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ARTICLES

ALIEN LANGUAGE: IMMIGRATION METAPHORS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF OTHERNESS

Keith Cunningham-Parmeter*

Metaphors tell the story of immigration law. Throughout its immigration jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has employed rich metaphoric language to describe immigrants attacking nations and aliens flooding communities. This Article applies research in cognitive linguistics to critically evaluate the metaphoric construction of immigrants in the law.

Three conceptual metaphors dominate legal texts: IMMIGRANTS ARE ALIENS, IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION. In order to gauge the prevalence of these metaphors, the Article engages in a textual analysis of modern Supreme Court opinions and presents original empirical data on the incidence of alienage terminology in federal court decisions. The Article explains how immigration metaphors influence not only judicial outcomes, but also social discourse and the broader debate over immigration reform. As such, the theoretical study of language has very practical consequences for the people defined by immigration metaphors.

The Article concludes by proposing an oppositional metaphoric framework based on the concepts of migration and economic sanctuary. These metaphors describe immigration in terms of movement, work, and community, in contrast to existing legal metaphors that describe immigration in terms of danger, attack, and criminality. Thus, while today’s immigration metaphors signify a loss of economic security and cultural hegemony, the proposed terms emphasize immigrants’ economic contributions and potential for social belonging. This process of evaluation and substitution diminishes the power of existing metaphors to conflate and

* Assistant Professor of Law, Willamette University. J.D., Stanford University. I am grateful to David Frank, Kevin Johnson, Hiroshi Motomura, and Leti Volpp for sharing their insights and expertise on this topic. I also thank Laura Appleman, Richard Birke, Caroline Davidson, and Paul Diller for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. David Anderson, Andrea Breinholt, Marshall Dunst, and Michael Owens provided outstanding research assistance throughout this project. Finally, I thank Dean Symeon Symeonides for providing generous research support for this Article. All errors are exclusively my own.
essentialize, while creating space in the legal imagination for new frames to emerge.

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INTRODUCTION

“As an Oriental invasion . . . a menace to our civilization . . . .”
-Justice Stephen J. Field, 1889

“[T]his silent invasion of illegal aliens from Mexico . . . .”
-Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 1975

“[T]he northbound tide of illegal entrants . . . .”
-Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 2000

William Rehnquist referred to Mexican children as “wetbacks.”4 No one disputes that the future Chief Justice of the Supreme Court used the ethnic slur in front of his colleagues in 1981.5 When a shocked Justice Thurgood Marshall objected, Justice Rehnquist defended himself arguing that “wetback” still carried “currency in his part of the country.”6

Justice Rehnquist would go on to author some of the most important immigration decisions of the late twentieth century. In those opinions, he did not refer to immigrants as “wetbacks.” Rather he employed a rich array of metaphors to describe a nation at risk. He wrote of “an avalanche of claims” coming from unauthorized immigrants.7 He described the fight against illegal immigration as a form of “national self protection.”8 He argued that federal law must “combat[] the employment of illegal aliens.”9 The larger cognitive frame structuring these statements might be described as IMMIGRATION IS A LOSING BATTLE.10 Illegal aliens are entering the country like an avalanche—dangerous, monolithic, overpowering, and unstoppable. Law enforcement officers are engaged in combat for national self-protection. In this metaphoric war, Supreme Court Justices become soldiers who must protect citizens against the impending alien offensive.

A growing body of research in cognitive linguistics demonstrates that human beings view the world in metaphoric terms.11 In attempting to

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10. Throughout this Article, I employ the linguistic convention of using small capital letters to refer to conceptual metaphors and italicized letters to refer to metaphoric linguistic expressions. See infra Part I.A and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between conceptual metaphors and metaphoric linguistic expressions); see also Bruce Kochis & Diane Gillespie, Conceptual Metaphors as Interpretive Tools in Qualitative Research: A Re-Examination of College Students’ Diversity Discussions, 11 QUALITATIVE REP. 566, 567 n.1 (2006) (using the convention).
comprehend new ideas, people borrow from familiar concepts. The metaphors floating in our minds determine our linguistic choices, which in turn affect social discourse and ultimately social action. Thus, how we think metaphorically affects how we talk about problems and the solutions we formulate in response to those problems. This becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more we repeat, circulate, and repackage certain metaphors, the more our conceptual domains become tied to a limited set of associations.

Justice Rehnquist’s description of immigrants illustrates this point. By using and defending the word “wetback” in front of his colleagues, Justice Rehnquist revealed a particular perspective on immigration. As his defense of the term suggests, he viewed “wetback” as a neutral word—simply a way to refer to Mexican immigrants that was linguistically and culturally appropriate in “his part of the country.” His conceptual frame of immigrants, then, created a version of reality that highlighted certain features of immigrants, while obscuring others. Namely, the image of immigrants as “wetbacks” focuses on immigration-related characteristics such as illegality, ethnicity, and invasion, while concealing other characteristics such as personhood, diversity, and belonging. Through this process of metaphoric framing, inferences and understandings arise that severely restrict the universe of possible judicial outcomes.

The external face of the law denies the importance of language, yet metaphor’s prevalence in legal texts indicates otherwise. Supreme Court opinions that appear to express objective legal principles rely heavily on nonliteral language to reach their conclusions. For example, the Supreme Court frequently refers to corporations as people. The wall of separation and the marketplace of ideas protect First Amendment


15. Brennan, supra note 6, at IX (recounting Justice Rehnquist’s explanation).


17. Id.


rights. States are laboratories. The list goes on and on. Immigration is no exception to metaphor’s ubiquity in the law.

This Article explores the prevailing metaphors of immigration law and examines the social and legal consequences of their use. Employing a critical discourse framework, I assert that three immigration metaphors dominate Supreme Court texts: IMMIGRANTS ARE ALIENS, IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION.

Part I of this Article establishes a method for understanding these terms by introducing the conceptual theory of metaphor. According to cognitive linguists, human thought is defined by metaphors. I evaluate Stephen Winter’s claim that legal reasoning is grounded in metaphors that derive from our “embodied” experiences as physical, social, and cultural beings.

Applying Winter’s theory to immigration metaphors, I explain why the dangers of distortion and conflation—risks associated with all metaphors—are heightened in the immigration context.

Working from the critical framework established in Part I, Part II analyzes the conceptual metaphors of three modern Supreme Court opinions. In undoubtedly the most important constitutional decision affecting unauthorized immigrants in the last century, the Supreme Court referred to a “shadow population” of millions of “illegal aliens” that constituted “an ever-increasing flood.” In its most important labor law decision involving immigrants, the Court described the criminality of “illegal aliens.” Finally, in the deportation context, the Supreme Court analogized the detention of immigrants to the discovery of “contraband

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22. See Bosmajian, supra note 19, at 200 (questioning whether the marketplace metaphor is appropriate in modern society).


28. Id. at 218 (emphasis added).

29. Id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

explosives or drugs.”31 I explain that, rather than stand as outliers, these cases join a much larger body of Supreme Court decisions that use metaphors to describe immigration in terms of criminality, flood, and attack.

In Part III, I explain how the Supreme Court’s metaphors interact with metaphors from other important cultural institutions like Congress to create a social understanding of “the immigration problem” and the necessary solutions to the problem.32 For example, if immigrants are viewed as illegal alien criminals, then they should be captured and deported. If immigration is an invasion from the south, then the government should construct a virtual fence across the border to resist the Mexican offensive. These “common sense” responses are made possible by selective metaphoric framing.

The Article concludes by proposing several avenues for discursive change. First, I assert that similes are more effective vehicles for understanding immigration-related concepts than metaphors. Because similes stimulate analogic reasoning, they are less likely than metaphors to encourage cognitive shortcuts and conflate ideas. Given that human reasoning depends on figurative associations, however, metaphors will remain fundamental components of discourse and thought. Because of metaphor’s omnipresence in law, I argue that speakers must develop an oppositional metaphoric framework to compete with dominant accounts.33 I suggest two alternative metaphors: unauthorized immigrants should be referred to as migrants, and illegal immigration should instead be thought of as a process of obtaining economic sanctuary.

In contrast to existing terms that describe nonhumans who attack, migration describes people who move. Whereas the Supreme Court’s current immigration metaphors focus on criminality, economic sanctuary focuses on the human consequences of globalization and the displacement of workers. Finally, while current frames signify a loss of economic security and cultural hegemony, the proposed terms highlight immigrants’ economic contributions and potential for social belonging.

In the midst of heated immigration debates and calls for greater restrictions, we should pause for a moment to consider the role metaphors play in the social and legal construction of noncitizens. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson—the pioneers of conceptual metaphor theory—remind us, “[P]eople in power get to impose their metaphors.”34 The Supreme Court has imposed many immigration metaphors on the legal community.

34. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 157.
This Article seeks to critically evaluate the metaphors of immigration law so that competing frames might emerge.

I. CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS AND THE LAW

A. The Traditional and Cognitive Accounts

Metaphors are typically described as figures of speech used to understand one concept in terms of another. The most common metaphoric expression employs an “A is a B” format. Thus, the expression “life is a dance” makes the association between “life” and “dance” explicit. But a person might also say, “I’m going to find a life partner” or “You take the lead,” thereby associating living with dancing more indirectly. Regardless of the format, however, the classical rhetorical definition of metaphor involves a tacit comparison between two concepts.

Philosophers of language have long studied the role metaphor plays in communicating ideas. Aristotle, the father of the traditional approach, described metaphor as a method for producing understanding “through the generic similarity.” Under this view, metaphor has both descriptive and normative components. On the descriptive side, metaphors are simply linguistic expressions used for nonliteral comparisons. Normatively, the traditional view holds that metaphors are linguistically deviant because they inhibit language’s primary function, which is to accurately represent reality.

The conventional wisdom on metaphor took a radical turn in the mid-twentieth century when theorists questioned the foregoing descriptive and normative accounts. Although traditionalists viewed metaphor as a rhetorical device, later theorists described metaphor in cognitive terms. The influential twentieth-century philosopher and literary critic I.A. Richards asserted that metaphor involves a “borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts.” According to Richards, we


37. Hibbitts, supra note 35, at 234 (noting that metaphors create images that emphasize specific qualities of particular referents).


41. Hunter, supra note 39, at 463.

42. Id. (discussing the “linguistic deviance” of metaphors and tracing the traditional view to Aristotle).

think metaphorically, and the figurative expressions we utter represent underlying cognitive processes.\textsuperscript{44} Max Black extended Richards’s initial assault on the traditionalist approach by describing metaphoric meaning not in terms of shared literal properties but in terms of shared concepts and relationships.\textsuperscript{45} Black analyzed the phrase “man is a wolf” to illustrate what is known as the “interaction” theory of metaphor.\textsuperscript{46} Under this approach, when listeners hear “man is a wolf,” they associate certain characteristics and relationships with “man,” which then interact with characteristics and relationships that they unconsciously associate with “wolf.”\textsuperscript{47} The interaction of these “associated commonplaces” produces a unique meaning that cannot be explained through paraphrase.\textsuperscript{48}

Although the interaction theory of metaphor challenged many core assumptions of the traditional view—that metaphors are solely ornamental, linguistic, and comparative\textsuperscript{49}—Richards and Black left other questions unanswered. Namely: how does the human mind select certain characteristics of a particular domain, while ignoring other potential “associated commonplaces”? Thus, in the phrase “man is a wolf,” why do we map concepts such as anger and ferocity from wolf to man, but filter out other characteristics such as “has legs,” “breathes air,” or “drinks water”?\textsuperscript{50} Cognitive linguists addressed these and other questions in the latter half of the twentieth century.

