal the wounds left by World War II. But we have also initiated a number of bilateral assistance programs and the Norwegian Government has established a special fund for export credits.

The Soviet Union that we have dealt with for more than seventy years had a peculiarly legalistic approach to international cooperation, and worked tirelessly to codify all kinds of relations into treaties, agreements, and pacts. We have often seen this bureaucratic zeal as a nuisance, but today we have some reason to be grateful as the new, or revived, Russian Federation has declared its intention to honor and respect all international obligations signed by the former Soviet Union. Norway recognized the Russian Federation as successor state in an exchange of notes in the beginning of 1992, and we think we now have a relatively solid base for legal dealings with our great neighbor, regardless of which political system will prevail. It is, by the way, an interesting twist of history that the former Russia—the tzarist one—was the first major power to recognize Norway's independence in 1905, a gesture promptly returned when Russia proclaimed its independence at the end of 1991.

In the long term, a fruitful economic cooperation between Russia and her Nordic neighbors may very well develop. Regular consultations on economic cooperation have been established on the government level, and agreements on investments, joint ventures, environmental protection etc., are being prepared. Several projects already have been initiated on the regional level, e.g., between Finnmark, the northernmost county in Norway, and the Murmansk area. An example is a Government-sponsored project aimed at increasing food production in Northwest Russia—the Kola Peninsula—with farmers and agricultural authorities on the Norwegian side providing expertise, equipment, breeding assistance, and the like to increase output from soil and cattle. A further step was taken in January 1993, when an agreement on extensive regional cooperation between the northernmost counties of Russia, Fin-
land, Norway, and Sweden was signed by the Foreign Ministers of these countries.

One day even the traditional border trade, known until the Russian revolution as the "Pomor trade," may flourish again. But several years are likely to pass before the Russian economy has reached a state when individual, Western companies can expect a profit without taking considerable risks. So for the time being, governments will have to share the risks and most cooperative opportunities will be found on the government level.

When former Soviet President Gorbachev visited Oslo in May 1991 to deliver a somewhat belated Nobel Peace Prize acceptance lecture, a wide range of issues and opportunities were discussed and eventually found their way into a Joint Declaration, covering issues like industrial and nuclear pollution, cross-border trade, the delimitation of the Barents Sea and feasibility studies for increased commercial use of the Northeast Passage. The goals and terms of the Declaration were confirmed in a Joint Protocol signed during a visit by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Oslo in March 1992. We are now in the process of debating the follow-up to the Declaration and the implementation of projects with the new Russian government and with the local authorities in the border regions. In the following, I shall discuss a few of these issues in some detail.

In addition to the Joint Declaration, Mr. Gorbachev agreed to the establishment of a Norwegian-Soviet Forum for Energy and Environment Issues, which is continuing its work in the new, Russian political context. The main reason for establishing the Forum is that one of the most striking challenges facing all the countries in the region is to be found in the environmental sector. We have known for a long time that the virtual absence of responsibility and anti-pollution measures in Soviet industrial plants has caused great harm to people and to the natural environment, not only in the immediate surroundings but deep into the neighboring states. The most spectacular case in point was of course the radiation following the Chernobyl disaster. But we have also long suspected that several sunken nuclear submarines, discarded submarine reactors, and dumps of spent nuclear fuel in the Arctic Ocean and the Kara Sea could one day produce dangerous leaks; the Russians
have recently admitted that this is indeed the case. The fact that several of the sunken submarines lie on the seabed of international waters in an area where strong currents spanning the entire globe may turn any serious pollution into an instant worldwide catastrophe, makes this a problem for the entire international community. And the enormous difficulties involved in salvaging such dangerous materials from extreme depths clearly put the challenge well beyond the technological capacities of Russia. The situation here is a good illustration of the kind of global problems that can only be solved through cooperation and collective efforts, and which are rapidly replacing the traditional concerns of military security as the main focus for foreign policy.

When the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense visited Norway last year, he acknowledged the existence of some 150 cities and villages engaged in secret nuclear research and weapons production. Most of these cities, totalling a population of 1,500,000, are located on the Kola Peninsula. Though it has been suggested that some of the cities will be engaged in the destruction of nuclear weapons, no comprehensive plans for their elimination or future activities have yet been announced. In addition to a potential pollution problem, we are worried about a possible exodus of nuclear experts from these sights, seeking more lucrative conditions elsewhere, and an ensuing lack of control and authority.

