Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle

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INTRODUCTION

The thrift industry\(^1\) was designed to help people in local communities afford their own homes.\(^2\) To accomplish this goal, thrifts accepted savings from individuals and in turn made low-rate mortgage loans to local citizens.\(^3\)

Thrift asset portfolios have been traditionally restricted in their composition to long-term, fixed-rate mortgages that were financed by short-term deposits.\(^4\) After the Great Depression, the industry prospered under this regulatory framework, functioning best when interest rates were stable.\(^5\) Thrifts profited from the spread between the rate they paid to depositors and the rate they charged on mortgage loans.\(^6\) Since the late 1960s, however, the thrift industry has steadily deteriorated. The inability of thrifts to diversify their portfolios left them vulnerable to the “maturity gap” risk inherent in funding long-term mortgage loans with short-term customer deposits. For many years, Congress, the executive branch\(^7\) and the industry itself\(^8\) minimized or ignored the industry’s de-

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1. The term “thrift” includes savings-and-loan associations, credit unions and savings banks. See M. Stich, How to Profit from the Savings and Loan Crisis 230 (1989). All three accept funds primarily from individual depositors and then lend them to the public as home mortgages. See id. For the purposes of this Note, “thrift” will be used interchangeably with “savings and loan”.


Originally, thrifts were only authorized to extend mortgages on property located within a fifty-mile radius of the home office. See House Report, supra note 2, at 293, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 89. By 1983, most geographical restrictions were lifted and most thrifts were permitted to lend nationwide. See id.


6. See Clark, et. al., Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. Law. 1013, 1019 (May 1990) [hereinafter Regulation of Savings Associations]. In fact, it was so easy for thrifts to make a profit that some argue that the industry previously ran by a 3-6-3 rule: pay depositors three percent interest, charge borrowers six percent interest, and tee off on the golf course by three in the afternoon. See Rudolph, Finally the Bill has Come Due, Time, Feb. 20, 1989, at 73.


cline. As a result, by the late 1980s the industry was in a dire financial condition.

This Note examines the causes of the thrift industry's demise. Part I examines the industry from 1966 to 1980. Part II analyzes the restructuring of the thrift industry throughout the 1980s, including the effects of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 and the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. This Note concludes that the thrift crisis was caused by inherent structural problems within the industry, congressional carelessness and regulatory lapses.

I. THE INDUSTRY BACKGROUND FROM 1966 TO 1980

A. Interest Rate Regulation

Because of rising interest rates throughout the mid-1960s, thrifts were faced with an earnings decline. Since thrifts' investments were restricted to fixed-rate, long-term mortgages, the industry's income level remained stable, but its expenses—the interest paid on deposits—fluctuated to reflect market rates. In 1966, in an effort to insulate the thrift industry from interest rate fluctuations, Congress extended to thrifts the interest rate ceilings embodied in Regulation Q. Regulation Q “specifically refers to the interest-rate regulations of the Federal Reserve” and had previously applied only to commercial banks.

The interest rate ceiling imposed on thrifts under Regulation Q was set higher than the ceiling imposed on commercial banks. Depositors were

10. See White II, supra note 9, at 17-20.
11. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1019.
14. See L. Ritter & W. Silber, Principles of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets 89 (5th ed. 1985). Commercial banks were originally subjected to Regulation Q in response to the banking system collapse of 1933. See id. Legislators reasoned that the high interest expense associated with excessive interest rate competition in attracting deposits during the 1920s negatively affected the banking industry. See id. To compensate for this higher expense, banks invested in high yielding, risky ventures that weakened the overall banking system. See id. Regulation Q was thus enacted to prevent similar competition in the future. See Financial Market Deregulation, Am. Banker, Mar. 13, 1984, at 8.
15. See A. Carron, The Plight of the Thrift Institutions 5 (1982). In 1970, the differential was 0.50%, but in 1973 it was cut to 0.25%. See G. Krefetz, All About Saving 21 (1987). Indeed, in 1981 commercial banks could pay 5.25%, while savings-and-loans were allowed to pay 5.50% interest on deposits. See Scharff, The Savings Revolution, Time, June 8, 1981, at 60.

Prior to 1966 the interest rate limit on commercial banks' deposits rose with the market rate of interest, and thus commercial banks were able to remain very competitive with thrifts. See A. Carron, supra, at 5. Indeed, thrifts were forced to offer rates in excess of
therefore encouraged to invest in thrifts rather than commercial banks in hopes of ensuring a steady flow of funds for mortgage lending. In fact, depositors had few investment alternatives other than the thrift industry as unregulated investment vehicles, such as money market accounts, were unavailable until the early 1970s.

B. The Economic Environment

Inflation during the 1970s factored into the thrift industry's demise. In 1970, the consumer price index ("CPI"), the primary measure of inflation, rose to 5.9% due to increased domestic spending, coupled with a near capacity economy. The Nixon Administration instituted wage and price controls as a combatant measure, but they were eventu-
ally removed. By 1974 the CPI reached twelve percent.\(^\text{25}\) After falling to 5.8% in 1976, the CPI increased steadily each year until 1980.\(^\text{26}\)

In 1979, in an effort to combat inflation, the Federal Reserve restricted the money supply, sending interest rates, a reflection of the cost of funds, soaring.\(^\text{27}\) Although there have been four periods of high and volatile interest rates since the mid-1960s,\(^\text{28}\) none has had more impact on the thrift industry than the 1979 to 1980 period.

