A Common Law for the Statutory Era: The Right of Publicity and New York's Right of Privacy Statute

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A COMMON LAW FOR THE STATUTORY ERA: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND NEW YORK’S RIGHT OF PRIVACY STATUTE

I. Introduction

In Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,\(^1\) the widows of Stanley Laurel and Oliver Hardy sued the copyright owners of certain Laurel and Hardy motion pictures because of their merchandizing of the actors’ names and likenesses.\(^2\) Acknowledging the defendants’ copyrights,\(^3\) the complaint conceded use of film “stills” to the defendants.\(^4\) Nonetheless, the complaint asserted that the actors had valid property rights in their names and likenesses, independent of the copyrights, that descended to their heirs.\(^5\) The court agreed,\(^6\) distinguishing the instant case, in which the actors portrayed themselves, from other situations, in which actors develop fictional characters that are copyrightable in their own right.\(^7\) Therefore, the court entered an injunction against the defendant and awarded damages to the plaintiffs.\(^8\)

The Price decision is predicated on the common law right of publicity.\(^9\) The doctrine, which recently has gained wide recognition from judges,\(^10\) legislators\(^11\) and scholars,\(^12\) affords an individual the

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2. Id. at 838.
3. Id. at 840.
4. Id. at 842.
5. Id. at 839.
6. Id. at 846.
7. Id. at 845.
8. Id. at 847.
11. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (West Supp. 1987); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108 (1984). Other state legislatures, under the aegis of the right of privacy, have also created publicity rights. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1972); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-202, 20-208 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.2, 839.3 (West 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1984). Other statutes prohibit the misappropriation of another’s name, photograph or likeness, but these either deny descendibility or fail to address the issue. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (Law. Co-op. 1986);
right to control and profit from the exploitation of his persona, \(^{13}\)
i.e., "the public image that makes people want to identify with the object person, and thereby imbues his name or likeness with commercial value marketable to those that seek such identification." \(^{15}\)
The scope of the right of publicity includes aspects of an individual, such as name or likeness, that attain value from his persona. \(^{16}\)

The right of publicity emanated from recognition that the right of privacy, \(^{17}\) which protects an individual's feelings, did not sufficiently protect against the commercial misappropriation of a persona. \(^{18}\) Indeed, New York's right of privacy statute provides individuals with protection that is in part identical to that safeguarded by the right of publicity. \(^{19}\) The privacy statute procribes the use of a living person's "name, portrait or picture" for "advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade" without his written consent. \(^{20}\)

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13. Throughout this Note, the pronouns "he," "his" and "him" include references to "she," "her's" or "her," unless the context suggests otherwise, to avoid awkward grammatical constructions that would likely occur because of the limitations of the English language.


16. "Persona" denotes not only name, picture and likeness but also voice, style and attributes, such as a baseball player's fielding and batting statistics or Charlie Chaplin's cigar, glasses and bushy eyebrows. See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 612, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 261 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984).

17. See infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.

18. See infra notes 37, 55-63 and accompanying text.

19. See infra notes 134-96 and accompanying text.

In a landmark decision implicating New York's right of privacy statute, *Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.*,\(^{21}\) the Second Circuit held that "in addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy . . . a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph."\(^{22}\) This case, precedent for the proposition that the right of publicity exceeds the scope of the privacy statute, has led the federal courts of the Second Circuit to develop a common law right of publicity under New York law.\(^{23}\)

Unlike these federal courts, however, the New York Court of Appeals has never expressly recognized a common law right of publicity in the state.\(^{24}\) Indeed, writing for New York's highest court in December of 1984, Chief Judge Wachtler stated: "Since the 'right of publicity' is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law as an aspect of the right of privacy, . . . [a] plaintiff cannot claim an independent common-law right of publicity."\(^{25}\) Less than one year later, however, following a contrary determination by the appellate division,\(^{26}\) the court of appeals equivocated: "[W]e do not pass upon the question of whether a common-law descendible right of publicity exists in this [s]tate."\(^{27}\) Thus, the existence of an independent common law right of publicity remains at issue in New York.\(^{28}\)

This Note compares New York's right of privacy statute with the right of publicity and considers whether New York courts, in accordance with the judiciary's traditional lawmaking role, should recognize a common law right of publicity.\(^{29}\) Initially, it reviews the

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22. 202 F.2d at 868.
23. See, e.g., *Hicks v. Casablanca Records*, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (right of publicity descends only if decedent exploited it during his lifetime, that is, "acted in such a way as to evidence his . . . recognition of the extrinsic commercial value of his . . . name or likeness, and manifested that recognition in some overt manner"); *Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.*, 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (right of publicity "does not terminate upon death"); *Grant v. Esquire, Inc.*, 367 F. Supp. 876, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[t]he 'right of publicity' is somewhat akin to the exclusive right of a commercial enterprise to the benefits to be derived from the goodwill and secondary meaning that it has managed to build up in its name").
29. See infra notes 70-196, 220-348 and accompanying text.
historical development of the rights of privacy and publicity in the United States and their current articulation in New York. 30 The Note then asserts that the unauthorized exploitation of a persona, such as the marketing of a model's posters without her consent 31 or the use of a celebrity's look-alike to imply his endorsement of a product without his consent, 32 merits judicial recognition of a common law right of publicity in New York. 33 Finally, in response to the argument that a judge-made right of publicity—regardless of its value—would impermissibly encroach on the legislature's prerogative, the Note addresses the propriety of court-initiated change today and concludes that some traditional justifications for judge-made law remain persuasive. 34

II. History of the Rights of Privacy and Publicity: Protection of a Persona From Unauthorized Exploitation

The rights of privacy and publicity both protect an individual's persona from unauthorized exploitation. 35 The rights, however, protect against different kinds of injury. 36 This Part briefly presents the historical development and current understanding of these rights, and concludes by contrasting them.

A. The Right of Privacy

Commentators first noted the right of privacy, which secures an individual's right "to be let alone," almost a century ago. 37 In their seminal article, The Right of Privacy, 38 Samuel D. Warren and Louis

30. See infra notes 35-196 and accompanying text.
31. See Brinkley v. Casablanca, 80 A.D.2d 428, 430, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1006 (1st Dep't 1981) (court resolved Christie Brinkley's identical complaint under New York's right of privacy statute while stating in dictum that the state's common law fails to recognize the right of publicity).
33. See infra notes 220-85 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 286-348 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 55-63, 93-106, 144-60 and accompanying text.
38. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 37, at 193.
D. Brandeis asserted that the right must be recognized lest trade in
gossip diminish social standards. 39 Warren and Brandeis proceeded
from the general proposition that an "individual shall have full
protection in [his] person and . . . property." 40 To reinforce their
justification of a remedy for "mere injury to the feelings," 41 which
had previously been uncompensable, Warren and Brandeis illustrated
that the right of privacy was already being protected. 42 The law,
they asserted, protected the right of privacy not on "the principle
of private property, but that of an inviolate personality." 43 Specif-
ically, the authors demonstrated that common law protection against
unauthorized publication of an owner's intellectual property rested
"not in the right to take the profits arising from publication, but
in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent
any publication at all." 44 In their conclusion, the authors argued
that privacy rights, unlike those arising from contractual or fiduciary
relationships, are "rights as against the world." 45

1. The Right of Privacy at Common Law

In the decade following the release of the Warren and Brandeis
article, professional debate raged over the existence of the right of
privacy. 46 It was not until 1905, however, that a landmark decision

39. See id. Warren and Brandeis found other reasons to protect the right to
be left alone:

The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under
the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity,
so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual;
but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could
be inflicted by mere bodily injury.

Id. at 196.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 197.
42. See id. at 193, 197.
43. Id. at 205.
44. Id. at 200.
45. Id. at 213. The remainder of the article explains limitations on the right
of privacy, and remedies available for its infringement.
46. Savell, Right of Privacy—Appropriation of a Person's Name, Portrait, or
Picture for Advertising or Trade Purposes Without Prior Written Consent: History
Some commentators favored recognition of the right of privacy. See, e.g., Note,
Injunctions Against Publications Intruding Upon Privacy, 43 U. PA. L. REV. 134,
135 (1895); Comment, The Right To Privacy, 11 YALE L.J. 53, 54 (1901); cf.
Corliss v. Walker, 64 F. 280, 282-83 (D. Mass. 1894) (if right of privacy exists,
publicity waives it and death extinguishes it). Other authority opposed recognition.
recognized such a right at common law.\textsuperscript{47} In \textit{Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.},\textsuperscript{48} the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the unauthorized publication of a person's picture in an advertisement to promote the publisher's business violated the person's right of privacy.\textsuperscript{49} Although \textit{Pavesich} became the leading case in the area, courts issued divergent opinions for the next thirty years.\textsuperscript{50} As the \textit{Restatement of Torts}\textsuperscript{51} gained acceptance, however, "the tide set in strongly in favor of recognition."\textsuperscript{52}

Early cases recognizing a common law right of privacy, concerned with the threshold question of existence, gave little consideration to its parameters.\textsuperscript{53} Commentators, rather than the judiciary, took the lead in defining the extent of the right.\textsuperscript{54} Today, however, it is generally agreed that "[t]he law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff . . . 'to be let alone.'"\textsuperscript{55}

One text writer has described these four torts in the following manner:

1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.

\textsuperscript{48} Id.
\textsuperscript{49} See id. at 220, 50 S.E. at 81.
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Restatement of Torts} § 867 (1939). Section 867 provides: "A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other." \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{52} Prosser, \textit{supra} note 50, at 386 & nn.17-43.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Id.} at 388.
\textsuperscript{55} Prosser, \textit{supra} note 50, at 389.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.\textsuperscript{56}

An example of the "intrusion" cause of action is a case in which a landlord physically moves in on a tenant,\textsuperscript{57} or technologically enters a tenant's bedroom through wiretaps.\textsuperscript{58} The classic "publication of private facts" case involved a prostitute, tried for murder but acquitted, who subsequently married and led an "exemplary" life in another state.\textsuperscript{59} Release of a film portraying her experiences, which used her true maiden name and was advertised as a factual account, led to plaintiff's suit.\textsuperscript{60} In a recent "false light" case,\textsuperscript{61} the Supreme Court held that a journalist, who had implied that the widow of a disaster victim had been present but almost catatonic during the journalist's visit five months later to record its repercussions, violated the widow's right of privacy.\textsuperscript{62} Finally, plaintiffs have used the "appropriation" tort to prohibit the unauthorized publication of their photograph or likeness in newspaper advertisements.\textsuperscript{63}

Different as the torts are, they share several important features: they are personal\textsuperscript{64} and non-assignable.\textsuperscript{65} Moreover, limited waiver of the rights against invasion of privacy may be implied against those in the public eye because of first amendment concerns.\textsuperscript{66} A worthy plaintiff may seek injunction and damages to remedy his injury.\textsuperscript{67} New York's right of privacy is among the most circumscribed in the United States.\textsuperscript{68} The limitation stems from the peculiar history

\textsuperscript{56} Id.
\textsuperscript{57} See Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
\textsuperscript{60} See id.
\textsuperscript{62} See id.
\textsuperscript{64} Prosser, supra note 50, at 408 & n.200.
\textsuperscript{65} Id. at 408 & n.202; see, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 7, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968), aff'd, 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1st Dep't 1969).
\textsuperscript{67} Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971) (permitting damages for invasion of privacy); Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974, 978 (3d Cir. 1951) (same); Brinkley v. Casablanca, 80 A.D.2d 428, 444, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1014 (1st Dep't 1981) (granting damages and injunction for invasion of privacy).
\textsuperscript{68} See Manger v. Kree Inst. of Electrolysis, 233 F.2d 5, 8 n.3a (2d Cir. 1956); Prosser, supra note 50, at 402-403.
of the right of privacy in the state.⁶⁹

2. New York's Right of Privacy Statute

Unlike most states,⁷⁰ New York has no common law right of privacy.⁷¹ Although lower New York courts discussed the right several times in the years immediately succeeding publication of the Warren and Brandeis article,⁷² the state's highest court avoided the issue until 1902.⁷³ In that year, the court decided Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,⁷⁴ which presented facts almost identical to those appearing three years later in the Pavesich case discussed above.⁷⁵

⁶⁹. Prosser, supra note 50, at 402-403; see also infra notes 70-99 and accompanying text.