Even if the arsenals of nuclear missiles are now being scaled back, we will have to live with important nuclear stockpiles on our doorstep for many years to come; if not for other reasons, simply because the destruction process is costly and slow. The good news is that the Russians have pledged and begun to demonstrate full openness on all nuclear issues and have agreed to consider even military nuclear installations and stockpiles under an environmental angle. They have also established a program with the International Atomic Energy Agency (the "IAEA") for a thorough inspection of the nuclear plants. The most recent assessment by the IAEA shows that twenty-six of the sixty nuclear reactors in the Russian Federation and Central and Eastern Europe have "serious" safety deficiencies, and that fourteen have "considerable" ones. All the Scandinavian countries are, of course, relieved to see this pro-
gram well under way and have contributed significantly to the financing of it.

The nickel plants *Petchenganikel* and *Severonikel* in the city of Nikel, and other heavy industry plants on the Kola Peninsula, produce sulfuric emissions far above all internationally accepted limits, leading to highly visible environmental destruction. Earlier, it was virtually impossible to make the Soviet authorities acknowledge this, let alone do something about it. Today, the problems are discussed openly, and there is a manifest will not only to do something about it, but even to seek cooperation. To reclaim the damaged environment and rebuild the pollutant industries is, however, extremely costly and necessitates a kind of technology and expertise that the Russians simply do not have. The governments of Norway, Sweden, and Finland have therefore jointly offered the Russians an assistance package for the modernization of the nickel works within an initial framework of approximately US$580,000,000. Private companies have joined forces to develop cleansing technology while the governments will tailor a financial package involving both direct funding and offers of loans. The whole modernization process is scheduled to be completed by 1995, but much will depend on the Russians’ ability to get the administrative structures in place and working. We are not yet fully convinced of that. The offer is partly meant to help the Russians help themselves, as a transfer of technology that they will further develop on their own; partly, it is a selfish effort to save our own environment in the border areas. A similar cooperation effort has been initiated with the Baltic countries to restore the ecological balance in the Baltic Sea, and will be pursued within the context of the newly established Baltic Council.

In all events, the rehabilitation of the environmental damage in Russia and the East European countries will remain a formidable task for the whole of Europe for many years to come. In a long-term perspective, however, there are also positive opportunities in this field, particularly in the transportation and energy sectors. We know that the energy consumption in the countries of Eastern Europe traditionally has been wasteful and polluting. Coal has been a main source. But recently, they have begun to show interest in natural gas as a source of energy much less harmful to the environment. That
makes them a significant market in the longer term, both for technology and for the transport of energy.

Another long-term, and perhaps somewhat exotic project with positive potential for the whole world, but particularly for neighboring Norway, is the declared intention of the Russians to open the Northeast Passage to commercial shipping. Mr. Gorbachev first announced this intention to open the Northeast Passage for commercial shipping in his widely publicized speech in Murmansk on October 1, 1987. If this proves feasible, the tradeways between the Atlantic and the Pacific will be cut in half, and a significant part of international maritime traffic will sail along the Norwegian coast. Our port cities will be busy with repair, bunkering and other activities, and our fish and energy products will be far more competitive in markets such as Japan's, due to considerably shorter transportation.

This project is still being researched, but it is in itself encouraging that the former Soviet Government asked the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo to plan and coordinate an international research effort, involving a number of well-known institutions throughout the world and comprising the commercial, environmental, legal, and political dimensions of an internationalization of these waters, which for so long have been one of the best-guarded secrets in the Soviet military strategy.

The passage is 5600 nautical miles long, stretching from Murmansk/Arhangelsk in the west to Vladivostok in the east, along the northern rim of Siberia and through the Bering Strait. Many problems have to be solved before commercial sailing can be initiated, from pollution risks in a sensitive environment to breaking through the enormous ice masses. But the Russians have managed to keep the passage open nine months of the year, allowing 300 to 400 ships to pass, bound for the great Siberian rivers.