**C. Disintermediation**

Thrifts and other depository institutions, like investment banks and insurance companies, are “financial intermediaries,” entities that receive financial assets (like deposits) and invest them in firms in need of funds (like borrowers). During periods of high market interest rates thrifts experienced “disintermediation,” a phenomenon whereby market interest rates rise above government imposed rate ceilings,\(^\text{29}\) causing depositors to withdraw funds and invest them in instruments that provide a higher return.\(^\text{30}\) The outflow of deposits from thrifts severely limited the amount of funds available to make loans\(^\text{31}\) and to meet expenses.\(^\text{32}\) After witnessing three periods of disintermediation from the mid-1960s to mid-

\(\text{25. See id., at 34; L. Lindberg & C. Maier, supra note 22, at 33. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") induced an energy crisis in 1973 and 1974 that also contributed to the 1974 CPI surge. See F. Balderston, supra note 23, at 5; Willax, Pundits Ignore the Real Villain in S&L Crisis: Inflation, Am. Banker, Mar. 9, 1989, at 4.}\)

\(\text{26. See G. Wilson, supra note 21, at 33. The United States experienced successive years of double-digit inflation in 1979 and 1980 when the inflation rate reached 13.3\% and 12.4\%, respectively. See L. Ritter & W. Silber, supra note 14, at 168.}\)


\(\text{29. For a discussion of Regulation Q's interest-rate ceilings, see supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.}\)


\(\text{31. See Budget Hearings, supra note 5, at 203 (statement of Richard Pratt, former Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board); Benston, supra note 16, at 216.}\)

\(\text{32. See Consumer Financial Services Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 8891 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Fernand J. St Germain, Chairman, Subcommittee); cf. Task Force Report, supra note 28, at 4-7 ("advances have played a crucial role in satisfying short-term liquidity needs").}\)
1970s, in 1978, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB"), then the thrift regulatory body, authorized thrifts to offer money market savings certificates that were tied to current market interest rates. This device required a six-month minimum deposit and a ten thousand dollar minimum balance which many small savers could not afford. It therefore had limited success in stemming the outflow of funds from thrifts.

II. THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE THRIFT INDUSTRY

A. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980

In an attempt to restructure the thrift industry, Congress enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 ("DIDMCA"). Among other things, DIDMCA attempted a limited economic deregulation of the thrift industry. It authorized thrifts to place up to twenty percent of their assets in short-term, market-rate investments, thereby increasing both industry-wide liquidity and earn-

33. See Hearings, supra note 32, at 78 (statement of Fernand J. St Germain, Chairman, Subcommittee). During these early periods of disintermediation, thrifts had a choice of two unappealing options to meet their liquidity needs: either borrow expensively in the open market or sell assets. See Task Force Report, supra note 28, at 3-4. Selling thrift assets (long-term mortgages) in periods of rising interest rates generally resulted in losses, however. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.

34. The FHLBB is the independent agency of the federal government's executive branch responsible for chartering federal savings-and-loans and regulating all associations insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"). See M. Stich, supra note 1, at 210.


36. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 9. In early 1980, the FHLBB also authorized thrifts to offer 30-month small-saver certificates on terms similar to the six-month certificate. See id.


38. In 1979, 20% of the total balances in all thrift accounts were composed of money-market savings certificates, see R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 40, and rose to 36% in 1980. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 45. Paying market interest rates on these balances, however, severely strained thrift industry earnings. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.

39. See Seiders, supra note 37, at 463. In 1978, thrifts were allowed to offer their money market at an interest rate that was .25% higher than commercial banks, which were offering a comparable account. See Moran, Thrift Institutions in Recent Years, 68 Fed. Reserve Bull. 725, 729 (1982). In March 1979, however, "this differential was made effective only at lower levels of interest rates, and deposit growth at savings and loans . . . weakened considerably relative to that at commercial banks." Id.


41. These investments include such things as consumer loans, commercial paper and corporate debt securities. See id. § 401(e)(2), 94 Stat. at 153 (codified at various sections of 12 U.S.C.).

42. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 66.
ings potential. Additionally, it authorized thrifts to offer Negotiable Order of Withdrawal checking accounts (“NOW”), trust services and credit cards. Legislators reasoned that depositors would be more willing to accept lower deposit rates in exchange for “one stop” banking convenience. These measures gave thrifts increased flexibility in generating revenue.

DIDMCA also increased the level of federal deposit insurance coverage from $40,000 to $100,000. This increase in the level of deposit insurance effectively guaranteed the liabilities of insolvent thrifts. It enabled thrift management to gamble with depositor’s funds, confident that the government would bear any losses. Increased deposit insurance muted depositor motivation to investigate the solvency of thrift institutions. Before deposit insurance, thrifts were self-regulated; if depositors felt that an institution had become too risky, they would withdraw their funds. The advent of federal deposit insurance, however, removed this self-limiting feature.

Commentators have argued that the increased risk to taxpayers associated with federal deposit insurance should have been mitigated by increased regulatory supervision. In stead, however, the premium thrifts paid to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) for deposit insurance was set

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43. See DIDMCA, supra note 40, § 303, 94 Stat. at 146 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1988)).
46. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 66.
48. See DIDMCA, supra note 40, § 308(a)-(c), 94 Stat. at 147-48 (codified as amended at various sections of 12 U.S.C.). The $60,000 increase in deposit insurance has caused a significant amount of controversy. See History of a Blank Check, Wall St. J., May 24, 1990, at A14, col. 1; White II, supra note 9, at 10; Who is to Blame for the S & L Crisis?, Fortune Mar. 13, 1989, at 152; cf. St&L Crisis Hearing, supra note 27, at 15 (statement of Donald Regan, former Secretary of the Treasury) (deposit insurance increase was made in the “dead of night”). The increase was made with little debate, no congressional hearings, see Inside Job, supra note 3, at 11, and over the objections of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). See Isaac, supra note 22 at 4.
49. See e.g. R. Kormendi, V. Bernard, S. Pirrong & E. Snyder, Crisis Resolution in the Thrift Industry 13-14 (1989) [hereinafter Crisis Resolution] (comparing deposit insurance to a put option, requiring the “government to pay out assistance if the asset base of a savings and loan falls below a certain level”).
50. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 80.
52. Cf. id. (“The decision to provide deposit insurance set a higher priority of giving small depositors confidence than on exposing thrifts to depositor scrutiny.”).
53. See Financial Market Deregulation, supra note 14, at 12; cf. P. Rose, supra note 47, at 366 (deposit insurance “has reduced the effectiveness of the self-regulating powers of the market”). Holders of insured accounts had little or no reason to be concerned with the quality of the institution or to demand an increased return commensurate with an increased risk. See Scott, supra note 7, at 1886.
54. See infra notes 148-159 and accompanying text.
55. For a complete discussion of the origins of FSLIC insurance, see Note, Too Many
by statute and "was the same rate for all insured institutions, regardless of the riskiness of their assets, the size of their equity capital, or the capability of their management."56 Furthermore, federal deposit insurance was available to state-chartered institutions,57 even though such institutions were not adequately regulated by the federal government.58