⁷⁰. See W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts 804 (4th ed. 1971) ("[i]n one form or another, the right of privacy is by this time recognized and accepted in all but a very few jurisdictions"), quoted in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975).


⁷². See Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 292, 26 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (N.Y.C. Super. Ct. N.Y. County 1893) (court enjoined defendant, editor of newspaper, from publishing picture of plaintiff actor, holding that no institution "has the right to use the name or picture of anyone for [a trade] without his consent"); Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240, 249 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1891) (physician obtained injunction against unauthorized use of his name to advertise a medicine on ground of injury to reputation); Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 789 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1891) (motion by nephew to continue preliminary injunction restraining defendants from exhibiting statue of Mary M. Schuyler, decedent, upheld under right of privacy), aff'd, 19 N.Y.S. 264 (1st Dep't 1892), rev'd subsequently, 147 N.Y. 434, 451, 42 N.E. 22, 27 (1895) (though "[n]ot assuming to decide what this right of privacy is, in all cases," court rejected claim because nephew did not represent any right of privacy surviving Mrs. Schuyler's death); Manola v. Stevens, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1890, at 2, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 18, 1890, § 1, at 3, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 21, 1890, at 2, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1890) (plaintiff, photographed without her consent by defendants while appearing in tights on stage at Broadway theater, won permanent injunction against publication by defendant).


⁷⁴. Id.

⁷⁵. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. In Roberson, the defendants made unauthorized prints of the plaintiff, Abigail M. Roberson, and used them to advertise flour they manufactured and sold. Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 542-43, 64 N.E. at 442-43. The plaintiff alleged without contradiction that the "scorns and jeers" of persons who recognized her had greatly humiliated her so that "she was made sick... and compelled to employ a physician." Id. at 542-43, 64 N.E. at 442. As a result, in what appeared to be an invasion of privacy claim, Roberson sought an injunction and $15,000 "to reimburse her for the damages to her feelings." Id. at 543, 64 N.E. at 443.
In a four to three decision, the court of appeals refused to recognize the existence of a right of privacy under the common law of New York.\textsuperscript{76} The court relied on several factors to reach its determination: the complete lack of precedent;\textsuperscript{77} the "vast amount of litigation" that would result;\textsuperscript{78} the arbitrary limitation on scope;\textsuperscript{79} and the inevitable problem of line-drawing\textsuperscript{80} that would be associated with judicial recognition of the right. It should be noted, however, that Judge Parker, wary of acting beyond the judiciary's mandate,\textsuperscript{81} suggested legislation on the subject in his opinion for the court.\textsuperscript{82}

The disposition of Roberson incited a storm of controversy.\textsuperscript{83} Publication of a New York Times' editorial\textsuperscript{84} spurred a judge who had joined the court's opinion to take "the unprecedented step"\textsuperscript{85} of publishing a law review article defending the decision.\textsuperscript{86} In 1903, however, the controversy subsided when New York became the first state to adopt a statute creating a right of privacy.\textsuperscript{87}

New York's right of privacy statute "was enacted as a direct response to Roberson."\textsuperscript{88} Indeed, according to a case brought shortly

\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447.
\textsuperscript{77} Id. at 543, 64 N.E. at 443.
\textsuperscript{78} Id. at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
\textsuperscript{79} See id.
\textsuperscript{80} Id. at 555, 64 N.E. at 447.
\textsuperscript{81} See id. at 545, 555, 64 N.E. at 443, 447.
\textsuperscript{82} See id. at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
\textsuperscript{83} Most commentators favored recognition of the right of privacy by this time. See, e.g., Note, Publication of Photograph as an Advertisement, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 486, 487 (1902); Note, Injunction—Rights of Privacy—Enforcement in Equity, 50 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 675 (1902); Right of Privacy (Book Review), 16 HARV. L. REV. 72, 72 (1902).
\textsuperscript{84} N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1902, § 1, at 8, col. 3. In describing the unwillingness of the New York Court of Appeals to prohibit the unauthorized photographing of Ms. Roberson and the subsequent publication of her pictures, as well as similar occurrences, the article stated:

If there be, as Judge Parker says there is, no law now to cover these savage and horrible practices, practices incompatible with the claims of the community in which they are allowed to be committed with impunity to be called a civilized community, then the decent people will say that it is high time that there were such a law.

Id. The article concluded with a call for legislation creating a right of privacy. Id.
\textsuperscript{85} PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 37, § 117, at 850; see also S. Hofstadter & G. Horowitz, The Right of Privacy 28 (1964) [hereinafter Hofstadter & Horowitz].
\textsuperscript{86} See O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1902).
after passage of the statute, "there can be little doubt that its enactment was prompted by the suggestion" of Judge Parker in his Roberson opinion. After addressing the Roberson-type situation, in which a plaintiff suffers "damages to [his] feelings," the legislature designed the statute "to protect the sentiments, thoughts and feelings of an individual" from injury by the commercial misappropriation

89. Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 227, 85 N.E. 1097, 1098 (1908) (emphasis added), aff'd, 220 U.S. 502 (1911). This case appears to be the first to construe the New York statute. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.

90. Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 543, 64 N.E. at 443; see also supra note 75.

91. Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280, 164 N.E.2d 853, 855, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975, 978 (1959) (citation omitted); see also Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[s]ection 51 protects a person's feelings and right to be let alone"); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 36 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("right of privacy has developed to compensate an individual for the injury to his feelings, to prevent inaccurate portrayal of private life, and, in some instances, to prevent one's private life from being depicted at all"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 100 A.D.2d 175, 178, 473 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (1st Dep't) ("statute affords protection against the commercial exploitation of one's name, portrait or picture and furnishes a remedy for the injury to a person's feelings and sentiments"), aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (2d Dep't 1977) ("[t]he statutory right is deemed a 'right of privacy' and is based upon the classic right of privacy's theoretical basis, which is to prevent injury to feelings"); Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 58 A.D.2d 45, 47, 395 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206 (1st Dep't 1977) ("right of privacy or the right of a person to live his life quietly and to be left alone rests solely in and is limited by statute") (quoting Flores, 7 N.Y.2d at 280, 164 N.E.2d at 854, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 977), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 858, 374 N.E.2d 129, 403 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978); Wilson v. Brown, 189 Misc. 79, 80, 73 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1947) (statute "was meant to protect private rights and to prevent invasion of the individual and personal right to privacy") (emphasis in original).

Another line of cases, however, implies that the purpose of the New York statute was to prevent the unjust enrichment of a person by prohibiting unauthorized commercial exploitation of his name or photograph. See, e.g., Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 439, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (1982) (in order to address specific circumstances presented in Roberson, legislature drafted statute "narrowly to encompass only the commercial use of an individual's name or likeness and no more"); cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 358, 107 N.E.2d 485, 487 (1952) (policy underlying statute is to protect individual against "selfish, commercial exploitation"); aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 806, 257 N.E.2d 895, 309 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1970); Davis v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 374, 381, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 314 (2d Dep't 1982) ("purpose of sections 50 and 51 is to prohibit commercial misappropriation of a person's name or picture"); Cardy v. Maxwell, 9 Misc. 2d 329, 331, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957) (sections were intended "to prevent commercial exploitation of a person's name, portrait or picture") (emphasis in original);
of his name or likeness.\textsuperscript{92}

Today, the statute is codified in the New York Civil Rights Law.\textsuperscript{93}

Kline v. Robert M. McBride & Co., 170 Misc. 974, 982, 11 N.Y.S.2d 674, 682 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1939) (sections were "designed to stop the merchandising in the channels of normal trade of a portrait of a person who occupies a position in which there is monetary value by publicizing same"). Judges have imputed this economic purpose not only from the language of the statute, under which commercial uses alone are proscribed, see N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987), but also from the nature of the violation, which incorporates both privacy and pecuniary interests. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 563, 64 N.E. 442, 450 (Gray, J., dissenting) ("for that complete personal security, which will result in the peaceful and wholesome enjoyment of one's privileges as a member of society, there should be afforded protection, not only against the scandalous portraiture and display of one's features and person, but against the display and use thereof for another's commercial purposes or gain") (emphasis added). The language, however, reflects the legislature's attempt to provide a remedy for the type of injury suffered by Ms. Roberson, who was humiliated as a result of the defendant's publication of her picture to advertise its product. See id. at 542-43, 64 N.E. at 442. The statute remedies the injury, invasion of privacy, of which Ms. Roberson had complained, not infringement of the purely commercial right of publicity which may occur concomitantly.

\textsuperscript{92} The legislature appears to have relied on Judge Gray in drafting the statute. Although he drew significantly from the Warren and Brandeis article, see Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 563, 64 N.E. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting), the statute fails to mention the publication of private facts. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987). Rather, "cast in terms of the use of someone's name, portrait or picture, [the statute] most closely fits the appropriation branch of the common law right of privacy." Greenawalt, New York's Right of Privacy—The Need For Change, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 159, 176 (1975).

While some authority equates the appropriation branch of the privacy tort with the right of publicity and by analogy extends New York's right of privacy statute to the vindication of economic interests, see Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 442 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting Prosser, supra note 50, at 854), such authority is doctrinally suspect because the right of privacy is a personal right ensuring an individual's right to be let alone while the right of publicity is a proprietary right protecting a person's right to control the commercial exploitation of his persona. See infra note 112.

