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Cover Page Footnote
J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Christine for her endless support in this project.

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CIVILIANS, SERVICE-MEMBERS, AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE FAILURE OF ARTICLE 25A TO REQUIRE TWELVE-MEMBER PANELS IN CAPITAL TRIALS FOR NON-MILITARY CRIMES

Jonathan Choa*

If the twelve Apostles on their twelve Thrones, must try us in our eternal State, good Reason hath the Law to appoint the Number of Twelve to try our Temporal.¹

INTRODUCTION

On December 28, 2001, President Bush signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 ("NDAA"). Section 582 added Article 25a to the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"). It states:

In a case in which the accused may be sentenced to a penalty of death, the number of members shall be not less than 12, unless 12 members are not reasonably available because of physical conditions or military exigencies, in which case the convening authority shall specify a lesser number of members not less than five, and the court may be assembled and the trial held with not less than the number of members so specified. In such a case, the convening authority shall make a detailed written statement, to be appended to the record, stating why a greater number of members were not reasonably available.²

Before the amendment, only five members were necessary.³ Now, at least twelve are required except where physical conditions or military exigencies make convening twelve members unreasonable. In 2002, it is possible that President Bush will have to decide to approve the death warrants of two soldiers, Dwight Loving and Ronald Gray,

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¹ Giles Duncombe, Trials per Pas 79 (6th ed. 1725).
or grant them clemency. Panels of fewer than twelve convicted them both, but their respective convictions and sentences have been upheld throughout a lengthy appeals process. They could become the first people executed by the military since 1961 when Private John Arthur Bennett was hanged outside of Fort Leavenworth for raping and attempting to murder an eleven-year old Australian girl. Since then only one other soldier has been close to execution, but President Kennedy commuted his death sentence to life.

The legislative change in panel size and the possibility of military executions combine to focus a bright light on the military justice system. The current war on terrorism and the possibility of military tribunals have also increased the attention given to military justice. The time has come to reevaluate the way soldiers are tried in capital cases in the military before the first soldiers in forty years are executed. Six soldiers currently sit on death row. Loving and Gray have seemingly exhausted their appeals. The other four, Wade Walker, Kenneth Parker, William Kreutzer, and Jessie Quintanilla, have yet to have their first appeals heard. All have been accused of murder, not uniquely military crimes such as spying or aiding the enemy.

Unlike soldiers, civilians charged with capital offenses are guaranteed twelve jurors in all jurisdictions that have the death penalty, including the federal jurisdiction. Article 25a was meant to remedy this problem. This Note examines that dichotomy and the new legislation designed to eliminate it. This Note argues that Article 25a, the weight of two hundred years of tradition to the contrary, was correct in requiring at least twelve members on a panel in military capital trials. However, Article 25a does not effectively create a twelve-member requirement. This Note offers an amendment that would plug Article 25a’s loophole and require twelve-member panels in all capital, military trials for civilian crimes.

4. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. This process could be lengthy and may not occur for some time.
9. These cases are not discussed in depth because their first appeals have not yet been filed with their respective Courts of Criminal Appeals.
This Note in general, and Part II specifically, focus on the civilian, federal system. The federal system presents the best comparison because Congress makes the rules for federal courts\(^1\) and the military.\(^2\) In the limited scope of this Note, it would not be fully possible to analyze the way the death penalty is administered in all thirty-eight states that have capital punishment.\(^3\) The disadvantage of this limited focus is that most capital cases occur in state courts. Also, rights guaranteed to a defendant facing the death penalty in a federal trial are not necessarily guaranteed to a defendant in a state court.

Part I describes the major historical developments in panel size, capital punishment, incorporation of civilian protections in military proceedings, and procedures for charging and prosecuting the accused. This part begins by outlining the history and development of the panel's size and the death penalty from the Founding through the inception of the UCMJ.\(^4\) This part will illustrate that the original rationale for requiring only five panel members is no longer applicable. It then examines prior incorporation of civilian protections into military law to show that previous incorporations of civilian protections have not hindered the military from enforcing good order and discipline\(^5\)—the standard that all provisions of the UCMJ must meet.\(^6\) To provide readers with a helpful background of military justice, this part concludes with a description of how defendants are charged and prosecuted in the military.\(^7\)

Part II is an analysis of the federal and military systems, focusing on three key aspects of capital defense. To give this analysis a practical context, this part begins by detailing the facts of three recent military capital cases, with an emphasis on the crimes' "civilian" nature. This part, in addition to illustrating the problems with the military panel,\(^8\) also examines the quality of defense,\(^9\) and the appellate procedure\(^10\) in the military and federal systems. These last two sections are designed to assess any argument that the military can use less than twelve-member panels because it adequately protects the defendant with other safeguards. This part focuses on the federal system, but this narrow focus does not diminish the comparison. The relevant state cases on jury composition are largely controlled by Supreme Court decisions since the right to a jury trial is secured by the

\(^{11}\) U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

\(^{12}\) Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.

\(^{13}\) See Bonner, supra note 10, at A12.

\(^{14}\) See infra Part I.A.

\(^{15}\) See infra Part I.B.


\(^{17}\) See infra Part I.C.

\(^{18}\) See infra Part II.B.

\(^{19}\) See infra Part II.C.

\(^{20}\) See infra Part II.D.
Likewise, because of the constitutional right to counsel, the minimum standards for effective counsel decided by the Supreme Court are also binding upon the state courts. The federal appellate procedure is also relevant to all state death penalty cases, because habeas corpus proceedings can be heard in federal courts.

Part III argues that twelve-member panels are necessary in military capital trials for civilian crimes but not adequately provided for in the new legislation. This part begins by arguing the context for adopting the five-member panels in 1786 has never been properly reevaluated and is no longer applicable. This part then refutes the argument that introducing civilian protections into the military setting is detrimental by discussing previous incorporations of civilian rights that have not harmed the military. It then argues guaranteed twelve-member panels are necessary because of the inability of the military justice system to protect defendants' rights as effectively as the federal system. Twelve-member panels can better protect a defendant because the vote to convict and sentence to death must be unanimous in the military. The more panel members, the more likely the defense is to get a dissenting vote. The reason why military justice must meet a higher standard in capital cases is because death is different than other non-capital punishments. The Note concludes that the new legislation does not effectively institute a twelve-member panel requirement and offers a solution to ensure the protection of soldiers' rights while maintaining the integrity of the military justice system.

21. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI.
22. Id. amend. VI.
26. See infra Part III.A.3. The same argument could be extended to twelve jurors in all courts-martial where the accused could face a substantial amount of jail time; however, this Note specifically address Article 25a. Non-capital cases are beyond the scope of this Note. See infra text accompanying notes 305-07.
28. See infra text accompanying note 356.
29. This might lead to the conclusion that all military capital trials should have twelve-member panels, but that is not the contention of this Note. It focuses only on soldiers accused of violating Article 188 (murder) and, to a lesser extent, Article 120(a) (rape). In strictly military crimes like spying or aiding the enemy, the interests of good order and discipline may supersede the need to protect defendants' rights. This is justified because non-military murder affects a few people, while spying or aiding the enemy could endanger a whole platoon, corps, or even the country.
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. See infra Part III.C.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND WORKINGS OF MILITARY JUSTICE

The first section of this part describes the development of the panel size in military capital cases.\textsuperscript{32} It is important to scrutinize the context in which five-member panels were adopted in 1786 in order to determine if the relevance of this historical rationale is still relevant or should be reevaluated. This part's subsequent examination of the military's prior incorporation of civilian protections is important to illustrate that incorporation can be done without hurting good order and discipline.\textsuperscript{33} If other protections, like \textit{Miranda} warnings and aggravating factors used to determine the death penalty, have been successfully incorporated, then there is good reason to believe that twelve-member panels can be incorporated as well. The final section describes how a service member is charged and prosecuted in order to better understand some of the problems in the system.\textsuperscript{34}

A. History of Military Justice

This section examines the development of the panel size and death penalty solely in the Army. The Navy did not receive its own written rules of governance until after five-member panels were created in the Army.\textsuperscript{35} The Marine Corps did not have its own rules; it was governed by the rules of the Navy when at sea and by the rules of the Army when ashore.\textsuperscript{36} The Air Force did not exist in 1786. The purpose of this section is to set the foundation for examining whether the rationale for adopting five-member panels in 1786 is still valid today. The history will show that thirteen-member panels were required before the change in 1786, and that the rationale for the change is no longer relevant.

1. Number of Panel Members

Unlike federal and state statutes for capital trials,\textsuperscript{37} the military has required only a minimum of five members in its trial equivalent, the general court-martial, even for capital trials.\textsuperscript{38} This was not always the case. The first national Articles of War to govern the Army were enacted on June 30, 1775 and amended on November 7, 1775.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{32} See infra Part I.A.
\textsuperscript{33} See infra Part I.B.
\textsuperscript{34} See infra Part I.C.
\textsuperscript{37} See Bonner, supra note 10 (writing that every state that has the death penalty and federal death penalty legislation require twelve jurors).
\textsuperscript{39} William B. Aycock & Seymour W. Wurfel, \textit{Military Law Under the Uniform
Article XXXIII of the Articles of War of 1775 required that no general court-martial "shall consist of a less number than thirteen, none of which shall be under the degree of a commissioned officer."\textsuperscript{40} The number of panel members was based on British practice.\textsuperscript{41}

After the Revolutionary War, Secretary of War Henry Knox presented a proposal to amend the Articles of War to require only five officers in a general courts-martial.\textsuperscript{42} Knox was concerned that the downsizing of an army, coupled with its sprawl over distant garrisons, would make it impossible to impanel thirteen commissioned officers.\textsuperscript{43} He suggested "that five should be sufficient, in cases where a greater number cannot be obtained."\textsuperscript{44} Knox also argued that discipline would suffer if offenders could not be given a speedy trial. He cited the opinion of "many judicious officers . . . that the discipline of the army would have been bettered . . . had the courts martial been composed of a less number of members. The sickness or absence of members frequently protracted the trial to the most inordinate lengths, by which the service was extremely injured."\textsuperscript{45} Knox thought a written record of the evidence and proceedings, as well as an independent review, protected against "unfair practices."\textsuperscript{46}

Congressmen Arthur St. Clair, Henry Lee, and John Lawrance took up Knox's proposal on March 9, 1786.\textsuperscript{47} Congress adopted their report on March 30, 1786, without any recorded debate, and repealed section 14 of the Articles of War of 1776.\textsuperscript{48} The amended Articles of War established, "[g]eneral courts-martial may consist of any number of commissioned officers from 5 to 13 inclusively; but they shall not consist of less than 13, where that number can be convened without manifest injury to the service."\textsuperscript{49}