It is therefore quite possible that, one day, we will have a new international waterway to the north of us. The economies that can be obtained are sizeable. In September 1989, a Soviet freighter sailed from Osaka in Japan through the Northeast Passage to Hamburg in 22 days, whereas the normal sailing time through the Suez Canal would be 30 days. Similarly, sailing time from Europe to the west coast of America can be reduced by more than one-third by avoiding the Panama Canal.
Considering that eighty percent of the world's industrial production originates north of thirty degrees N, and that most of the world's largest urban centers are situated in the top part of the Northern hemisphere, the savings of a Northern Sea Route would of course be substantial.

The project was thoroughly discussed by The Third Northern Regions Conference, convened by the Governor of Alaska in Anchorage in September 1990, and again in May 1991. Twenty regional leaders from all the nations bordering on the Arctic Ocean met in order to "share common concerns regarding environmental protection, economic well-being and the appropriate role of regional governments in decision-making which affects the North." They agreed to establish a "Northern Forum as a mechanism for regular interactions among those who are northern leaders," and one of the issues they decided to give priority status was opening the Northern Sea Route to international shipping. Apart from a final document signed by all the participants at the 1990 meeting, a U.S.-Soviet protocol specifically pledged to "assess the technical and economic feasibility of the Northern Sea Route utilizing Soviet ice breakers for Pacific to Atlantic trade."

Like many other nations, the Soviet Union extended its territorial waters to twelve nautical miles in the 1960s, and it came to consider the entire Northern Sea Route as "internal, historic waters." Indeed, a Decree of January 15, 1985 formalized this claim by drawing straight lines from firm land to all islands and archipelagoes; an action which, in the Soviet view, was authenticated by the provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Though the right to innocent passage was recognized in principle, at least for civilian vessels, access to the entire area remained in practice very limited to foreigners. The fact that strategic interests were scaled down significantly, and Western cooperation in opening the Passage sought well before the actual dissolution of the Soviet Union, is ample proof of the economic potential of this project. In addition to considerable revenue from Russian pilots and icebreakers serving international shipping, Moscow obviously also hopes that a new and rational transportation system in the High North would facilitate exploitation of Siberia's enormous, and largely untapped, mineral resources.

But let us go back to the neighbor perspective for a mo-
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ment and to the relations between the big power Russia and the smaller, Scandinavian countries. The Norwegian-Russian border is relatively short and historically well-established, so we need not fear serious problems there. But the Finns face several sensitive issues, mainly in Eastern Carelia which they were forced to cede after World War II. Norway will more likely face problems at sea, and particularly when it comes to the long disputed delimitation line in the Barents Sea.

The Barents Sea is a naturally defined body of water of approximately 1,250,000 square kilometers. The disputed area covers some 175,000 square kilometers. The entire seabed in the area is sufficiently shallow to be part of the continental shelf of one of the parties, as defined by the International Court of Justice in its 1969 ruling. It stretches past the northern archipelagoes, i.e., the Norwegian Svalbard to the west and the Russian Franz Josef Land to the east.

The Law of the Sea developed very rapidly in the 1970s. In 1977, both Norway and the Soviet Union extended their exclusive economic zones to 200 nautical miles. These overlap to the north. From 1974 the two nations were engaged in formal negotiations on a delimitation of the continental shelves, and later agreed to include the economic zones in the negotiations.

Because agreement could not be reached after many rounds of negotiations, the parties agreed in 1978 to an interim accord, known as the "Grey Zone Agreement," pending a final settlement. It has since been renewed annually. The agreement applies to an area of 155,000 square kilometers, and it covers undisputed Norwegian as well as Russian waters so as not to prejudice a final solution. The "Grey Zone Agreement" pertains only to agreed rules for fishing and establishment of quotas. Each party may permit their own or third party vessels to fish in the Grey Zone, each supervising the vessels they have granted a license. This is a kind of shared jurisdiction, but certainly not a joint jurisdiction, for which the Soviets had pressed hard in the past.

Both countries are parties to the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958. In Article 6, the Convention stipulates as a main rule that boundaries on the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between States. In ab-
sence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary between States whose coasts are opposite each other is the median line. Similarly, where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. In practice, this corresponds to the median line.

The boundaries of the Norwegian shelf in the North Sea were determined in the 1960s according to the median principle in relation to Sweden, Denmark, and the UK. Only brief negotiations were necessary to determine minor realignments to avoid too much zig-zagging.