Furthermore, in its concern over an individual's control of his name or likeness, the legislature appears to have intended to fashion a personal right, based on the protection of a person's privacy interest, rather than any pecuniary interest. This inference follows from the legislature's apparent reliance on Judge Gray, see supra, who in turn used the Warren and Brandeis article. See Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 563, 64 N.E. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting). But see Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (privacy rights vindicate commercial value of person's name or likeness as well as "mental strain, humiliation, [and] distress associated with the traditional notion of privacy"). It should be noted that there is "little indication that Warren and Brandeis intended to direct their article at . . . the exploitation of attributes of the plaintiff's identity." Prosser, supra note 50, at 401; see also Nimmer, supra note 12, at 203 (statute extended scope of privacy actions "beyond that envisaged by Brandeis and Warren").

\textsuperscript{93} N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987). Although
Section 50 of the Civil Rights Law makes it a misdemeanor to use a living person’s “name, portrait or picture” for advertising or other trade purposes without that person’s written consent. This narrow statute, unlike the common law of other states, provides no recovery for appropriations of the plaintiff’s name for non-commercial purposes. Section 51 creates a private right to sue for an injunction and damages. In addition, section 51 contains a number of provisions that the legislature has limited its scope through amendment, the statute retains the critical language it possessed when first passed in 1903. See 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2.

94. Section 50, entitled “Right of privacy,” provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.


95. Id.

96. See id.; infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.

97. Section 51, labelled “Action for injunction and for damages,” provides:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly used such person’s name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by section fifty of this article, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages. But nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation from selling or otherwise transferring any material containing such name, portrait or picture in whatever medium to any user of such name, portrait or picture, or to any third party for sale or transfer directly or indirectly to such a user, for use in a manner lawful under this article; nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation, practicing the profession of photography, from exhibiting in or about his or its establishment specimens of the work of such establishment, unless the same is continued by such person, firm or corporation after written notice objecting thereto has been given by the person portrayed; and nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation from using the name, portrait or picture of any manufacturer or dealer in connection with the goods, wares and merchandise manufactured, produced or dealt in by him which he has sold or disposed of with such name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith; or from using the name, portrait or picture of any author, composer or artist in connection with his literary, musical or artistic productions which he has sold or disposed of with such name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith.


98. Id.
of limitations on the right. Together, these sections comprise New York's privacy statute.

B. The Right of Publicity

The common law right of publicity affords an individual the right to control and profit from the exploitation of his persona, i.e., the image of him with which people want to identify. In practice, the right protects the aspects of an individual that have been imbued with value by his persona. These aspects include name, picture and likeness. Thus, if a person photographs Christie Brinkley and distributes posters of the model without her consent, the photographer-distributor has "exploited" Brinkley's persona by misap-

99. Id.
100. See supra note 14.
101. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.


Some authority supports the view that only commercial exploitation is actionable. See Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 442; Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 37, § 117, at 851-54; Hoffman, The Right of Publicity: An Analytical Update, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 14 (1982); Simon, supra note 12, at 709. The better view, however, maintains that the right of publicity protects against non-commercial exploitation as well because such use may diminish the subsequent value of the right. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575; Nimmer, supra note 12, at 217; see also Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (when person misappropriates a right of publicity never before exercised, "[t]here may well be a recognized first-time value (which diminishes with use)"). Copyright law supports this view by its approach to an analogous situation, prohibiting non-profit public performances because they reduce demand as much as for-profit public performances. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982). Because the rule of damages will limit recovery for non-commercial exploitation, however, plaintiffs will rarely bring such cases. See Nimmer, supra note 12, at 217.


propriation of her photograph, which gives her a cause of action under the right of publicity for injunction and damages against the exploiter.106

Although based on different policies107 and bounded by different parameters,108 the right of publicity has its origins in a case involving New York's right of privacy.109 In fact, the first express reference to the right of publicity occurred in a case involving New York's right of privacy statute.110 In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,111 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized that, independent of the right of privacy,112 an individual

106. In Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep't 1981), which presented these same facts, the court ruled in favor of the model under the New York right of privacy statute, see id. at 442-44, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1013-14, but could well have decided the case under the right of publicity although it stated in dictum that New York common law fails to recognize the right of publicity. See id. at 435, 438, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1009, 1011.

107. See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.

108. See infra notes 144-85 and accompanying text.

109. This development apparently happened because misappropriation of photograph cases, which were novel at the beginning of the century but have become increasingly frequent, implicate both the right to be let alone and the right to control the exploitation of one's persona. See Nimmer, supra note 12, at 204 (publicity "may be regarded as the reverse side of the coin of privacy"); Pilpel, The Right of Publicity, 27 BULL. OF THE COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 249, 262 (1979-80) ("[a]t one and the same time, totally apart from your privacy interests, you have a potentially exploitable right of publicity which enables you . . . to prevent others from commercially exploiting your name and likeness and which permits you . . . to do so") [hereinafter Pilpel].

110. Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868.

111. Id.

112. While the unauthorized commercial exploitation of an individual's name or likeness implicates both the right of privacy and the right of publicity, it is the appropriation branch of the privacy tort that protects his mental well-being and the right of publicity that protects his financial interest. Cf. Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In other words:

Rather than recognizing the legal right to protection against the injury to feelings which results from the commercial appropriation of elements of personality [and is protected by the privacy statute, the] "right of publicity" recognizes the pecuniary value which attaches to the names and pictures of public figures . . . and the right of such people to this financial benefit.

Id. at 139-40; see also Uhlænder, 316 F. Supp. at 1279-80 ("[a]lthough misappropriation of one's name, likeness or personality for commercial use has been considered as one species of the general tort of invasion of privacy, many authorities suggest that misappropriation is a distinctly independent tort"); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 387, 280 N.W.2d 129, 132 (1979) ("[f]rom almost the very outset of the recognition of the right of privacy, there has been an intermingling or confusion of the right of privacy and the right of control of the commercial aspects of one's identity").
has the right to control the exploitation of his photograph." So emerged the right of publicity.

Unlike the right of privacy and New York's privacy statute, the right of publicity does not protect personal concerns—those concerns that have meaning solely in conjunction with a specific individual, as opposed to property, which has value regardless of who owns it. In other words, the former right protects Brinkley from the helpless feeling of being used, a feeling with which others can only empathize rather than feel on their own when Brinkley is exploited. The latter right ensures the financial stake she has in carefully marketing her image. In safeguarding this proprietary interest, the right of publicity fosters two related

114. See *supra* notes 55-67, 88-98 and accompanying text.
115. See *Zacchini*, 433 U.S. at 573 (purpose of right of publicity has "little to do with protecting feelings or reputation"); *Chaplin*, 15 F.R.D. at 139 (rather than protecting "against the injury to feelings which results from the commercial appropriation of elements of personality, [the] 'right of publicity' recognizes the pecuniary value which attaches to the names and pictures of public figures"); Pielpel, *supra* note 109, at 253-57 (right of publicity does not protect against injury to feelings but violation of property right).
116. Scholars have asserted that the right of publicity vindicates other interests as well. For example, the right of publicity fosters production of creative works by providing a financial incentive, for people to develop their talents. See *Zacchini*, 433 U.S. at 576 ("protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public"); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[v]indication of the right will tend to encourage achievement"); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 287 (2d Cir. 1981) (right of publicity vindicates "public policy of providing incentives for individual enterprise and investment of capital"); *cert. denied*, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); *Memphis*, 616 F.2d at 958 (purpose served by recognition of descendible right of publicity would be "the encouragement of effort and creativity"); Hoffman, *Limitations on the Right of Publicity*, 28 BUL. OF THE COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 111, 118 (1980) (right of publicity fosters "production of intellectual and creative works by providing the financial incentive for individuals to expend the time and resources necessary to produce them") [hereinafter Hoffman]; Horowitz, *An Analysis of the Right of Publicity*, 6 ART & THE LAW 39, 39 (1981) (protecting individual's investment in developing his identity by creation of property right encourages people to develop skills necessary for public recognition, resulting in individual creativity and cultural advancement) [hereinafter Horowitz].

The incentive for creativity argument stems from an analogy to copyright, another branch of intellectual property. See Carson, 698 F.2d at 838 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Hoffman, *supra*, at 118). Unlike a copyrightable work, however, a marketable personality is usually the by-product—rather than the objective—of a creative effort. See *Memphis*, 616 F.2d at 958. As judge Merritt stated in *Memphis*:

Although fame and stardom may be ends in themselves, they are normally by-products of one's activities and personal attributes, as well as luck and promotion. The basic motivations are the desire to achieve success
or excellence in a chosen field, the desire to contribute to the happiness or improvement of one's fellows and the desire to receive the psychic and financial rewards of achievement.

Id.

In an apparent analogy to trademark law, other commentators suggest that the right of publicity serves to mitigate consumer confusion in advertising. See Hirsch, 90 Wis. 2d at 401, 280 N.W. at 139; Hoffman, supra, at 118; Treece, supra note 12, at 647. This assertion, however, in fact implicates common law trademark and unfair competition laws rather than right of publicity law.


118. See Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 445 ("[i]n the area of publicity rights ... the law must balance the competing goals ... of facilitating public access to valuable images ... and ... rewarding individual effort"); Carson, 698 F.2d at 837 (the identity of a celebrity "has a pecuniary value which the right of publicity should vindicate"); Grant, 367 F. Supp. at 879 (" 'right of publicity' is somewhat akin to the exclusive right of a commercial enterprise to the benefits to be derived from the goodwill and secondary meaning that it has managed to build up in its name"); Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1282 ("[a] celebrity must be considered to have invested his years of practice and competition in a public personality which eventually may reach marketable status. That identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statistics and other personal characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and is a type of property") (emphasis added); Nimmer, supra note 12, at 216 (courts should recognize right of publicity lest "persons who have long and laboriously nurtured the fruit of publicity values ... be deprived of them").

119. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (quoting Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326, 331 (1966)) (justification for protecting right of publicity "is the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay"); Carson, 698 F.2d at 837 ("[v]indication of the right will also tend to prevent unjust enrichment by persons such as appellee who seek commercially to exploit the identity of celebrities without their consent"); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 289 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (right of publicity "protects against the unauthorized appropriation of an individual's very persona which would result in unearned commercial gain policies. First, by guaranteeing recompense for the commercial exploitation of an individual's persona, the right of publicity vindicates the individual's natural right of property in the fruit of his labors. Thus, Brinkley alone deserves to profit from the marketable persona she has developed over the years. Second, by prohibiting the misappropriation of a person's identity, the right prevents unjust enrichment of infringers. Otherwise, the opportunistic merchant could enjoy wind-
fall gains attributable, not to his own effort, but that of Brinkley.

Since the Haelan decision, commentators,\(^{120}\) courts\(^{121}\) and a few legislatures\(^{122}\) have elucidated the scope and limitations of the right of publicity. While every person has a right of publicity,\(^{123}\) it is usually asserted by one who has achieved "celebrity" status because without such renown, damages—determined by the value of the misappropriation\(^{124}\)—are

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\(^{120}\) See supra note 12.

\(^{121}\) See supra note 10.

\(^{122}\) See supra note 11.

