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Letter from Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) to Geraldine Ferraro

Dennis DeConcini
United States Senate

C. V. Lafeber

Geraldine Ferraro

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Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro  
U. S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congresswoman Ferraro:

    I have been requested to deliver the enclosed proposal to you in the hope that you might feel it worthwhile to use in your campaign.

    If you have any questions about it, they may be directed to Dr. C. V. Lafeber.

Very truly yours,

DENNIS DeCONCINI  
United States Senator

DDC/GKJ  
Enclosure
Dear Mr. Senator,

I hope You remember our acquaintance and our reciprocal interest in the development of Poland. Last year I spoke in Warszawa with many people, governmental and ecclesiastical. As well I spoke with many Dutch politicians about the East-West relations, the arms race and the situation in Poland.

From all this contacts is born a project, written by General von Meijenfeld and the undersigned, that will be published in the newspapers on 31 Augustus 1984. We ask You to deliver this project to Mrs. Geraldine Ferraro. The Democratic Party can use it in the electoral struggle. We hope that, if the democratic party wins this election - we hope that and pray for it - the new government will back this very important Dutch proposal.

I send You many cordial salutations and hope You to see again, whether in the USA or in the Netherlands. You are always welcome.

Yours very sincerely,

C.V. Lafeber
Polish-Dutch cooperation: A proposal.

"The Dutch Cabinet is not willing to wait for what is happening in the field of armament for the next one year and a half, but it wants to undertake between East and West internationally necessary action" (Bert de Vries, Christian-democratic leader, 20.6.1984, House of Commons, The Hague).

"The East-West dialogue does not count only for the Soviet Union, but also for the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, of which we have the feeling that they appreciate contacts with the Western countries" (Minister Van den Broek, Foreign Affairs, 31.5.1984, in Washington)

In the discussion about the decision of the Cabinet d.d. 1 June 1984 about the (non-)placing of cruise missiles in the Netherlands on the 1st of November 1985 is repeatedly spoken both of a Dutch signal function as of bilateral contacts with East-European countries.

Apart from this decision it is useful and necessary to elaborate those two elements and bring them into practice. The subjoined plan is a very prudent effort to achieve this.

In our proposal we took the view that, if between the two antagonistic blocks a peace keeping deterrent exists, this also stays on a lower level by mutual minimum reduction. Our philosophy which lies behind the proposal is, that no superpower, let alone clientstates connected with it, has aggressive intentions towards each other, in spite of the semblance of the contrary. The Netherlands have of all West-European countries the most and best relations with Poland. The liberation of our country by Polish soldiers created many personal contacts and is till now a source of gratitude and inspiration for all those "Poland committees" in our country, which on their turn again made so many new friendships.

The time has come to give a political translation on this friendships. These two each other very friendly nations, which by a political fate turned up in mutual hostile camps, have the historical duty to work on the diminishing of the contrasts. "Idealism", Minister De Ruyter said, "has to get a political translation".

In the same way as Polish and Dutch families have come into contact with each other, so the Dutch and Polish Governments have to make a common proposal in mutual deliberation - perhaps conform the ideas which we have -, which they communicate to all regarding Governments, but which they also will defend with all their forces in the concerning gremia - we think on the MBFR-talks in Vienna -, and which they, in spite of the reactions, deliberately will realize.

This plan, which will have to receive the official status in Warsaw and The Hague, comprises that both in Holland and Poland a marginal military task will be knocked off. Each country will do so according to its own discretion and opinion, but in bilateral and mutual relation. The released money will be spent on a medical or social-cultural project in Poland; Poland on its turn will help with the solution of a Dutch problem, e.g. that of the unemployment, by giving work during a fixed time for Dutch unemployed in a fixed industry and in a fixed region. The Polish Government will give food and housing and pay this cost from the released defence-money.

Which military task will be pushed down by the Polish Government, if she had consented principally with this proposal, is only her case, as it is up to lay down to the Dutch Government which tasks eventually can be missed here. The discussion about this missing has to be started now.
During discussions in both countries the objection will be heard that "properly nothing" here can be missed, and that "our" repulsion will be more fundamental, more risky and more precious than this of the other side, by which the balance would be endangered. André Fontaine recently said that we keep on speaking endlessly which party had an overweight, but that each party differently reckons and that everybody is afraid that the other has or gets a preponderance and that every "reckons to itself or from itself". Evidently, both governments have to be open for criticism, but a serious dialogue is only possible with those critics who know that the present armsrace and diabolization of the opposing party at least is so risky, and who have the political will to change the political and military false positions of our days.

The Dutch part in the proposal can comprise:
- the removal of a certain military (conventional or atomic) unit;
- the change of a certain military (conventional or atomic) unit into a position of indirect preparedness;
- the elimination of certain atomic tasks.

Concerning the reduction of the nuclear tasks is to be remarked that the Dutch NATO-contribution in nuclear loads is very limited. A Dutch reduction will not endanger either the military deterrent, which never will be endangered by mutual reductions. An advantage of the repulsion of Dutch nuclear tasks is that about this has been spoken since many years. The NATO-decision of Montebello, fall 1983, to eliminate 1400 nuclear loads from Western Europe, is typical. But it will be evident that those nuclear tasks will not be considered for repulsion which are obsolete or are hardly functional. When honest and honourable politicians will deliver a marginal but substantial contribution to a better understanding between the two blocs and to a diminishing of the armsrace, they don't have to offer one clearance-sale-article.

The repulsion of nuclear tasks has to be free from the decision-making about the placing of Tomahawk cruise missiles in the Netherlands. In other words: the reduction of our national nuclear tasks may be no argument to place the new rocketsystems. On the other hand a decision not to place needs not to be a reason to maintain undiminishedly the whole present-day packet of nuclear tasks. The whole problem of the nuclear weapons is one different from a Polish-Dutch agreement.

Though there is hardly any calculation about costs of specific military tasks, it can be accepted that a reduction of military efforts as meant here, will vary from a diminishing of one million of guilders at the repulsion of certain atomic tasks on the one hand till a diminishing of several millions of guilders when the Dutch army will lift up or change the status of direct preparedness into an indirect one of a military unit.

Necessary is that both in Poland and in the Netherlands a commission will have to be set up, existing of ministerial officials, parliamentarians and civil persons, who are interested in the Polish-Dutch relations. They will have the task to elaborate this proposal, to evaluate it later and to propose new plans. Close cooperation between the Polish and the Dutch commission is necessary.

On a Continent that is the greatest powder-magazine of the world, which itself is full of threats and menaces, every idea to promote a climate of detente at least deserves the serious attention of the politicians. On 27th May of this year the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the cadre of the European Political Cooperation spoke that every European country has to build up its own relation with the countries of the Eastern bloc. The French Minister Cheysson said in the name of his E3-colleagues: "Moscow and Washington speak so loudly that ultimately no country doesn't hear the other more". His British colleague Haseltine at the same time pleaded for block-connecting relations between the East- and West-European countries.
This proposal gives a form to those thoughts; it endangers, in the case of realization neither the USA nor the Soviet Union nor both blocs; it is minimal step - but a step - to reversal; it is a fair, honest attempt to point out a different direction to the world, in which the nations menace each other with death. Certainly the people of Europe can not wait for ever under the East-West threat. The politicians have to take up this proposal.

C. V. Lefeber, historian
Royal Military Academy Breda

M. H. von Meyenfeldt, general