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} Code of Military Justice 9-10 (Greenwood Press 1972) (1955).
\item \textsuperscript{41} American Articles of War of 1775, art. XXXIII, \textit{reprinted in} William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents app. at 956 (Gov't Printing Office 1920) (1886).
\item \textsuperscript{42} Articles I and II of Section XV of the British Articles of War of 1765 stated, "[a] General Court-martial in Our Kingdoms of \textit{Great Britain or Ireland}, shall not consist of less than Thirteen Commissioned Officers." British Articles of War of 1765, \textit{reprinted in} Winthrop, \textit{supra} note 40, app. at 942. Thirteen-member panels were also adopted by Massachusetts to govern its militia. Article 32 of the Massachusetts Articles of War stated, "[n]o General Court Martial shall consist of a less number than thirteen [including the president], none of which shall be under the degree of a Field Officer." Massachusetts Articles of War (1775), \textit{reprinted in} Winthrop, \textit{supra} note 40, app. at 950.
\item \textsuperscript{43} 29 Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774-1789, at 851 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., Gov't Printing Office 1933) (1785).
\item \textsuperscript{44} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{Id.} at 851-52.
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{Id.} at 852.
\item \textsuperscript{47} \textit{Id.} at 854 n.1.
\item \textsuperscript{48} 30 Journals of the Continental Congress, \textit{supra} note 42, at 145.
\item \textsuperscript{49} American Articles of War of 1786, art. 1, \textit{reprinted in} Winthrop, \textit{supra} note 40, app. at 972. There must have been some debate on this amendment because the final
\end{itemize}
\end{tiny}
2. History of the Death Penalty

Understanding the actual crimes requiring administration of the death penalty is important to understand the 1786 amendment. At first, the American Articles of War of 1775 authorized the death penalty for only three offenses: shamefully abandoning one's post, disclosing or giving a false watchword, and compelling a senior officer to surrender his command to the enemy. The revision of these Articles of War several months later added two more capital offenses, "striking or offering violence against a superior officer in the execution of his office," and "committing violence to any person bringing provisions or other necessaries into camp." The amended articles of 1776 authorized death for sixteen different offenses, all military in nature. In 1863, when courts-martial were given jurisdiction in time of war or rebellion over a host of crimes now considered felonies, such as murder, robbery, arson, and manslaughter, the number of offenses subject to capital punishment expanded. The punishment was to be at minimum the equivalent punishment of the jurisdiction where the crime occurred. If that penalty was death, then the soldier could be executed.

In 1916, the Articles of War were revised again. Attacking a person bringing supplies to camp, made a capital crime in 1776, was made a non-capital offense. Military jurisdiction over the previously mentioned civilian crimes was extended to cover peacetime as well as war and rebellion, but the penalty was no longer connected to the penalty of the jurisdiction, making these offenses non-capital. Rape and murder in time of war and rebellion, or when committed outside the continental United States, were expressly made capital crimes.

3. The Uniform Code of Military Justice

In the 1940s, reformers began to clamor for a revision of the Articles of War because of the abuses they perceived during World War II. Studies by Congress and the separate military branches

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version is slightly different than the one proposed by St. Clair, Lee, and Lawrance. See 30 Journals of the Continental Congress, supra note 42, at 145.

51. Id. at 185.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 184-85.
54. See id. at 189-90.
55. Id. at 190.
56. Id. at 191.
57. Id. at 185.
58. Id. at 191-92.
59. Id. at 192.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See William T. Generous, Jr., Swords and Scales: The Development of the
discovered severe sentences, incompetent defense counsel, unlawful command influence, and lack of qualified men to serve in courts-martial.\textsuperscript{63} To solve these problems, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal created a new committee with a mandate to design a whole new body of law.\textsuperscript{64} It was to accomplish three main goals:

(1) integrate the systems of the three services into a Uniform Code of Military Justice; (2) make the new code a modern one, "with a view to protecting the rights of those subject to the code and increasing public confidence in military justice, without impairing the performance of military functions"; and (3) improve the arrangement and draftsmanship of the military justice statutes.\textsuperscript{65}

After some congressional revision, the UCMJ was enacted on May 5, 1950.\textsuperscript{66} When it became effective on May 31, 1951, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Force were governed for the first time by the same articles.\textsuperscript{67} Article 16 kept the same minimum requirement of five members for general courts-martial, but removed the requirement, in place since 1786, that thirteen officers be impaneled "where that number can be convened without manifest injury to the service."\textsuperscript{68} The new article simply read, "general courts-martial, consisting of—a military judge and not less than five members."\textsuperscript{69}

The UCMJ removed geographical and wartime restrictions on capital crimes and gave the military jurisdiction over "all enumerated capital offenses no matter where or when the crime was committed."\textsuperscript{70} Connected to this, the UCMJ eliminated the requirement that commanders give accused soldiers to civilian authorities for trial if requested by the victim.\textsuperscript{71} Felony murder was made a capital offense when "the underlying felony was an actual or attempted burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or aggravated arson."\textsuperscript{72} Rape was also made a capital offense no matter if it was committed during war or peacetime.\textsuperscript{73} The UCMJ also made striking an officer in the execution of his duties a non-capital offense as long as it occurred in peacetime.\textsuperscript{74}

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\item \textsuperscript{63} Uniform Code of Military Justice 24 (1973).
\item \textsuperscript{64} Id. at 16.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Id. at 34.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Aycock & Wurfel, supra note 39, at 15.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{69} American Articles of War of 1786, art. 1, \textit{reprinted in} Winthrop, supra note 40, app. at 972; Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{70} Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16(1)(A).
\item \textsuperscript{71} O'Connor, supra note 35, at 196.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Id. at 197.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 120.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 90.
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B. Incorporation of Civilian Liberties in the Military

After passage of the UCMJ, various civil liberties of the civilian justice system were incorporated into the military system. The civilian judges that sat on the Court of Military Appeals, the highest military appellate court, began to “import[] into the military most of the rights of criminal defendants which expanded so dramatically in the post-[World War II] period.”75 A string of cases began to expand civil liberty protections for the soldiers.76 United States v. Matthews77 and United States v. Tempia78 are particularly important because of their direct incorporation of protections from the civilian system, their wide-ranging impact on how soldiers are prosecuted in the military, and their seemingly minimal impact on good order and discipline.

1. United States v. Matthews

In United States v. Matthews, the defendant, who was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder and rape of a woman in Germany, had his death sentence overturned.79 The Court of Military Appeals (“CMA”) ruled that the military death penalty as promulgated in the UCMJ was unconstitutional because it did not require the panel members to explicitly identify the aggravating factors relied upon in the imposition of the death penalty.80 The court’s decision was based upon the civilian precedent in Furman v. Georgia,81 where the Supreme Court held that the jury’s sentencing discretion had to be controlled in regards to the death penalty.82 The CMA did not go so far as to hold the UCMJ unconstitutional, but it did prevent the imposition of the death penalty.83 The court, however, did suggest that the President or Congress could remedy the defect by

76. See, e.g., Giles v. Secretary of the Army, 627 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (striking down compulsory urine tests because they were a form of self-incrimination); United States v. Ware, 1 M.J. 282 (C.M.A. 1976) (limiting convening authority’s power to overrule the trial judge); United States v. Jordan, 1 M.J. 334 (C.M.A. 1976) (holding foreign searches are not exempt from the exacting standards of search and seizure law); United States v. Douglas, 1 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1976) (holding pre-trial transcripts from the Article 32 hearing were inadmissible at trial); United States v. Courtney, 1 M.J. 438 (C.M.A. 1976) (striking down certain maximum sentences).
77. 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983).
78. 37 C.M.R. 249 (C.M.A. 1967).
79. Matthews, 16 M.J. at 359, 382.
81. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
82. Matthews, 16 M.J. at 369 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
83. See Cooke, supra note 80, at 246.
enumerating aggravating factors that must be present before the accused can be sentenced to death.\(^8\) The administration of the death penalty in the federal system required the finding of such aggravating factors.\(^8\) President Ronald Reagan, in 1984, did just that in an Executive Order creating Rules for Court-Martial 1004.\(^8\) This required a unanimous finding that one aggravating factor, out of a possible ten,\(^8\) be present and that admissible aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating factors.\(^8\)

Dwight Loving was one of the first soldiers to be prosecuted under this new rule. He was an Army private convicted of two murders and sentenced to death.\(^9\) Loving appealed to the Supreme Court arguing the President did not have the authority to detail the aggravating factors necessary to impose a sentence of death.\(^9\) He claimed this was a violation of separation of powers because only Congress could formulate laws regarding the military.\(^9\) The Supreme Court first affirmed the CMA’s decision in Matthews that Furman applied to the military.\(^9\) The Court then held in Loving that Congress lawfully delegated its power to the President to prescribe the aggravating factors.\(^9\)

### 2. United States v. Tempia

In *United States v. Tempia*, a soldier was charged and convicted of making obscene proposals to three young girls in a library bathroom.\(^9\) The CMA threw out the conviction because it was based on a confession the defendant made without receiving an adequate warning of his right to counsel as required in the recent civilian decision *Miranda v. Arizona*.\(^9\) The Tempia case is remarkable for its full incorporation of civilian protections into the military. The accused had been advised as to his right to remain silent and the purpose for which his statements could be used, but he was not told of

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\(^8\) See Matthews, 16 M.J. at 380-81.


\(^9\) There are now eleven aggravating factors. MCM, *supra* note 16, Rules for Court-Martial 1004.


\(^9\) Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 751 (1996). Loving robbed two 7-Eleven stores at gunpoint, robbed and killed two cab drivers, and attempted to rob another. *Id.*

\(^9\) *Id.* at 751-52.

\(^9\) *Id.* at 754-55.

\(^9\) *Id.* at 754.

\(^9\) *Id.* at 773.


his right to consult with an attorney. This was enough to vacate the conviction. The prosecution argued the Miranda decision did not apply to the military, and the defendant had been fully advised of his rights under Article 31 of the UCMJ. The court rejected that argument, stating, "our duty [is] to follow the interpretation by the Supreme Court of the Constitution of the United States insofar as it is not made expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable to members of the armed forces." Tempia, despite its wide impact on the system, has never been overruled for hurting good order and discipline or for any other reason. In addition, Matthews did not cripple the military's ability to sentence soldiers to death. The defect was fixed and Loving and several other soldiers have since been sentenced to death.