In their pioneering book \textit{Metaphors We Live By}, Lakoff and Johnson applied research in philosophy and cognitive linguistics to the study of metaphor.\textsuperscript{51} Although prior theorists had discussed the cognitive nature of metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson were the first to offer a comprehensive, empirically tested approach.\textsuperscript{52} According to their account, metaphors live in the mind but reveal themselves in words and phrases.\textsuperscript{53} We scale our conceptual metaphors according to familiarity, with abstract concepts

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{44}. Id. \\
\textsuperscript{45}. See Berger, supra note 20, at 174–77 (summarizing Black’s theory). \\
\textsuperscript{46}. MAX BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY 39–44 (1962). \\
\textsuperscript{47}. Berger, supra note 20, at 175–76 (analyzing the man is a wolf metaphor); Hunter, supra note 39, at 468–69 (same). \\
\textsuperscript{48}. BLACK, supra note 46, at 44–46; see also Berger, supra note 20, at 176; Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949, 955 (2007) (discussing Black’s theory). \\
\textsuperscript{49}. David T. Ritchie, Who Is on the Outside Looking in, and What Do They See?: Metaphors of Exclusion in Legal Education, 58 MERCER L. REV. 991, 992 (2007) (describing the traditional view of metaphor as “a mere trick designed to conceal or cover over the truth”). \\
\textsuperscript{50}. Hunter, supra note 39, at 469 (discussing the limitations of Black’s theory). \\
\textsuperscript{51}. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 3–9; see also Otto Santa Ana et al., Awash Under a Brown Tide: Immigration Metaphors in California Public and Print Media Discourse, 23 AZTLÁN 137, 142 (1998) (arguing that Lakoff and Johnson’s work “signaled the advent of cognitive science in understanding how metaphors shape everyday thinking”). \\
\textsuperscript{52}. See KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at xi (discussing the significance of Lakoff and Johnson’s work). \\
\end{flushright}
understood in terms of more concrete experiences. Thus, in the metaphor
TIME IS MONEY, the abstract concept (time) is viewed in terms of a better-
understood concept grounded in the real world (money). Lakoff and
Johnson refer to the more obscure concept (i.e., the one the listener is trying
to understand) as the “target domain” (time) and the idea or experience
from which the listener borrows attributes as the “source domain”
(money). Conceptual metaphors, thus, involve multiple mappings
between domains.

Cognitive linguists emphasize the difference between conceptual
metaphors and their linguistic expressions. Conceptual metaphors
involve the process of understanding one conceptual domain in terms of
another. Linguistic expressions are the words or phrases that reflect the
conceptual metaphor. For example, a speaker might express the
conceptual metaphor THE MIND IS A CONTAINER by stating: “He’s empty-
headed” or “She’s full of ideas.” Whether or not the speaker actually
utters the conceptual metaphor, researchers can identify the underlying idea
based on the number of linguistic metaphoric expressions that refer to it.
Thus, conceptual metaphors are “ways of thinking” about concepts, while
linguistic expressions are “ways of talking” about them. If a large
number of similar metaphoric expressions or “tokens” of conceptual
metaphors exist, then they likely evince an underlying conceptual
association.

The conceptual theory of metaphor addresses two key issues that prior
theories had failed to resolve: (1) the process through which the human
mind selects certain source domains over others, and (2) the criteria used to
map certain attributes within domains while ignoring others. According to

54. Hugh G. Petrie & Rebecca S. Oshlag, Metaphor and Learning, in METAPHOR AND
THOUGHT 579, 589 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) (“[M]etaphor is what enables one to
pass from the more familiar to the unfamiliar . . . .”).
55. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7–9.
56. See KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 4 (discussing “conceptual domains”).
57. See Dan Hunter, Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY
L.J. 1197, 1212 (2001) (explaining how features of source domains are mapped onto target
domains); Steven L. Winter, Re-Embodying Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 869, 882 (2006)
discussing mappings).
58. See KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 4–6; O’Brien, supra note 13, at 32 (distinguishing
between conceptual and linguistic metaphors).
59. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 5.
60. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 4.
61. George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, The Metaphorical Structure of the Human
Conceptual System, 4 COGNITIVE SCI. 195, 196–97 (1980) (examining various examples of
ontological metaphors).
62. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 6 (describing metaphoric expressions as evidence of
conceptual metaphors).
63. Thomas H. Smith, When Experts Educate, What Do Their Metaphors Say? Complex
Metaphor Structure in the Professional Conflict Resolution Literature, 17 IBERICA 175, 176–
77 (2009).
Lakoff and Johnson, the notion of “experientialism” explains these unconscious metaphoric choices.64

Experientialism holds that our understanding of the world is rooted in our interactions with physical, social, and cultural environments.65 For example, when a parent holds a child, the child feels affection and warmth at the same time.66 By experiencing these stimuli simultaneously, the child conflates the ideas of affection and warmth. The conceptual metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH gives rise to statements such as: “Our relationship has cooled recently” and “I received a warm reception from the audience.”67 Because the human mind operates in conjunction with a physical body that dwells in the physical world, physical and spatial perceptions largely determine our metaphoric understandings.68

Source domains can be culturally grounded as well. In fact, the notion of experientialism extends to every environment a human being encounters, whether physical, cultural, social, economic, or moral.69 For example, Western speakers often articulate the concept TIME IS MONEY through a series of linguistic expressions such as “She spent her time wisely” or “I should budget my time more effectively.”70 Listeners draw meaning from these statements based on shared cultural understandings of money and business. Yet non-capitalist societies have very different perceptions of transactions and therefore do not describe the concept of time in economic terms.71 Whether metaphors are grounded in physical, social, or cultural knowledge, listeners will evaluate the accuracy of a particular metaphoric statement based on their embodied knowledge.72 As explained below, this experiential approach to human reasoning provides a useful tool for evaluating the operation of legal metaphors in general and immigration metaphors in particular.


67. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 48–49 (1999); see also Johnson, supra note 66, at 859–60 (explaining how physical associations give rise to many primary metaphors).


69. Johnson, supra note 66, at 846 (“Our embodiment shapes both what and how we experience, think, mean, imagine, reason, and communicate.”).


71. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7–9.

72. See id.
B. The Metaphoric Nature of Legal Reasoning

Much like traditional philosophers of language, early legal commentators viewed metaphor with great skepticism. Lord Mansfield opined that “nothing in law is so apt to mislead as a metaphor,”73 Jeremy Bentham stated tersely that “[m]etaphors are not [r]easons,”74 and Justice Benjamin Cardozo warned that metaphors “end often by enslaving [thought].”75

Early critics of legal metaphors embraced a rationalist view of law that dismissed metaphors as distracting rhetorical flourishes.76 Rationalists viewed the law as a product of logical, impartial discernment.77 According to this account, lawyers are not reality-makers but rather creative applicators of a rule-based system.78 As such, metaphors cannot create multiple realities because the law embodies a singular version of reality.

In his groundbreaking application of research in cognitive linguistics to the law, Steven Winter offered an alternative account of the role played by metaphor in legal thought.79 According to Winter, those who dismiss legal metaphors as rhetorical trifles rely on flawed assumptions about human rationality. Winter argues that legal reasoning is grounded in human interactions, which become institutionalized first in social practices, and later in cultural and legal norms.80 Just as human reasoning is metaphoric, so too is the law.81 Because we think metaphorically based on our “embodied interactions” with physical, social, and cultural environments, the law also derives from these experiences.82 The law’s metaphoric grounding allows for dynamic change as social practices and cultural understandings develop.83 As Winter states, “Actual examination of legal metaphors—how they work, how they come to be, how they come to be meaningful and persuasive to us as embodied, socially-situated human beings—shows that . . . metaphor is both the product and embodiment of constraint.”84

74. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69–71 (1911).
76. See Ross, supra note 73, at 1057 n.9 (examining the formalist view of metaphor).
77. See Berger, supra note 20, at 178 (discussing legal fundamentalism).
78. See MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 8 (1985) (characterizing objectivism as the “received tradition” of law).
80. WINTER, supra note 79, at 193.
81. See id. at 197 (arguing that legal reasoning does not operate in a rule-like way).
82. Johnson, supra note 65, at 958.
83. See Winter, supra note 57, at 895–96 (challenging both the objectivist and subjectivist accounts of law).
84. Id. at 897.
According to this experientialist account, there is no law without metaphor. Metaphors do not misrepresent the law; metaphor is the law because human reasoning is essentially metaphorical. At its core, then, the conceptual theory of metaphor “humanizes” the law by situating it within social institutions and ordinary thought processes.

Winter’s experiential understanding of legal metaphors raises several questions about the metaphoric construction of immigrants in the law. If human beings comprehend foreign concepts through metaphors, then we would expect the law to employ many metaphors to describe immigrants and immigration (i.e., people and processes perceived as “different” or “foreign” and therefore in need of greater explanation). In addition, if source domains are experientially grounded, then we would expect immigration metaphors to reference basic human experiences such as survival and self-protection, as well as basic culturally constructed concepts such as race and ethnicity. As seen below, the Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors bear these hypotheses out, producing reified images of immigrants that legal actors have largely adopted through unconscious associations.

C. Immigration Metaphors and the Dangers of Conflation

Cognitive linguists warn that metaphors can mislead as well as enlighten. As a selective process that emphasizes certain aspects of source and target domains, while masking others, metaphors do not tell stories completely. For example, the metaphor IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD utilizes certain characteristics of “flood” (the source domain), while underutilizing others. Thus, the metaphor brings focus to a flood’s destructive qualities, while ignoring the fact that floods often recede and leave fertile soil in their wake. Such mappings never capture the entire source. The same is true for the selective highlighting of target domains. The metaphor IMMIGRANTS ARE ILLEGAL ALIENS, for example, highlights the criminal characteristics of some immigrants (the target domain), while ignoring the fact that most immigrants reside legally in the United States.

Metaphors are most likely to deceive listeners when they conflate two domains entirely. If the target domain becomes the source domain in the listener’s mind, then the mapping process changes from metaphoric to literal. An inverse relationship exists between a metaphor’s potential to


86. Johnson, supra note 65, at 951–53 (explaining how cultural understandings constrain legal concepts).


89. See Stephen Ullman, Language and Style 237–38 (1964) (“By unthinkingly and mechanically repeating the same image, we may in the end forget that it is metaphorical . . . .”).
mislead and the extent to which readers understand it as a metaphoric representation, rather than as a semi-literal representation.90

Here I explain why the risk of distortion associated with all metaphors is heightened in the immigration context. Most immigration metaphors are what I call “personal metaphors,” meaning figurative representations that describe people or social processes. For example, the Supreme Court describes immigration using metaphors such as illegal alien, northbound tide, and silent invasion.91 The target domains of these metaphors (i.e., the subjects that the metaphors are trying to explain) are not novel rules or legal principles, but rather involve immigrants themselves. As explained below,92 immigration opinions often literalize these personal metaphors: through metaphor, the immigrant becomes the alien, the illegal becomes the Mexican.

The personal nature of immigration metaphors differs sharply from the doctrinal nature of most legal metaphors. By “doctrinal metaphor” I mean a figurative statement that attempts to summarize a legal rule or concept (e.g., marketplace of ideas, wall of separation, stream of commerce).93 In contrast to the personal nature of immigration metaphors, doctrinal metaphors have received widespread evaluation and criticism from the legal community, thereby reducing the risk that these metaphors will pass unconsciously into the legal imagination. For example, even though the marketplace of ideas metaphor94 is an established part of the First Amendment vernacular, it remains a statement that readers can observe and assess. When the marketplace metaphor appears in written opinions, it stands as an obvious shortcut to a broader legal principle, thereby inviting criticism and proposals for change. Demonstrating the testability of the metaphor, Cass Sunstein has argued that the marketplace concept improperly commodifies the First Amendment,95 and Kathleen Sullivan has argued that speech is more like self-government than a sale of goods.96 These assessments are made possible because, like all doctrinal metaphors,

92. See infra Part II.D.1 (examining different permutations of the alien metaphor).
93. See Smith, supra note 21, at 921–23 (defining “doctrinal metaphors” and describing them as both “powerful” and “dangerous”).
94. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 Yale L.J. 1757, 1759 (1995) (discussing the history of the marketplace metaphor); see also Tsai, supra note 18, at 230 (referring to the marketplace metaphor as the “single most recognized metaphor in all of constitutional law”).
the *marketplace* metaphor summarizes a legal concept that lawyers, judges, and scholars are predisposed to identify and debate.

Even if doctrinal metaphors pass unwittingly into everyday use, they never conflate source and target domains completely. For example, we know when we speak of a *wall of separation* that we are not talking about a *wall* literally. Legal critics continue to question the *wall* metaphor, despite its ubiquity.97 Likewise, scholars have questioned whether corporations are really *people*98 and whether property rights are really *bundles of sticks*.99

In contrast to doctrinal metaphors, the images of ethnicity and danger contained in immigration metaphors create the impression that immigrants can *only* be described in terms of alienage and criminality. Thus, although scholars have paid substantial attention to doctrinal metaphors, immigration metaphors have generated significantly less critical evaluation.