\(^{123}\) See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08(1) (West 1972) (prohibiting unauthorized exploitation of name or likeness "of any natural person") (emphasis added); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1103(a) (1984) ("[e]very individual has a property right in the use of his name, photograph or likeness in any medium in any manner") (emphasis added); McLane, The Right of Publicity: Dispelling Survivability, Preemption and First Amendment Myths Threatening to Eviscerate a Recognized State Right, 20 Cal. W.L. Rev. 415, 417 (1984) (unfair not to compensate the unknown because exploitation would not occur unless persona had some value); Nimmer, supra note 12, at 217 ("it would probably be preferable not to impose an arbitrary [celebrity] limit on the right but rather to rely upon the rule of damages"); cf. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 ("[n]o social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay") (citation omitted); T.J. Hooker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (if defendant had appropriated commercial value of plaintiff woodcarver's name, he would have stated proper right of publicity cause of action); Price, 400 F. Supp. at 847, quoted in Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 729 (stating that prominence should not effect waiver of right, and implying that right exists regardless of celebrity status). But see Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 442 ("well known individuals [have a right] to control commercial exploitation of their names and likenesses"); Memphis, 616 F.2d at 957 ("[t]he famous have an exclusive legal right during life to control and profit from the commercial use of their name and personality"); Hoffman, The Right of Publicity: An Analytical Update, 14 Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (1982) (prominence of plaintiff is threshold question in right of publicity action); Simon, supra note 12, at 708 (same).

inconsequential. In order to make this right valuable, an individual may assign his right of publicity to third parties with products or services that would benefit from association with the individual. Acknowledging the right's proprietary nature, an increasing number of jurisdictions now have a descendible right of publicity—that is, they permit the celebrity's heirs to bring suit after his death.

Like the right of privacy, however, the right of publicity fails to safeguard an otherwise protectable identity when the value of free expression outweighs the proprietary (or personal, in the case of the right of privacy) interests at issue. The first amendment protects biography of public figures and commentary on newsworthy

\[supra\ note 12, at 648;\ see also Black's Law Dictionary 1180 (5th ed. 1979).\] The Tennessee statute even permits impoundment and destruction of offending materials.

\[Tenn. Code Ann. \ § 47-25-1106(b) to -1106(c) (1984).\]

\[125. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.11 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[g]enerally, the greater the fame or notoriety of the identity appropriated, the greater will be the extent of the economic injury suffered"); Nimmer, supra note 12, at 216.\]

\[126. See Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868; Nimmer, supra note 12, at 209.\]

\[127. See, e.g., Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 442; Cepeda, 415 F.2d at 1206; Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868; Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (case preempted by legislation creating a descendible right of publicity).\]

\[128. Compare Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1280 (right of publicity is property) and Nimmer, supra note 12, at 216. With Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 442 (quoting Prosser & Keeton, supra note 37, § 117, at 854) ("[i]t seems quite pointless to dispute over whether such a right is to be classified as 'property'; it is at least clearly proprietary in its nature. 'Once protected by law, it is a right of value upon which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling licenses'") and Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868 (same).\]

\[129. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, 694 F.2d at 682 (certified questions answered by Supreme Court of Georgia); Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844 (interpretation of New York law by federal court); Cal. Civ. Code § 990(b) (West Supp. 1987); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08(1)(c) (West 1972); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 391.170(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1103(b) (1984); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-40 (1984); see also Sims, supra note 12, at 453. But see Memphis, 616 F.2d at 959 (right of publicity not descendible); Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (right of publicity not descendible without exploitation by the decedent). It is significant, however, that these decisions relied in part on the fact that the states whose law was at issue had not codified a descendible right of publicity at that time. Subsequent passage of right of publicity statutes with descendibility provisions by these states has weakened these decisions considerably. See Cal. Civ. Code § 990 (West Supp. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1104 (1984).\]

\[130. Nimmer, supra note 12, at 216.\]

\[131. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574; Bi-Rite Enters., 757 F.2d at 445 (dictum); Factors Etc., 652 F.2d at 288 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Horowitz, supra note 116, at 41.\]
matters. Consciously fictionalized accounts, in contrast, receive no protection.

C. Comparison of New York's Right of Privacy Statute and the Right of Publicity

This section contrasts New York's right of privacy statute with the right of publicity. After examining the policies underlying the statute and the right of publicity, the section considers the applicability of both to certain situations.

1. Purpose of the Rights

In protecting a personal rather than a pecuniary interest, the right of privacy differs fundamentally from the right of publicity. New York's right of privacy statute, however, contains language prohibiting the commercial appropriation of a person's name or picture. Therefore, celebrities, who are particularly susceptible to abuse of this nature, have used the statute to remedy economic harm. For example, in Brinkley v. Casablancas, the Appellate Division, First Department, enjoined the defendant from marketing


134. See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.

135. See infra notes 144-96 and accompanying text.

136. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("protection from intrusion upon an individual's privacy, on the one hand, and protection from appropriation of some element of an individual's personality for commercial exploitation, on the other hand, are different in theory and in scope"); see also supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. But see Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 430 ("rights of privacy and . . . publicity are intertwined due to the similarity between the nature of the interests protected by each").


139. 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep't 1981).
unauthorized posters of Christie Brinkley, and awarded damages to the model under the New York right of privacy statute.\(^{140}\) Brinkley had used the statute to protect a pecuniary, not a personal, interest: concern about market saturation and poor marketing affecting her future earnings potential motivated the action.\(^{141}\) Thus, although recovery under the statute satisfied the plaintiff involved, the recovery rested on an inapposite theory.\(^{142}\) In sum, a statute designed to ameliorate emotional injury is now often pressed to remedy economic harm.\(^{143}\)

2. **Scope of Protection**

Not only does current use of New York’s right of privacy statute fail to comport with its purpose,\(^{144}\) but the language of the statute inadequately remedies the abuses to which plaintiffs direct such use.\(^{145}\) The privacy statute, which encompasses “name, portrait or picture,”\(^{146}\) covers only a limited portion of persona. Generally, only full names are protected,\(^{147}\) although a surname alone may qualify if it has become associated with an individual.\(^{148}\) Indeed, without unequivocal identification with a person, even a full name may go without protection.\(^{149}\) While strict construction of the statute usually

\(^{140}\) Id. at 442, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.  
\(^{141}\) See id. at 430-31, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.  
\(^{142}\) See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
\(^{143}\) See id.  
\(^{144}\) See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.  
\(^{145}\) See N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1987); see also infra notes 146-85 and accompanying text.  
\(^{148}\) See Adrian v. Unterman, 281 A.D. 81, 88, 118 N.Y.S.2d 121, 127 (1st Dep’t 1952) (court protects against use of name of famous women’s dress designer named “Adrian”), aff’d, 306 N.Y. 771, 118 N.E.2d 477 (1954).  
\(^{149}\) See Nebb v. Bell Syndicate, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 929, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (suit by Mr. and Mrs. Rudy Nebb to enjoin defendant’s publication of cartoon with similarly-named characters dismissed because defendant did not trade on secondary meaning or reputation of plaintiffs’ names); People ex rel. Maggio v.
blocks actions based on the appropriation of an assumed name or nickname, the courts will not block an action when the public has come to associate the new name with the individual. Therefore, because society failed to identify a particular individual as "Dr. Seuss," a court refused to protect the well-known pseudonym. In addition, the statute does not extend to business, corporate or partnership names.

The phrase "portrait or picture" has received a somewhat broader interpretation than the term "name." Although the portrait or picture used need not be exact, mere word portraits are not actionable. Other representations, such as drawings, sculptures and


150. See Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (no cause of action for exploitation of "Dr. Seuss" because statute "does not protect an assumed or trade name"); Maggio, 205 Misc. at 822, 130 N.Y.S.2d at 519 (statute "does not protect a nickname known to a few intimates").

151. See Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1937) ("Aunt Jemima" is protected by statute because "stage name has come to be closely and widely identified with the person who bears it"). The court's language on this issue is dictum, however, because it subsequently held the statute inapplicable to the case due to previous trademark ownership of the name. See id.

152. See Geisel, 295 F. Supp. at 355-56.


155. See Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 100 A.D.2d 175, 179, 473 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429 (1st Dep't) (phrase "does not require that there be an identifiable facial representation ... [but] includes any representation of the person"), aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984); Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing Co., 192 A.D. 251, 256, 182 N.Y.S. 428, 431 (1st Dep't 1920) (portrait appearing in advertising matter protected under statute, although not exact reproduction); Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 611, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261 (phrase encompasses "not only actuality, but the close and purposeful resemblance to reality").

156. Toscani v. Hersey, 271 A.D. 445, 448, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (1st Dep't
mannequins, may be protected. Nonetheless, protection requires recognizability of the plaintiff as the individual portrayed and intent by the defendant to exploit plaintiff’s likeness. Moreover, even if the defendant purposefully exploits the likeness of a sufficiently identifiable plaintiff, the phrase permits such use when it is “incidental” to advertising.

The right of publicity, on the other hand, provides greater protection of a plaintiff’s name, portrait or picture. The right protects nicknames, business names and personal names, regardless of particular identification with a person. Moreover, the right of publicity extends protection to aspects of persona entirely beyond


157. See Young v. Greneker Studios, Inc., 175 Misc. 1027, 1028, 26 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358-59 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941) (in view of definitions of “portrait” as carved or molded figure, statue, sculpture, visible representation or likeness, image, copy, and likeness of individual produced by art, as in oils, water-color, crayon, engraving, photography or sculpture, the court held that a picture or portrait “is not necessarily a photograph ... [of a] person, but includes any representation of ... [a] person ..., whether by photograph, painting or sculpture”).

158. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (exploitation of photograph gives rise to cause of action when court can conclude, as matter of law, “that most persons who could identify an actual photograph of [the celebrity] would be likely to think that [it] was actually his picture”) (dictum because court ultimately decided case under law of unfair competition and trademarks); Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (for valid cause of action, “picture used must be a clear representation of the plaintiff, recognizable from the advertisement itself”); Levey, 57 F. Supp. at 42 (statute “require[s] a clear representation of a person”).


160. Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 15 A.D.2d 343, 350, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 744 (1st Dep’t) (“so long as the reproduction was used to illustrate the quality and content of the periodical in which it originally appeared, the statute was not violated, albeit the reproduction appeared in other media for purposes of advertising the periodical”), aff’d 11 N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962), quoted in Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48 A.D.2d 487, 488, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (1st Dep’t 1975), aff’d, 39 N.Y.2d 897, 352 N.E.2d 584, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976).


162. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 683 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc.”).

163. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
the statute: voice, style and personal attributes.

3. Nature of Exploitation Prohibited

The right of privacy statute bars a specific type of exploitation, namely exploitation "for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade." Although "advertising purposes," connoting solicitation of patronage, receives a broader reading than "purposes of trade,"

164. See Cal. Civ. Code § 990 (West Supp. 1987) (voice protected); cf. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1970) (in case decided on unfair competition grounds but implicating right of publicity, court denied protection of plaintiff singer's voice but implied that result would have differed had plaintiff's "sound [been] uniquely personal," i.e., had no copyright in music and lyrics owned by third party), cert. denied., 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 260 (1st Cir. 1962) (in case based on unfair competition but essentially implicating right of publicity, court vacated judgment below dismissing complaint for infringement of actor's distinctive vocal style); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court implied that commercial using imitation of Shirley Booth's voice would be actionable if it used her name or likeness to identify her as voice of fictional television character she portrayed).

165. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[i]f the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there has been an invasion of his right whether or not his name or likeness is used") (emphasis added); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974) (although plaintiff's physical features not identifiable in television commercial exhibiting race car with distinctive styling of the one ordinarily driven by plaintiff, commercial could be enjoined because viewers would associate car with plaintiff); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (2d Dep't 1977) (automobile commercial on television against New Year's Eve party backdrop, including actor conducting band and using same gestures, musical beat and choice of music with which plaintiff had become associated in public's mind, held actionable).


169. Manger v. Kee Inst. of Electrolysis, Inc., 233 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1956) ("advertising purposes" in section 50 is broader than "purposes of trade" in section 51); see Selsman v. Universal Photo Books, Inc., 18 A.D.2d 151, 152, 238 N.Y.S.2d
in essence the phrases contemplate commercial exploitation and exclude non-commercial appropriation. The right of publicity, on the other hand, affords individuals protection from all exploitation of their personas, provided that the exploitation is not privileged. Therefore, non-profit uses that would be actionable under the right of publicity—for example, a charity making and selling a Paul Newman poster without his consent—escape legal sanction of the privacy statute.

4. Transferability of the Rights

The right of privacy, entirely statutory in New York, contains

686, 687 (1st Dep't 1963) (with regard to “uses for advertising purposes,” section 50 is to be construed liberally).

170. See Barrows v. Rozansky, 111 A.D.2d 105, 106, 489 N.Y.S.2d 481, 484 (1st Dep't 1985) (“only judicially recognized relief for invasion of privacy in New York is the protection afforded the commercial misappropriation of a person’s name or picture”); Davis v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 374, 378, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (2d Dep't 1982) (“only the commercial use of a person’s name or likeness without permission is prohibited”); D’Agostino v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 79 A.D.2d 646, 647, 433 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (2d Dep't 1980) (“New York recognizes no right to judicial relief for the invasion of privacy beyond protection from ... commercial misappropriation”).

171. See Cardy v. Maxwell, 9 Misc. 2d 329, 331-32, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547, 551 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957) (statute, protecting right of privacy in certain situations, is “aimed at exploitation for purposes of commerce. Being partly penal, its scope must be strictly construed and may not be enlarged to include any unauthorized use with a mercenary motive”) (emphasis added).

172. See supra note 102.

173. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.

174. Analogous cases illustrate this point. Compare Davis v. Duryea, 99 Misc. 2d 933, 940, 417 N.Y.S.2d 624, 629 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (“use of a photograph or public personage’s name in any appropriate form during a political campaign is a constitutionally protected activity” that does not violate right of privacy statute) with State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 93, 229 P. 317, 319 (1924) (court enjoined unauthorized use of political candidate’s “valuable” name for political party allegedly espousing his views). See also Griffin v. Harris Beach, 112 A.D.2d 514, 516, 490 N.Y.S.2d 919, 921 (3d Dep't 1985) (permitted use of individual’s name as plaintiff in federal court action brought to defeat plan for use of federal funds to finance hotel project); McGraw v. Watkins, 49 A.D.2d 958, 959, 373 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (3d Dep't 1975) (court denied injunction against publication of nude photograph of plaintiff because plaintiff had failed to allege commercial use thereof); Wallace v. Weiss, 82 Misc. 2d 1053, 1055, 372 N.Y.S.2d 416, 420 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1975) (court allowed free distribution of non-profit student magazine with picture of plaintiff that had no connection to advertisement).

175. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
several gaps. It is a personal right\textsuperscript{176} incapable of assignment\textsuperscript{177} or inheritance.\textsuperscript{178} Furthermore, relatives of a New Yorker cannot enforce his right of privacy through a derivative action.\textsuperscript{179} Surprisingly, however, the courts may enforce a contract made for the use of a decedent’s name in favor of the survivor.\textsuperscript{180}

The right of publicity, on the other hand, is assignable,\textsuperscript{181} and courts have increasingly recognized it as descendible.\textsuperscript{182} Without assignability, the value of a right to exploit one’s name or picture is greatly reduced.\textsuperscript{183} In addition, descendibility vindicates the rights of those, like Martin Luther King, who consciously avoided exploitation of their valuable personas during their lives\textsuperscript{184} and those, like Bela Lugosi, who had planned subsequent exploitation of their rights of publicity but died unexpectedly.\textsuperscript{185}

In sum, New York’s right of privacy statute contains gaps that

\begin{itemize}

\item \textsuperscript{177} See Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868; Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844; Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d at 436, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1010; Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (2d Dep’t 1977); Rosemont Enters., 58 Misc. 2d at 7, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129; Savell, supra note 46, at 38.

\item \textsuperscript{178} See Runyon, 281 F.2d at 592; Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 436, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1010 (1st Dep’t 1981); Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664; Savell, supra note 46, at 38.

\item \textsuperscript{179} See Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 451, 42 N.E. 22, 27 (1895); Russell v. Marlboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 189, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8, 34 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959); Savell, supra note 46, at 38.

\item \textsuperscript{180} See Lunceford v. Wilcox, 88 N.Y.S.2d 225, 228 (N.Y.C. Ct. N.Y. County 1949). But cf. Runyon, 281 F.2d at 592 (holding that son of deceased person has no right to assign his father’s right of privacy but failing to nullify contract).

\item \textsuperscript{181} See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Center For Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 680 (11th Cir. 1983); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see supra note 127 and accompanying text.

\item \textsuperscript{182} See supra note 129.

\item \textsuperscript{183} See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.

\item \textsuperscript{184} Martin Luther King, 694 F.2d at 683; Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (right of publicity protects living plaintiff who chooses not to exploit his persona).

\item \textsuperscript{185} Cf. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 79, 232 A.2d 458, 462 (1967) (prominent individuals “may not all desire to capitalize upon their names in the commercial field, beyond or apart from that in which they have reached their known excellence. However, because they presently do not should not be justification for others to do so because of the void”).
leave worthy plaintiffs without redress. Drafted over eighty years ago to address the situation presented by Roberson in which the plaintiff’s picture is used for advertising without his consent, the language inadequately remedies the abuses to which plaintiffs now direct it. Strict construction of the statute further constrains its application.

In contrast, the right of publicity would provide broader protection to citizens of New York by filling these gaps. The state should not redress economic harm with a statute enacted to protect an individual’s feelings, when another doctrine, the right of publicity, directly addresses the situation. As a practical matter, the law should protect aspects of persona, such as nickname, voice, style and personal attributes, whose misappropriation has commercial ramifications. Similarly, the law should prevent not-for-profit exploitations because they also diminish future earnings potential by saturating the market. Most importantly, like all other forms of property, the proprietary interest a person has in his persona should be assignable and descendible.

III. Recognition of a Common Law Right of Publicity in New York

The existence of worthy plaintiffs without remedies and the
confusion from unsettled law in the field\textsuperscript{198} demonstrate the need for New York courts to acknowledge a right of publicity. While scholars commenting on the right in general have suggested state\textsuperscript{199} or federal\textsuperscript{200} legislation, others indicate that the Copyright Act of 1976 pre-empts much right-of-publicity law.\textsuperscript{201} A discussion of these propositions exceeds the scope of this Note. Rather, this Note now addresses the propriety of judicial recognition of a common law right of publicity in New York.\textsuperscript{203} After briefly discussing the history of judge-made law, this section considers the amenability of the right of publicity to common law creation in New York. The section concludes with an analysis and refutation of arguments opposing judicial lawmaking as a general proposition.

A. History of Judge-Made Law

The courts have significantly influenced the evolution of our law.\textsuperscript{204} Indeed, until this century, the judiciary dominated lawmaking.\textsuperscript{205} The

198. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
199. See Sims, supra note 12, at 455 n.16 (focusing on survivability issue).
200. See Simon, supra note 12, at 755; see also Sims, supra note 12, at 455.
202. For the purposes of this Note, the phrase "common law" does not refer to constitutional adjudication or statutory interpretation; rather, "common law" refers to non-constitutional decisional law in areas not considered by the legislature.
204. The powerful effect of judges on the law, viewed with apprehension in the Reagan era, has a long history in the United States. "From 1800 on, strong-minded American judges, whose work was recorded, influenced their courts and the law." L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 135 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW]. According to another authority, "[a] hundred years ago, case law was—or seemed—the dominant ingredient of American law, and legislation of only secondary importance." H. JONES, JR., KERNOCHAN & A. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD CASES AND TEXT MATERIALS 2 (1980) [hereinafter JONES, LEGAL METHOD]. In describing post-revolutionary American jurisprudence, another scholar stated that "[t]he federal Congress did little; the state legislatures did less. The judges became our preferred problem-solvers." G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 35-36 (1977) [hereinafter GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW].
opinions of Justice Cardozo, especially those written as a member of New York's Court of Appeals, powerfully illustrate the impact judges have had on the development of the law. Justice Holmes even went so far as to assert that the only law was what the court decided.

Holmes' exuberance notwithstanding, the judiciary as an institution has performed in a more conservative manner. Its role was, and remains today, to adjudicate disputes unresolvable by private means, through pre-existing and reasonably knowable rules. The courts balance "the competing values of stability in the law, served by adherence to precedent, and responsiveness to social change, which may call for the abandonment of an outworn legal doctrine." In practice, courts accomplish their task in two ways: (1) interpreting statutes; and (2) making common law.

Today, many legislatures, including that of New York, convene
year-round. As a result, federal and state law has undergone "statutorification." Despite the proliferation of statutes, legal problems amenable to judge-made solutions remain. To establish a principle that courts should confine their activity to statutory interpretation would be futile. The courts do make law today, perhaps more a result of, than in spite of, the proliferation of statutes. As the Supreme Court recently observed, "state courts . . . are general common law courts and . . . possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision."

B. A Common Law Right of Publicity in New York

In Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., the heirs of the late reverend and a non-profit corporation, the assignee of the right to use his name or likeness and certain of his copyrights, sued to enjoin an opportunistic merchant from distributing miniature plastic busts of the leader without consent. In answer to certified questions from the Eleventh Circuit, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized a common law right of publicity that descends without exploitation by
the decedent during his lifetime. Thus, the court reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of the defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings, including the assessment of damages. In New York, however, the plaintiff’s cause of action would fail. First, the scope of the right of privacy statute does not include statuettes. Indeed, unauthorized use of King’s distinctive voice in a radio advertisement would also elude sanction in New York. Second, and more importantly, the statute protects against the exploitation of living persons only. Thus, though King chose not to exploit the image he created, had he planned to bequeath a valuable right of publicity to his relatives, New York law would not vindicate this desire. Because of its huge media industry and concomitantly large number of recognizable figures, New York should protect the commercial interest these individuals have in the marketing of their images. Nonetheless, even the most worthy plaintiff receives no protection from opportunistic New York retailers.