C. Structure of the Military Justice System

This section explains the military process for charging and prosecuting service members, which is very different from the federal model. This presentation is important because many of the problems in the military justice system stem from the intimate relationship between the accuser and the trier of fact. These problems can be better understood with background knowledge of the military process.

Under the UCMJ, infractions are first brought to the attention of the commanding officer who has authority to issue non-judicial punishment. This commanding officer can refer it to the senior commanding officer, who has summary court-martial jurisdiction. That commander can either administer non-judicial punishment or refer it to a summary, special, or general court-martial.
If a case is referred to a general court-martial, the only forum where capital trials can be tried, there must be a formal Article 32 investigation conducted by an investigating officer. This functions essentially as a grand jury. After this procedure, the investigating officer prepares a report to the convening authority, the commander who referred the case to the general court-martial. The convening authority then has the responsibility to appoint the court-martial members, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney. The Judge Advocate General ("TJAG"), who is responsible for directing the members of his or her service branch’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps ("JAGC"), appoints the military judge of a general court-martial or designates someone to do the task.

The actual workings of a court-martial are nearly identical to a federal criminal trial: The Federal Rules of Evidence apply as do the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, unless explicitly replaced by the UCMJ or inconsistent with military justice. The major difference is that a verdict requires only two-thirds of the panel members. However, in death penalty cases the verdict must be unanimous in regards to the guilt, the presence of aggravating factors, the balance between mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and the sentence of death.

The appeals process begins with approval of the verdict by the convening authority. In capital cases, appeals then go to the Courts of Criminal Appeals ("CCA") and then to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ("CAAF"). The Supreme Court can review decisions from the CAAF on a writ of certiorari. The President must also approve all sentences of death. Outside of this
appellate structure, the accused can petition TJAG in writing for a new trial within five years of approval of the sentence by the convening authority. The defendant usually needs to show newly discovered evidence or a fraud in the initial court-martial to receive a new trial.\textsuperscript{120}

Military jurisdiction to prosecute service members has developed slowly over history.\textsuperscript{121} Today, the test is whether the person was on active-duty status when the crime was committed and when he or she is being tried.\textsuperscript{122} It does not matter if the victim was a civilian or if the crime was committed outside of a military installation or if the soldier was off duty. The mere status of being a soldier subjects active-service members to military justice.\textsuperscript{123}

As shown above, courts-martial in the United States originally involved thirteen panel members. This requirement was later changed to five. At the same time, the crimes that were punishable by death were also changing. In 1950, the UCMJ was passed and the five-member panel was continued along with new jurisdiction over peacetime murder and rape. Part II will continue with a discussion of the current state of the law in military and federal systems and how they protect defendants.

\section*{II. Analysis of Federal and Military Justice Systems}

This part examines three significant aspects of the trial process in the military and federal systems: the jury,\textsuperscript{124} the defense,\textsuperscript{125} and the appellate procedure.\textsuperscript{126} These three areas comprise a large part of the trial process, and present the most material for evaluating the ability of the military justice system to protect defendants. Other elements, like the rules of evidence, and the prosecutor's burden of proof, are either identical or very similar to the federal model.\textsuperscript{127} The sections analyzing the defense and the appellate procedure are meant to determine whether the military compensates for a five-member panel by better protecting defendants in these two areas. The analysis of each section will pay specific attention to the requirements or

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{120} Id. art. 73.
\item\textsuperscript{121} See O'Conner, supra note 35, at 201-02.
\item\textsuperscript{122} Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). This was a reversal of the Court's previous rulings. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (holding that the crime must be service related to try an active-duty service member).
\item\textsuperscript{123} Solorio, 483 U.S. at 450-51.
\item\textsuperscript{124} See infra Part II.B.
\item\textsuperscript{125} See infra Part II.C.
\item\textsuperscript{126} See infra Part II.D.
\item\textsuperscript{127} The military uses the civilian Federal Rules of Evidence as long as they are not inconsistent with military justice. MCM, supra note 16, Military Rules of Evidence Rule 101. In convicting, a military court-martial must find that "guilt is established by legal and competent evidence beyond reasonable doubt." Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 51(c)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 851(c)(1) (2000).
\end{itemize}
procedures of capital trials. The three aspects will be analyzed through reference to three recent capital military cases, United States v. Simoy,128 United States v. Gray,129 and United States v. Curtis,130 along with several non-capital cases. The capital cases were selected for their recentness and the full development of the appeals process. Of the three defendants, only Gray remains on death row.131 The other two have had their sentences commuted.132 Besides Gray, the only other current death row resident who had his appeal heard by an appellate court is Dwight Loving.133 The other four—Walker, Parker, Kreutzer, and Quintanilla—have yet to have their appeals filed with an appellate court.134

Before examining the relevant aspects of the trial process in military and federal systems, this part begins with a discussion of the facts of the capital cases to illustrate the character of capital crimes in the military. The civilian nature of these crimes is important in Part III's discussion.135 The following sections will illustrate some of the problems in the military and federal systems.

A. The Facts of the Cases

The facts of the cases of Senior Airman Simoy, Specialist Gray, and Lance Corporal Curtis are disturbing, but similar to crimes committed in the civilian world. They are a result of motives found in civilian life like greed, anger, or hatred. It is important to emphasize that these crimes were not military in nature, and that some did not even occur on military property. They were in a military court only because the accused had been active service members at the time of the crime and trial.

1. Senior Airman Jose F. S. Simoy, U. S. Air Force

Senior Airman Jose Simoy was stationed on Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, as a law enforcement security policeman.136 On December 29, 1991, Simoy, his brother Dennis, Dennis's friend Che Wolford, and two Filipinos nicknamed Nito and Tickboy robbed a commissary worker making a night deposit. Wolford pointed a rifle at Sgt. Stacy LeVay, who was accompanying the commissary worker,
and ordered him to freeze. Sgt. LeVay spun around and grabbed the
gun. While they were fighting over it, Dennis hit Sgt. LeVay in the
back of the head with a pipe. Sgt. LeVay fell to the ground where
Dennis beat him to death. Nito and Tickboy attacked the commissary
worker. One punched her in the stomach, knocking her down. The
other grabbed the bag of money. They hopped into the car Simoy was
driving and sped away. When they realized they left Dennis behind,
they went back to get him. 137

While waiting for Dennis, the group noticed a man had pulled up
behind them and was checking some papers in his car. 138 Wolford
asked Simoy if they had to kill him. Simoy answered yes. One of the
Filipinos got out with a knife and stabbed Sgt. Donald P. Marquardt
in the chest. He also slashed his neck just missing the trachea. He ran
back to the car and the men sped away. About two weeks later,
Simoy was found and arrested. 139 The trial lasted for two weeks, after
which, the eight-member panel convicted Simoy of conspiring to rob
the commissary worker, to murder Sgt. LeVay, to rob Sgt. LeVay of
his pistol and radio, and to attempt the murder of Sgt. Marquardt. 140
Simoy was sentenced to death. 141

2. Specialist Four, Ronald A. Gray, U. S. Army

In January 1987, the roommate of Kimberly Ann Ruggles became
concerned about her absence. 142 The roommate told the authorities
that Ruggles, a cab driver, had gone to pick up a fare named Ron. 143
Ruggles never returned home. On January 7, 1987, two military
policemen spotted an abandoned cab near the tree line on Fort Bragg.
Several hours later they found Kimberly’s body in the woods, not far
from the car. 144

She was face down with her hands tied behind her back, nude
except for her socks. She had been raped, sodomized, stabbed, and
suffered bruises and cuts on her face. 145 The evidence, including
fingerprints, implicated Ronald Gray. 146 Ten days later, a soldier
discovered the body of Private Laura Lee Vickery-Clay. 147 She had
been severely beaten, shot several times while still alive, raped, and

137. Id. at 600.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 600-01.
140. Id. at 601.
141. Id.
opinion gives only the victims’ initials. However, they are identified by name in the
143. Gray, 37 M.J. at 735-36.
144. Id. at 736.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
sodomized. The murder weapon and evidence found on her car also implicated Gray.\textsuperscript{148} Later, a third victim recognized Gray's picture when it appeared in the newspaper and on television after his arrest.\textsuperscript{149} Gray had attacked her in her barracks room. He held a knife to her throat, tied her hands behind her back with the cord of a curling iron, raped her, and stabbed her several times in the side and neck.\textsuperscript{150}

Gray was convicted before a general court-martial of attempted murder, two specifications of premeditated murder, three specifications of rape, larceny, two specifications of robbery, two specifications of forcible sodomy, and burglary. He was sentenced to death.\textsuperscript{151}

3. Lance Corporal Ronnie A. Curtis, U.S. Marine Corps

Corporal Ronnie Curtis worked as a supply administrative clerk at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Lieutenant James F. Lotz was his supervisor.\textsuperscript{152} During the two years they worked together, Curtis, an African American, began to believe Lotz was prejudiced towards him.\textsuperscript{153} Lotz's black friends and acquaintances later refuted these accusations.\textsuperscript{154}

On April 13, 1987, Curtis went to his barracks after work and drank a pint of gin.\textsuperscript{155} He then took a walk and began to think about his work situation. He decided to kill Lotz.\textsuperscript{156} Curtis broke into the supply building and stole a seven-inch knife;\textsuperscript{157} he then stole a bicycle and rode the bike to Lotz's house.\textsuperscript{158}

When he got there he told Lotz that a soldier who worked in the supply building needed help with his automobile. When Lotz went to call for help, Curtis stabbed him in the chest.\textsuperscript{159} Lotz then called for his wife before being stabbed a second time in the back.\textsuperscript{160} Joan Lotz emerged from the bedroom and went to her dying husband. She then attacked Curtis, kicking him in the shin with her bare feet.\textsuperscript{161} Curtis assaulted Joan, stabbing her in the head, neck, and back as she

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Id.} at 736.
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Id.} at 733.
\textsuperscript{152} United States v. Curtis, 28 M.J. 1074, 1077 (N-M.C.M.R. 1989).
\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Id.} at 1078.
\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Id.}
pleaded for him to stop. As she lay dying on the floor, Curtis cut off her panties and touched her vaginal area.

