Abstract
Part I of this Article examines whether, in evaluating a concentration, the Commission of the European Communities is permitted to take into account factors, such as industrial or social policy, that are not, strictly speaking, related to competition law. Part II explores whether “dominant position” has the same meaning under the Regulation No. 4064/89 as under Article 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community and, in particular, whether the Regulation also applies to concentrations that create, or further narrow, interdependent oligopolies. Part III examines whether the Commission is required to prohibit or modify every concentration that creates or strengthens a dominant position, or whether it is required to do so only when a further evaluation indicates that the concentration will result in effective competition being substantially impeded in all or a substantial part of the common market. The Article concludes with some reflections on market definitions, customer dependence and vertical concentrations.
Recommended Citation
James S. Venit,
The Evaluation of Concentrations Under the Merger Control Regulation: The Nature of the Beast,
14 Fordham Int'l L.J. 412
(1990).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol14/iss2/4