In keeping with this principle, Norway proposed to the Soviet Union back in 1974 that the Barents Sea shelf be divided along a median line stipulated from the northernmost points on the mainland border and the easternmost points of Svalbard to the west, and from Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya to the east. This would give the Soviets sovereignty over approximately six-tenths of the entire Barents Sea surface, and Norway, four-tenths.

Moscow rejected the offer, maintaining that the median rule did not apply when the parties were free to negotiate the border lines they wanted. They also invoked a series of “special circumstances”: the shape and the length of the coastline; ice and geological conditions; the size of the population; economic interests, such as fisheries and shipping; special ecological problems caused by the Gulf Stream; and the highly sensitive strategic interests of the Soviet Union—unquestionably the most important consideration at the time the negotiations started.

For all these reasons, the Soviets proposed a line following a meridian due north from the western edge of the Soviet coastline, or the Soviet land border. Such a solution, commonly referred to as the “sector line,” would be in keeping with a Soviet decree of 1926 which drew meridian lines all the way to the North Pole: in the west from the end of what was then the Finnish-Soviet border; in the east in the Bering Strait according to the Treaty of 1867 which ceded Alaska to the
United States. Within these meridians, the young Soviet Union claimed all islands and territories, discovered as well as undiscovered.

At the time, there was perhaps a rationale for this, as U.S. and Canadian expeditions had attempted to establish themselves at Wrangel Island and Herald Island, and Norway was contemplating claiming sovereignty over Franz Josef Land, well inside the Soviet Sector.

Norway did protest the Sector decree in 1926, but has not since objected to the Soviet possession of Franz Josef Land. We have maintained, however, that the Sector principle can only be applied to determine the territorial status of certain islands and remote territories. It has never been established in international law that a “Sector line” could be invoked as a basis for delimiting areas of maritime jurisdiction.

Norway has previously signalled its willingness to compromise, provided agreement can be reached on a fixed and undisputed border line. The Declaration that former President Gorbachev agreed to in the summer of 1991 seemed to signal a new and more constructive attitude on the Russian part as well. The new Russian Government has also signalled that it is positively inclined to finding a negotiated solution to the twenty year old dispute, and a new rounds of talks held recently showed the difference to have narrowed somewhat, but formal negotiations have not yet been scheduled. An agreement would allow us to proceed with cooperation on resource management in the Barents sea, in particular protective measures for the considerable fish stocks and for the sensitive Arctic environment.

A main priority of the new Russian big power is the locating of new natural resources. A look at the energy sector, for example, shows that Russian oil production has declined steadily for several years. The very significant investments in the oil and gas industry in the 1980s did not yield the kind of results expected from a more efficient economic system. Instead, production costs have tripled since 1985, according to available Russian statistics. At the same time, production declined from 12.14 mbd in 1989 to 11.4 mbd in 1990, and exports slumped from 2 mbd in 1990 to 1.1 mbd in 1991. The high oil prices prompted by the Gulf War may have offered some compensa-
tion in actual revenue, but that level has already been significantly reduced.

Anyway, a modern Russia will obviously have a significantly higher oil consumption than today. It will not take more than a modest rise in the number of cars to increase fuel consumption dramatically. The land-based reserves being limited, off-shore drilling will be necessary, in the far east as well as in the Barents Sea. So far, more natural gas than oil has been discovered on the Barents Sea shelf. One enormous gas field, the Chtokmanovskoye, is located some 600 kilometers from shore at water depths of 300 meters. A group of Scandinavian and U.S. companies has conducted a feasibility study for field development and tested its contents. Though exploitation is probably many years away, one expects that this field alone can produce 25,000,000,000 cubic meters a year, equal to Norway’s total gas production. (And Norway is today Europe’s leading producer of natural gas.) In addition, the Russians have recently located an even larger gas field, the Rusanovskoye, in the Kara Sea.

So, the resources are not lacking, but technology, expertise, and investment capital are. Joint ventures and concessions to foreign companies will obviously be coming on a great scale, as soon as the Russian Federation finds practical ways to deal with the administrative and policy tasks once handled by the powerful Soviet Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry. What is certain is that tomorrow’s Russia will need all the resources it can get.