Curtis then stole some money and fled in one of the Lotz’s cars. While driving, he fell asleep at the wheel and crashed into a ditch. When the police questioned him about the accident, he confessed to the murders. Curtis was convicted by a general court-martial of two premeditated murders, larceny, burglary, unlawful entry, indecent assault, and damage to government property. He was sentenced to death.

B. The Jury

This section compares the federal and military jury systems. While the federal model uses jurors and the military model uses court-martial members to ascertain guilt, they are identical in purpose. By analyzing the jury in terms of composition, voting, and empanelment, this section will illustrate fundamental differences between the two systems.

1. Composition and Jury Voting

A civilian jury in federal court is governed first by the Constitution, and second by federal statute. Twelve jurors are required in a federal capital trial. There are six alternate jurors. After the jury has retired to consider the verdict, one juror can be dismissed for just cause. There must be a unanimous vote to convict or acquit.

Prior to the recent passage of Article 25a, general courts-martial consisted of at least five members (the civilian equivalent of jurors) and a military judge. Conviction and sentencing by less than twelve members in capital cases was common. An eight-member panel sentenced Jose Simoy. A six-member panel sentenced Ronald Gray. Voting is done by secret ballot. The result of the first

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1076.
167. Id. at 1077.
170. Id. 24 (c).
175. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 4 n.5.
176. See id. The number of panel members in Curtis’s trial could not be determined from the published cases.
177. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 51.
ballot is the verdict. This vote is preceded by a discussion of the case amongst the panel members. Like the federal system, the panel must find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In capital cases there must be separate, unanimous votes on guilt, the presence of an aggravating factor, the outweighing of mitigating circumstances by aggravating circumstances, and the sentence of death.

2. Impaneling the Jury

Selection of a federal jury must be done randomly. Additionally, a defendant can object if a distinctive group is excluded from the jury. To prevail the defendant must show the group is not fairly represented "due to systematic exclusion" in the jury selection process. The defense can also challenge the composition of the jury when jurors are selected in an intentionally discriminatory manner. To prove this a defendant must show "substantial underrepresentation of the class to which he belongs."

The prosecution and the defense can question jurors during voir dire to help secure a fair and impartial jury. Both sides can use challenges for cause, which are granted by the judge, and peremptory challenges, which may be used without explanation or justification. Each side has twenty peremptory challenges in capital cases. Challenges for cause can be granted if a juror fails to meet statutory requirements, is biased, would suffer undue hardship, or would threaten the secrecy of the trial. In capital cases, jurors cannot be dismissed based on their conscientious scruples against capital punishment, so long as they are able to render an impartial verdict.

In general courts-martial, the convening authority selects the potential court-martial members. The convening authority is usually given a broad presumption of propriety in compiling court-

178. See id. art. 52.
179. Id. art. 51(c)(1).
180. Id. art. 52(b)(1); MCM, supra note 16, Rules for Court-Martial 1004(a)(2), 1004(b)(7), 1004(b)(4)(C), 1006(d)(4)(A).
182. See id. § 12-4(a). A distinctive group is a legal term defined by the courts. Hispanics are a distinctive group but persons between eighteen and twenty-one years of age are not. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. § 12-4(b).
187. Id. § 12-4(d).
189. See Cissell, supra note 168, § 12-4(c).
190. Id.
191. Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 115; see also supra text accompanying note 109.
martial members.\textsuperscript{192} This presumption can be overcome by showing the convening authority systematically excluded potential members from serving\textsuperscript{193} or picked members to help the prosecution.\textsuperscript{194} "An appearance that the convening authority handpicked members to favor the prosecution may provide sufficient evidence to infer such intent."\textsuperscript{195} When picking members to serve, the convening authority must select possible members who are "best qualified for the duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament.'\textsuperscript{196}

Voir dire in the military is different than the federal system because removed members will not be replaced unless the composition of the panel goes below quorum (five).\textsuperscript{197} Like the federal system, the defense and trial counsel (the military equivalent of the prosecutor) have for cause and peremptory challenges.\textsuperscript{198} The trial counsel, however, only gets one peremptory challenge regardless of the number of defendants, while the defense gets one peremptory challenge for each defendant.\textsuperscript{199}

3. Comparison

The composition and selection of a panel is substantially different in the military than in the federal system. The military defense attorney must choose to either remove panel members who are perceived as hostile or leave them on the panel, thereby increasing the chances the verdict will not be unanimous. The federal jury is fixed at twelve so the defense has no incentive to keep prejudicial jurors. Also, a federal defense attorney has twenty peremptory challenges\textsuperscript{200} the military defense attorney has one for each defendant.\textsuperscript{201} The convening authority, who also brings the charges against the defendant, handpicks the panel members.\textsuperscript{202} Jurors in the federal system are chosen randomly, outside the control of the prosecution.\textsuperscript{203}

\textsuperscript{193} See id.
\textsuperscript{194} Id. at 1037.
\textsuperscript{195} Id.
\textsuperscript{197} Id. art. 41.
\textsuperscript{198} MCM, supra note 16, Rules for Courts-Martial 912.
\textsuperscript{200} See Cissell, supra note 168, § 12-4(d).
\textsuperscript{201} See Everett, supra note 199, at 176.
\textsuperscript{202} Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 102.
\textsuperscript{203} See Cissell, supra note 168, § 12-4.
4. The Danger of Court-Stacking and Command Influence

Two peculiar problems arise out of the military approach to juries: court-stacking and command influence.\textsuperscript{204} They are both a result of the close relationship between the accuser (the convening authority) and the trier of fact (panel members chosen by the accuser). The problem can go undetected for a long time. Several non-capital cases have been thrown out by the military appellate courts for court-stacking or unlawful command influence.

In \textit{United States v. Youngblood}, the CAAF set aside the sentence because biased members were not removed for cause during voir dire.\textsuperscript{205} Ten days before the trial, several panel members attended a staff meeting where the convening authority and the Staff Judge Advocate ("SJA") discussed the state of discipline in the unit.\textsuperscript{206} The convening authority also expressed his opinion of appropriate levels of punishment.\textsuperscript{207} The SJA told a story about a soldier who, according to the SJA, did not decide the sentence in a child abuse case properly. The convening authority said he had handled the matter by telling the soldier's next commanding officer that the soldier's career was at its peak and he should not be promoted any more.\textsuperscript{208}

In another case, \textit{United States v. Reynolds}, the convening authority expressed to four soldiers his dissatisfaction with previous courts-martial results.\textsuperscript{209} He also expressed his opinion that anyone involved with drugs did not belong in the military.\textsuperscript{210} Reynolds was charged with a drug offense, pled guilty, and was sentenced by a special court-martial that included those four soldiers.\textsuperscript{211}

\textit{United States v. Hilow} is a good example of court stacking.\textsuperscript{212} In that case nominees were selected because they were "commanders and supporters of a command policy of hard discipline."\textsuperscript{213} Hilow also presents a different problem—someone other than the convening authority compiled the list of nominees, thus demonstrating the broad

\begin{footnotes}
\item[204] See Guy P. Glazier, \textit{He Called for His Pipe, and He Called for His Bowl, and He Called for His Members Three—Selection of Military Juries by the Sovereign: Impediment to Military Justice}, 157 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 45-54 (1998). Court-stacking is done by impaneling members whom the convening authority thinks will vote a certain way. \textit{Id.} at 45. Command influence occurs when the convening authority tries implicitly or explicitly to persuade panel members to vote a certain way.


\item[206] Youngblood, 47 M.J. at 339.

\item[207] \textit{Id.} at 340.

\item[208] \textit{Id.;} Glazier, \textit{supra} note 204, at 62.

\item[209] United States v. Reynolds, 40 M.J. 198, 199-200 (C.M.A. 1994); Glazier, \textit{supra} note 204, at 65.

\item[210] Reynolds, 40 M.J. at 200; see Glazier, \textit{supra} note 204, at 65.

\item[211] Reynolds, 40 M.J. at 198-99; see Glazier, \textit{supra} note 204, at 65.


\item[213] \textit{Id.} at 441.
\end{footnotes}
range of individuals capable of stacking a panel. There was no evidence the convening authority meant to engage in court stacking, but the chosen potential members were already tainted. In another case, United States v. McClain, the SJA only recommended senior officers and non-commissioned officers to the convening authorities. He wanted to avoid the lighter sentences he thought junior officers and enlisted men gave. These abuses do not arise in the federal system, where the jury is chosen through an anonymous and random process.

C. The Defense

This section analyzes the way accused are defended in the different systems. The defense of the accused is one of the most important aspects of a trial. Only through an effective, rigorous defense can a reliable verdict be achieved. The defense is examined through the quality of defense counsel and the right to a grand jury or Article 32 hearing.

1. Quality of Counsel

There are rules for assignment of counsel in federal cases. Each United States district court must institute a plan for furnishing representation for defendants who cannot afford it. The plan must include the appointment of private attorneys or attorneys from a bar association, a legal aid society, a federal public defender organization, or a community defender group. The right to representation covers the entire process from initial appearance through appeal, including all ancillary matters. In capital cases a judge must promptly, on defendant’s request, “assign [two] such counsel, of whom at least [one] shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases.”

Defense counsel in the military is provided to the accused in all general courts-martial, while associate counsel is optional. Defense attorneys must also be a member of the federal bar or bar of the highest court of the state and be certified as competent to perform their duties by TJAG for the appropriate branch of the armed forces.

214. Id.
215. See Glazier, supra note 204, at 45-46.
217. Id. at 130; Glazier, supra note 204, at 51.
219. Id. § 3006A(a).
220. See id. § 3006A(b).
221. Id. § 3006A(c).
222. Id. § 3005.
services. At either the trial or appellate stage, the defendant may hire his own civilian counsel. Military defense counsel may be more experienced in trial advocacy than the prosecutors. For example, in the Air Force, "JAGs who acquire sufficient litigation experience, expertise, and skill as prosecutors may request to be a defense counsel." Nevertheless, death penalty cases in the military "always include claims that the defense lawyer was incompetent." These claims have had varying degrees of success. The military does not require defense counsel to be ABA "death-qualified."

2. The Grand Jury; Article 32

The Fifth Amendment guarantees a civilian accused of a capital crime the right of a grand jury hearing. To indict, there must be a finding of probable cause. The government attorney has no obligation to present evidence that may be exculpatory or undermine their own witnesses. The government attorneys, the witnesses, an interpreter when needed, and a stenographer may be present during the grand jury proceedings. The presence of unauthorized persons may void a grand jury's indictment.