I propose two explanations for why immigration metaphors are more likely to conflate source and target domains, while enjoying uncritical acceptance. First, doctrinal metaphors attempt to neatly summarize complex rules or concepts—a purpose arguably necessary to the interpretation and enforcement of laws. They are “cognitively efficient” because they establish criteria for resolving unpredictable problems that are yet to occur.100 As such, doctrinal metaphors are indicative of a “healthy legal culture” because they facilitate a shared understanding of legal norms and explain difficult legal concepts.101 In contrast, there is no way to “neatly summarize” a group of noncitizens with varied backgrounds and objectives. Thus, unlike doctrinal metaphors, the goals of immigration metaphors are neither necessary nor attainable; metaphors that attempt to capture the essence of immigrants will inevitably miss the mark and therefore distort.

Second, although metaphors are a natural product of experiential knowledge, not all experiences exist on equal cognitive planes. The social and cultural understandings associated with immigration metaphors are more likely to involve race, ethnicity, and self-protection—source domains that operate on deeply unconscious levels because of the mind’s tendency to sort this type of information based on invisible categorical structures.102 The intergroup judgments that flow from racialized perspectives are largely unintentional and non-motivational.103 If legal actors are unable to

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98. Berger, *supra* note 20, at 187 (considering the implications of using metaphors to associate corporations with people).
101. Tsai, *supra* note 18, at 189–90; see also Bosmajian, *supra* note 19, at 46–47 (arguing that metaphors are necessary for explaining abstractions).
103. See id. at 1187–88.
recognize the mind’s methods for sorting information related to outside social groups, then they are equally unable to question the assumptions upon which many immigration metaphors depend. As such, lawyers and scholars have found it much easier to question assumptions contained in doctrinal metaphors, such as whether ideas are commodities, than to question the assumptions embedded in immigration metaphors, such as whether immigrants are criminals or whether all illegal aliens come from Mexico.

The foregoing discussion has established a framework for understanding immigration metaphors from a cognitive perspective. According to the theoretical approach outlined above, immigration metaphors tend to highlight certain characteristics of noncitizens, while conflating and distorting others. Until now, this discussion has been entirely a matter of theory. It is now time to evaluate the metaphors of immigration law in practice.

II. DECONSTRUCTING THE SUPREME COURT’S IMMIGRATION METAPHORS

Law is told through stories, and stories are told through metaphors. Here I analyze the metaphors of immigration stories told by the Supreme Court. These opinions address vastly different areas of the law and reach vastly different conclusions about the extent of rights that immigrants should enjoy. I tell an “immigrant-friendly” story that has been called a “conceptual watershed in immigration law” for its focus on the universal rights of noncitizens.104 I tell an “anti-immigrant” story that has been labeled a “human rights . . . crisis in immigration policy” for denying unauthorized immigrants basic workplace remedies.105

What links these stories is not legal subject matter or judicial perspective. Rather, these immigration stories demonstrate how Supreme Court Justices with very different legal philosophies often engage in the shared endeavor of constructing immigrants through metaphors. Justice Rehnquist, the author of the “anti-immigrant” story, described “illegal aliens” as criminals who trick businesses.106 Justice William Brennan, the author of the “immigrant-friendly” story (and Justice Rehnquist’s intellectual rival on the left of the Court)107 wrote of a “shadow population of illegal migrants” who live within our borders.108 These cases—ranging from constitutional law,

107. Newton, supra note 6 (discussing the rivalry between Justices Rehnquist and Brennan).
to labor law, to immigration law—suggest that the metaphoric construction of immigrants is a conceptual process that cuts across ideological lines.

After telling three immigration stories, I explain how the metaphors contained therein join a much larger body of metaphors in Supreme Court opinions. I selected these cases based on their impact and relevance. To that end, I considered Supreme Court opinions authored after 1965—the year Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to eliminate national origin quotas. That year is widely regarded as the beginning of the modern era of immigration law. Older cases contain metaphoric language as well, much of which is explicitly racist. Such decisions, however, do not provide the same insight into the contemporary construction of immigrants in the law.

The conceptual metaphors that emerge from a critical evaluation of numerous Supreme Court texts are: IMMIGRANTS ARE ALIENS, IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION. Applying the framework established above, I explain how the Court’s metaphors draw from embodied knowledge to construct a psychologically reductive image of immigrants in the legal imagination. In order to understand this symbol-making process and consider discursive alternatives, we now turn to the symbols themselves.

A. Plyler: Educating the Shadow Population

In 1977, a rural school district in Texas began charging $1000 tuition to unauthorized immigrant children attending public school. The Tyler Independent School District adopted the requirement after the Texas legislature voted to limit free public education to “[e]very child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted alien.” By altering the Texas Education Code in this way, the state legislature effectively cut off funding to local school districts that wanted to educate every child, regardless of status. As such, Tyler and other Texas towns enacted measures designed to prevent the state from becoming a “haven for illegal aliens."

Parents of sixteen unauthorized immigrant children in Tyler brought suit against Superintendent James Plyler. All of the children were under the

111. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (“And it may be that the national government . . . has the power to build, as it were, a Chinese wall around our borders and absolutely forbid aliens to enter.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (emphasis added) (referring to “vast hordes of . . . people crowding in upon us”).
114. Doe, 458 F. Supp. at 572 (internal quotations omitted).
115. Id. at 574–75.
The families’ decision to sue did not come without risks. The local U.S. Attorney had reportedly asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to deport the plaintiffs and conduct an immigration sweep in Tyler. To the plaintiffs’ lawyers, this was the Latino community’s chance to achieve a civil rights victory comparable to Brown v. Board of Education: an opportunity to challenge an egregious instance of discrimination against a subordinated ethnic group. To supporters of the Texas statute, this was one state’s admirable attempt to do what the federal government had failed to achieve: contain the growing illegal alien problem.

The case of Plyler v. Doe represented a seven-year legal battle that culminated in a 5-4 Supreme Court ruling striking down the Texas statute on equal protection grounds. Immigration scholars regard Plyler as “the ultimate aliens’ rights decision” for opposing “caste legislation in America.” According to many accounts, the case represents a high-water mark in immigration law because of its steadfast focus on universalism and equal personhood. Despite the praise heaped on Plyler’s holding, however, less attention has been paid to the metaphors used to achieve this outcome. In fact, an analysis of Plyler’s text reveals that, despite the case’s famously egalitarian ends, the decision relies on restrictive metaphors to portray a nation overcome by illegal immigration.

Plyler depicts immigrants in hiding. The opinion refers to a “shadow population of illegal migrants—numbering in the millions—within our borders.” Because they dwell in the shadows, members of this

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119. Id. at 201.
120. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
121. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
123. See BOSNIK, supra note 104, at 65–67 (noting that critical commentary has both castigated and celebrated Plyler’s outcome); Motomura, supra note 24, at 2043 (arguing that the Supreme Court has largely contained Plyler’s holding); Nina Rabin et al., Understanding Plyler’s Legacy: Voices from Border Schools, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 15, 15 (2008).
124. Although Plyler’s metaphors have not been analyzed in great detail, several scholars have discussed the opinion’s competing rhetorical frames. See, e.g., BOSNIK, supra note 104, at 66–67 (discussing the role of moral culpability in Plyler); Motomura, supra note 24, at 2041–47 (analyzing Plyler’s discussion of unlawful presence, state power, and immigrant integration); Schuck, supra note 104, at 55 (analyzing Plyler’s description of immigrant parents and children).
125. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
population are “defenseless against any abuse, exploitation, or callous neglect.”\footnote{126. Id. at 219 n.18 (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex 1978)).}

Denying them education would create “a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.”\footnote{127. Id. at 230; see also id. at 241 (Powell, J., concurring) (referring to the “subclass of illiterate persons” who would add to the current problems of “unemployment, welfare, and crime”).}

*Plyler* is littered with metaphors of paternalism that cast immigrants as nameless actors who depend on the Supreme Court for protection. But *Plyler*’s metaphors do not construct all immigrants equally. The majority opinion contrasts “undocumented children disabled by this classification”\footnote{128. Id. at 230 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).} with the adult parents who brought the infirmity of illegal status on their offspring:

> The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special members of this underclass . . . . [T]hose who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not limited to, deportation. But the children of those illegal entrants are not comparably situated.\footnote{129. Id. at 219–20 (emphasis added).}

*Plyler* castigates parents who enter the country illegally through “voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the [undocumented] class is itself a crime.”\footnote{130. Id. at 219 n.19 (emphasis added).} According to *Plyler*’s metaphors, bad aliens are criminal adults, while good aliens are infantilized immigrants who remain quiet and vulnerable.\footnote{131. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, *Good Aliens, Bad Aliens and the Supreme Court*, in IX IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 46, 46–47 (L. Tomasi ed., 1987) (discussing the legal differentiation between aliens based on relative culpability); see also BOSNIAK, supra note 104, at 66–67 (examining the “innocent child/culpable adult opposition” in *Plyler*).}

Legal responses emerge naturally from these frames: good immigrants deserve an education; bad aliens deserve swift removal from the country.

Although they disagreed on the substantive rights at issue, the *Plyler* Justices shared a common vision of immigration as a dangerous body of water. The word “influx,” which means “an inflow, as of a physical fluid,” appears six times in the decision.\footnote{132. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228–49 (majority opinion); 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 941 (2d ed. 1989).} Justice Brennan wrote of Texas’s attempt to “stem the tide of illegal immigration.”\footnote{133. Id. at 228–29 (emphasis added) (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex 1978)).} Chief Justice Warren Burger referred to “millions of illegal aliens flooding across our southern border” and “an ever-increasing flood of illegal aliens—aliens over whose entry or continued presence [the federal government] has no control.”\footnote{134. Id. at 249, 253 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).}

Rising floods must be contained, lest they drown the citizenry. Accordingly, the solutions proposed in *Plyler* match the metaphors used to define the problem. The majority described the need to “control[ ] the
influx of illegal entrants into the State," while the dissenting Justices proposed “sealing our vast borders.” According to Plyler, however, these efforts will ultimately prove unsuccessful given the overwhelming strength of the immigrant wave. Bodies of water are difficult to hold back. Thus, notwithstanding “the serious national problems caused by the influx of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across our borders,” the alien inundation remains “virtually uncontrollable.”

Despite Plyler’s many references to floods, illegal immigration was more like a trickle at the time the opinion was written in 1982. In fact, immigrant children from Mexico accounted for less than two percent of the student population in Texas schools. In contrast to the “influx of uncountable millions of illegal aliens” described by the Plyler dissent, roughly two million unauthorized immigrants lived in the United States in the early 1980s and accounted for less than fifteen percent of the foreign-born population. Immigrants were not an advancing body of water, but an identifiable group of people that represented a relatively small proportion of noncitizens in the United States. But Plyler’s water metaphors ignored this demographic information. Through metaphor, waves washed away facts and left a new reality in their wake.

According to the conceptual theory of metaphor, human beings naturally map physical experiences onto more abstract domains. Plyler’s metaphors achieve this end by presenting an image of aliens submerging the United States. When human beings are forced under water, they will do anything to reach the surface. By creating the image of a sinking nation, Plyler draws on our fear of drowning and our instinct to respond aggressively to existential threats.

Plyler’s story begins with innocent children hiding in the shadows and ends with adult criminals deluging the nation. The more Plyler imbues immigrants with a sense of agency, the more menacing the metaphors become. But submersion is not the only basic human experience triggered by the Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors. Human beings also fear criminal attack. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, the next immigration story told here, the Supreme Court employed metaphors of stealth and criminality to describe the dangers of illegal immigration.

135. Id. at 228 n.24 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring).
142. See Hunter, supra note 39, at 474–75 (explaining how legal scholarship often describes virtual concepts in physical terms).
B. Hoffman: “An Illegal” Tries to Form a Union

In May 1988, Jose Castro applied for a job at a plastics factory in Southern California. Castro was a low-skilled employee who worked in gardening and construction. The company, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, was a family-owned business that made PVC pellets for customers. As a limited-English speaker with little education, Castro could not complete Hoffman’s six-page job application without assistance. Hoffman hired Castro anyway, and he soon began earning the minimum wage while cooking and mixing plastic formulas at Hoffman’s plant.

Seven months into Castro’s tenure at Hoffman, around Christmas 1988, several employees tried to form a union. Castro joined the campaign and solicited support from his coworkers. When they caught wind of the nascent union efforts, Hoffman’s managers began interrogating workers. One employee, Moises Gonzalez, identified Castro as a union leader. Several weeks later, Ronald Hoffman, the company president, laid off every single organizer. Hoffman argued that a decline in business caused the layoffs, despite displaying a “Help Wanted” sign before the layoffs and hiring new employees shortly thereafter. The union lost the campaign and the workers never organized.