Finally, because Congress believed that Regulation Q failed to curb disintermediation,59 DIDMCA established the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee ("DIDC")60 to phase out the artificial interest rate constraints of Regulation Q.61 Congress believed that Regulation Q impeded the thrift industry's ability to compete with uninsured investment vehicles for deposits,62 and therefore failed to provide a steady flow of funds for mortgage lending. Regulation Q also tended to discriminate against small depositors because they could not afford the minimum balance requirement of the thrift money market, nor did they have access to higher yielding uninsured money market mutual funds.63 Small savers,


56. Scott, supra note 7, at 1886; see also Crisis Resolution, supra note 49, at 13 ("a key fault with the insurance system is that FSLIC charged all savings and loans (regardless of their riskiness) a flat premium calculated as a percent of all deposits").

57. For a discussion of the availability of federal deposit insurance to state-chartered thrifts see Note, supra note 55, at S282.

58. See Solving the FSLIC Crisis, Panel Meeting at the 1989 Washington Seminar, May 15, 1989, at 8 [hereinafter Panel Meeting] (testimony of Sen. Donald Riegle, Chairman, Senate Banking Committee) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file); National Press Foundation Forum on the Savings and Loan Crisis "Where Was Congress?", Apr. 24, 1989, at 6 [hereinafter Forum] (statement of Rep. Jim Leach) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file); See also S&L Crisis Hearing, supra note 27, at 30 (testimony of Richard Pratt, former Chairman, FHLBB) (federal insurer should have been able to control the risks it was insuring).


60. See DIDMCA, supra note 40, § 203(a), 94 Stat. at 142 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3502 (1988)).

61. See id. § 204(a), 94 Stat. at 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3502 (1988)). DIDMCA mandated that the DIDC phase out and ultimately eliminate the interest rate ceilings, which "may be paid on deposits and accounts as rapidly as economic conditions warrant." Id. Such phase-out and elimination were to occur within six years of DIDMCA's enactment. See id. § 205(a), 94 Stat. at 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1988)).

Congress ignored previous calls for the removal of interest rate ceilings and the expansion of thrift asset powers. After the thrift industry's first bout with disintermediation in the late 1960s, Congress authorized a study of the industry by the FHLBB. See S&Ls—Don't Blame Deregulation, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1989, at D7 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Wpost file). The FHLBB recommended the removal of interest rate ceilings and expanded asset powers, but Congress failed to act. See id. In 1971, similar recommendations were made by the President's Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation (Hunt Commission), but again Congress ignored the recommendations. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 8; see also A. Gart, supra note 35, at 12-13 (discussing recommendations of Hunt Commission and their incorporation into DIDMCA).


63. See Financial Market Deregulation, supra note 14, at 8.
therefore, were prevented from obtaining a market rate.64

B. State of the Industry: 1980 to 1982
1. Severe Disintermediation

Although DIDMCA authorized the newly formed DIDC to phase out interest rate ceilings, Congress failed to provide the DIDC with specific guidance in this regard. As a result, artificial interest rate ceilings remained in place and disintermediation remained prevalent during 1980 and 1981.67 In 1981, total deposit outflows from thrifts exceeded deposit inflows by $25.5 billion. Regulation Q further failed to protect thrifts from increased competition from Wall Street investment houses, which offered investment devices, such as money market funds, that were not subject to artificial rate ceilings. Consequently, in both 1981 and 1982 Federal Home Loan Banks were required to make loans to thrifts to

64. See id.
65. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
66. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 56. Even the legislation itself was subject to varying interpretations: "Savings and loan associations viewed this new legislation as a six-year extension of Regulation Q and the housing differential. . . . On the other hand, commercial banks saw it as attaining their long sought goal to end the housing differential." Id. (quoting Depository Institutions Deregulation Comm.: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1980)) (statement of Edwin J. Brooks, Jr., president, U.S. League of Savings Associations) (alterations in original).
68. See Budget Hearings, supra note 5, at 203 (statement of Richard Pratt, former Chairman, FHLBB). For seven consecutive quarters beginning in January 1981, savings-and-loans had total net outflows of $45.7 billion. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 71.
70. See Hearings, supra note 32, at 77-78 (statement of Fernand J. St Germain, Chairman, Subcommittee). Money market funds are liquid and offer high rates. See LaFalce, Banking in the Eighties, 37 Bus. Law. 839, 844 (1982). Although such funds are not federally insured, they have been perceived as safe due to their composition of short-term corporate and government securities. See G. Krefetz, supra note 15, at 57; Scharff, supra note 15, at 60.
71. Congress established the Federal Home Loan Bank System in 1932 to afford home financing institutions a central credit facility, as well as to serve as a secondary liquidity source to its members during heavy withdrawal periods. See Savings Institution Sourcebook 15 (1984). All FSLIC-insured savings institutions were required to join the Federal Home Loan Bank System. See id. Most thrifts were thus members of the system and eligible to receive loans; total outstanding loans to thrifts grew from $6 billion in 1966 to over $40 billion by January 1980. See Task Force Report, supra note 28, at 4. Such loans were tied to money market rates. See F. Balderston, supra note 23, at 55.
avert an industry-wide liquidity crisis.\textsuperscript{72}

2. Interest Rate Mismatch

As market interest rates rose throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, the spread between rates paid to depositors and rates charged on long-term mortgage commitments narrowed.\textsuperscript{73} By the second half of 1981, the industry's average cost of funds (deposits and borrowings) was 11.5%, while the average asset portfolio yield was only ten percent.\textsuperscript{74} As a result, more than eighty percent of FSLIC-insured associations sustained a net loss in 1981.\textsuperscript{75}

To prevent such losses in the future, the DIDMCA preempted state usury laws that restricted interest rates chargeable on loans and mortgages.\textsuperscript{76} In April 1981, the FHLBB adopted regulations allowing federal thrifts to issue Adjustable Rate Mortgages ("ARM").\textsuperscript{77} Because ARM yields adjust to reflect market interest rates,\textsuperscript{78} regulators hoped thrifts would be able to match revenues with expenses.\textsuperscript{79} This move, however,
"was long overdue." Because of disintermediation and heavy industry losses, thrifts lacked the funds to dedicate to ARMs. In addition, the maturity gap between short-term deposits and long-term loans exacerbated the problem. Furthermore, borrower reluctance to pre-pay low rate mortgages during periods of rising interest rates made it increasingly difficult for thrifts to turn such mortgages into higher yielding assets, such as ARMs.