And even if the Russians will be more cooperative and rational, generally speaking, we must realistically assume that they will look after their own interests. As a big power—though not necessarily a “superpower” any longer—Russia will still have important strategic interests in the North. Unless we experience a decisive breakthrough for the Test Ban Treaty, Russia will also remain a nuclear power with a need for test explosions as part of an ongoing modernization program. The growing environmental concern, and the fear of radiation resulting from Chernobyl, prompted the Soviet authorities a few years back to move their underground nuclear tests from Semi-Palatinsk in Kazakhstan to Novaya Zemlya, where they, against our protests, started test explosions. For the time being, we are enjoying their self-imposed moratorium, and we
sincerely hope that their proclaimed wish to end all nuclear testing soon will be translated into a comprehensive, international agreement.

With its petroleum and mineral resources, important fisheries and prospects for increased international shipping, the Barents Sea will remain a sensitive area, strategically and militarily, for the Russians. A significant portion of the strategic nuclear weapons remaining after the conclusion of the START Treaty will be deployed in nuclear-powered submarines, and Russia will, in all likelihood, continue to deploy most of the former Soviet strategic missile submarine fleet from home-bases on the Kola Peninsula. Kola will also remain the home port area for the largest of the Russian, or Commonwealth, fleets in Europe because it provides the least constrained access to the open sea. And, rather than scale down their naval arsenals in the High North, the Russians have recently chosen to enforce them by transferring parts of the Black Sea Fleet to the Kola bases. One particularly spectacular enforcement is the brand new aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov," which was whisked out of Sevastopol on the eve of Ukranian independence. But it lacks aircraft and remains at dock, so we do not see it as a sign of increased global ambitions. More likely, the Russian strategy will gradually be returned to its traditional sphere, coastal protection and patrol work.

But with the weakening of Russian power, U.S. or Allied supremacy probably will increase rather than diminish in the Northern waters. While the entire strategic and tactical situation in Central Europe is being completely altered as a result of the CFE agreement, Russian withdrawal and the unification of Germany, the military geography of the Northern flank remains strangely unaltered. The United States does not seem inclined to include naval forces in arms reduction negotiations. A main reason for that is clearly the global defense needs of the United States, the Gulf crisis being an acute case in point, and therefore the wish to maintain the "advance strategy" in the North. That translates among other things into a deployment of surface and submarine forces capable of quickly destroying the Russian submarines carrying nuclear long range missiles.

Though the rest of Europe is becoming more actually disarmed than it has been in a century, "The Hunt for Red Octo-
ber" remains the military scenario of the North. In other words, unless the Russians choose to scrap their entire naval strike force, the U.S.-Russian military standoff will remain in our Northern waters, regardless of other positive developments in their relationship. The importance of the Kola Peninsula, in military terms, will increase rather than diminish. The big power Russia may, just like the Soviet super power, feel a need to secure the "Second Strike" capability represented by their nuclear submarines.

Norway, Svalbard, and the adjoining waters will remain strategically important to our eastern neighbor, and that makes our eastern neighbor a problem for us. Paradoxically, the problem may even grow more serious as Russian power, generally speaking, weakens. With their last and most serious offensive capability concentrated in this area, the need to protect it and keep it operational may become more of an obsession to the Russians. In the long term, mutually agreed arms reductions in the naval field, international cooperation on the Barents Sea shelf, and the possible opening of the Northeast Passage to international shipping may gradually ease these tensions. But whether the leader of tomorrow’s Russia is a president in Moscow, a tzar in St. Petersburg, or a popularly elected Commonwealth leader in Minsk, he or she will inherit this military geography and will have to find ways to cope with it.

Though not directly party to the underlying big power rivalry, Norway will continue to be part of that military geography, whether we like it or not. As the only NATO country, Norway will remain a "frontline state," with a common border with Russia in an area of very great economic and strategic importance. However stronger the U.S. naval forces will be than the Russian ones, Norway will always be the weaker part in relation to Russia.

As long as conditions remain unstable throughout the former Soviet Union, Norway will have to be concerned with safeguards against insecurity. At the same time, we are convinced that the future holds promises of cooperation and important economic development in the High North. So, whereas our planning today must focus primarily on how to deal with insecurity and all its implications, we take a confident view of the long term perspective. But I would like to stress in conclusion
that the most immediate challenge for all of us is to make all possible efforts to prevent a new "poverty curtain," social unrest, and further destruction of the environment from disrupting the unique opportunity we now have to build a new Europe of lasting peace and cooperation.