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Hoffman had illegally interrogated employees and discharged workers “in order to rid itself of known union supporters.” At a compliance hearing to determine damages, Castro testified that he was born in Mexico and had used a friend’s birth certificate to obtain employment at Hoffman. Despite this admission, the NLRB ordered Hoffman to pay Castro over $60,000 in backpay. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, issuing a landmark decision that denied monetary remedies to unauthorized immigrants in labor cases.

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146. See Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 144, at 408 (summarizing Hoffman’s procedural history).
147. Hoffman, 208 F.3d at 232.
149. Id. at 108.
150. Id. at 106.
151. Id. at 108.
152. Id. at 102.
153. Id. at 103.
154. See Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 144, at 410 (describing the workplace environment at Hoffman following the Supreme Court’s decision).
158. Id. at 151–52.
None of the Supreme Court Justices uttered Jose Castro’s name during oral argument. Instead, the two most common terms the Justices used to refer to Castro were “the alien” and “the illegal alien.” At one point in the oral argument, one Justice used the adjective “illegal” as a noun, referring to situations in which an “employer did not know that the employee was an illegal , hence the employer was not violating the immigration law.”

The Court went on to describe aliens as stealthy criminals. Unlike Plyler , in which immigrants hide from exploitation, Hoffman’s immigrants hide their criminality. The alien is a person who “conceal[s] the facts . . . that he’s here illegally and has no right to work.” This person tries to “phony up more documents and . . . extend for the longest possible time the charade that the worker is here lawfully . . . .” He “subverts the cornerstone” of immigration law, all the while “evading apprehension by immigration authorities.” At one point in oral argument, Justice Antonin Scalia assumed the first-person voice of a crafty, lazy alien: “I can just sit home and eat chocolates and get my back pay.”

The Court lamented the “massive problem of illegal immigration” in the United States. One Justice said that “we have to do something to reduce this massive number of . . . illegal aliens.” Seen from this vantage, illegal immigration is a crisis that we, the citizens and victims of illegal immigration, must address immediately.

A choice of frames is as important for the problems it overlooks as for the problems it emphasizes. Although the Hoffman Court referred to Jose Castro as an “illegal alien,” it could just as easily have labeled him a “union organizer” or “discrimination victim.” Likewise, the Court could have described the “massive problem” of “employee exploitation” or “blatant unfair labor practices.” By choosing to describe illegal immigration not only as a problem, but the problem, Ronald Hoffman’s obvious illegal behavior became virtually irrelevant. Although Jose Castro was an illegal alien, Ronald Hoffman was not an illegal employer.

The conceptual theory of metaphor holds that cognitive understandings begin from basic, unmediated human experiences, which lead to the formation of more abstract knowledge. One such basic human experience is the fear of criminal attack. By emphasizing the criminal nature of Jose Castro’s wrongdoing and the need to “combat” aliens.

159. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-1595), 2002 WL 77224. The Justices used the term “illegal alien” fifteen times and the term “alien” ten times. No other term involving illegal immigration was used more than twice. Id.
160. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
164. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 159, at 33.
165. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
167. Winter, supra note 26, at 1133 (arguing that the process of “motivation . . . makes meaning possible”).
“forcefully,” Hoffman’s metaphors draw upon this survival instinct. Aliens conceal their criminal activity by silently crossing the border and tricking employers like Ronald Hoffman into giving them jobs. Aware of the alien’s cunning ways, the Hoffman Court employed metaphors of criminality to highlight the silent threat posed by illegal immigration.

C. Lopez-Mendoza: Immigrants as Toxic Waste

Many noncitizens could tell Adan Lopez-Mendoza’s immigration story. At the age of twenty-four, Lopez-Mendoza left his family in Mexico to find work in the United States and send small remittances home when he could. After departing from Mexico on foot, Lopez-Mendoza eventually found a job at a transmission repair shop in San Mateo, California. Several months after Lopez-Mendoza arrived in the United States, the INS received a tip that seven unauthorized immigrants were employed at the business where Lopez-Mendoza worked. Believing they lacked sufficient information to obtain a search warrant, two INS agents proceeded directly to the repair shop without going to court. One agent guarded the building’s only exit, while the other agent spoke to the owner, Art Bradley. Bradley refused to grant the agents access to the shop, asking instead that they return with a search warrant. Ignoring Bradley, one agent entered the business and began questioning the workers. According to the agents, Lopez-Mendoza provided suspicious answers and was brought to a local INS office for further questioning. There, he admitted that he had entered the United States illegally. This confession eventually served as the primary basis for Lopez-Mendoza’s deportation.

In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the normal rules for excluding illegally obtained evidence in criminal cases applied to civil deportation proceedings. According to the doctrinal metaphor in criminal law known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” courts should not admit evidence discovered derivatively from illegal searches, arrests, or interrogations. The tainted evidence (i.e., the target of the poisonous tree metaphor) is seen as diseased fruit that must be discarded before it harms the judicial process.

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168. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id.
174. Id.
176. Id. at 1040–41; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–87 (1963) (discussing the foundations of the exclusionary rule).
In a ruling that created the “illegal alien exception” to the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court declined to suppress Lopez-Mendoza’s confession.178 The Court concluded that although the exclusionary rule might discourage police officers from engaging in misconduct, the same prophylactic rationale carried little force in civil deportation proceedings.179 Beyond the legal significance of this holding, it is once again Lopez-Mendoza’s metaphors that are most remarkable.

Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor radically altered the target domain of the poisonous tree metaphor. In contrast to criminal cases, in which pieces of evidence are viewed as tainted fruit that defile the courtroom, the metaphors of Lopez-Mendoza describe immigrants as tainted bodies that defile the nation. As Justice O’Connor wrote:

Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule should be invoked to prevent an agency from ordering corrective action at a leaking hazardous waste dump if the evidence underlying the order had been improperly obtained, or to compel police to return contraband explosives or drugs to their owner if the contraband had been unlawfully seized.180

Thus, unlike criminal defendants who are viewed as victims of illegally obtained evidence, Lopez-Mendoza presents immigrants as the objects of taint. As Thomas Ross has observed: “To see something as ‘defiled’ is to feel a special sense of the rightness, indeed the obligation, to cut it off, to exclude it, at whatever cost.”181 Drugs destroy the body. Hazardous waste pollutes the environment. Lopez-Mendoza equates immigrants with these toxic items. According to the Supreme Court’s metaphors, aliens are like poisonous agents that should be removed from the national body immediately.

Just as cleanup crews must do everything in their power to contain toxic waste and protect society, so too must the Supreme Court contain immigrants who would otherwise pollute the country. The task before the Justices is imperative. The illegal alien problem is like “contraband explosives” that could detonate at any time.182 If something is not done immediately, the alien bomb will blow up, destroying everything around it.

Organism metaphors describe the social community in terms of a physical body. Mapping concepts of health and life onto concepts of country and society, Lopez-Mendoza’s organism metaphors describe the

179. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044–46 (distinguishing between civil deportation proceedings and criminal trials).
180. Id. at 1046 (emphasis added).
181. See Ross, supra note 73, at 1068 (explaining how the poisonous tree metaphor connects readers to known realities).
poisonous effects of immigration. Just as infectious diseases threaten our health, illegal aliens contaminate the social body. The associations created by these metaphors tie directly into our experiential understanding of the world. We know that drugs endanger our well-being. When foreign substances enter our bodies, our immune systems immediately attempt to combat them. By comparing immigrants to drugs and toxic waste, Lopez-Mendoza’s metaphors draw on the universal human desire to fend off internal contaminants.

As in previous immigration stories, Lopez-Mendoza speaks of the “staggering dimension of the problem that the INS confronts.” Unlike Plyler’s metaphors that describe the scale of immigration in terms of flooding, however, Lopez-Mendoza refers to the “massed numbers of ascertainably illegal aliens” in terms of national health. Lopez-Mendoza proposes to remove the pollution of illegal immigration from the United States by allowing courts to deport aliens with evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, organism metaphors empower judges to overlook constitutional violations in order to purge the nation of the contamination caused by illegal immigration.

D. Metaphors of Alienage, Floods, and Invasions

Consistent with the conceptual theory of metaphor, the foregoing immigration stories contain rich figurative language tied to our embodied understanding of the world. Plyler contains numerous water metaphors that engage readers’ fear of drowning. Hoffman employs metaphors of crime and attack that trigger self-defense instincts. Lopez-Mendoza describes a national body polluted by immigrants. These cases not only establish basic principles for the legal treatment of immigrants, they dictate how legal actors talk and think about noncitizens.

Although these three stories are among the most important immigration decisions in the modern era, they are rather unexceptional in the prominent role metaphors play in their texts. Here I explain how these stories join a much larger body of metaphors in the Supreme Court’s immigration jurisprudence. By analyzing numerous metaphoric expressions in diverse legal contexts, three conceptual metaphors emerge: IMMIGRANTS ARE ALIENS, IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD, and IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION.

1. Immigrants Are Aliens

“Alien” is the most dominant metaphor in all of immigration law. In fact, lawyers and judges refer to “aliens” so frequently that few would
identify the word as a metaphor. This reaction is understandable. Metaphors are traditionally viewed as simple comparisons between non-literal concepts. So, for example, statements such as “the flood of immigration” or “the immigrant invasion” are obvious metaphors because they describe immigration in terms of something that it is not—a body of water or an advancing army. In contrast to such “strong” metaphors, the word “alien” appears to be definitional, rather than metaphoric. The INA presents the term in this manner, defining “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.”

Stated mildly in the statutory context, “alien” seems to be a neutral word that means simply “noncitizen.” As such, the INA presents “alien” in profoundly unmetaphoric terms.

Despite this benign appearance, however, several metaphoric references lie just beneath the surface. Here I employ the conceptual definition of metaphor, rather than the traditional linguistic definition that involves an “A is a B” format. The theory of experientialism holds that human beings formulate knowledge by drawing metaphoric associations between abstract concepts and more meaningful concepts. As bridges between the familiar and unfamiliar, metaphors serve as critical tools for understanding the world. In this way, “alien” is the central metaphor of immigration law because it relies on a wide body of experiential knowledge—social, cultural, and historical—to create meaning. The term is a metaphor not because it involves a comparison between concepts—as the linguist definition of metaphor holds—but because it serves as the primary vehicle for mapping culturally embedded references onto the legal identity of immigrants.

Words cannot be divorced from their culturally grounded meanings. When legal actors speak of “aliens,” a series of qualities comes to mind about the target group: aliens are nonhuman; aliens are illegal border-crossers; and aliens are Mexicans. Those who doubt the metaphoric nature of “alien” and reduce its meaning to simple statutory or definitional terms assume a level of mutual exclusivity in language that does not exist. “Alien” is both a metaphor and a statutory term. In addition to defining immigrants as noncitizens in the INA, “alien” conveys three distinct qualities: otherness, illegality, and ethnicity. The following sections consider each of these metaphoric associations in turn.

190. See Rakova, supra note 64, at 217 (noting that the experientialist account challenges the older definition of metaphor as a means of expressing similarity between concepts); see also Calvert, supra note 36, at 547 (describing the traditional definition of metaphor).
191. See Rakova, supra note 64, at 216 (discussing the breadth and attractiveness of experiential theory).
192. Petrie & Oshlag, supra note 54, at 589 (explaining how metaphors allow for the transfer of meanings).
1. Alien Is Other

The etymology of “alien” informs the modern use of the word. The English definition of “alien” derives from the Old French word *allien*, which means “strange, foreign,” and the Latin words *alienus* and *alius*, which mean “of or belonging to another person or place,” “hostile,” “strange,” and “other.”¹⁹³ Thus, according to early definitions, aliens are dangerous others who are marked by their strangeness.

The contemporary definition of “alien,” reflects its origins:

A. *adj.* 1. gen. Belonging to another person, place, or family; strange, foreign, not of one’s own . . . .

B. *n.* 1.a. A person belonging to another family, race, or nation; a stranger, a foreigner.¹⁹⁴

From these definitions, American immigration law was born. Under the Naturalization Act of 1790 only “free white person[s]” could *naturalize* (i.e., escape from the *unnatural* state of alienage).¹⁹⁵ The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 allowed the president to remove aliens “judge[d] dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.”¹⁹⁶ Multiple states enacted Alien Land Laws in the early 1900s out of fear of competition from aliens.¹⁹⁷ The Alien Registration Act of 1940 expanded the grounds for deporting immigrants engaged in subversive activities.¹⁹⁸ All of this alien-specific legislation reflected a conceptual understanding of aliens that matched the word’s etymology. Because aliens were defined as “hostile” and “strange,” early legislatures enacted laws to protect citizens from the other-worldly threat depicted by these metaphoric representations.