At this time, thrifts considered selling older fixed-rate mortgages in the secondary market to increase liquidity. Higher interest rates, however, generally diminished the market value of thrifts' low-yielding mortgages, making thrifts hesitant to engage in such sales. Further, the loss incurred by selling these loans could have diminished thrifts' already weakened capital ratios below minimum regulatory standards, thereby increasing the likelihood of regulatory intervention.

3. Regulatory Lapse and a Policy of Forbearance

In the early 1980s, industry-wide net worth plummeted due to the unfavorable interest rate spread. Because the FSLIC lacked sufficient

80. See White II, supra note 9, at 10.
81. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 33; Willax, supra note 25, at 4. Such inability resulted from the high interest rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which decreased the number of early mortgage prepayments. See Moran, supra note 39, at 728. "Periods of high interest rates slow portfolio turnover further, as people defer home construction and purchases until rates decline. The rate of return on the portfolio increases only slowly under such conditions." Savings Institutions Sourcebook, supra note 71, at 15. In 1977, for example, mortgage turnover was approximately 14%, but after the interest rate increase from 1979 to 1982, turnover fell to approximately seven percent. See Rescue, supra note 67, at 4.
82. See Farnsworth, U.S. Aid for Thrift Units Poses Questions of Need, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1981, at D6, col. 1. The decrease in asset value was due to the below market return they were receiving on their long-term mortgages. See Regulations of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1019; Farnsworth, supra, at D6, col. 1. Because thrift liabilities remained either unchanged or increased, such liabilities became increasingly difficult to meet with assets generating below market returns. See Benston, supra note 16, at 24. Depository institutions are not required to mark to market their loan portfolios, but rather are permitted to value their loans at historical cost. See G. Kaufman & R. Kormendi, Deregulating Financial Services 132 (1986). Thus the book value of such loans was higher than the corresponding market values. Indeed, "take a fully-amortizing 25-year mortgage made at the end of 1975 at an interest rate of 9%, the average then prevailing. Putting shifts in prepayment possibilities or in the borrower's credit risk, that loan would, in the 15%-world of late-1980, be subject to a market discount of about 32%." See Scott, supra note 7, at 1887 n.21.
83. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 43.
84. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
85. See A. Gart, supra note 35, at 86-87.
86. Net worth (or capital) is the dollar value of a thrift's total assets less total liabilities. See M. Stich, supra note 1, at 221.
87. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 94. A thrift's solvency was primarily determined by the ratio of its net worth to its total assets. See Moran, supra note 39, at 731. When the net-worth ratio fell below FHLBB established levels, see infra note 90, for a certain time period, regulatory agencies were supposed to intervene. This regulatory intervention could have included
funds to close insolvent thrifts and pay insured depositors, the FHLBB instituted a policy of forbearance hoping that interest rates would decrease and return thrifts to profitability. This policy of forbearance enabled thrifts to "technically avoid insolvency" while actually remaining insolvent.

Consistent with this policy, the FHLBB initiated a reduction in capital standards, lowering the required amount of ownership capital at risk, while enabling thrifts to lend or invest at increasingly high levels. The depositors and the federal government would have borne any losses beyond thrift owners' initial capital investment. Decreased capital requirements "enabled institutions to undertake explosive asset and liability growth without increasing the institution's capital base."

anything from forced mergers with financially sound institutions to possible liquidation. See Moran, supra note 39, at 731.

88. See Findings of Booz Allen & Hamilton Study of FHLBB: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight and Investigations of the House of Representatives Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1987). One commentator estimates that industry net worth in 1980 was negative $17.5 billion, based on the market value of assets and liabilities. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 44. The FSLIC, however, only had reserves of $6.5 billion. See id.


90. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. The minimum capital requirement was reduced from five percent to four percent in 1980 and then to three percent in 1982. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 94. Lower capital standards decreased the total investment that thrift owners were required to maintain as a buffer against losses. See G. Kaufman & R. Kormendi, supra note 82, at 134; White II, supra note 9. Capital serves other useful functions as well, such as "enhancing the safety of depositor funds, helping maintain public confidence in the financial system, and supporting the expansion of banks and thrifts." See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 94.

Minimum capital requirements, as well as investment and liability restrictions, are examples of safety and soundness regulations. See White II, supra note 9, at 3-4. These regulations were designed to protect depositors and the deposit-insurance fund from losses. See id. at 4. The liberal availability of deposit insurance increased the importance of safety and soundness regulation. See id. at 3. Conversely, economic regulations, such as interest-rate regulation and branch-location restrictions, were designed to shield thrifts from competition, as well as to ensure low-cost financing for home buyers. See id.

91. See White II, supra note 9, at 5-7; Nash, Who to Thank for the Thrift Crisis, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1988, § 3, at 14, col. 2. Because of the concept of limited personal liability, thrift owners' losses were limited to their initial capital investment. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 76; White I, supra note 9, at S58.

92. "Uninsured depositors are not a significant number. There are [approximately] one or two percent of the deposits in an insolvent savings and loan that are above one hundred thousand dollars." See White I, supra note 9, at S61.

93. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 76.