Having demonstrated that the right of privacy statute leaves badly harmed plaintiffs remediless, the final inquiry concerns the propriety of judicial acknowledgement of a common law right of publicity in New York. Like private law in general and tort law in particular, the right of publicity is an appropriate subject for judicial lawmaking. The recognition in New York of such a right—which protects not only name and picture but all aspects of persona from both commercial and non-commercial exploitation and is both assignable and descendible—would fill gaps in the state’s right of privacy statute. Interstitial lawmaking, such as that implicated by recog-

223. Id. at 683.
224. Id. at 675, 680.
225. See supra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 146-66 and accompanying text.
229. Cf. id. at 675 (King did assign rights to several of his copyrighted speeches).
230. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
231. See Savell, supra note 46, at 3 n.5. See generally 100 Largest Media Companies, Advertising Age, June 27, 1985, passim.
233. See Friedmann, supra note 216, at 839 (noting amenability of family and criminal law, and especially tort law, to common law development).
234. See supra notes 146-66 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 146-96 and accompanying text.
nition of the right of publicity in New York, is a proper judicial activity which does not usurp the legislature's prerogative.238

Furthermore, the right of publicity possesses certain characteristics that make it particularly well-suited for recognition at common law. Judge-made law is appropriate when the legal landscape merits a new rule whose articulation does not strain the court's competence.239 In New York, worthy plaintiffs need relief that the courts can articulate without special expertise.240

Indeed, New York's judiciary may have already recognized the right implicitly.241 In Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.,242 for instance, the Second Department of the Appellate Division held that the plaintiff had a valid cause of action for the exploitation of his style under the common law, although he had no action under the privacy statute.243 In Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Company,244 the first department seemed to recognize publicity rights in an action for unfair competition when it stated, "the complaint sufficiently alleges a misappropriation of plaintiff's property rights."245 And in Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc.,246 Judge Des-

238. In many areas, it is still proper for the courts to adjust the rights and liabilities of litigants to changing conditions. See Friedmann, supra note 216, at 841 ("large groups" of such cases); see also Calabresi, Age of Statutes, supra note 205, at 163 ("fair number" of such cases may remain). In general, the courts should focus their activity on interstitial areas, deciding whether to fill legislative gaps, extend statutes or retain existing law. See Friedmann, supra note 216, at 837. But see Breitel I, supra note 203, at 769 (several reasons "make for a strong lawmaking function in the courts, far beyond the interstitial and gap-filling") (emphasis added).

239. See Calabresi, Age of Statutes, supra note 205, at 163 ("[i]t will occur in areas in which the new rule to be promulgated is clearly mandated by the legal landscape and in which a statement of the rule does not involve detailed language and technical data beyond a court's competence"); cf. Friedmann, supra note 216, at 841 ("courts are neither equipped nor called upon to undertake" lawmaking in areas requiring "comprehensive administrative arrangements"). Thus, the courts should ordinarily demur from lawmaking when the issue is particularly complex, especially if it requires technical expertise. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 325 (1981). But see id. at 349 & n.25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (complexity "is hardly a suitable basis for denying ... courts the power to adjudicate").

240. See supra notes 145-96 and accompanying text.

241. See Nimmer, supra note 12, at 218-23 (discussing several New York cases purportedly recognizing right of publicity).


243. See id. at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65 (television commercial presented against New Year's Eve party backdrop, including actor conducting band and using same gestures, musical beat and choice of music with which plaintiff had become associated in mind of public held actionable under common law).

244. 255 A.D. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1st Dep't 1938).

245. Id. at 464, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 850.

mond's concurrence to an opinion denying plaintiff protection under New York's right of privacy statute suggested that redress "for the telecasting of [the plaintiff's] show" might be justified, although certainly not under a privacy theory. Even if these cases fail to demonstrate implicit recognition of the right of publicity, as was asserted in *Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc.* a judge-made right of publicity would merely supplement the existing body of judge-made intellectual property law in the areas of unfair competition, anti-dilution and common law copyright—which all seek to maintain commercial morality and discourage unjust enrichment—rather than establish an entirely new body of law requiring particularized knowledge.

Moreover, as illustrated by the development of the right of publicity in the federal courts, purportedly under New York law, the right of publicity lends itself to case-by-case evolution, and thus invites the development of common law. The New York courts, therefore, need not hesitate to begin explicating the doctrine.

In determining when to revise a rule to serve contemporary society, courts consider both the circumstances surrounding the rule's initial appearance and developments affecting the relevant legal landscape.

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247. *Id.* at 361, 107 N.E.2d at 489 (Desmond, J., concurring).
249. 66 N.Y.2d 910, 912, 489 N.E.2d 744, 745, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (1985); see *supra* notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
251. See *supra* notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
252. See *supra* note 23.
253. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 325 (1981) (common law is inappropriate when continuous attention, rather than "sporadic" or "ad hoc" address, is required); *id.* at 352 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (common law useful when case-by-case resolution necessary); Calabresi, *Age of Statutes, supra* note 205, at 163 (proper judicial lawmaking today "will also occur in areas in which, despite the usual demands of modern society for quick and certain rules, a slow judicial development of a new rule is still acceptable or even desirable").
254. See generally Calabresi, *Age of Statutes, supra* note 205, at 120-45. Calabresi also mentions a third factor: the effect judicial action or inaction will have on the legislature with respect to the rule. With regard to this factor, which Calabresi calls "[a]symmetries in inertia," *id.* at 124, the courts should be most inclined to revise a rule of dubious current value when the legislature is unlikely to address the issue otherwise. See *id.* at 124-29; see also Breitel 1, *supra* note 203, at 768 (courts will consider "the ease or difficulty with which . . . [a statute] may be amended"). Under this view, by resisting much needed amendment to the right of privacy statute twice in the last decade, see *infra* note 362, the legislature is signaling the court that revision of the statute, whose entire current application
When assessing the origin of a rule, courts first examine its age—most agree that the older the rule, the more willing a court will be to change it because it is more likely to be obsolete. New York’s right of privacy statute, passed in its essential form over seventy-five years ago, is an old rule. Although rules obsolesce at different rates, older rules are less likely to be responsive to current problems. While the statute still achieves its purpose, it fails to address certain contemporary exploitations.

Also, courts consider the circumstances of the rule’s creation. If the legislature established the rule through deliberation and temperance, the rule will receive far more deference than one created through inadvertance or overreaction. In passing the right of privacy statute, the New York Legislature quickly and decisively responded to the outrageous invasion of Ms. Roberson’s right to be let alone by creating privacy rights vesting in the individual. Extensive public debate preceding enactment assured that the statute properly remedied that situation. The circumstances behind the right of privacy statute indicate a willingness to protect individuals from exploitation generally. The right of publicity is merely another form of protection, albeit commercial. Thus, a court should not hesitate to create a right of publicity.

is limited, requires judicial action. In essence, however, this argument restates the legislative acquiescence doctrine discredited subsequently. See infra notes 307-12 and accompanying text.

255. See Calabresi, Age of Statutes, supra note 205, at 131-34.
258. See Calabresi, Age of Statutes, supra note 205, at 132-33 (“likelihood that a new statute is based on distinctions that are not currently valid is much less than if the statute were old”).
259. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 145-96 and accompanying text.
261. See Calabresi, Age of Statutes, supra note 205, at 120-45.
262. See id. at 132 (“newborn statute may be the result of inadvertence, overreaction to a particular set of events, or a legislative response to temporary majority at war with more persistent societal views”); Breitel I, supra note 203, at 768 (courts will consider “the base of public support for the statute, the care and deliberateness with which its purpose was made known and promoted, and the ease or difficulty with which it was enacted”).
263. See supra notes 83-87, 262 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 75.
266. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, courts examine the policy behind the rule. Creation of the right of privacy statute, first theorized thirteen years before its enactment, broadened protection of individuals to include their right to be let alone. A rule intended to expand rights, such as New York’s right of privacy statute, is more properly expanded, by the recognition of a common law right of publicity in this case, than one that denied or restricted rights.

In addition, the courts examine how the legal landscape—i.e., the legal rules and moral principles currently prevailing—surrounding the rule has changed since its creation. In essence, courts using this process seek to apply “some concept of what the law ought to be,” and can base such a decision only on policy. This

267. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 768; see also Wellington, supra note 209, at 233. Wellington distinguishes principle from policy—“the latter is an instrumental justification for a rule, while the former is not.” Id. at 223-24. According to him:

The breach of a strong duty (one created by a rule that is justified primarily by a principle) empowers a court to pay less attention, in the remedy it fashions, to the surprise of the defendant than does the breach of a weak duty (one created by a rule primarily justified by a policy).

Id. at 233.

268. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 37, at 193.

269. See supra notes 73-99 and accompanying text.

270. See id. Amendments exempting certain practices of photographers and merchants have subsequently narrowed the scope of protection provided by the statute. See N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1987).


272. See Wellington, supra note 209, at 231.


[O]utside a “core of settled meaning,” there is “a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out. . . .” The application of the law to specific cases in the penumbra area is admitted not to be a matter of logical deduction and reasoning. “[T]he criterion which makes a decision sound in such cases is some concept of what the law ought to be.”

Friedmann, supra note 216, at 823 (quoting Hart, supra, at 607-608).

275. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 349 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[w]hen choosing the precise legal principles to apply, common law courts draw upon relevant standards of conduct available in their communities”). In an earlier case, Judge Learned Hand stated:

Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sym-
analysis includes an examination of the common law around the rule, constitutional law and scholarly discussion of the issue.

Applying such an analysis to the right of publicity question, a court would find that although the age of regional telegraphic communications has given way to the modern era of media ubiquity, New York's right of privacy statute retains its turn of the century form. The persona, however, has assumed a public value entirely distinct from its traditional meaning. Judges and legislators in other states have ascertained and adjusted to this development through common law and statutory lawmaking. Scholars, too, support the concept of a right of publicity with virtual unanimity. It is both timely and fitting that courts extend New York's right of privacy, an expansionist rule in the first place, to provide plaintiffs with full protection of their personas.

pathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), quoted in Friedmann, supra note 216, at 831; id. at 826 (policy element in judicial decision making may be refined, "[b]ut there must always remain a point at which a choice has to be made").

276. See Calabresi, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 129; Friedmann, supra note 216, at 838 (appropriate to fashion common law when rule occupies position in broad common law field); Wellington, supra note 209, at 236.

277. See Calabresi, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 129-30; Friedmann, supra note 216, at 837 (recent debate of pertinent legislation should discourage courts from making law); Wellington, supra note 209, at 236.

278. See Calabresi, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 130; Wellington, supra note 209, at 236.

279. See Calabresi, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 131; Wellington, supra note 209, at 237 (political platforms, speeches and campaign promises; public opinion polls; and professional articles).


283. See supra note 12.

284. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.

