This Article explores the extent to which the agencies charged with administering the antidumping and countervailing duty laws are refusing to acquiesce in decisions of the CIT and the justifications, if any, for the practice of nonacquiescence. This article considers the use of devices with the potential of controlling or limiting agency nonacquiescence, such as collateral estoppel and stare decisis, as mechanisms to ensure uniformity among decisions by both the agencies and the CIT. The authors believe that nonacquiescence should be curtailed by the CIT so that the judiciary's power “to say what the law is” will remain separate from exercises of power by the legislative and executive branches of government.
David A. Hartquist, Jeffrey S. Beckington, and Kathleen W. Cannon,
Toward a Fuller Appreciation of Nonacquiescence, Collateral Estoppel, and Stare Decisis in the U.S. Court of International Trade,
14 Fordham Int'l L.J. 112
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol14/iss1/7