The military system uses a pretrial investigation, referred to as an Article 32 hearing instead of a grand jury. This is constitutional because the Fifth Amendment explicitly does not apply to the military. During an Article 32 hearing, the accused is present and has the right to counsel, the right to cross-examine government

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224. Id.
225. Id. arts. 38(b)(2), 70(d).
230. United States v. Curtis, 44 M.J. 106, 126 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ("This Court has rejected a requirement for appointment of ABA qualified counsel. . . .").
231. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
232. See Cissell, supra note 168, § 4-1.
233. See id. § 4-4.
235. See Cissell, supra note 168, § 4-2(g).
witnesses, and the right to present anything that goes towards a defense or mitigation. This is vastly different than the federal grand jury where the defendant may not even be present. Military defense attorneys may either use the Article 32 hearing to put on a full-fledged defense to prevent charges from being forwarded to trial or simply appraise the prosecution's case. After the hearing, the investigating officer makes a recommendation about what should be done next so as to further justice and discipline. Either way, a non-verbatim transcript of the Article 32 hearing cannot be used in the court-martial proceedings.

3. Comparison

While the military defense attorney may have more trial experience, this does not, by definition, translate into more capital trial experience. The burden of trying a capital case is very different than the burden of trying a non-capital one. One obvious difference is the possible death of the defendant. There are other considerations as well. The cases of defendants facing the death penalty tend to be horrific and violent. A military capital case is also the only military trial to require a unanimous verdict. The federal system requires that one of the defendant's lawyers have knowledge of the capital law—arguably not a high standard. The military does not.

Facially, an Article 32 investigation gives the accused a chance to disprove the charge before the case even goes to trial, but there is no concrete standard of proof required of the prosecution; it is simply to further justice and discipline. A grand jury, on the other hand, hears only the prosecutor's argument. This can make it easier to indict in the federal system.

4. The Problem of Ineffective Counsel

This section illustrates some of the problems with the military and federal systems. These problems may be great enough to prevent the military from providing a more reliable system of defense than a flawed, but capable federal system.

238. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32(b).
239. Telephone Interview with Col. Adele H. Odegard, Chief, supra note 226.
240. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32.
242. For instance, in a capital trial, the more panel members, the better the chance at avoiding the death penalty. In a non-capital general courts-martial, where the verdict is not unanimous, a larger panel is not necessarily an advantage. See infra text accompanying note 356.
243. See supra Part II.A.
244. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 52.
246. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32(a).
The CAAF found such egregious ineffectiveness of counsel in United States v. Curtis that it set aside the sentence.247 The CAAF also found ineffective counsel in both the trial phase and sentencing in one case, United States v. Murphy.248 Jose Simoy's case presents an example of trial experience not necessarily preparing a defense attorney for a capital trial. In an affidavit, Simoy's attorney, Major Doyle, supported Simoy's claim of ineffective counsel, stating, "our efforts were sufficient for a non-capital felony court-martial, [but] we failed to perform up to the professional standards I have since realized are necessary in the representation of a capital case."249

The attorneys in Simoy's case had varying degrees of trial experience but neither was well-versed in capital litigation. Captain Bemis was the installation defense counsel and had tried some courts-martial, although the record does not indicate the nature of these courts-martial.250 Captain Bemis also worked as a civilian attorney for about one year handling some misdemeanor criminal cases.251 Major Doyle was assigned to Air Force members who had committed more serious crimes.252 Before the Simoy case, he had defended or prosecuted between thirty and forty trials and worked as an appellate defense attorney on about 200 cases.253 By Doyle's own admission, however, this experience did not adequately prepare him for a capital trial. Two former high-ranking officers in the Army JAGC, Michael I.

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247. United States v. Curtis, 46 M.J. 129, 130 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (finding ineffective counsel for failure to present mitigating factors in the sentencing phase). The court then ordered the case remanded to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals for imposition of a life sentence or a rehearing on sentencing. Id.
248. 50 M.J. 4 (C.A.A.F. 1998). The court held that post-trial evidence cast doubt on the defendant's ability to form premeditation and whether the defendant had a fair sentencing hearing. The case was returned to the Army Court of Criminal Appeals, which could do several things:
(1) Review the new evidence to determine if a different verdict as to findings might reasonably result in light of posttrial evidence; (2) If it determined that the record before it is inadequate to resolve the factual issues regarding findings, it may order a DuBay hearing to consider the factual issues raised on appeal as to the findings; (3) If it determines that a different verdict would not reasonably result as to findings, then it may either affirm appellant’s sentence only as to life imprisonment and accessory penalties, or it may order a rehearing as to the death sentence; (4) If it determines that a different verdict on findings might reasonably result, then it shall order a rehearing on findings and sentence; (5) If on remand the Court of Criminal Appeals determines that further review under Article 66 is impracticable, then in the interest of judicial economy, it may order forthwith a rehearing on findings and sentence. Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
250. Simoy, 46 M.J. at 602.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
Spak and Jonathon P. Tomes, have also commented on the inexperience of military defense counsel. They wrote, "we agree that [military defense counsel] are generally too inexperienced today to entrust with representing service members before general courts-martial in death penalty or life imprisonment cases." 254

Simoy's case also demonstrates the arguably illusory advantage an Article 32 hearing has over a grand jury. 255 During Simoy's Article 32 hearing, two government witnesses were more than a hundred miles away, so the investigating officer, rather than compelling them to appear, considered their prior sworn statements. 256 The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ("AFCCA") held that the one hundred mile standard for not requiring a witness to appear as stated in Rules for Court Martial 405(g)(1)(A) was not a bright-line rule. 257 It was supposed to be weighed against the importance of the witness. 258 This weighing was not done in Simoy's case. However, the court found it harmless error because the defense did not move to depose the witnesses and thereby preserve the right to appeal that issue. 259 The AFCCA did not put much bite into a defendant's right to examine witnesses for the prosecution during an Article 32 hearing. The CAAF upheld the court's decision. 260

Of course, ineffective counsel in capital cases plagues the civilian system as well. While this section focuses on the federal criminal system, the use of federal habeas corpus proceedings have caused federal courts to rule on claims of ineffective counsel from state capital trials. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent to a denial of certiorari in McFarland v. Scott, 261 strongly criticized the public-defender system for its lack of resources and lack of standards for counsel in death-penalty cases. 262 Justice Blackmun also criticized the relatively high threshold for finding ineffective counsel. 263 "Ten years after the articulation of that standard, practical experience establishes that the ... test, in application, has failed to protect a defendant's right to be represented by something more than 'a person who happens to be

255. See Simoy, 46 M.J. at 608.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
262. Id. Justice Blackmun noted that public defenders in Louisiana were limited in capital cases to $1000 to pay for pretrial preparation and the trial. Kentucky's maximum was $2500 and Alabama offered $1000 for each part. Id. at 1258.
263. Id. at 1259; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (articulating a high threshold for finding counsel so ineffective that the Sixth Amendment was violated).
Justice Blackmun gave a laundry list of outrageous defense counsel behavior in several capital trials:

Capital defendants have been sentenced to death when represented by counsel who never bothered to read the state death penalty statute, [who] slept through or otherwise were not present during trial, or failed to investigate or present any mitigating evidence at the penalty phase . . . who had been admitted to the bar only six months before and never had conducted a criminal trial. . . . [Who conducted] a [one]-day trial and [twenty]-minute penalty phase proceeding, in which . . . counsel stipulated to the defendant’s age at the time of the crime and rested. . . . [And] who failed to challenge his client’s racially unrepresentative jury [and] could name only two cases: *Miranda v. Arizona* and *Dred Scott v. Sandford*.265

Justice Blackmun also cited to one particularly egregious case where the defense attorney presented no defense, did not object during the trial, stressed the horror of the crime during closing arguments, and, argued during sentencing that death was appropriate.266

D. Appellate Procedure

This section focuses on the appellate process, in particular, its purpose and scope of review. This is the last safeguard for a convicted person’s rights. In the three capital cases discussed below, two defendants had their death sentences commuted to life imprisonment and one had his death sentence upheld. This section will illustrate that the two systems, military and federal, reach similar results through different processes.

1. The Appellate Process

The Constitution and federal law govern appeals from a final judgment in federal court.267 The circuit courts have appellate jurisdiction over such final judgments.268 These appeals are a right guaranteed to the defendant. The Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction. It can decide to review a capital case but is not compelled to do so.269

In the military, after completion of the trial, the commander who convened the court-martial must affirm the court’s actions.270 The commander cannot change a finding of not guilty, but is authorized to disagree with a finding of guilty, and can reduce, mitigate, or

265. *Id.* (citations omitted).
266. *Id.* at 1260 (citing *Messer v. Kemp*, 760 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1985).
disapprove any sentence or part of a sentence. The SJA, the prosecutor's commanding officer, must also write a review. After a capital trial, the entire record, including the outcome of the case and the SJA's opinion must be sent to TJAG of the defendant's military branch. TJAG conducts an administrative review to determine if the law supports the findings and sentence. All cases involving sentences of death must be referred to the Court of Criminal Appeals for the defendant's service branch. The court must consist of a minimum of three judges who are commissioned officers or civilians, members of the federal bar or the bar of the highest state court, and appointed by their service branch's TJAG. The judges are usually senior JAG officers.

If a Court of Criminal Appeals affirms the sentence of death, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces hears the case. The court is comprised of five civilian judges, appointed by the President and approved by the Senate for staggered fifteen-year terms. The Supreme Court can review the case by writ of certiorari.

2. Purposes and Scope of Review

Appellate review in the federal and military systems is designed to serve as a safeguard, not a second trial. Consequently, in the federal system facts are rarely re-examined except to determine if they support the verdict. A federal appellate court will review questions of fact under a "clearly erroneous" standard. Issues of law are examined under a more relaxed "merely wrong" standard.