285. See supra note 271 and accompanying text (expansionist rule allows greater common law development); supra notes 73-99 and accompanying text (demonstrating that right of privacy statute expanded protectable rights of New York plaintiffs).
C. Rationales for Judge-Made Law

Presuming the desirability of the right of publicity, some authority maintains that only legislatures should create the right because courts are not empowered to make such law. New York's Legislature, however, has failed to augment the statute's protection of individuals in any manner, least of all to extend protection to voice, style and personal attributes, to non-commercial appropriations and to heirs and legates. Given the New York Legislature's inertia toward creation of a right of publicity and the right's amenability to judicial acknowledgement in the state, this Section considers the lack of power argument in the context of various arguments proffered by supporters of judge-made law to counter it.

Supporters of judicial lawmaking give several justifications for their position. First, under what is known as the implicit delegation doctrine, they assert that by failure to act, elective bodies have
implicitly delegated this power to the courts.\textsuperscript{290} Although the legislature's failure to act may imply authorization of judges to make law, other explanations often exist. Legislative inaction may indicate distraction, time insufficiency or evasion of politically sensitive issues.\textsuperscript{291} Cognizant of these other explanations,\textsuperscript{292} supporters of the implicit delegation doctrine reason, in essence, that necessity justifies recognition of a rule.\textsuperscript{293}

Such reasoning, however, encourages the courts to take an aggressive antimajoritarian approach to non-constitutional matters,\textsuperscript{294} thus undermining the separation of powers principle.\textsuperscript{295} Not only does an "end-justifies-the-means" attitude concerning judicial lawmaking disregard this country's embrace of a tripartite government empowering the legislature with primary responsibility for lawmaking but it also obscures the policies supporting that choice. On the one hand, through bicameralism,\textsuperscript{296} opposing lobbies,\textsuperscript{297} rules for deliberation\textsuperscript{298} process to the courts, and sometimes to the executive.

\textit{Id.}; cf. Friedmann, \textit{supra} note 216, at 829 (legislator can "transfer a certain legal branch to regulation by judicial fiat . . . when he . . . establishes a dominant directive and enforceable general legal principles controlling this field, a principle that the judge has to develop only to find (not make) the law in the individual case").

\textsuperscript{290} CALABRESI, \textit{AGE OF STATUTES}, \textit{supra} note 205, at 92. "[T]he legislative determination to leave certain matters to the courts is often consciously made by the negative device of sheer inaction." Breitel I, \textit{supra} note 203, at 762. \textit{Contra} City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 332 n.24 (1981) (failure to enact a statute is "not the best of guides to legislative intent") (citation omitted).

\textsuperscript{291} See Breitel I, \textit{supra} note 203, at 762 ("it is not always possible to distinguish deliberate deferment in the legislative process from inaction resulting from deadlock or the evasion of responsibilities because of fear of political consequences"); Hart, \textit{Comment, supra} note 203, at 47 ("possible reasons for the legislature's failure to act, and hence the possible interpretations of the silence, are always numerous and sometimes innumerable").

\textsuperscript{292} See Breitel I, \textit{supra} note 203, at 762.

\textsuperscript{293} See \textit{City of Milwaukee v. Illinois}, 451 U.S. 304, 325 (1981) ("one of the major concerns underlying the recognition of federal common law in \textit{Illinois v. Milwaukee} was "that Illinois did not have any forum in which to protect its interests unless federal common law were created"); see also Breitel I, \textit{supra} note 203, at 762 (implicitly).

\textsuperscript{294} See CALABRESI, \textit{AGE OF STATUTES}, \textit{supra} note 205, at 163-64.

\textsuperscript{295} \textit{Id.} at 164; Friedmann, \textit{supra} note 216, at 822.

\textsuperscript{296} See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, art. II, art. III; N.Y. CONST. art. I, art. II, art. III.

\textsuperscript{297} \textit{See Hart & Sacks, Legal Process, supra} note 209, at 740, 829-34 (citations omitted); Breitel I, \textit{supra} note 203, at 762; Wellington, \textit{supra} note 209, at 238, 240-41.

\textsuperscript{298} In New York, for example, neither house may pass a bill "unless it shall have been printed and upon the desks of the members, in its final form, at least three calendar legislative days prior to its final passage." N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 14. The requirement may only be circumvented by the Governor, but only upon
and the sheer size of our legislatures, our system of lawmaking engenders inertia. In turn, this legislative inertia creates a presumption of the status quo and hinders the progress of worthy causes. On the other hand, deliberation by a large representative body also protects the public from the excesses of special interests and the dangers of shortsighted statutes. Therefore, the mere need of a right of publicity in New York is not sufficient justification for its recognition by the state's courts.

In addition, legislative inaction sometimes reflects the will of the public to maintain the status quo. In effect, judicial lawmaking under these circumstances overrules the legislature. This situation, too, violates separation of powers and the policies behind it.

The legislative acquiescence doctrine, a corollary of the implicit delegation doctrine, maintains that legislative inaction in the second instance, i.e., after the court has made law, ratifies the common presentation of a message of necessity outlining facts warranting an immediate vote. Nonetheless, the legislators must still have the bill on their desks in final form before passage. In addition, no bill shall "be passed or become a law, except by the assent of a majority of the members elected to each branch of the legislature." Bills "appropriating the public moneys or property for local or private purposes" require the assent of two-thirds of both houses for passage. Finally, three-fifths of the members of either house is necessary to constitute a quorum for final passage of any tax or appropriations bill.


300. See Traynor, supra note 218, at 414.

301. See, e.g., Hart & Sacks, Legal Process, supra note 209, at 895-902 (quoting Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drug Legislation, 1 Law & Contemp. Probs. 3-12 (1933)) (describing slow but eventually successful passage of Food and Drug Act despite minority opposition of powerful business interests).

302. Some authorities maintain that not even the deliberation of large legislatures is sufficient to catch all faulty statutes. See Traynor, supra note 218, at 426-27 (no quality control on statutes); Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, in Legal Institutions Today and Tomorrow 20-21 (Paulsen ed. 1959) [hereinafter Breitel II].

303. See supra notes 136-96 and accompanying text.

304. See Breitel II, supra note 302, at 12.

305. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (requiring municipalities to provide realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing in their land use regulations).

306. See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
This view assumes that law is ubiquitous, that there is no non-law. Accordingly, when the legislature omits to proscribe an act, such as exploitation of another's right of publicity, it effectively approves the act. Under this view, the legislature is an instrument chartered to do nothing in order that something may be done, i.e., that the status quo, with its newly created common law, may be maintained. The legislature, however, is not an institution for the perfunctory recodification of previously determined initiatives, but rather, a deliberative body. Legislative inaction reflects an absence of agreement rather than a ratification; it is not an enactment of the status quo that would render law, which had originally been beyond the scope of judicial lawmaking, interstitial and thus capable of common lawmaking. In other words, the New York Legislature's failure to invalidate a plaintiff's recovery on what were apparently right of publicity grounds does not ratify the common law made in that case.

A third argument justifies judicial power to make law on the ground that such judge-made rules are subject to legislative or popular revision, and hence are acceptable in a democracy. This view,
advocated by those who feel judges should not abdicate their law-making function in the name of judicial restraint, also emphasizes the inertia of the legislature and the public. Furthermore, it implies that judge-made law, as much as legislation generally, reflects the will of the people. Actually, this view suggests that the law does not reflect the beliefs of the majority at all but those of an organized minority with the initiative to seek legal change in the courts and the legislatures. In other words, the interested, who regularly vote, also sue, and the apathetic, who usually do not vote, also do not sue. Therefore, the interested instigate both statutes and decisions and the apathetic are represented only by the foresight of the official lawmakers. Perhaps true, this practical analysis nevertheless conflicts with the theoretical division of powers discussed above.

When analyzed closely, moreover, the inherent limitation argument


314. See Traynor, supra note 218, at 427 (implicitly).
315. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 769.

Popular lawmaking can occur in two ways: referendum or initiative. Referendum is "[t]he process of referring to the electorate for approval a proposed new State constitution or amendment (constitutional referendum) or of a law passed by the legislature (statutory referendum)." Black's Law Dictionary 1152 (5th ed. 1979). Initiative, on the other hand, is "[a]n electoral process whereby designated percentages of the electorate may initiate legislative or constitutional changes through the filing of formal petitions to be acted on by the legislature or the total electorate." Id. at 705. In other words, "the referendum enables the voters to accept or reject the legislature's proposals, while the initiative allows the voters both to make their own proposals and to pass upon the proposals of other voters." Ranney, The United States of America, in Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory 67 (D. Butler ed. 1978).

Every state except Delaware permits constitutional referendums. See Book of States, supra note 213, at 69. Fewer states, however, allow direct statutory law-making. As of 1986, 37 states and the District of Columbia permitted statutory referendums, see id. at 215-16 (table), while only 21 states and the District of Columbia allowed statutory initiatives. See id. at 214 (table). California "stands alone among the large urban industrial states ... in employing both the constitutional amendment initiative and direct statutory initiative." Lee, California, in Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory 88 (D. Butler ed. 1978). New York, in contrast, does not even permit initiative. See Book of States, supra note 213, at 214 (table). See generally The Popular Interest versus The Public Interest ... A Report on the Popular Initiative, New York Senate Research Service, Task Force on Critical Problems (1979). In addition, use of referendums is limited in New York. The constitution only permits referendums on matters affecting the state's debt, see N.Y. Const. art. VII, §§ 11, 14, art. XVIII, § 3, and limited situations effecting local governments. See id. art. IX, § 1(d), (h). Popular lawmaking has not significantly effected New York.

316. See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
proves circular. Limitation, in this case by legislative veto or popular initiative, does not justify a rule, here the propriety of judicial lawmaking. The ability to override judicial determinations does not justify them in the first place. It merely reins in the judiciary once it has improperly acted.

The fourth justification for judicial lawmaking emphasizes the notion that courts do look at election returns, because of the nature of judicial selection, to ascertain the legal landscape. While judges are capable of reading the public will, they do so through institutional blinders. This myopia results from several factors. First, judges can decide cases only on the facts presented, and, generally speaking, those decisions can address only those issues raised by counsel. While the analyses of judges often exceed the issues at hand, the rule of dictum specifically limits the persuasiveness of such assertions. Second, the legislature's apparatus for ascertaining social conditions surpasses that of the court in the resolution of conflicts. Legislatures, unlike the courts, provide greater access to all individuals, the opportunity for more thorough investigation, and

318. See CALABRESE, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 93-94; Wellington, supra note 209, at 240 ("no better process available for selecting a socially desirable policy" than judicial process).
319. Although certain judges have tremendous vision, as an institutional matter, judicial procedure, political dependence and systematic isolation narrow the scope of judicial opinions. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 769.
320. See id. at 749 ("law is made only at the instigation of those interested").
321. Id. at 770 ("courts are limited to viewing the problem as presented in a litigated case within the four corners of its record"); Friedmann, supra note 216, at 839 (because courts "develop the law on a case-by-case basis they can not as can the legislature, undertake the establishment of a new legal institution, 'an elaborate procedure of investigation and consideration eventuating in the approval of a particular form of words as law' ") (citations omitted).
322. See JONES, LEGAL METHOD, supra note 204, at 113-14. "Dicta are pronouncements on points which need not be considered in order to reach a decision and are, therefore, in most cases, pronouncements on points on which the court has not had the benefit of argument." Id. at 114. As a result, such pronouncements "may be persuasive, but are not binding." Id. at 113.
323. Id.
324. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762; Hart, Comment, supra note 203, at 45.
325. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762; Wellington, supra note 209, at 238. Litigation is too expensive for many people to test issues affecting them, and even if they have the money, the doctrines of justiciability may preclude a judicial determination on the merits of their issue.
326. See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762. But see Wellington, supra note 209, at 240-41. In the courts, on the other hand, the rules of evidence constrain investigation. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401-402 (permitting admission of narrowly
public debate of countervailing factors.\textsuperscript{327} Courts can neither scan the law’s foreground nor probe its horizon. Thus, even if New York voters registered overwhelming support for acknowledgment of a right of publicity, judges would not be justified in recognizing the right at common law.