94. See Long, Shilling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 409. Many thrift owners believed that rapid growth was the easiest manner in which to generate new capital and regain profitability. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298-99, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 94-95. A five percent capital level meant, for example, that thrift owners had to maintain a $1 safety cushion for every $20 of loans; but by lowering the standard to three percent, institutions could lend $33 with the same $1 cushion. See Nash, supra note 91, § 3, at 14, col. 2.
The FHLBB also made it easier for thrifts to meet these reduced capital standards through creative accounting techniques. The FHLBB granted thrifts the option of following either Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") or Regulatory Accounting Principles ("RAP") for the purposes of financial statement preparation. Reporting under RAP often produced a more favorable thrift net worth than under GAAP without producing any real economic difference. The application of RAP understated the number of thrifts considered insolvent for regulatory purposes. RAP, for example, allowed thrifts to amortize losses on the sale of assets over the remaining life of the asset instead of recognizing the entire loss in the period of the sale, as required under GAAP. Moreover, thrifts exploited the weaknesses of both RAP and GAAP standards to present an illusion of financial strength that did not exist. GAAP generally required thrifts to value assets, liabilities and

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95. See A. Gart, supra note 35, at 99. While the FHLBB was responsible for determining RAP, the Financial Accounting Standards Board primarily promulgates GAAP. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 36-39. The differences between RAP and GAAP are so significant that commentators argue that such differences played a major role in the thrift crisis. See House Report supra note 2, at 297, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong & Admin. News at 93; R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 39; Breeden, Thumbs on the Scale: The Role that Accounting Practices Played in the Savings and Loan Crisis, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S57 (1991). RAP was generally more liberal than GAAP with respect to income recognition. See A. Gart, supra note 35, at 99. Some argue that allowing more liberal accounting procedures further debilitated an accounting system ("GAAP") that already allowed thrifts to overstate their financial positions. See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 71-72; see also White I, supra note 9, at S60 (advocating change to market-value accounting system).

96. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 94. RAP accomplished this by boosting reported net worth through balance sheet adjustments above what it would have been otherwise. See Moran, supra note 39, at 731. Such adjustments, however, did little to decrease thrift losses or to permit them to absorb losses in any real way. See id. RAP therefore "represent[ed] 'solutions' in an accounting sense rather than in basic economic terms." Id.

97. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 44; cf. Isaac, supra note 22, at 4 (insolvent thrifts were allowed to continue operation due to regulatory accounting techniques). By 1984, thrift industry net worth computed under RAP was nine billion dollars higher than that computed under GAAP. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 94; R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 44. In other words, thrift industry capital, its buffer against loss, was overstated by nine billion dollars. See House Report, supra note 2, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 94. The difference grew to $13.3 billion by 1986 and $14.9 billion by 1988. See id.

98. See G. Kaufman & R. Kormendi, supra note 82, at 132; Moran, supra note 39, at 733.

99. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 43-44. The principle reason this provision was adopted was to encourage thrifts to restructure their asset portfolios by selling older fixed-rate mortgages and acquiring higher yielding assets, such as adjustable-rate mortgages. See id.; Long, Schilling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 428. Deferred losses grew from six million dollars in 1980, see Cope, Did Pratt's Piloting Sink S&L Industry?, Am. Banker, Oct. 1, 1990, at 14, to six billion dollars in 1984. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 44.
off-balance sheet items at historical cost, not at current market value.\textsuperscript{100} RAP, conversely, permitted thrifts to include in their net worth calculation appraised equity capital,\textsuperscript{101} which represented the unrealized appreciation of thrift assets.\textsuperscript{102} As a result, thrifts were permitted to include a favorable increase in asset value in their net worth calculation without recognizing the unfavorable unrealized depreciation of other assets, such as long-term mortgages.\textsuperscript{103}

In 1982, Congress enabled thrifts to further bolster their increasingly endangered net worth through the issuance of net worth certificates,\textsuperscript{104} capital instruments that were added to thrift net worth as a means of "providing additional time for the regulatory agencies to arrange the further consolidation of the industry."\textsuperscript{105} The FSLIC sold these certificates to financially troubled thrifts in exchange for promissory notes and a portion of the institution's future profits.\textsuperscript{106} Although net worth certificates

\textsuperscript{100.} See White I, supra note 9, at S60; cf. N. Eichler, \textit{supra} note 22, at 71 (GAAP does not require adjustment to market value). GAAP thus allowed thrifts to mask their financial woes, particularly in the late 1970s when the market value of thrift long-term mortgages plunged. See \textit{supra} notes 82-85 and accompanying text. Thrifts were not required under GAAP to recognize any losses or to include unrealized depreciation in their net worth calculation for regulatory purposes. See White II, \textit{supra} note 9, at 7. By 1982, most thrifts had a negative net worth when assets were valued at market. See Scott, \textit{supra} note 7, at 1887. One commentator estimates that by mid-1981, thrift assets at book value were overstated by $86.5 billion. See A. Carron, \textit{supra} note 15, at 83.


\textsuperscript{102.} Appraised equity capital is the difference between the market value of property like land and buildings and the book value. See Moran, \textit{supra} note 39, at 732. Appraised equity capital did not appear on thrift balance sheets, nor was it reported in the net worth figure in thrift financial statements. See \textit{id.} at 733. Instead, it was used by the regulatory agencies in reviewing thrift's overall financial health. See \textit{id.}

\textsuperscript{103.} See \textit{supra} notes 82-85 and accompanying text. Appraised equity capital could only be included in a thrift's regulatory net worth calculation once; on December 31, 1985, the permission to use this accounting procedure expired. See Moran, \textit{supra} note 39, at 733.


\textsuperscript{104.} See \textit{infra} note 106. The net worth program was designed to aid thrifts whose poor financial condition was due primarily to mortgage lending activities. See Long, Shilling & Van Cleef, \textit{supra} note 4, at 403-04.

\textsuperscript{105.} See Rescue, \textit{supra} note 67, at 16.