In federal death-penalty cases, an appellate court reviews the entire record to determine if the "sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and whether the evidence supports the special finding of the existence of an aggravating factor." If the court finds the sentence was imposed

271. Id. art. 60(e)(2). The convening authority cannot reconsider a finding of not guilty or increase the severity of the sentence unless that sentence is mandatory. Id.
272. Id. arts. 61, 65.
273. Id. art. 65.
274. Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 128.
275. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66(b).
276. Id. art. 66(a).
277. Shanor & Terrell, supra note 103, at 128-29.
278. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 67(a)(1).
281. See Alan D. Hornstein, Appellate Advocacy in a Nutshell 31 (1984); see also Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66(c).
283. Id. at 33.
284. Id. at 34-35.
under the influence of a prohibited factor, the finding of an aggravating factor was not supported by the admissible evidence, or there was any other properly preserved error that affected sentencing, the court can remand for a new hearing to determine whether a sentence of death was justified or for imposition of a penalty other than death.286

The military appellate courts conduct a similar type of review;287 however, the Courts of Criminal Appeals have broader powers of review and can consider questions of fact, credibility of witnesses, the weight of evidence, and all questions of law.288 The CAAF considers only issues of law,289 but can set aside the findings and the sentence, order a new hearing, or set aside the sentence.290

3. Comparison

The military system has more levels of review than the federal system. Before an appellate court hears a case, the convening authority, the SJA and TJAG all examine the trial record and the sentence. The Courts of Criminal Appeals also have greater power than their federal counterparts because they can determine questions of fact, reliability of witnesses, and evidence. However, the judges on this court are appointed by their respective service branch's TJAG;291 the President appoints federal appellate court judges. The scope and purpose each appellate system undertakes in capital cases is nearly identical.

4. The Strength of the Appellate Process

This section illustrates some of the problems that can occur in the military and federal appellate systems. Ronald Curtis's case is a good example of a Court of Criminal Appeals not affording the best protection to the defendant. The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals ("N-MCCA") and the CAAF affirmed Curtis's death sentence twice292 before the sentence was thrown-out by the CAAF on reconsideration.293 The first time the N-MCCA affirmed, the CAAF, on appeal, remanded the case back for a review of several other issues.294 After the second affirmation by the N-MCCA, the

286. Id. § (c)(2).
288. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66(c).
289. Id. art. 67(c).
290. Id. art. 67(d).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
294. See Curtis, 38 M.J. at 532.
CAAF affirmed the N-MCCA's decision on the death sentence. The N-MCCA did not find defense counsel rose to a level of ineffectiveness that the CAAF did when it ultimately reversed the lower court. This illustrates that in practice the added level of appellate review in the military may be illusory.

The United States courts of appeal have been criticized on two fronts: their inability to handle an increasing caseload and their "excessively ideological" decisions. The increased caseload has led to reduced time for oral arguments and deciding cases in nonprecedential order. Some critics have called the appellate courts "appellate factories." Making decisions based on ideological reasons instead of on the merits may benefit some defendants sentenced to death, but it also may cause a backlash with more conservative justices. This happened with Supreme Court justices after the Court's decision to reinstate the death penalty in 1976.

Justices Marshall and Brennan, ideologically opposed to the death penalty, began to "vote[] to reverse or vacate every death sentence that came before the Court." The conservative backlash reduced the grounds for which defendants could seek federal habeas relief, a major avenue of appeal for people sentenced to death.

This part compared the way the military and the federal system protect defendants facing the death penalty. Both systems use the appellate procedure to safeguard defendant's rights. Both systems, however, suffer from problems—particularly ineffective counsel. However, the military model places defendants at a distinct disadvantage because of how a panel is selected. Part III attempts to show that this shortcoming makes it necessary that military defendants in capital trials for non-military crimes be judged by twelve-member panels.

III. SHOULD MILITARY CAPITAL CASES HAVE A GUARANTEE OF TWELVE-MEMBER PANELS?

This part analyzes the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 and argues that the change in panel size for capital cases did not go far enough. The first section argues that two primary barriers, the outdated rationale for changing the panel size in 1786 and the denial of civilian protections to soldiers, no longer apply.

296. See Curtis, 46 M.J. at 130.
298. See id.
299. See id.
302. See id. at 149.
today. Once these barriers are overcome, the military’s failure to adequately protect the rights of the accused proves the necessity of twelve-member panels in capital trials for non-military crimes. If twelve-member panels are necessary, it becomes important to show why the new legislation is not adequate. The next section will illustrate how similarly written, previous legislation establishing thirteen-member panels was easily sidestepped. The Note concludes with a suggested UCMJ amendment that would guarantee no soldier is executed for murder and/or rape without first being convicted by twelve people.

A. Necessity of Twelve-Member Panels

This section begins with the contention that two barriers to increasing military panels have become obsolete. The first barrier is that the 1786 context in which five-member panels were adequate is no longer applicable today. Developments in the military have rendered the rationale for five-member panels a historical anomaly. The second barrier is the idea that incorporating civilian liberties into the military will hurt good order and discipline. The example of civilian protections being incorporated without great protest or condemnation in United States v. Matthews303 and United States v. Tempia304 refutes this notion. This section concludes with the argument that the military does not adequately protect an accused’s rights in capital trials. This inadequacy demands that twelve people judge defendants in capital trials for civilian crimes.

The arguments made in this section could be extended to all capital crimes in the military. This is the approach taken by Article 25a.305 This Note, however, deals with only civilian crimes, specifically murder and rape. This is an important distinction because of the demands of military justice. All reforms to the UCMJ must not hurt good order and discipline in the armed forces.306 A strictly military crime, like spying or aiding the enemy, can hurt an entire unit and even weaken the country.307 The interests of good order and discipline are strong enough to outweigh the need for a twelve-member panel. The difference between a crime that injures a few, like murder, and a crime that can injure many, like spying, requires that the two be treated separately. Additionally, a central contention

303. 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983).
306. MCM, supra note 16, pmbl.
of this Note is that service-members should not receive less protection than their civilian counterparts solely because of their occupation. With the possible exception of spying, none of the other military capital crimes have an equivalent civilian crime. Therefore, service members do not receive less protection merely because of their occupation; they receive less protection because of their crime.

1. The Historical Precedent

The Articles of War of 1775 required, without exception, that court-martial panels consist of thirteen officers. The amendment in 1786 created an exception to this requirement to allow smaller panels if thirteen-member panels would harm military service.

Knox’s request in 1785, which led to the amendment, resulted from a concern with a shrinking army and its ability to convene thirteen officers without lowering the effectiveness of the military. While today’s military has also downsized, the numbers are vastly different than in Knox’s day. One historian has estimated the entire United States Army had fewer than forty officers in 1786. Three years later the Army had only 672 soldiers. Impaneling thirteen officers would have constituted almost a third of the officer corps.

The small size of the Army was a result of several factors; the primary two will be discussed here. First, the United States had great trouble in repaying its debts, including the salaries of the soldiers, after the war. Things got so bad, that in June 1783, a group of soldiers from Pennsylvania took their muskets and bayonets and surrounded the State House in Philadelphia where Congress was meeting. Second, there was already a fear of standing armies rooted in the colonial experience; the Philadelphia incident may have placed this concern in the forefront of public consciousness and given Knox little hope of an expanded military capable of meeting the minimum number of panel members. Today, the armed forces

308. American Articles of War of 1775, art XXXIII, reprinted in Winthrop, supra note 40, app. at 956.
309. American Articles of War of 1786, art 1, reprinted in Winthrop, supra note 40, app. at 972.
310. 29 Journals of the Continental Congress, supra note 42, at 851; see supra text accompanying note 42.
311. The impetus for Knox’s request probably came from two courts-martial in Western Pennsylvania where the defendants’ convictions for desertion had to be overturned because there were only five members on each panel. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 6 n.18.
312. Id. at 5 n.17.
313. Id. at 5 n.16.
315. Id. at 69.
certainly have the resources to afford any service member on trial for his or her life the right to a jury of twelve.317

There is another, more compelling, reason to disregard Knox's concerns—the difference in crimes for which a soldier can be sentenced to death. In 1786, all of the military crimes eligible for the death penalty were uniquely military in nature.318 The military never prosecuted murder and rape in peacetime before 1950.319 The UCMJ brought panel size and the death penalty together in a disastrous way for soldiers' civil rights. It removed the requirement that a panel have thirteen members whenever possible320 and added jurisdiction over murder and rape committed in peacetime.321 Soldiers were prosecuted for civilian crimes—murder and rape—in a military court with no guarantee of twelve-member panels. Civilians were tried under federal or state law and guaranteed twelve jurors.322

This unfortunate result might have been a by-product of the piecemeal manner in which the UCMJ was compiled and ratified. The authors looked at each article from the Army Articles of War and the Rules for Governing the Navy individually.323 There is no indication that they were ever examined for their overall effect when combined.324 Congress likewise reviewed the articles in a piecemeal manner.325 It appears this critical question of panel size was never debated or even considered.

The added burden of prosecuting soldiers who commit a murder in peacetime, previously a uniquely civilian crime, was a momentous change in 1950. Knox's reasons for five-member panels certainly do not apply to prosecutions for peacetime murder and rape. Even without the change in 1950, the reasons for resizing were particular to the country and the military in 1786. The congressional passage of the UCMJ in 1950 does not support the current system because there is no record of congressional intent. The creation of a system where


318. See O'Connor, supra note 35, at 188-89.

319. See id. at 192; see also Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2000).

320. American Articles of War of 1786, art 1, reprinted in Winthrop, supra note 40, app. at 972.

321. See O'Connor, supra note 35, at 189, 192; see also Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 118.

322. See supra text accompanying note 169.

323. Generous, supra note 62, at 37.

324. See id.

325. See A Bill to Unify, Consolidate, Revise, and Codify the Articles of War, the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the Disciplinary Laws of the Coast Guard, and to Enact and Establish a Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearing on H.R. 2498 Before the House Subcomm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong. 955-56 (1949). Discussion of the punitive articles, if any, would have occurred after the public hearings. Id. at 1307.
fewer than twelve people can sentence soldiers to death for non-military crimes was never discussed in subcommittee hearings before the Senate and the House of Representatives.\textsuperscript{326}

2. Incorporating Civilian Protections into the Military

The rules of military justice must uphold the standards of good order and discipline.\textsuperscript{327} Any incorporation of civilian protections to the military system must meet this standard. Several decisions since 1950 vastly altered how the military prosecuted the accused and imposed the death penalty. These incorporations have not caused a great uproar over the decline of good order and discipline.\textsuperscript{328} There is good reason to believe a no-exceptions requirement of twelve-panel members in trials for capital, non-military crimes would also not affect good order and discipline.

