Keywords
collateral estoppal, parole, exclusionary rule, revocation
Abstract
In recent years courts have shown more recognition of the rights of parolees and probationers. Spurred by a Supreme Court decision that certain due process protections were applicable to parole revocation procedures, revocation hearings are now providing parolees and probationers some of the procedural protections available to criminal defendants at trial. Policy considerations have dictated, however, that the protections available at revocation hearings must fall far short of conferring upon the accused "the full panoply of rights due a defendant" at trial. As a result of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the difference between revocation hearings and criminal proceedings, lower courts have held that some constitutional protections available to defendants at trial do not apply at revocation hearings. Thus, the exclusionary rule has been held inapplicable to revocation hearings. This is in contrast to a recent district court decision, Standlee v. Rhay, where it was held that because of the punitive nature of a revocation hearing, it should be treated in some respects as equivalent to a criminal proceeding. These contrasting results are not as inconsistent as they may seem at first glance, but may be harmonized, to some extent, through an analysis of the principles underlying the respective doctrines. Although revocation hearings often present both exclusionary rule and collateral estoppel problems, these are essentially distinct legal concepts.
Recommended Citation
Patrick M. Reilly,
The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel in Parole Revocation,
4 Fordham Urb. L.J. 609
(1976).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol4/iss3/9