The same dehumanizing associations presented in the statutory context (i.e., strangeness, hostility, and otherness) appear in contemporary judicial decisions as well. Several variations of the Supreme Court’s *alien* metaphors emphasize the nonhuman qualities of immigrants:


[T]he alien must first either surrender to the INS for deportation or wait for the INS to catch him and commence a deportation proceeding . . . .

[T]he Government may continue to detain an alien who still remains here or release that alien under supervision.

Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries slows their movement and makes them more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols.

Thus, in certain instances, the Supreme Court employs dehumanizing metaphors to describe aliens as animals that are caught and released. In other Court opinions, dehumanization occurs by describing aliens as creatures from outer space. Extraterrestrials are the ultimate nonhumans. Recognizing the ability of “alien” to convey foreignness, science fiction writers co-opted the word in the mid-twentieth century. Born in a foreign galaxy, space creatures do not eat our food or breathe our air; they possess fewer human qualities than even animals on Earth. At times, the Court has described immigrants in this way:

[T]he relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.

Empirical data discussed in detail below show that “alien” and “illegal alien” are by far the most common terms used to refer to immigrants in the law. Because metaphors connect listeners to deeply embedded cultural knowledge, the repeated use of “alien” in legal texts unavoidably triggers readers’ inclinations to associate aliens with extraterrestrials. For example, the Court frequently employs the metaphor ALIENS ARE INVADERS to discuss immigration. According to popular science fiction narratives, extraterrestrials seek to dominate the universe. As a method for creating multiple, overlapping correspondences, the invasion metaphor relates simultaneously to popular images of space creatures attempting to overtake the galaxy, as well as more conventional notions of warfare. By connecting readers to this cultural imagery, the Court’s alien metaphors present
immigrants not only as invaders from foreign countries, but also as nonhuman aggressors from foreign worlds.

Metaphors can dehumanize through direct comparisons to nonhumans, such as animals or space creatures, or by refusing to ascribe human qualities to immigrants. Metaphors dehumanize immigrants by presenting aliens as inanimate objects that are transported and pulled by outside forces:

[T]he general purpose of the immigration statute’s employment prohibition is to diminish the attractive force of employment, which like a magnet pulls illegal immigrants toward the United States . . . .

[M]any Mexicans being imported into this country . . . .

[Respondent] and respondent’s wife paid a professional smuggler $450 to transport them into this country . . . .

[S]he had attempted to smuggle aliens for gain.

As nonhuman things, aliens can be pulled, smuggled, or transported, much like boxes of books or cases of wine. The law does not extend personal rights to such goods. According to these metaphors, aliens should be controlled and regulated in the same manner as other articles of commerce.

Another form of attribute-based dehumanization in Supreme Court texts presents aliens as dangerous diseases. Much like Lopez-Mendoza’s reference to aliens as hazardous waste and drugs, these organism metaphors describe immigrants as health risks:

Illegal aliens pose a potential health hazard to the community since many seek work as nursemaids, food handlers, cooks, housekeepers, waiters, dishwashers, and grocery workers.

Congress recognized that the influx of foreign infectious diseases, mass immigration coupled with poor housing and sanitation, hunger, and malnutrition had taken their toll.

[T]he flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens.


Much as diseases enter the body, aliens enter the country and quickly spread throughout communities. Through attribute-based dehumanizing metaphors, the Supreme Court presents illegal immigration as a form of public health emergency that justifies aggressive containment measures.\textsuperscript{215}

According to the conceptual theory of metaphor, the process of mapping qualities from source domains onto target domains is always partial and incomplete.\textsuperscript{216} The aspects of each domain obscured by a particular metaphor remain a crucial (yet concealed) function of this mapping process. By presenting immigrants as animals, diseases, and inanimate objects, the metaphor IMMIGRANTS ARE ALIENS conceals immigrants’ personhood and potential for social contribution. The metaphor brings focus to images of foreignness and otherness, producing a narrowly focused picture of nonhumans who can never belong.

\textit{b. Alien Is Illegal}

The metaphoric image of illegal aliens is omnipresent in law. To demonstrate the metaphoric association between immigrants and illegality, this Article presents original empirical data on alienage terminology in legal opinions. The data derives from post-1965 federal court decisions that contain any combination of three adjectives (“illegal,” “undocumented,” and “unauthorized”) and three nouns (“immigrant,” “alien,” and “noncitizen”).\textsuperscript{217} The study produced 4200 instances of separate adjective-noun combinations. As Figure 1 indicates, “illegal alien” was by far the most common term, appearing in 69% of opinions (2905 cases). No other term appeared in more than 10% of opinions, except “undocumented alien,” which accounted for 16% of the results in 670 cases. Distinguishing between the nouns “alien,” “immigrant,” and “noncitizen” in the data set, judges used “alien” in 88% of opinions (3706 cases), while “immigrant” appeared in only 12% of opinions (494 cases).

\textsuperscript{215} See O’Brien, supra note 13, at 36 (examining metaphors that involve harm to national health).


\textsuperscript{217} These data were generated from a textual search on Westlaw conducted on January 6, 2010. The search consisted of all federal court opinions that appeared in the following Westlaw databases: All U.S. Supreme Court Cases (SCT), Reported U.S. Court of Appeals Cases (CTAR), and Reported U.S. District Court Cases (DCTR). The search contained the singular and plural versions of the following terms: “illegal alien,” “undocumented alien,” “unauthorized alien,” “illegal immigrant,” “undocumented immigrant,” “unauthorized immigrant,” “illegal noncitizen,” “undocumented noncitizen,” and “unauthorized noncitizen.” Opinions that contained more than one search term (e.g., both “illegal alien” and “undocumented immigrant”) were counted as separate instances in the data set. Multiple appearances of the same term within an opinion, as well as plural and singular versions of the same term within an opinion, were counted as one instance in the data set.
The prevalence of “illegal alien” in legal opinions is extraordinary given that the law provides no clear definition of the term.²¹⁸ Although “illegal alien” is often used to refer to people who overstay their visas or enter the country without inspection, there are several scenarios in which these immigrants may remain lawfully in the United States. For example, many of the people described as “illegal aliens” have family connections, community ties, or legitimate fears of persecution that entitle them to discretionary relief.²¹⁹ But when courts use “illegal alien” as a descriptive term, these rights have rarely been adjudicated. As Beth Lyon has noted, referring to such people as “illegal aliens” is equivalent to referring to defendants awaiting trial as “convicted criminals.”²²⁰ Although lay audiences may not grasp this distinction, federal judges should.


²¹⁹ See Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws, supra note 24, at 276–78; Neuman, supra note 24, at 1440–41 (describing situations in which unauthorized immigrants may assert valid claims to remain in the United States).

Even Supreme Court Justices overlook basic notions of due process when describing “illegal aliens.” For instance, in *Lopez-Mendoza*, the Supreme Court wrote: “The constable’s blunder may allow the criminal to go free, but we have never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue in the commission of an ongoing crime.” Remarkably, the Court conceded that the person described in the above passage as a “criminal” had never been convicted of any crime. Because the immigrant in *Lopez-Mendoza* was an “alien,” however, the Justices simply presumed that he had engaged in criminal wrongdoing even though no court had ruled as such.

In addition to ignoring the nuanced nature of immigration status, the *illegal alien* metaphor distorts the severity of an immigrant’s offense. For example, entering the country without inspection (i.e., crossing the border illegally) is a first-time misdemeanor that federal officials rarely prosecute. Further, nearly half of all people described as “illegal aliens” obtained their “illegal” status by overstaying valid visas—a civil immigration violation that involves no criminal conduct whatsoever.

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222. Id. at 1047 n.3; see also In re Sandoval-Sanchez, No. A22 346 925, 168 (INS Oct. 7, 1977) (“There is nothing in the record to show that he has any criminal record.”).
Nevertheless, the language of alienage equates these misdemeanors and non-criminal acts with serious crimes:

> [T]he minivan was registered to an address . . . north of the border in an area notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling.\(^{225}\)

> [I]t seems that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is powerless to stop the tide of illegal aliens—and dangerous drugs—that daily and freely crosses our 2,000-mile southern boundary.\(^{226}\)

If “illegal” means “criminal” and “alien” means “stranger,” then through the illegal alien metaphor, immigrants become criminal strangers. As such, the illegal alien metaphor presents immigrants as more than mere border-crossers; like murderers, robbers, and drug dealers, they threaten the social order.

Once understood as “illegal aliens,” immigrants garner little sympathy from a public accustomed to punishing its convicts. A society that constantly seeks to separate the “wicked” from the “righteous” relies on the sorting function provided by the illegal frame.\(^{227}\) If a crime has been committed, then arrests must be made, convictions obtained, and penalties assessed.\(^{228}\)

The conflation of source and target domains encouraged by the illegal alien metaphor fuels a growing public distrust of both authorized and unauthorized immigrants.\(^{229}\) Based on the popular misconception that most immigrants lack legal status, over fifty percent of Americans want to reduce all levels of immigration, legal and illegal.\(^{230}\) As a proxy for criminality and immigration in general, the illegal alien metaphor fosters misunderstandings about the scope of illegal immigration and the appropriate responses to the perceived problem.\(^{231}\)


\(^{227}\) See Duncan, supra note 90, at 793 (discussing images of “criminal contamination” in American law).

\(^{228}\) See Johnson, supra note 66, at 868 (describing social responses to metaphorical frames involving crime).


\(^{231}\) See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 2–3 (2004) (arguing that the presence of a large number of unauthorized immigrants within Asian and Latino communities creates a perception that members of those communities are illegitimate).
According to cognitive linguists, metaphors are more likely to mislead listeners when they are repeated and accepted without evaluation. As George Lakoff, the pioneer of conceptual metaphor theory, states, “The things most alive in our conceptual system are those things that we use constantly, unconsciously, and automatically.” But metaphors that appear “dead” are in fact very much alive in our minds, silently influencing our perceptions of people and concepts. *Illegal alien* is one such metaphor. Through constant, uncritical repetition, the *illegal alien* metaphor has transformed immigrants into a monolithic group of criminal strangers who must be captured, convicted, and expelled.

c. Alien Is Mexican

The immigration laws of the United States have been marred by a long history of racist restrictions. From Chinese exclusion, to bans on “undesirable races” from Europe, to a host of other racial and ethnic barriers, immigration laws during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries exhibited an undeniable preoccupation with race. Much like the explicitly racist language of the past, today’s *illegal alien* remains a highly racialized figure.

Although “illegal alien” could theoretically refer to any group of immigrants, the term has a much tighter racial focus. In contemporary legal discourse, references to “illegal aliens” facilitate a coded discussion on immigration that—rather than involving immigrants in general—focuses on Mexicans in particular:

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232. See *Winter, The Metaphor of Standing*, supra note 79, at 1382 (warning against the uncritical use of metaphors).


The net effect of this silent invasion of illegal aliens from Mexico is suffering by the aliens . . . .

These local problems are particularly acute in California in light of the significant influx . . . . of illegal aliens from neighboring Mexico.

Like metaphors of criminality that distort the nature of an immigrant’s wrongdoing, the illegal alien metaphor suggests that the unauthorized immigrant population is entirely composed of Mexican residents. But this is simply not the case. For example, the two Supreme Court passages listed above were written in the mid-1970s, at a time when nearly half of unauthorized immigrants came from countries other than Mexico.

Although immigration from Mexico represented a substantial proportion of the unauthorized population, the “invasion” from Mexico described in those passages simply did not exist. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has employed the illegal alien frame to describe a massive number of aliens approaching from the south:

Access from Mexico into this country, across our 2,000-mile border, is readily available and virtually uncontrollable.

The colossal problem presented by illegal entries from Mexico.

Although the number of unauthorized Mexican immigrants has increased substantially in recent decades, thus making the metaphor’s associations more “accurate,” the illegal alien metaphor has never been concerned with conveying a true picture of real demographics.

Citizens and immigrants alike are affected by the racial and ethnic implications of the illegal alien frame. Just as the alien metaphor merges every immigrant category into one, thereby raising public opposition to all forms of immigration, the illegal alien metaphor merges all Latino residents into one group of unauthorized outsiders. Historian Mae Ngai describes “alien citizenship” as the concept of existing as a foreigner in one’s own country. Thus, although they reside legally in the United States, naturalized citizens remain presumptive foreigners within American society because of the immutability of their alien citizenship status.