\textsuperscript{106.} See Long, Shilling & Van Cleef, \textit{supra} note 4, at 404. This exchange increased thrift net worth without a cash infusion by the FSLIC, thereby "cushion[ing] the impact on the insurance funds." See Rescue, \textit{supra} note 67, at 15. The three primary qualifications that a thrift had to meet to be eligible to receive capital certificates were losses in the previous two quarters, a net worth less than or equal to three percent and investments in residential mortgages aggregating at least 20% of its loans. See Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 202B, 96 Stat. 1469, 1490 (1982) [hereinafter Garn-St Germain] (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988)).

Congressional members linked the net worth certificate program to the grant of additional and more flexible investment powers to the thrift industry under Garn-St Germain. See Long, Shilling & Van Cleef, \textit{supra} note 4, at 403 n. 125. "To offer a net worth guarantee program to the thrift institutions without simultaneously allowing them
increased the thrifts’ net worth, they had little positive effect on earnings.

C. The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982

In passing the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 ("Garn-St Germain"), Congress again attempted to restructure the thrift industry. Congress' intent was to ensure a high degree of future home mortgage lending through strengthened financial institutions and a revitalized housing industry. First, and most importantly, it enabled thrifts to further diversify their asset portfolios. Second, Garn-St Germain created an account that was competitive and comparable to money market mutual funds. Third, it conferred new powers to the FHLLB to deal with financially troubled thrifts. Fourth, Garn-St Germain created a program to aid financially troubled thrifts. Finally, it removed the interest rate differential between thrifts and commercial

broader lending power is to tie our guarantee power to a set of institutions which will not be able to earn their way out of their current problems." Id. at 403-04 n.125 (quoting 128 Cong. Rec. 27,349 (1982) (statement of Rep. Frank)).

107. Net worth certificates were considered capital even under GAAP. See Long, Shilling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 403 n.125.

108. See Rescue, supra note 67, at 24.


110. See id. at preamble.

111. Garn-St Germain facilitated asset diversification in six ways. First, Garn-St Germain authorized thrifts to invest up to 40% of total assets in loans for nonresidential real property. See Garn-St Germain, supra note 106, § 322, 96 Stat. at 1499 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(B) (1988)). Second, it allowed thrifts to invest in other thrifts' time deposits or savings accounts provided that the accounts were insured by the federal government. See id. § 323, 96 Stat. at 1499-500 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(G) (1988)). Third, Garn-St Germain allowed thrifts to invest all their assets in local or state government obligations. See id. § 324, 96 Stat. at 1500 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(H) (1988)). Fourth, it authorized thrifts to invest up to 10% of total assets in commercial, corporate, business or agricultural loans. See id. § 325, 96 Stat. at 1500 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(R) (1988)). Fifth, Garn-St Germain allowed thrifts to invest up to 30% of total assets in consumer loans. See id. § 329, 96 Stat. at 1502 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(B) (1988)). Finally, it authorized thrifts to invest up to 10% of total assets in tangible personal property. See id. § 330, 96 Stat. at 1502 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(e) (1988)).

112. See Garn-St Germain, supra note 106, § 327, 96 Stat. at 1501 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)-(3) (1988)). The account was insured by the federal government, was liquid and paid a market rate. See Banks Prepare for New Market-Rate Deposit Account, Banking J., at 35, (Nov. 1982). Individuals were therefore able to obtain benefits comparable to those of institutional investors. See infra notes 125-127 and accompanying text. In December 1982 alone, this new account attracted $43 billion in funds, see Rescue, supra note 67, at 18, and helped to stem the massive disintermediation that thrifts experienced in the 1980 to 1982 period. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.


D. State of the Industry: 1982 and Beyond

1. State-Chartered Thrifts Granted Broad Investment Powers

Since the Garn-St Germain Act liberalized federal restrictions on thrifts, many state-chartered thrifts abandoned the state system and joined the federal system. In response, many states, California, Texas and Florida in particular, granted thrifts investment powers that were far more liberal than those authorized by Garn-St Germain. Many state-chartered thrifts were therefore able to abandon traditional home mortgage lending for riskier ventures, such as fast food restaurants, low-grade corporate notes and commercial paper. The resulting high failure rate among state-chartered institutions was commensurate with this increased risk. Because most state-chartered thrifts were federally insured, a significant portion of FSLIC expenditures in the late 1980s went to depositors of failed state institutions.

As a result of these expanded investment powers, management of both state and federally-chartered thrifts, experienced in evaluating credit risks associated with home mortgage loans, found itself evaluating credit risks associated with complex investments. As a result, the industry suffered increased losses due to credit failures outside the realm of traditional thrift investments. Texas thrifts, for example, were particularly hard hit when oil prices plunged in the mid-1980s, causing real estate prices to decline. Therefore, thrifts that had either invested in or fi-
nanced real estate ventures were financially weakened by this market price decline.\footnote{124}

2. Brokered Deposits and Industry Growth

The removal of rate ceilings on deposits of $100,000 or more\footnote{125} and the increase in deposit insurance to $100,000\footnote{126} created an influx of deposits beginning in 1982. Because thrifts could offer federally-insured $100,000 accounts at market rates, Wall Street brokers funneled cash to thrifts in $100,000 bundles called brokered deposits.\footnote{127} The elimination of the limitation on thrift holdings in brokered deposits\footnote{128} further con-

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\footnote{124} See White I, \textit{supra} note 9, at S67. Much of the collateral that Texas thrifts were holding, therefore, had fair market values below the book values of the corresponding outstanding mortgage loans. When borrowers defaulted on those mortgages, thrifts were stuck with losses for the difference.


\footnote{126} See \textit{supra} note 48 and accompanying text. The reason that the increase to $100,000 was so significant to the thrift industry dates back to 1970. See \textit{Sprague, Unrelated Series of Events Led to S&L Crisis}, Am. Banker, May 3, 1984, at 9 (hereinafter \textit{Series of Events}). When thrift industry regulators were confronted with the bailout of Penn Central Railroad, they removed Regulation Q interest rate ceilings on deposits of $100,000 or greater so that large banks could attract large deposits. See \textit{Sprague, supra}, note 125, at 5; \textit{Series of Events, supra}, at 4. As a result, an institutional market was established in which $100,000 bundles were deposited in government-insured accounts at thrifts. See \textit{Seward & Zaitzeff, Insurability of Brokered Deposits: A Legislative Analysis}, 39 Bus. Law. 1705, 1713 (1984). Although this institutional market was available to investors in 1980, it did not become prevalent in the industry until 1982.