There is, admittedly, a long tradition of keeping the military and civilian systems separate. General William T. Sherman said:

The object of the civil law is to secure to every human being in a community all the liberty, security, and happiness possible, consistent with the safety of all. The object of military law is to govern armies composed of strong men, so as to be capable of exercising the largest measure of force at the will of the nation.\textsuperscript{329}

Justice Rehnquist echoed this sentiment about one hundred years later:

This Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. We have also recognized that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history. The differences between the military and civilian communities result from the fact that "it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise."\textsuperscript{330}

These statements acknowledge that giving civilian protections to soldiers must not hinder the effectiveness of the military. They \textit{do not} mean civilian protections cannot be given to military members. In fact, the mission statement of the UCMJ is to make a new, modern code "with a view to protecting the rights of those subject to the code

\textsuperscript{326} See \textit{id.}; \textit{Bills to Unify, Consolidate, Revise, and Codify the Articles of War, the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the Disciplinary Laws of the Coast Guard, and to Enact and Establish a Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearing on S. 857 and H.R. 4080 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong. (1949).} 
\textsuperscript{327} MCM, supra note 16, pmbl.
\textsuperscript{328} A thorough search revealed no negative reaction by military authorities to these decisions.
\textsuperscript{329} Van Loan, supra note 237, at 417 (citation omitted).
and increasing public confidence in military justice, without impairing the performance of military functions.\footnote{331}

Two decisions to incorporate civilian protections into the military, \textit{United States v. Matthews}\footnote{332} and \textit{United States v. Tempia},\footnote{333} fundamentally altered the way military justice was administered to soldiers. However, the incorporation of these civilian protections did not create widespread condemnation among military lawyers or commentators and neither case has been overruled.\footnote{334} If these protections were brought into the military system without problems, than there is similar hope for twelve-member panels. While \textit{Matthews} and \textit{Tempia} were based on already existing military rights,\footnote{335} there is no reason to suppose that a no-exceptions requirement of twelve-panel members in capital trials for murder and rape would be difficult to institute or create a breakdown in good order and discipline. The military has already been able to prosecute two defendants with twelve-member panels, as it did with two current death-row inmates, Kreutzer and Quintanilla.\footnote{336} A no-exceptions rule requiring twelve-member panels would affect only those service-members accused of murder and/or rape and facing the death penalty, a miniscule portion of all service members. Additionally, if the panel was not unanimous on the imposition of the death penalty, it could still convict with a two-thirds vote. The sentence would be life imprisonment—the statutory minimum.\footnote{337} Such a rule would not require the prosecution to try murders as non-capital when the burden of twelve-panel members could not be met; in those situations, the soldier could be turned over to the civilian authorities for trial or moved to an installation that could impanel twelve soldiers.

3. Current Practice

The current military practice in capital cases does not meet the heightened standards that should accompany a decision to prosecute and execute soldiers who commit a civilian, capital crime.\footnote{338} The military justice system is designed to further different goals than the civilian system. Good order and discipline are the principles to which

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{331} Generous, supra note 62, at 34.
\item \footnote{332} 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983); see discussion supra Part I.B.1.
\item \footnote{333} 37 C.M.R. 249 (C.M.A. 1967); see discussion supra Part I.B.2.
\item \footnote{334} See supra Part I.B.
\item \footnote{335} The \textit{Matthews} court based its decision partly on the fact the military already had an article banning cruel and unusual punishment, and \textit{Furman} was decided on Eighth Amendment grounds. \textit{Matthews}, 16 M.J. at 368-69; see also U.S. Const. amend VIII. The \textit{Tempia} court based its decision partly on the existence of an article similar to the \textit{Miranda} warnings. \textit{Tempia}, 37 C.M.R. at 260.
\item \footnote{336} Sullivan, supra note 36, at 4 n.5.
\item \footnote{337} Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 118 (2000).
\item \footnote{338} The death penalty requires a higher standard of reliability. See \textit{Woodson v. North Carolina}, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); supra Part II.B-D.
\end{itemize}
military justice must measure up.\textsuperscript{339} While good order and discipline justify less than twelve-member panels in military crimes like desertion or aiding the enemy,\textsuperscript{340} it fails to justify the systematic abuses that can occur during a military trial which can result in the death of a soldier for a civilian crime. The military particularly fails when it comes to the method by which a panel is chosen\textsuperscript{341} and the accused is defended.\textsuperscript{342} The appellate procedure provides a protection equal to the federal model,\textsuperscript{343} but it is not enough to make up for the other deficiencies.

It might be argued that since no soldier has been put to death since 1961,\textsuperscript{344} the system is working. Rather than providing an example of judicial prudence, this is probably a result of a judicially active CMA incorporating civilian protections in the 1960s and '70s\textsuperscript{345} and the 1983 \textit{United States v. Matthews}\textsuperscript{346} decision, holding the military death penalty unconstitutional. Ronald Reagan, as commander-in-chief, remedied that problem by providing aggravating factors that must be present in order to sentence a person to death. Two of the first cases tried under that new rubric are now approaching the final stages of their appeals.\textsuperscript{347} The pause in executions may be at an end if President George W. Bush maintains the execution track record he established as governor of Texas.\textsuperscript{348}

Panel selection, the biggest problem in military justice, can be divided into two sub-problems: command influence and stacking the panel.\textsuperscript{349} Command influence has proven to be a problem in the military justice system.\textsuperscript{350} The existence of a secret ballot does not solve the command influence problem because pre-vote deliberations can reveal dissenting panel members. It is also not mandated that the ballot remain secret after it is taken.\textsuperscript{351} Dissenting members could later be forced to reveal their decision. Court stacking stems from the requirement that a convening authority appoint soldiers with a good judicial temperament.\textsuperscript{352} It seems difficult, if not impossible, to determine persons' judicial temperament by examining their service

\textsuperscript{339} MCM, supra note 16, pmbl.
\textsuperscript{340} See supra text accompanying notes 306-07.
\textsuperscript{341} See supra Part II.B.
\textsuperscript{342} See supra Part II.C.
\textsuperscript{343} See supra Part II.D.
\textsuperscript{344} See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
\textsuperscript{345} See infra note 381.
\textsuperscript{346} 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983).
\textsuperscript{347} See supra text accompanying note 9.
\textsuperscript{349} See supra Part II.B.4.
\textsuperscript{350} See Glazier, supra note 204, at 45-54.
\textsuperscript{352} See supra text accompanying note 111.
record. Probably the best way to know persons' judicial temperament is to know them or know of them.\textsuperscript{353} This means a convening authority could appoint people who lean towards the same ideological viewpoint. If the convening authority wanted a death sentence it would not be difficult to appoint members who are known to be proponents of the death penalty or at least strong believers in good order and discipline.\textsuperscript{354}

The federal system does not suffer from these problems. Since the pool is random, there is little chance the jury would want to convict to win the approval of the prosecutor. Randomness is so prized that an attempt to create a less random but fairer religious and racial grouping of jurors has been cause to vacate the trial and order a new one.\textsuperscript{355} The prosecutor has no ability to affect the lives or careers of the jurors before, during, or after the trial.

The biggest advantage in a twelve-member panel is the increase in the number of votes needed to sentence a person to death. Since the vote must be unanimous and is only taken once, an accused with twelve panel members has a larger pool from which to find a sparing vote than does a defendant with only five panel members. Judge Morgan wrote in his concurrence in \textit{United States v. Simoy}:

\begin{quote}
The larger the jury pool, the more likely it is to harbor the one or two dissenting votes. Remarkably, a minority viewpoint held by 10 percent of the population (such as a strong moral aversion to the death penalty, perhaps?) has only a 28.2 percent chance of going unrepresented in a 12-member jury, but more than half of 6-member juries could be expected to have no representative of that view at all.\textsuperscript{356}
\end{quote}

This chance for excluding viewpoints grows if a convening authority can impanel members known not to represent a minority view.

The way a defense is conducted in the military also does not afford enough protection to compensate for a panel of only five members. There are two relevant issues: the quality of the defense\textsuperscript{357} and the amount of protection actually afforded by an Article 32 hearing.\textsuperscript{358} The quality of the defense attorney is a common criticism of both military and civilian capital trials. There are no specific qualifications

\textsuperscript{353} Telephone Interview with Col. Adele H. Odegard, \textit{supra} note 226.
\textsuperscript{354} See Glazier, \textit{supra} note 204, at 45-54; \textit{supra} Part II.B.4.
\textsuperscript{355} United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 201-05 (2d Cir. 2002).
\textsuperscript{356} United States v. Simoy, 46 M.J 592, 627 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996). Other studies have found that the verdicts of smaller juries in criminal trials will vary to the detriment of the defendant. Ronald Jay Allen et al., \textit{Comprehensive Criminal Procedure} 1188 (2001). Other studies have shown that a large jury is more likely to hang than a small one. \textit{Id}. In the military this would mean the defendant could not be sentenced to death because the vote would not be unanimous. \textit{Uniform Code of Military Justice} art. 52. 10 U.S.C. § 827 (2000).
\textsuperscript{357} See \textit{supra} Part II.C.4.
\textsuperscript{358} See \textit{supra} Part II.C.4.
for appointment of defense counsel in military capital cases. The same guidelines apply for capital and non-capital trials.\textsuperscript{359} The federal system at least requires that one defense counsel be learned in capital litigation.\textsuperscript{360} In the military, the CAAF has expressly rejected the argument that a capital defendant is entitled to counsel who is “death-qualified.”\textsuperscript{361} Similarly, many states do not have the same guidelines as the federal system.\textsuperscript{362}

The “knowledge-gap” between capital and non-capital trials works to the detriment of a military defendant. There is one major difference between capital and non-capital courts-martial, the requirement of unanimity.\textsuperscript{363} This difference affects the way military defense attorneys conduct voir dire and presents a trap for the unwary defense counsel. In Senior Airman Simoy’s trial, defense counsel used four challenges for cause and one peremptory to reduce the panel’s size from thirteen members to eight.\textsuperscript{364} This reduced the chance Simoy had of receiving one vote against death. This difference in rules is not present in the federal system. In either system it is possible to receive an attorney inexperienced in capital trials,\textsuperscript{365} but in the military an inexperienced lawyer is faced with a trap that could lead to his client’s execution. An incompetent military lawyer has one more problem to worry about than an incompetent civilian lawyer.

An Article 32 hearing and a grand jury provide similar levels of protection. A military defendant can put on a defense during the hearing,\textsuperscript{366} but if the charges are serious enough to possibly warrant the death penalty, it seems unlikely that justice and discipline would be furthered by an early acquittal. It seems more likely that a military defense attorney would use this hearing to probe the prosecution’s case. This tactical advantage does not compensate for the tremendous disadvantage posed by a defendant not having twelve people deciding execution.