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242. In 2008, 7 million unauthorized immigrants from Mexico resided in the United States, as compared to 4.9 million unauthorized immigrants from other countries. Passel & Cohn, supra note 230, at 3–5.
243. NGAI, supra note 231, at 8 (arguing that the experience of Asian and Latino immigrants should be understood within the context of exclusionary racial quotas and colonialism).
244. Id. at 2.
ethnicity, the illegal alien metaphor brands Latino residents as una assimilable foreigners who remain ineligible to attain full membership in society, regardless of their legal status.245

The Supreme Court established a direct link between “alien” and “Mexican” in Rosales-Lopez v. United States.246 That case involved a criminal defendant charged with “smuggling” people into the United States from Mexico.247 The defense sought to ask prospective jurors about any personal biases they held against Mexican immigrants.248 The presiding judge disallowed the question, instead asking: “Do any of you have any feelings about the alien problem at all?”249 On review, the Supreme Court held that asking about “the alien problem” was equivalent to asking about Mexican immigration.250 According to the Supreme Court, because “alien” meant “Mexican,” the presiding judge did not have to utter the word “Mexican” in order for the jury to comprehend the reference. In other words, because every juror understood that the “alien problem” was the “Mexican problem,” no further inquiry was necessary. This association was possible only because of the racial code provided by the illegal alien metaphor.

American society no longer sanctions racist language in legal discourse. Because “illegal alien” is facially ambiguous, however, the term enables speakers to express racialized concerns in a race-neutral way.251 Society will accept Supreme Court Justices who are “anti-crime” or “anti-illegal immigration,” but will reject those Justices viewed as “anti-Mexican.”252 As such, the code provided by the illegal alien metaphor enables a silent transfer of meaning without the social sanction that would otherwise accompany more overt language.253

As discussed above, conceptual metaphors are most likely to conflate subject and target domains when describing people and social movements.254 No longer seen as figurative, the metaphor becomes mistaken for a semi-literal representation of a target group.255 The illegal alien...
alien metaphor achieves this end by transferring meaning from alien to
criminal to Mexican. These associations are difficult to recognize,
however, because their definitions derive from unspoken racial codes.
What emerges in legal texts is an essentialized understanding of immigrants
as dangerous things that are infused with ethnicity. Just as the root word
alienus means “hostile” or “other,” the term “illegal alien” presents
immigrants as racialized outsiders who are unable to contribute to a
common social endeavor.

2. Immigration Is a Flood

Conceptual metaphors often describe social changes in terms of moving
objects. According to these metaphors, just as we cannot control the
speed or direction of some physical forces, we cannot control changes in
our lives and communities. For example, some people might say that the
country is “sliding into disaster” or “the winds of change are blowing.”
The Supreme Court frequently frames immigration in this way, describing
the movement of people across borders as an uncontrollable body of water
that harms the nation.

The metaphor IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD involves three distinct
characteristics of immigration: direction, size, and force. With regard to
direction, the Supreme Court’s metaphors depict a northward immigrant
stream:

[T]he “formidable law enforcement problems” posed by the northbound
tide of illegal entrants into the United States.

[S]treaming the flow of illegal aliens along the Mexican-American
border . . .

These metaphors suggest that most immigrants flow into the United
States without first obtaining authorization at the border. Once again,
immigration demographics do not bear out the metaphor’s implications.
Forty-five percent of unauthorized immigrants living in the United States
entered the country legally; they did not gush into the country as the

256. See Lisa A. Flores, Constructing Rhetorical Borders: Peons, Illegal Aliens, and
(discussing metaphors of immigration and criminality).
257. Joo, supra note 216, at 799 (noting that the “essentialized part” of a domain may
appear to represent the whole).
258. Kövecses, supra note 25, at 136 (examining the conceptual metaphor “changes are
movements”).
259. Id.
260. Id.
262. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 899, 902 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
1973)).
263. PEW HISPANIC CTR., MODES OF ENTRY FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
that up to forty-five percent of unauthorized immigrants enter the country on a valid visa but
flood metaphor suggests, but instead came to the country on valid visas that later expired. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court describes unauthorized immigrants as a monolithic group of border-crossers that approaches from Mexico in an overwhelming fashion:

[T]he presence of large numbers of undocumented aliens in this country creates law enforcement problems of titanic proportions.264

[T]he vast tide of illegal immigration that had produced a shadow population of literally millions of undocumented aliens in the United States.265

With . . . the facilities at Guantanamo and available Coast Guard cutters saturated, . . . the Government could no longer . . . protect our borders . . . .266

The Court’s many references to massive flows267 and influxes268 are too numerous to list. Just as levies attempt to hold back large bodies of water, the border is presented as a fragile dike that might burst at any moment, given the pressure coming from the alien flood:

The entire system, however, has been notably unsuccessful in deterring or stemming this heavy flow; and its costs, including added burdens on the courts, have been substantial.269

[T]he flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the border.270

The unrestrained immigrant flood portends dangerous social change.271 The immigrant waves described in Supreme Court opinions appear as foreboding bodies that submerge everything in their path, including American culture. As Justice Rehnquist wrote, aliens are not like naturalized citizens who have adjusted “to our patterns of living and attitudes, and have demonstrated a basic understanding of our institutions, system of government, history, and traditions.”272 Instead, as Justice Lewis

overstay or otherwise violate a condition of entry); see also Johnson, supra note 235, at 1546 (discussing misperceptions about the number of illegal border-crossers residing in the United States).


Powell said, aliens bring “significant economic and social problems” with them. Water is supposed to cleanse and give life. But the immigrant surge in Supreme Court opinions is a brown tide that immerses the American way of life.

According to cognitive linguists, much of human reasoning derives from basic physical and social interactions. Floods constitute a core component of this embodied knowledge. Great floods have devastated societies throughout human history. In addition, people possess a keen sense of rivers and tides based on their knowledge of the physical world. Drawing on these associations, the Supreme Court’s water metaphors emphasize the dangers of a growing immigrant population.

Although they would like to right our national ship before it capsizes, the Justices are nihilistic in their figurative accounts of immigration, describing a nation saturated by an uncontrolled flow of aliens. According to the Court’s water metaphors, the immigrant wave is too massive and the federal government is too inept for citizens to hold back the alien surge.

3. Immigration Is an Invasion

Human beings instinctively fear outside physical threats. Throughout recorded history, nations have built walls and raised armies in response to real and perceived enemies. There are few, if any, aspects of our embodied experience more central than self-defense.

Drawing on this social, historical, and cultural knowledge, we often explain foreign concepts in terms of battle. Consider the following conceptual metaphors and their linguistic tokens: POLITICS IS WAR (“The fight erupted over abortion”), ARGUMENT IS WAR (“I couldn’t defend that point”), and SPORT IS WAR (“My team did not use the right strategy”). Reflecting the centrality of war metaphors in human thought, the Supreme Court often describes immigration in terms of invasion.

274. See Duncan, supra note 90, at 749 (explaining how the image of water plays a central role in metaphors of crime control).
275. See generally OTTO SANTA ANA, BROWN TIDE RISING: METAPHORS OF LATINOS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE 65–155 (2002) (analyzing the use of water metaphors in recent immigration debates in California); Santa Ana et al., supra note 51, at 152–53 (arguing that water metaphors mask the individuality and humanity of immigrants).
277. Charteris-Black, supra note 271, at 570–71 (arguing that water metaphors often describe an increase in the rate of immigration).
278. Santa Ana et al., supra note 51, at 154–56 (explaining how water metaphors portray the nation as a sinking boat).
279. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 22, 62, 94.
280. Id. at 22.
281. Id. at 80.
282. Id. at 75.
Mirroring popular media accounts of an “alien invasion,” the Supreme Court’s metaphoric wars present immigrants as aggressors who threaten national sovereignty:

Congress [is] vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our borders.

[W]e leave no unprotected spot in the Nation’s armor.

The deployment of border patrol agents along the border . . . maximize[s] . . . personnel, with the first line of defense being called the “line watch.”

At times the Supreme Court’s war metaphors depict aliens engaged in direct conflict. At other times, however, the intruders approach silently:

The evasion of the federal regulatory program that is the mark of undocumented status . . .

Illegal entrants from Mexico pose[] formidable law enforcement problems. The principal problem arises from surreptitious entries.

Through these metaphors, immigrants appear as guerrilla warriors who hide and wait to attack. The battles in the Court’s metaphoric wars will cease only when the foreign invaders surrender:

In attempting to protect California’s fiscal interests . . . from the deleterious effects on its economy . . . [the statute] . . . is tailored to combat effectively the perceived evils.

Most aliens . . . can ensure themselves review in courts of appeals only if they voluntarily surrender themselves for deportation.

In addition to depicting conventional and guerilla warfare, the Court also employs metaphors that describe a more exotic attack involving female immigrants overtaking the nation through reproduction. These fertility metaphors depict unauthorized immigrant women as people who wish to conquer the United States by bearing American citizens:

Deportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously produce new and material facts . . .

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288. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
[S]he managed to become the actual parent of a United States citizen by conceiving and bearing an illegitimate child here.\(^\text{293}\) [M]ore significant demographic or economic [problems] . . . are engendered by the illegal entry into the State of entire families of aliens for indefinite periods than by the periodic sojourns of single adults . . . .\(^\text{294}\)

The female alien does not use force to overtake the country. Rather she utilizes her superior reproductive power to attain conquest.\(^\text{295}\) By manipulating American law to achieve power, the female alien is a clever invader who relies on legal technicalities to gain advantage.

These fertility metaphors feed into larger debates over \textit{jus soli}, or birthright citizenship, in which opponents frequently express fears about the changing racial demographics of the country.\(^\text{296}\) According to the fertility frame, the nation can accept single men who will work temporarily in the United States without bringing their culture and traditions with them. But the nation cannot bear the social consequences that come with importing entire families who will reside in our communities, study in our schools, and worship in our churches. If the fertile invader is not thwarted soon, her massed offspring will overtake the nation. As such, the fertility metaphor presents the loss of cultural hegemony as the most dangerous consequence of the alien invasion.

Whether the attack is by stealth, invasion, or reproduction, the Supreme Court’s war metaphors share a common theme: America is under assault by a different kind of enemy. Through metaphor, Supreme Court Justices become protectors of a nation besieged by an ominous alien attack.

### III. TOWARD A NEW IMMIGRATION DISCOURSE

Words affect thought, and thought affects action. As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court’s immigration decisions are filled with evocative words that fuse the concept of immigration with notions of criminality, devastation, and attack. Here I consider the consequences of these associations and propose an alternative account. Just as cognitive linguists challenged the traditional description of metaphors as minor poetic flourishes, I challenge the notion that the Supreme Court’s metaphors are nothing more than insignificant textual ornaments.

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\(^{292}\) INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 143 n.5 (1981) (emphasis added) (quoting Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1362 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Wallace, J., dissenting)).


\(^{295}\) See O’Brien, supra note 13, at 39 (analyzing immigration rhetoric that focuses on different birth rates among immigrants and citizens).

This section begins by comparing the Supreme Court’s metaphors to the metaphors of immigration policy. Whether Congress is building a virtual fence, requiring tamperproof identification cards, or sanctioning the mass incarceration of aliens, each step can be understood in terms of the metaphors discussed above.

The conceptual theory of metaphor explains why Congress legislates metaphorically in the same way that the Supreme Court rules metaphorically. Because meaning is culturally grounded, the social construction of immigrants depends on numerous voices coming from multiple cultural institutions such as Congress and the Supreme Court. No one institution is an exclusive or independent source of social meaning. Through metaphors, Congress, the Court, and other cultural bodies facilitate a discussion among lawyers, commentators, and legislators about “the immigration crisis” and the proposed responses to the crisis.297 Thus, the Court’s metaphoric choices do far more than reflect popular understandings of immigration. By appropriating, repackaging, and circulating certain immigration metaphors, the Court joins other cultural institutions in creating a dominant account of who immigrants are and how they should be treated.298

The Article concludes by considering opportunities for discursive change. I offer the concepts of migration and economic sanctuary as alternative metaphors for understanding immigration. The idea of migration focuses on the movement of people, rather than on an invasion of aliens. Likewise, the idea of economic sanctuary presents immigration as a product of trade and structural adjustment policies, rather than as a product of simple criminal intent. These metaphors highlight immigrants’ personhood and potential for economic cooperation—characteristics concealed by current accounts.

