Abstract
A careful approach needs to be taken by antitrust authorities in the assessment of the possible exclusionary effects of conglomerate mergers on competitive conditions. In general, conglomerate mergers will raise concerns when they make the leverage of market power possible, thus having as their effect or object a foreclosure of the market to effective competition. The resulting competitive harm stems from the accumulation of substantial market power across complementary products or product ranges that, not being based on normal business performance or competition on the merits, may substantially reduce consumers' choice and ultimately lead to higher prices and a loss of welfare.
Recommended Citation
Götz Drauz,
Unbundling GE/HONEYWELL: The Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers Under EC Competition Law,
25 Fordham Int'l L.J. 885
(2001).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol25/iss4/1