The appellate procedure may provide some safeguards and has saved several soldiers from execution, but entrusting a person’s life and the reliability of the sentence to the military’s two levels of appellate courts is dangerous. The appellate procedure does not provide a sufficient safeguard to offset a conviction and sentencing by fewer than twelve people. Before a court hears an appeal, the

\textsuperscript{359} See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 27; Simoy, 46 M.J. at 619.

\textsuperscript{360} See supra text accompanying note 222.


\textsuperscript{362} See supra notes 261-66 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{363} See supra text accompanying note 115.

\textsuperscript{364} Simoy, 46 M.J. at 625 (Morgan, J., concurring) (stating that defense counsel’s removal of four jurors almost amounted to ineffective counsel). It is unclear if Article 25a would remove this trap because the article does not state a quorum for capital trials or a maximum on the number of panel members.

\textsuperscript{365} See supra Part II.C.4.

\textsuperscript{366} See supra Part II.C.2.
convening authority, the SJA, and TJAG all examine the trial and the sentence. However, where death is imposed, it is always at the request of the convening authority. It seems unlikely the convening authority would commute a sentence that he or she asked for. The SJA is not a reliable safeguard because the office is part of the prosecution; it is impossible for it to be completely unbiased. TJAG is the only person in this chain who appears possibly neutral. TJAG's review, however, is limited only to determining whether the law supports the findings and sentence. TJAG does not examine for errors committed in the trial. The Courts of Criminal Appeal review cases presented to them by TJAG, the same office that appoints judges to their benches.

The need for twelve-member panels is specific to the issue of capital punishment because death penalty prosecutions must adhere to a higher standard of reliability than other punishments. The Supreme Court has held that "death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.... There is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." The military's prosecution of murder and rape committed in peacetime mandates an increased reliability. The capital cases previously discussed did not involve military crimes like spying or aiding the enemy, or even crimes committed during war or rebellion where good order and discipline is uniquely related. The crimes were non-military related murder, committed in peacetime. Some did not even occur on a military installation or involve a military victim. While the murders were horrible, soldiers should not receive less protection because of their occupation. It is inexcusable to make it easier to put a person to death merely because he or she is in the military. This dichotomy needs to be remedied in the military system. Indeed, the government itself conceded in Loving that civilian standards should be applied "in the context of a conviction under Article 118 for murder committed in peacetime within the United States." If the military chooses to prosecute soldiers for uniquely civilian crimes and put them to death, then it should be held to the same reliability standards as the federal system.

367. See supra Part II.D.1.
368. See supra text accompanying note 274.
369. See supra text accompanying note 274.
B. Failure To Make the Necessary Change

Drawing on historical analogy, this section argues that the NDAA fails to guarantee twelve members in capital trials because the language in Article 25a is ineffective and can be easily manipulated. Section 582 of the NDAA attempts to require twelve members in capital trials by adding article 25a to the UCMJ. To reiterate, it reads:

In a case in which the accused may be sentenced to a penalty of death, the number of members shall not be less than 12, unless 12 members are not reasonably available because of physical conditions or military exigencies, in which case the convening authority shall specify a lesser number of members not less than five, and the court may be assembled and the trial held with not less than the number of members so specified. In such a case, the convening authority shall make a detailed written statement, to be appended to the record, stating why a greater number of members were not reasonably available.374

Representative Ike Skelton, author of the amendment, noted that all civilian capital trials have twelve jurors and said, "[o]ur servicemen and women deserve no lesser standard."375 He is correct but, unfortunately, his amendment does not provide that standard. There are four problems with Article 25a, all centering on exceptions to the requirement of twelve. The first is the phrase "reasonably available," the second is the phrase "physical conditions," the third is the phrase "military exigencies," and the fourth is the requirement of a "detailed written statement."

The Articles of War, after their amendment in 1786 and before their replacement in 1950, called for convening thirteen-members panels only if it could be done "without manifest injury to the service."376 In 1827, a unanimous Supreme Court gutted this requirement. The Court held that the decision on whether thirteen-members panels could be convened without manifest injury was in the sound discretion of the convening authority and was conclusive.377 After that ruling, manifest injury was merely a guide to the convening authority but had no bite to it. When the UCMJ was written, the phrase was discarded entirely.378

The phrases "manifest injury to service" from the amendment in 1786 and "military exigencies" from the NDAA amendment have a similar ring to them. If anything, the new standard is less stringent than the old one. A "manifest injury" would require some sort of

376. American Articles of War of 1786, art 1, reprinted in Winthrop, supra note 40, app. at 972; see also Sullivan, supra note 36, at 7.
damage whereas, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, an exigency is merely a “[d]emand, want [,or] need.”379 The other phrases from Article 25a, “reasonably available” and “physical condition,” are so vague as to make one wonder if this could include the entire spectrum of complicating circumstances from unique wartime demands to a panel member having his car stolen and being unable to get to court. The Supreme Court decision in 1827 would probably not bind the Supreme Court because the UCMJ has replaced those Articles of War. The new exceptions, though, are not stringent and so vaguely worded that considering courts traditional deference to military authority, a convening authority would have great leeway in selecting the panel, leeway that could render the amendment almost completely ineffectual. The final sentence of Article 25a, requiring a written statement from the convening authority, also provides no guarantee because there is no body appointed to review this statement nor any standards to conduct such a review.

Even if all the linguistic loopholes previously mentioned were interpreted so narrowly as to render them moot, there still exists the possibility that after peremptory and causal challenges a panel of less than twelve members could remain. As the law currently stands, new members can only be added to the panel after assembly if the number drops below the quorum during voir dire, currently five.380 The new article does not make it clear if the quorum in capital cases is twelve. Since twelve only need be impaneled if physical conditions and military exigencies permit and five is the absolute minimum number, it seems that five is still the quorum. This throws into question the practicality of the amendment. What happens if fourteen members are impaneled and five are removed through challenges, leaving only nine? Does the trial proceed with only nine panel members but the penalty can no longer be death? Or is the rule restricting appointing new panel members a military exigency and the trial goes forward as capital but with only nine jurors? If the second scenario is true then the accused is no better off than before the amendment was passed. The deck still remains stacked in the prosecution’s favor. The amendment is a laudable attempt to secure a basic civil right for soldiers faced with possibility of death, a right that is extended to every single civilian. But the loopholes, and the failure to define a quorum, prevent the amendment from doing what it should.

380. MCM, supra note 16, Rules for Court-Martial 505(c)(2)(B).
C. Fixing Article 25a

1. How Article 25a Should be Fixed

This section evaluates which of the three branches of government is best suited to remedy the military panel problem. Ultimately, this section concludes it is necessary for Congress to amend Article 25a to ensure defendants in military, capital trials for civilian crimes receive the same protection as civilians. The next section suggests an addition to Article 25a that would protect the accused in capital trials while also maintaining the effectiveness of the military.

The Supreme Court cannot be relied upon to fix the defect for two reasons. First, the new article will only cover offenses committed after December 31, 2002. This means it could be ten years before the Supreme Court rules on the amendment. Second, the Court is unlikely to interpret the amendment narrowly. In the last twenty years the Court has repeatedly refused to apply civilian protections to the military. The executive branch is also unlikely to offer any help. President Bush could remedy the problem by refusing to approve any executions until there is a solution. Given his track record in Texas, this seems unlikely. The President could change the rules for replacing panel members before quorum is reached. This would be similar to former President Reagan’s creation of aggravating factors, but this would only solve part of the problem. It would not close the loopholes that Congress has left open.

The job of closing the loopholes lies with Congress. Only a congressional amendment to Article 25a would be effective. The amended article should require all capital trials for murder under Article 118 and rape under Article 120(a) have twelve-member panels. If for any reason a twelve-member panel cannot be summoned, then the accused should be turned over to the civilian authorities for trial. If the crime is committed overseas, the accused

381. The Supreme Court overruled a lower court’s ruling that articles 133 and 134 of the UCMJ were overbroad. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758-59 (1974). Punitive Article 133 makes “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” a crime and Article 134 allows for prosecution of any offense that is detrimental to “good order and discipline.” Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 133-34. The trend against civil liberties continued in Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1970). The Court held that the constitutional right to counsel does not extend to a summary court-martial. Id. at 42. In Chappell v. Wallace, the Court held that:
The need for special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice, is too obvious to require extensive discussion; no military organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting.


382. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
should be transferred to another military installation capable of handling the trial. The decision to turn over soldiers to civilian authorities or to move them to another installation should not be in the hands of the convening authority, but should be made by the Secretary of Defense. This would ensure that under no circumstances would an accused face the death penalty without twelve people sitting in unanimous judgment. Additionally, Article 25a should be rewritten to set the quorum at twelve. If any members were removed during voir dire, new members could be assigned as needed, even after assembly. Only legislation that mandates twelve-member panels and gives no exception can ensure our country’s service members are afforded the same freedoms and protections they risk their lives to defend.

2. Proposed Additional Language of Article 25a

I propose the following additional language be added to Article 25a:

In a case in which the accused may be sentenced to a penalty of death and is charged with a violation of Article 118, Murder, and/or Article 120(a), Rape, the number of panel members shall not be less than 12. If 12 members cannot be assembled because of physical conditions or military exigencies, the defendant will be handed over for trial to the civilian jurisdiction where the crime occurred. If the offense is committed outside the jurisdiction of a United States court, the accused will be removed to another military installation that will impanel twelve panel members. The decision for removal to either a federal court or another military installation shall be made by the Secretary of Defense upon a showing of physical conditions or military exigencies.

This language would guarantee twelve people judge all service members in capital trials for civilian crimes. The proposed amendment would also clearly state that the quorum for these capital cases is twelve. New panel members could be added after assembly if less than twelve remained after voir dire.

CONCLUSION

Military service members deserve the right to be judged by twelve people in capital trials for civilian crimes. The historical precedents of generally denying soldiers civilian protections and specifically denying the right to a twelve-member trial are no longer applicable. The creation of a system where a person can be sentenced to die by five people for committing what is essentially a civilian crime demands a heightened guarantee of reliability and fairness. The military system, particularly in the way a panel is impaneled and in the way a defense is conducted, does not create this guarantee. The discrepancy
between federal capital trials and military capital trials needs to be remedied.

Article 25a makes a laudable attempt to solve the problem but ultimately fails. It contains too many loopholes and ineffective language to secure soldiers the right to twelve-member panels. Congress should pass an amendment that removes the loopholes and makes the language more effective. This is the only way soldiers can get what they deserve—the same chance as their civilian counterparts to defend themselves and avoid execution.