A. Metaphors of Immigration Reform

Cognitive linguists speak of “entailments” as additional information that listeners logically adopt from metaphors.299 As such, entailments are underspecified pieces of knowledge that emerge naturally from conceptual metaphors.300 For example, the metaphor IMMIGRATION IS A FLOOD directly maps information about the size and power of floods, while indirectly entailing additional information that listeners associate with floods. Thus, we know that communities raise levies against floods and that floodwaters carry disease. When lawmakers understand a problem in metaphoric terms, they often formulate policies based on these metaphoric entailments. Therefore, a metaphor’s entailments are as important, if not

297. LAKOFF & FERGUSON, supra note 32, at 1–2 (arguing that the “immigrant problem” could also be understood as a “foreign policy problem” or a “trade problem”).
298. See Briggs, supra note 14, at 272 (explaining how meaning derives from “appropriation and reception”).
299. See Hunter, supra note 39, at 471–72 (arguing that the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY entails that people may face roadblocks or spin their wheels at times).
300. KÖVECSES, supra note 25, at 94–95 (defining metaphoric entailments).
more important, than the information utilized directly in the mapping process.\footnote{Simon, supra note 85, at 1041 (discussing the importance of entailments).}


Each component of immigration reform can be seen as an entailment of the metaphors discussed above. For example, the \textit{alien} metaphor is evident in proposals to modify the nation’s guestworker system. A new guestworker program would import hundreds of thousands of workers into the United States each year.\footnote{See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 219, 219–20 (2007) (analyzing recent guestworker proposals).} Advocates of this proposal promise that guestworkers will work in the United States several years and then return home. The description of immigrants as temporary visitors situates the nation as a family and aliens as guests of the family.\footnote{See Kővécses, supra note 25, at 62 (discussing the metaphor SOCIETY IS A FAMILY).} “Aliens” are defined as people “belonging to another . . . family.”\footnote{1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 314–15 (2d ed. 1989).} When a guest arrives at a family’s house, the family controls the conditions of the guest’s residency; the guest is told where to sleep and how long to stay. According to the vision fostered by the guestworker proposal, aliens will express gratitude to the nation by making food for their hosts, cleaning their homes, and washing their dishes. Because they are aliens (i.e., strangers to the national family), the guests cannot stay indefinitely. Once their temporary stay is over, the alien guests will leave politely and make room for other guests to begin work in the United States.\footnote{See Rodríguez, supra note 305, at 220–22 (discussing the difficulties associated with a large-scale guestworker program).} This image of foreign-born guests working in the national house becomes possible only when immigrants are first understood as \textit{alien strangers}.

As discussed above, the \textit{alien} metaphor conceals the humanity of immigrants. The mapping of nonhuman qualities onto immigrants was evident in Congress’s attempt to prevent unauthorized immigrants from obtaining driver’s licenses in the REAL ID Act of 2005.\footnote{Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2006)).}
alien metaphor, the REAL ID Act labeled people who belong in the United States as “real,” while describing unauthorized immigrants as unreal or inauthentic people. Unreal people are not entitled to basic credentials needed to live and work in society; they do not open bank accounts or rent apartments. Unreal people live nowhere because they are make-believe. By rejecting the personhood of immigrants, the alien metaphor facilitates this outcome.

The amnesty component of immigration reform is an entailment of the invasion metaphor. “Amnesty” is defined as “the overlooking of the past offences of (rebels).” Because the invasion metaphor describes immigration as an especially dangerous threat, however, citizens are reluctant to overlook the past offenses of aliens through amnesty. If immigrants are enemy soldiers, as the invasion metaphor suggests, then the country should capture and defeat them rather than forgive their war crimes. Although the law of war allows governments to grant amnesty, public attitudes have become so shaped by the image of battle against aliens that such acts of forgiveness appear treasonous.

The invasion metaphor entails the need for weapons, fronts, and battle lines. In the last decade, Congress has allocated billions of dollars to militarize the border. Touting the need for greater “border security,” the government has installed electronic intrusion sensors and a virtual fence along sections of the border, while providing agents with night-vision equipment to see the enemy at all hours. Enacting battle plans with names such as “Operation Hold the Line” and “Operation Blockade,” immigration officials have coordinated with the U.S. military to deploy soldiers along the border. Reflecting metaphor’s power to conflate, the border is now an actual militarized zone with real soldiers and real casualties.

The flood metaphor also informs contemporary immigration policy. Immigration reform proposals focus on the need to create a “more manageable and controlled flow of legal immigrants who can be absorbed

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310. See NGAI, supra note 231, at 266 (describing the “stunning militarization” of the border that occurred in the 1990s); Anne Demo, Sovereignty Discourse and Contemporary Immigration Politics, 91 Q.J. SPEECH 291, 302 (2005) (explaining how the U.S. military has constructed elaborate barriers along the border).
311. Demo, supra note 310, at 302 (emphasis added); see also Kate Philips, The War of Words, NIEMAN REP., Fall 2006, at 63, available at http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/100346/The-War-of-Words.aspx (summarizing political efforts to employ the terms “illegal alien” and “border security” to frame immigration-related issues).
312. See Demo, supra note 310, at 296–97 (summarizing the expansion of defense-related funding to patrol the border) (emphasis added); see also J. David Cisneros, Contaminated Communities: The Metaphor of “Immigrant as Pollutant” in Media Representations of Immigration, 11 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 569, 593 (2008) (discussing the relationship between border fencing and the image of immigrants as invaders).
These reforms are set against a backdrop of failure in immigration enforcement. As discussed above, the flood metaphor describes the overwhelming force of immigration. An entailment of the metaphor, therefore, is that attempts to secure the border are futile given the strength of the immigrant wave. Through decades of purposeful underenforcement of immigration laws, millions of unauthorized immigrants have entered the United States without permission. Much like local emergency workers who sandbag levies, knowing all the while that rising floodwaters will overtake their community, politicians discuss the need to control the alien stream, but enact ineffective enforcement techniques to achieve that end. Understandably, Americans share a widespread belief that the government is not doing enough to seal the border.

B. Legal Metaphors and Social Discourse

The conceptual theory of metaphor explains the common immigration discourses of legal opinions and legislation. Because reasoning is grounded in our embodied experiences, the social understanding of immigrants derives from multiple sources. Human beings absorb metaphors unconsciously through repeated interactions with their physical worlds and cultural environments. It is the recurrence of these experiences in a wide array of social and cultural settings that establishes the basis of human reasoning. Thus, cognition is not a simple process in which either the media, or politicians, or Supreme Court Justices construct the image of immigrants out of whole cloth. Rather, the “truth” about immigration emerges from a confluence of discourses produced and repeated by many cultural institutions.

Supreme Court Justices are among the most prominent members of the American linguistic community. They are “symbolic elites” who wield extra-legal power by recreating immigration narratives and presenting them to the social world. Justices express themselves predominately through
written opinions, and metaphors often provide the most quotable passages of those opinions. By enhancing the apparent persuasive force of a particular decision, the Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors increase the likelihood that lower courts will rely upon and cite to them.

But the Supreme Court’s discursive influence extends well beyond the legal community. By authoritatively expressing beliefs shared in law and society, Supreme Court Justices engage citizens, government officials, and other non-legal actors through their written opinions. News outlets publicize Supreme Court decisions within minutes of their release. Reporters, many of whom have no formal legal training, rarely have time to read and digest opinions before informing the public of a particular judicial outcome. Accordingly, members of the media are more likely to quote vivid metaphoric language that reconfirms existing conceptions about immigrants. In this way, media reports serve as discrete linguistic acts that interact with legal texts to provide a prevailing narrative on immigration.

Robert Tsai has argued that the Court’s First Amendment metaphors exude a “disturbing ethos of judicial centrality” that influences the behavior of non-legal actors. For example, members of the Court have employed fire metaphors in their free expression rulings to cast themselves as would-be firefighters against state attempts to restrict specific speech acts. According to Tsai, the juricentric posture of the fire metaphor discourages inter-community dialogue and political engagement by standing as the definitive account on certain First Amendment matters. The same is true with metaphoric depictions of immigrants in the law. The Court’s metaphors absorb and repackage cultural assumptions about immigration, adding an air of authority, neutrality, and exclusivity to representations that non-legal actors are invited to accept uncritically.

The Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors are models for understanding the world that masquerade as models of the world. In order to make this transition believable to readers who interpret texts based
on their own social experiences, the Court employs metaphors that conform to existing cultural knowledge about the scope and nature of the perceived problem.328 This becomes an entirely circular process in which the Court’s metaphors join discourses from other cultural institutions to sustain and reconstitute a “regime of truth” about immigration.329 In this way, metaphors become self-fulfilling prophecies by highlighting certain realities, masking others, and entailing a narrow universe of responses for readers to consider.330

Metaphors of criminality, flood, and invasion leave little space for readers to understand immigration-related issues outside frames selected for them by the Court and other cultural institutions.331 Because the mind develops metaphoric associations unconsciously over a prolonged period of time, readers are unaware that, absent concerted efforts to critically analyze Supreme Court texts, images from the past will be recycled as frames for understanding immigration in the future.332 As such, without methods for challenging existing representations, readers will continue to serve as unknowing accomplices to immigration metaphors and the legal realities they entail.333

C. Motivating Analogic Reasoning Through Similes

Metaphor is not an exclusive vehicle for figurative representation. Like metaphors, similes enable speakers to imagine new concepts in terms of embodied physical and cultural knowledge. But similes do not conflate domains in the same manner as metaphors. Instead, similes enable speakers to recognize and evaluate proposed correspondences with a level of transparency that metaphors fail to offer.

Similes create explicit associations between target and source domains by using the words “like” or “as” in their phrasing.334 Consider the following simile: “Illegal immigration is like a military invasion.” The statement invites listeners to notice and assess the contention that illegal entry into the United States is much like a foreign attack. If readers disagree about the appropriateness of the comparison, they can articulate their objections and propose alternative accounts.

329. See Hector Amaya, Latino Immigrants in the American Discourses of Citizenship and Nationalism During the Iraqi War, 4 CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUD. 237, 238 (2007) (citing Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, in THE FOCAULT READER 51, 74 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984)).
330. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 156–58 (examining the limitations of metaphoric entailments).
331. ONO & SLOOP, supra note 236, at 123.
332. See Blavin & Cohen, supra note 95, at 267 (warning against the unconscious acceptance of metaphors).
333. Boudin, supra note 35, at 413–14 (explaining how metaphors facilitate interactions between writers and readers).
In contrast to similes, metaphors such as “the silent invasion of illegal aliens” or “border security” morph the figurative into the literal, thereby concealing the analogic nature of each statement. The metaphor subsumes differences between the two domains, producing a dangerous literalism that readers may fail to recognize. Through metaphor, the immigrant becomes the alien; illegal immigration becomes an invasion.

Given the central role of analogic reasoning in law, the shift from metaphor to simile involves more than a simple alteration of verbiage. Lawyers are professional deductionists and analogists. They are trained to deduce a legal rule from a statute or holding of a case; they then argue whether the particular legal norm does or does not govern a given set of facts based on the similarities or dissimilarities between the norm and the facts. As discussed above, the personal metaphors of immigration law rarely facilitate this kind of analysis. Rather than attempt to capture a specific legal concept through analogic reasoning, immigration metaphors attempt to capture the “essence” of noncitizens by conflating different domains.

Although lawyers are hard-wired to reason analogically, metaphors short-circuit the process. In contrast, similes facilitate new modes for understanding problems by directly engaging lawyers’ analogic senses. For example, in the context of immigration discourse, similes allow legal actors to assess whether immigration is like a flood, or whether unauthorized immigrants are like violent criminals. Rather than attempt to capture the rational evaluation of current figurative expressions, they make room for new immigration frames as readers reject other models. As such, similes ask members of the linguistic community to recognize and contest certain representations of immigrants that, if stated in metaphoric terms, would pass silently into the legal imagination without discussion.

D. Migration and Economic Sanctuary as Outlaw Metaphors

Even if similes attain a more prominent place in legal discourse, metaphors will remain a fundamental component of language and

335. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 79, at 1386–87 (explaining how metaphoric statements can transform into myths).
337. Hunter, supra note 57, at 1238–42 (discussing assumptions about the processes of legal deduction and analogy).
338. See Boudin, supra note 35, at 406 n.73 (arguing that lawyers use analogy “to invoke the accepted norm that, if two different situations are sufficiently alike, they should be treated alike by the law”).
339. See supra Part I.C and accompanying text (discussing the dangers of conflation posed by immigration metaphors).
340. Cohen & Frank, supra note 334, at 761 (arguing that similes can restructure conflict frames that appear entrenched).
The human mind cannot always rationally assess multiple and overlapping correspondences. In order to simplify decisions, we depend on the cognitive shortcuts provided by metaphors. Therefore, in order to challenge the popular metaphoric representations of immigrants in the law, critics cannot simply ignore existing representations, but rather must offer a new set of words, images, and modes of figurative thought to compete with current frames.

The Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors are not immutable. Because metaphors are socially contingent, the Court’s metaphoric choices will change as social understandings of immigrants change. At first glance, then, the goal of altering existing representations appears exceedingly difficult; after all, major cultural shifts take time. But the introduction of competing metaphors does not require such a radical change. Linguistic metaphors are not merely products of embodied knowledge but also methods for re-creating culture. Like political discourse, the law is situated and contingent.

Therefore, in order to challenge the popular metaphoric representations of immigrants in the law, critics cannot simply ignore existing representations, but rather must offer a new set of words, images, and modes of figurative thought to compete with current frames.

Because today’s immigration metaphors represent only a partial selection of reality, competing representations should draw from aspects of existing cultural knowledge that current metaphors fail to utilize. For example, the Supreme Court’s immigration metaphors rely on embodied understandings of crime and invasion, but ignore issues related to movement and economic survival—concepts deeply embedded in our historical and cultural knowledge. Thus, the task of introducing new legal metaphors is not so much about modifying culture as it is accessing cultural references that members of the linguistic community already possess.

Before competing representations can emerge, however, legal actors must unwrap and evaluate current frames. Because metaphors loosen their hold on the human imagination only through negotiation and debate, much of the foregoing analysis has been directed toward that end. The limitation of this approach, however, is that it largely retells someone else’s story. The critical discussion must extend beyond the problems associated with existing metaphors so that legal actors might imagine new metaphoric possibilities.

342. See Charteris-Black, supra note 271, at 565–72 (examining the role metaphor plays as a cognitive heuristic); Duncan, supra note 90, at 799–800 (explaining how human communication depends on metaphors).
345. See Boudin, supra note 35, at 420–21 (discussing the limitations of rebuttal as a mechanism for challenging metaphoric associations).
According to cognitive linguists, the human mind is more likely to adopt metaphors stated in positive terms. Metaphors “work” when they offer affirmative correspondences between source and target domains. Thus, it is insufficient to explain why immigrants are not criminals or why immigration is not like an overwhelming flood. Likewise, terms such as “undocumented worker” and “noncitizen” present rather unconvincing accounts because they describe immigrants in the negative. In contrast, new metaphors must explain affirmatively what immigration is and who immigrants are based on a shared body of cultural knowledge.

Here I examine the ideas of migration and economic sanctuary as “outlaw” metaphors. By “outlaw,” I mean a category of concepts that tie into existing embodied knowledge but have not gained currency in popular discourse. Outlaw discourses appear strange because they do not comport with dominant accounts created by conventional metaphors. As they are circulated and tested against experiential knowledge, however, these metaphors may eventually shift from outlaw to dominant components of a new immigration vernacular.

The concept of migration focuses on the personhood of unauthorized immigrants. Under the taxonomy proposed here, noncitizens residing lawfully in the United States are referred to as “immigrants,” while those without authorization are called “migrants.” A migrant is “a person who moves temporarily . . . from place to place.” Unlike illegal aliens who commit crimes in the shadows, migrants are people who move, work, and live openly in and between societies.

Migration involves a temporary movement between places that results in permanent residence in sending and receiving countries. Migrants travel between places, but their travel will not last forever; they will someday settle within a nation-state. An entailment of migration, therefore, is that

347. Lakoff & Fergusson, supra note 32, at 4 (listing problems with the “undocumented” frame).
350. Ono & Slooph, supra note 236, at 22 (defining “outlaw discourses”).
351. Id. at 139–40.
both sending and receiving countries must adopt frameworks for encouraging belonging among all residents—an outcome that is especially needed in a transnational era.\textsuperscript{353}

Upon arrival in the United States, migrants inevitably formulate ties to employers, social networks, and cultural institutions. Migrants who travel to a specific nation with only a temporary intent to stay often become legal permanent residents as their community connections expand.\textsuperscript{354} But even migrants who never obtain legal status should be treated as presumptive members of receiving countries. Nations maintain a vested interest in fostering social belonging among all residents. Both citizens and noncitizens benefit from modes of social discourse that offer migrants a long-term stake in the welfare of their communities.\textsuperscript{355} As such, the \textit{migration} metaphor recognizes the inevitability of migrants in a transnational age and the need to encourage cooperation between community members, regardless of the outcome of any one person’s migrant journey.

The idea of \textit{economic sanctuary} brings focus to the reasons people migrate between nations.\textsuperscript{356} By “economic sanctuary,” I employ a decidedly non-legal definition, as immigration law does not provide relief for economic persecution alone.\textsuperscript{357} In addition, unlike the \textit{migrant} metaphor (a linguistic term that could conceivably displace “illegal alien” in the legal vernacular), I examine the \textit{economic sanctuary} metaphor for its conceptual benefits only. In other words, \textit{migration} is a method for talking about immigration, whereas \textit{economic sanctuary} is a method for thinking about immigration.

To grant “sanctuary” means “to place in safety” or “to afford protection or shelter.”\textsuperscript{358} As such, \textit{economic sanctuary} describes migrants as people seeking shelter in the United States in order to endure economically. Most immigrants come to the United States in order to escape poverty and find


\textsuperscript{355}. Rodriguez, \textit{supra} note 305, at 267 (discussing the inevitability of future immigrant generations and the need to encourage immigrant integration).

\textsuperscript{356}. See Lakoff \& Ferguson, \textit{supra} note 32, at 4–5 (describing immigrants as “economic refugees”); Philips, \textit{supra} note 311, at 63 (discussing the political implications of the term “economic refugee”).


\textsuperscript{358}. 14 \textit{The Oxford English Dictionary} 443 (2d ed. 1989).
Yet current immigration metaphors conceal migrants’ economic entrepreneurship, instead presenting immigrants as criminals and invaders. In contrast, the economic sanctuary metaphor brings focus to the forced displacement of people, thereby inviting readers to evaluate the complex causes of illegal immigration. For example, recent trade and structural adjustment policies have hampered employment opportunities in many developing countries. When small businesses cannot compete with transnational corporations in the production of goods and services, local farms and factories must close and lay off workers. Migrants are born from these circumstances. Seen in this light, migrants are neither criminals nor invaders, but instead people who cross international borders in order to survive. As such, the economic sanctuary metaphor brings focus to the human consequence of globalization.

Metaphors are effective only to the extent that they rely on shared cultural frames. Thus, listeners will accept migration and economic sanctuary as metaphors only if the concepts comport with their physical, social, and cultural experiences. American historical narratives shed an exceedingly positive light on the concept of migration. Since colonial times, Americans have sought to improve their economic status through relocation. Tied to notions of “frontier” and “exploration,” migration draws on popular historical accounts of national progress. Likewise, neoclassical economic theory posits that societies flourish when markets allow human capital to flow freely. As such, members of society gain

359. See Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 737, 741–42 (2003) (arguing that the factors causing dislocation among international migrants have increased in recent years); see also Capps, supra note 88 at 187–88 (examining high labor participation rates among unauthorized immigrants).

360. See BACON, supra note 234, at 68 (arguing that immigration reform proposals rarely account for the effect of trade policy on migrants).


365. See Wu, supra note 236, at 42 (discussing internal migration in the United States).

economically when all workers can travel between jobs. Seen through these frames, migration is an economically effective process that governments should encourage.

In addition to the foregoing social, economic, and historical accounts, the migration metaphor relates to readers’ personal life experiences as well. People often associate economic growth with physical movement. We move to attend schools. We travel to new cities in search of employment. We understand that personal advances in education, wealth, and security often require physical movement. Drawing on these associations, the concept of migration depicts immigrants as economically motivated people whose movement enhances social welfare.

The economic sanctuary metaphor also references shared experiences. Popular accounts of globalization present displaced American workers as victims of outsourcing. Society remains largely sympathetic to Americans who have lost their jobs through no fault of their own. Accordingly, state and federal legislatures extend unemployment benefits and job training to these workers. Building on this embodied knowledge, the economic sanctuary metaphor emphasizes the connections shared by migrants and displaced American workers; just as Americans become unemployed when their jobs are shipped overseas, migrants feel the consequences of international trade from the other side of the border. In this way, the economic sanctuary metaphor taps into cultural beliefs about the need to assist innocent, hard-working people who are harmed by international forces beyond their control.

The terms proposed here offer admittedly imperfect representations. Because the process of mapping qualities from source to target domains is always partial, no single metaphor can fully capture any one concept.367 For example, not every instance of migration is motivated by poverty or a lack of opportunity, as the economic sanctuary metaphor suggests; some people migrate in order to flee political persecution, while others move to live with family members. Even for those people who migrate out of economic necessity, nations may still choose to deny them sanctuary. In this way, the economic sanctuary metaphor is not a prescription for immigration policy but rather a conceptual vehicle for thinking about immigration in a global context. The metaphor does not foreclose realistic immigration restrictions but encourages policymakers to develop those restrictions based on representations that reflect the diverse and nuanced causes of international migration.368


368. See O’Brien, supra note 183, at 45 (examining how immigration policies emerge from social myths).
Because metaphors involve individualized, unconscious associations, these proposals may cause readers to ascribe characteristics to target groups that are neither intended nor desired. For example, although the concept of migration highlights immigrants’ entrepreneurship and economic contributions, it may also encourage an image of migrants as rootless wanderers. These associations cannot be avoided. As stated above, migration involves a temporary movement that results in permanent residence. Therefore, the metaphor encourages thought about how to treat members of this “wandering” class, given that a person’s transient presence often morphs into permanent residence. But even if readers overlook the temporary nature of migration and view migrants as a perpetual class, the term still stimulates debate about the global factors causing international migration and the need to enhance the affiliations that members of this perceived transient class have with existing social, civic, and cultural institutions.

Abstract concepts such as immigration entail different, sometimes contradictory, realities. Therefore, multiple metaphoric expressions are needed in order to establish meaning. The goal of this project, then, is not to offer terms that comprehensively describe immigration, but rather to expand the cluster of metaphors used to talk and think about immigration.

The potential awkwardness of the migration and economic sanctuary metaphors speaks to the ubiquity of existing representations. Outlaw discourses may seem strange or unrealistic to readers. But the economic sanctuary metaphor appears peculiar only because other metaphors such as invasion and flood appear normal. Likewise, the migration metaphor feels artificial only when terms such as illegal alien and undocumented worker appear to delineate the bounds of our discursive realities. Thus, in addition to highlighting new aspects of immigration-related issues, the terms proposed here serve as effective tools for deconstructing popular representations. This critical process diminishes the power of existing metaphors to conflate and essentialize, while creating space for new frames in the legal imagination.

CONCLUSION

Human beings tell stories in order to comprehend the world around them. As the nation’s preeminent legal storyteller, the Supreme Court has employed a host of metaphors to tell its immigration stories. Complete with heroes, villains, and foreboding plotlines, these stories describe aliens attacking, invaders encroaching, and floods overwhelming communities. Behaving like good audience members, most judges, lawyers, and scholars have passively accepted this narrative.

369. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 79, at 1492 (arguing that multiple metaphors create meaning).
370. See Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 61, at 200–06 (discussing the limitations of individual metaphoric representations).
371. Cisneros, supra note 312, at 592 (discussing the ubiquity of standard narratives).
If they were not obscured by metaphors, the images of immigrants in Supreme Court texts would appear comical, if not utterly tragic. For example, immigrants are not animals that succumb to “lure[s]” or are hunted by “roving patrols.”\textsuperscript{372} Capturing migrants is not equivalent to cleaning up a “leaking hazardous waste dump,” even if the Supreme Court describes immigration in those terms.\textsuperscript{373} Yet metaphor’s power to distort and pass without notice enables these and other dehumanizing representations to evade evaluation.

Because conceptual metaphors live in the imagination, attempts at revision must draw on the imaginative possibilities of language. If we can imagine immigration as an \textit{invasion}, then we can also imagine it as a method for improving economic stability and national welfare. If, through metaphor, immigrants can be viewed as \textit{aliens} and \textit{illegals}, then they can also be viewed as \textit{migrants}, \textit{workers}, and \textit{community members}. By critically evaluating metaphor—the cornerstone of immigration stories—we can approach legal opinions with a sense of agency, thereby rejecting the inevitability of current frames. From there, we might imagine a new immigration discourse for future legal texts—one that emphasizes cooperation over struggle, contribution over battle, and personhood over alienage.
