Abstract
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) criminalizes bribery of foreign government officials. The frequency of enforcement actions and severity of fines levied against corporations under the FCPA have significantly increased in the last few years. There is an ongoing problem, however, with the sanctions for FCPA violations: enforcement authorities (the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission) and contracting officials have limited themselves to fines, civil penalties, and occasional imprisonment of individual violators. Debarment from future federal government contracts, even temporarily, is an unused sanction for FCPA violations, even though Congress provided for this punishment by statute. Debarment offers a far more potent deterrent than fines and penalties, as multinational contractors that conduct business with the United States are much less likely to view the sanction as merely a cost of doing business. If ridding foreign markets of corruption truly is a top priority of the United States, it seems both unfair and imprudent for federal agencies to continue awarding lucrative, multi-billion dollar contracts to firms recently prosecuted for fraudulently obtaining them overseas. Enforcement officials shy away from debarring entities that violate the FCPA due to the short-term inconvenience of an agency’s inability to transact business with its favorite contractor, its inability to demand favorable bids from contractors when the field of potential bidders has thinned, the resulting job loss, and the risk of overdeterring companies that might otherwise pursue lucrative opportunities in emerging markets. This is the “too big to debar” problem—the federal government is too dependent on a particular set of large, private sector corporations for equipment and services. In addition to the virtual immunity from debarment enjoyed by these firms when they violate the FCPA, the fines imposed for engaging in foreign corrupt practices comprise a tiny fraction of the potential revenue generated by lucrative contracts with the United States and foreign states. When discounted by the low probability of detection, these sanctions are far too low to deter unlawful activity. Debarment would deter potential wrongdoers and incapacitate actual offenders. The deterrent would induce more firms to comply with the law, which would allow the “too big to debar” problem to diminish over time. To help illuminate these concerns and lend support to the thesis, this Article will examine the third largest FCPA-related enforcement action to date: the BAE Systems case. On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems paid approximately $400 million in fines for its corrupt practices abroad. In the year that followed, however, the federal government awarded BAE contracts in excess of $6 billion. The United States’ refusal to debar BAE because of the potential “collateral consequences” provides a case study on the benefits and drawbacks of deterring foreign corruption through suspension and debarment. This Article concludes that the United States must begin to diversify its portfolio of federal contractors so that prosecutors may leverage the legitimate threat of suspension and debarment to more effectively deter foreign corruption.
Recommended Citation
Drury D. Stevenson and Nicholas J. Wagoner,
FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?,
80 Fordham L. Rev. 775
(2011).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol80/iss2/13