\footnote{128} See \textit{S&L Crisis Hearing, supra} note 27, at 27-28 (testimony of Rep. Joseph Kennedy, II). Thrifts were previously authorized to invest only five percent of total assets in brokered deposits. See \textit{id}. Depositor losses from the failure of Penn Square Bank also
tributed to the deposit influx. Consequently investors were able to obtain market-rate returns on deposits that were federally insured.

The desire for brokered deposits precipitated an interest rate competition among thrifts. Higher interest rates increased thrift expenses and resulted in lower profits. Because of these higher expenses, brokered deposits had to be invested quickly and at high rates. As a result, many thrifts made hasty investments that involved unusually high credit risks. Many institutions doubled and tripled in size as a result of brokered deposits, thereby increasing their investment activity and the number of new loans being issued. The industry, however, lacked experienced thrift management and staff to effectively evaluate this increased activity.

In 1984, the FDIC and FHLBB recognized that the influx of brokered deposits encouraged rapid industry-wide growth and risky in-
vestment strategies.\textsuperscript{137} Both agencies thus issued regulations that restricted federal deposit insurance to $100,000 per brokerage firm.\textsuperscript{138} Those regulations were struck down, however, in \textit{FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States},\textsuperscript{139} where the court held that the FDIC and FHLBB lacked the statutory authority to impose such restrictions. Although the FDIC, FHLBB\textsuperscript{140} and Federal Reserve\textsuperscript{141} looked to Congress for legislation restricting brokered deposits, their pleas went unanswered.

3. Entry of the Thrift Entrepreneurs

After the state and federal liberalization of thrift investment powers, entrepreneurs were increasingly attracted to thrifts as investments.\textsuperscript{142} Such attraction resulted from reduced capital requirements, the availability of deposit insurance\textsuperscript{143} and the ability to invest in broad classes of assets. Many of the thrifts that experienced rapid growth between 1983 and 1985 were managed by "speculating neophytes" who tended to invest in non-traditional assets.\textsuperscript{144}

Some investors viewed thrift ownership as an opportunity to engage in self-dealing and fraud at taxpayer expense.\textsuperscript{145} Some commentators have argued that fraud played a significant role in the thrift debacle,\textsuperscript{146} while others have maintained that fraud was a mere symptom and not a cause of the overall crisis.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{137} See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 118; Isaac, supra note 22, at 5. The Federal Reserve also supported restrictions on brokered deposits in the form of a "cap" or limit on the total amount of brokered deposits an institution may maintain. See Gramley, supra note 128, at 293-94.

\textsuperscript{138} See Gramley, supra note 128, at 293.

\textsuperscript{139} See 595 F. Supp. 73, aff'd, 753 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

\textsuperscript{140} See N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 118; Isaac, supra note 22, at 5.

\textsuperscript{141} See Gramley, supra note 128, at 291.

\textsuperscript{142} See F. Balderston, supra note 23, at 128. Entrepreneurs entered the industry by either acquiring existing thrifts or chartering new ones. See id. at 127-28; Long, Schilling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 406.

\textsuperscript{143} See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 69; N. Eichler, supra note 22, at 75; Inside Job, supra note 2, at 317.

\textsuperscript{144} See White II, supra note 9, at 12-13.

\textsuperscript{145} See Rosenbaum, \textit{A Financial Disaster with Many Culprits}, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, at D4, col. 2.

\textsuperscript{146} Fraud's role in the thrift crisis has been examined quite thoroughly. See, e.g., \textit{Bank and Thrift Fraud: Hearing before the Senate Banking Committee}, Aug. 2, 1990, at 9 [hereinafter \textit{Fraud Hearing}] (statement of William Seidman, chairman, FDIC) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file); Panel Meeting, supra note 58, at 9 (testimony of Sen. Donald Riegle, Chairman, Senate Banking Committee); J. Adams, The Big Fix (1990); R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 69, 86 n.2; G. Kaufman & R. Kormendi, supra note 82, at 52; Inside Job, supra note 2; Long, Schilling & Van Cleef, supra note 4, at 406, 410; Chernow, \textit{The Menace of the Small Bank}, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1990, at A14, Col. 5; Rosenbaum, supra note 145, at D4, col. 1.

\textsuperscript{147} See Fraud Hearing, supra note 146, at 5 (statement of Sen. Kerry); Scott, supra note 7, at 1892-93; Thomas & Ricks, \textit{Tracing the Billions}, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at A6, Col. 2.
4. Deregulation and Decreased Supervision

A relaxation of regulatory scrutiny facilitated questionable management practices.\textsuperscript{148} Throughout the early 1980s, White House policy diminished the number and responsibilities of thrift examiners.\textsuperscript{149} Troubled and insolvent institutions were therefore often overlooked and not examined on a timely basis.\textsuperscript{150}

The lack of sufficient supervision was exacerbated by a lack of a trained and experienced examiner force.\textsuperscript{151} Bank examiners that were trained to analyze long-term mortgage portfolios suddenly found themselves scrutinizing complex business transactions such as land swaps, tax shelters and stock mergers.\textsuperscript{152} Additionally examiners were underpaid,\textsuperscript{153} under-trained and over-worked.\textsuperscript{154}