Under a fifth theory, judges should follow their own values in developing common law since it is their educated and disinterested sense of the community interest that is sought.\textsuperscript{328} The founding fathers, aware that fair adjudication requires independence of judges, largely insulated the judiciary from outside criticism.\textsuperscript{329} Although such seclusion secures for the judiciary an independence that is both necessary for unbiased dispute resolution and foreign to the legislature,\textsuperscript{330} removal from a position of political accountability also renders judges less responsive to the needs of the community.\textsuperscript{331} Furthermore, this paternalistic view does not comport with respect for our basic majoritarian institutions.\textsuperscript{332}

The best and classic justification for judicial lawmaking power, however, emphasizes “the subservience of courts to principles, to rational decisionmaking, and to the whole fabric of the law.”\textsuperscript{333} The

\textsuperscript{327} See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 762; see also Hart & Sacks, Legal Process, supra note 209, at 746-47 (Senate filibuster). But see id. at 746 (discussing time limitations on floor debate in Senate and House, and ability of Rules Committee to control debate in latter).

\textsuperscript{328} See Calabresi, Age of Statutes, supra note 205, at 94-96; Breitel I, supra note 203, at 766 (scholars “believe the judicial process, as compared with the political legislative process, is a mine of stimulating opportunities to discuss, develop and rationalize the law. After all, more judges than legislators read the law reviews and treatises”) (emphasis added); Friedmann, supra note 216, at 836 (“the importation of personal ideology or prejudice into a judicial interpretation, in the face of accepted principles of statutory or common law interpretation ... is extremely rare”); Hart, Comment, supra note 203, at 42 (“courts are the only institution which is manned by personnel with the training that is requisite ... for the authoritative exposition of principle”).

\textsuperscript{329} See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (particularly lifetime tenure and irreducible salary clauses).

\textsuperscript{330} See Breitel I, supra note 203, at 761.

\textsuperscript{331} See id. at 770.

\textsuperscript{332} See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{333} Calabresi, Age of Statutes, supra note 205, at 96. Another commentator states:

The judicial process is based on reasoning and presupposes ... that its determinations are justified only when explained or explainable in reason. No poll, no majority vote of the affected, no rule of expediency, and certainly no confessedly subjective or idiosyncratic view justifies a judicial determination. Emphatically, no claim of might, physical or political, justifies a judicial determination.

Breitel I, supra note 203, at 772.
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judicial process, properly administered, can develop law only incrementally.\textsuperscript{334} When courts express this power cautiously, they can advance society.\textsuperscript{335} Indeed, one scholar has stated that the strength of the common law derives “from the manner in which it has been forged from actual experience by the hammer and anvil of litigation.”\textsuperscript{336} While judicial lawmaking raises theoretical problems regarding the separation of powers,\textsuperscript{337} as a pragmatic matter, the slow development of common law has benefited society\textsuperscript{338} and no legislature has banned common law in its state.\textsuperscript{339} Practically, the slow development of common law provides legislatures with the opportunity to observe new approaches without taking responsibility for them. If it disagrees with the approach, the legislature can overrule the decision.\textsuperscript{340} In conclusion, the slow development of common law consistent with existing rules constitutes proper judicial action.

In sum, courts have historically adjudicated disputes by two means: interpreting statutes and making common law.\textsuperscript{341} While today’s active legislatures address a much broader spectrum of legal issues than

\textsuperscript{334} See Calabresi, Age of Statutes, supra note 205, at 4.

\textsuperscript{335} See Wellington, supra note 209, at 236; cf. Breitel I, supra note 203, at 770-71 (antimajoritarian judiciary “is not the proper organ for lawmaking on the molar scale in a democratically organized society”).


\textsuperscript{337} See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{339} Cf. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978) (adopting common law when code does not speak to issue).


\textsuperscript{341} See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
those of a century ago, the room still exists for judicial lawmaking. The limited protection which New York’s right of privacy statute gives to individuals with marketable personas, and especially the preclusion of assignment and descent of rights in one’s name or likeness, render acknowledgement of the right of publicity by New York courts appropriate. Because explication of the right of publicity requires little technical expertise and may be done on a case-by-case basis, the right is particularly amenable to judicial recognition. Technically, such judicial action would violate the separation of powers doctrine. As a practical matter, however, the practice should be promoted because it provides the legislature with alternatives for which it need not take responsibility and which it may overrule if necessary.

IV. Conclusion

New York courts have ample justification for allocating to the legislature the burden of inertia surrounding recognition of the right of publicity. Although the state’s right of privacy statute was designed to redress emotional discomfort, today’s plaintiffs often use it to compensate for pecuniary harm. The right of publicity, on the other hand, specifically addresses commercial harm. Logic dictates that the courts should apply the doctrine implicated rather than stretch an ill-fitting doctrine to remedy this situation. In addition, the statute’s scope, limited to the unauthorized publication of a plaintiff’s photograph for advertising purposes

342. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 144-96 and accompanying text.
344. See id.
345. See supra notes 239-50 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 333-40 and accompanying text.
349. According to one scholar:
   It is the judgmental function . . . of deciding when a rule has come to be sufficiently out of phase with the whole legal framework so that, whatever its age, it can only stand if a current majoritarian or representative body reaffirms it. It is to be the allocator of that burden of inertia which our system of separation of powers and checks and balances mandates.
   CALABRESI, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 164.
350. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
sented in *Roberson*, fails to reach abuses of which plaintiffs now complain. These abuses, which include exploitation of an individual's sound or style and even appropriation of a decedent's name or likeness, fall under the aegis of the right of publicity. Finally, strict construction of the statute further constrains its application.

On the one hand, the courts may spur reform "by deliberately stressing an antiquated principle, in the expectation that the legislature will take remedial action." Legislative inaction regarding the right of publicity, however, indicates that recognition of the law requires judicial action. Therefore, by judging the right of privacy rule too limited and developing right of publicity principles to supplement the statute, the courts may ameliorate the situation, prompt statutory reform or even spur majoritarian reaffirmation of the old rule.

Although the state's courts must justify any right of publicity rule they develop and keep it current, they need not "promulgate the new ... to find that the old fails." In other words, New York courts may recognize a common law right of publicity, overruling its traditional prohibition, without determining the parameters of the right except as regards the plaintiff. In addition, the courts need not obtain majority support for the new common law rule. The

354. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
355. See *supra* note 164 and accompanying text.
356. See *supra* note 165 and accompanying text.
357. See *supra* notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
358. See generally *supra* notes 100-33 and accompanying text.
359. See *supra* note 190.
360. See *supra* note 191.
361. Friedmann, *supra* note 216, at 838; see Calabresi, *Age of Statutes*, *supra* note 205, at 156. Another commentator has stated: "The organ for applying law, in this case a court, has no choice whether to decide or not; it cannot avoid decision, whatever one may think; it must decide for one side or another. It does." Breitel I, *supra* note 203, at 749.
362. See *supra* note 287.
363. Cf. *supra* notes 144-96 and accompanying text (presenting other limitations of the statute); see also *supra* note 254 (discussing whether courts should consider asymmetries in inertia before making law).
364. See Friedmann, *supra* note 216, at 842 ("an important aspect of judicial creativeness ... [is] the development of new principles, not in substitution but in preparation for statutory reform").
368. See Wellington, *supra* note 209, at 238 (majority support for judicially created policies is not necessary for we "know enough about interest group politics and public apathy to be confident that many legislative and executive policies would not be endorsed by a popular majority").
examples of federal courts, \textsuperscript{369} and state courts \textsuperscript{370} and legislatures, \textsuperscript{371} however, provide strong support for recognition of a common law right of publicity in New York. The approach of California, whose courts recognized a right of publicity \textsuperscript{372} and whose legislature subsequently superseded that common law right by creating a statutory descendible right of publicity, \textsuperscript{373} is especially significant because its media industry rivals that of New York. \textsuperscript{374} Finally, the common law may attach to outmoded statutes as much as to decisional law. \textsuperscript{375} In this way, the New York courts may complement the legislature's action by fulfilling its policy of protecting an individual's persona from commercial exploitation. \textsuperscript{376}


\textsuperscript{370} See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982) (Supreme Court of Georgia decided, on certified questions, that common law of the State contained a right of publicity which could descend without lifetime exploitation. This case is particularly noteworthy because Georgia also has a right of privacy, recognized at common law in Pavesich, see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text, which closely resembles that in New York); see also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (superseded by statute creating descendible right); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).

\textsuperscript{371} See supra note 11.


\textsuperscript{373} See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (West Supp. 1987).

\textsuperscript{374} See generally 100 Largest Media Companies, Advertising Age, June 27, 1985, passim.

\textsuperscript{375} In other words, just as a common law right of publicity may fill interstices in the common law, it may also extend the right of privacy statute to address commercial aspects within right of publicity doctrine. See CALABREST, AGE OF STATUTES, supra note 205, at 166; Breitel II, supra note 302, at 21-22 ("lawmaking role of the courts is not determined primarily by whether stated principles or rules of law are statutory or decisional in origin"), quoted with approval in Friedmann, supra note 216, at 833.

\textsuperscript{376} See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 334 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). One scholar has expounded on the relationship:

Effective collaboration between legislatures and courts requires, on the one hand, that legislatures leave room in their enactments for the exercise by the courts of their distinctive function of reasoned elaboration of the law. It requires, on the other hand, that courts have a conception of their function which is adequate to enable them to make good use of the room which the legislatures leave[ ] them.

Hart, Comment, supra note 203, at 43.
In conclusion, while recognition of the right of publicity presents theoretical problems,\textsuperscript{377} in practice such judicial action would cause little harm. Today's right of publicity, a creature of yesterday's courts,\textsuperscript{378} has benefited society. Indeed, no legislature has rejected a court-made rule recognizing the right of publicity.\textsuperscript{379} New York judges should no longer hesitate to follow the lead of their brethren throughout the country.

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\textsuperscript{377} See \textit{supra} notes 286-348 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{378} See \textit{supra} notes 21-23 and accompanying text.