Commentators have argued that the federal government should have supervised both state-chartered and federally-chartered thrifts more closely\textsuperscript{155} because the federal government was the insurer of thrift activities.\textsuperscript{156} Others have reasoned, however, that state regulators\textsuperscript{157} should have borne the burden of monitoring state-chartered thrifts more closely in light of increased investment powers granted by state legislatures.\textsuperscript{158}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{148} See House Report, supra note 2, at 301, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 97 ("[t]he lack of adequate supervision and examination of thrifts was one of the primary causes of the thrift crisis").
\item \textsuperscript{150} Cf. White II, supra note 9, at 12 (due to a decrease in examiner force throughout the early eighties, "the number of examinations relative to the size of the industry . . . fell").
\item \textsuperscript{151} See Stich, supra note 1, at 120.
\item \textsuperscript{152} There [was] also a limited staff available to deal with the unprecedented number of troubled institutions. In 1980 there were 34 FSLIC employees to handle 297 troubled institutions. By 1985, the FSLIC staff had grown to 159 (over half of whom had only two years of experience), but the number of troubled institutions had risen to 655. Over the same period, the number of field examiners declined. In 1980 there were 700 examiners to handle 297 troubled institutions. By 1985, the number of examiners had decreased to 679, while the number of troubled institutions had increased to 791. Thus, even if the FSLIC's reserves had been adequate, the limited number of personnel and their relative inexperience would have made it difficult to address the growing problem of insolvent institutions in a timely manner.
\item \textsuperscript{153} See S&L Crisis Hearing, supra note 27, at 58 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
\item \textsuperscript{154} See \textit{Inside Job}, supra note 2, at 14; Bartlett, supra note 149, at D7, col. 1. Such conditions were reflected in the field examiner turnover rate, which increased 60% from 1981 to 1984, to over 16% per year. See R. Brumbaugh, supra note 13, at 67.
\item \textsuperscript{155} See \textit{S&L Crisis Hearing}, supra note 27, at 8 (statement of Rep. Neal); \textit{Panel Meeting}, supra note 58, at 8 (testimony of Sen. Donald Riegle, Chairman, Senate Banking Committee).
\item \textsuperscript{156} See Scott, supra note 7, at 1883; White II, supra note 9, at 6.
\item \textsuperscript{157} State thrifts "are chartered under state statutes and are supervised and examined by agencies of the state government." A. Carron, supra note 15, at 2.
\item \textsuperscript{158} See \textit{Forum}, supra note 58, at 8 (statement of Rep. John Lafalce).
\end{itemize}
Either way, more stringent regulatory supervision was urgently needed throughout the 1980s.  

D. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987

In a further attempt to revamp the thrift industry, Congress enacted the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 ("CEBA"). CEBA's purpose was to "ensure that savings associations fulfill their mission of providing affordable home financing." CEBA, among other things, "formalized and tightened" the qualified thrift lender test ("QTL" Test) established in 1982 by Garn-St Germain.

CEBA's QTL Test required thrifts to maintain at least sixty percent of their tangible assets in "qualified-thrift investments" in three out of four quarters for two out of three years. Thrifts that failed to meet these levels were eligible to receive Federal Home Loan Bank advances only in proportion to their qualified thrift investment percentage. Additionally, once a thrift failed the QTL Test, it was denied QTL status for a five-year period.

Although Congress intended CEBA's QTL Test to force thrifts to increase home mortgage lending, Congress was dissatisfied with the result, as evidenced by Congress' amendment of the QTL Test two years later in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"). Prior to the FIRREA amendments, assets qualified as qualified thrift investments even if they were "only tangentially associated with residential real estate and housing," such as deposits held

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159. This was especially true because the vast majority of thrifts (83% from 1980 to 1981) were mutual in nature and therefore owned by depositors, not equity stockholders. See A. Carron, supra note 15, at 2. There was a greater need for monitoring because there were no stockholders to ensure that the organizations were being run efficiently and not fraudulently. See Benston, supra note 16, at 14; cf. Sussman, supra note 51, at 30 (stockholders have the greatest interest in the financial decisions of an institution and thus "exert influence over decisions of management").


161. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1065 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 261, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1987)).


164. See 12 U.S.C. § 1430(e) (1988). For example, a thrift "that had 59% of its tangible assets invested in qualified thrift investments would only be eligible to receive advances in amounts equal to 59% of the maximum amount which the association would have been eligible to receive if it had satisfied the QTL Test." Regulaton of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1072.


166. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1066.

by other thrifts and notes and obligations issued by the FSLIC.\textsuperscript{168} Furthermore, CEBA only required thrifts to comply quarterly with the QTL Test, rather than on a constant basis.\textsuperscript{169}

Some commentators have argued that the sixty percent qualified thrift investment requirement was insufficient to return thrifts to the home lending business.\textsuperscript{170} Others, however, have criticized the QTL Test because it did not allow thrifts to diversify their assets, but rather forced them to concentrate their assets in residential mortgage loans that had already proved troublesome.\textsuperscript{171} Still other critics of the QTL Test maintain that the test negatively impacted the thrift industry because it made thrifts less attractive to acquirors and only perpetuated the thrifts financial difficulties.\textsuperscript{172}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

The thrift crisis, the culmination of many forces, could have been avoided if timely action had been taken. The structure of the industry was flawed because of its inherent sensitivity to interest-rate risk. Non-diverse portfolios of long-term, fixed-rate mortgages funded by short-term obligations proved to be a disastrous combination.

Congress was careless in raising deposit insurance to $100,000 and granting it to state-chartered thrifts without effectively monitoring their activities; hence, Congress enabled insured institutions to shift their investment risks to the taxpayers. Meanwhile, the FHLBB decreased the level and quality of capital standards, allowing troubled institutions to increase their total loss exposure by allowing them to lower ownership equity. Failure to heed calls by the FDIC, FSLIC and the Federal Reserve for restrictions on brokered deposits further enabled troubled institutions to expand.

FIRREA was enacted to bring about vast structural change and was designed to improve and protect the thrift industry's viability in the future. Only time will tell, however, if the debacle of the 1980s can be overcome.

\textit{Robert J. Laughlin}

\textsuperscript{168} See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 6, at 1066-67.
\textsuperscript{169} See id. at 1068.
\textsuperscript{171} See, e.g., \textit{Beyond the Beltway}, ABA Banking J., at 44 (Mar. 1990) (arguing that the QTL Test was flawed because it required thrifts to invest too heavily in residential mortgages).
\textsuperscript{172} See, e.g., \textit{Washington Briefs}, ABA Banking J., at 8 (May 1990) (QTL Test "makes thrifts less attractive to acquire and perpetuates their financial difficulties").