Dellmuth v. Muth: Congressional Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act

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DELLMUTH V. MUTH: CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT

INTRODUCTION

In Dellmuth v. Muth, the Supreme Court held that the text of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act ("EAHCA") did not display unmistakable congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The Court created a bar to parental suits brought in federal courts against state educational agencies for violating the right of handicapped children to equal educational opportunities guaranteed by the EAHCA.

Yet in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court called education the most important function of state and local governments and required provision to all children on equal terms. This right to an equal educational opportunity should apply with equal force to handicapped children. Congress passed the EAHCA to provide all handicapped children with a free appropriate public education. The Act offers federal funds to states that guarantee an education to all handicapped children that is appropriate to their needs.

To protect the right to an appropriate public education, the EAHCA grants anyone "aggrieved by the findings and decision" of a state or local educational agency the right to bring a civil action in federal court. This provision explicitly empowers courts to "grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate" and has been held to confer "broad discretion on the court[s]."

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4. See id. at 493.
6. Free appropriate public education is defined in the Act as special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program.
9. See id.
10. Id.
The EAHCA was passed pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment, which grants Congress the power to lift the eleventh amendment's protection of state sovereign immunity by statute. The Court, however, has become increasingly reluctant to find that Congress intended to abrogate state immunity. In *Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon*, the Court held that the eleventh amendment precludes Congress from statutorily abrogating state immunity without "making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Thus, federal courts must "be certain of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment." Finally, Justice Kennedy, writing for the *Muth* Court, emphasized that the eleventh amendment requires evidence that is "both unequivocal and textual," stating that resort to legislative history to determine congressional intent is "irrelevant . . . unnecessary [and] futile."

*Muth* resolved a conflict in the courts. Some courts had held that Congress abrogated state immunity in the EAHCA, given the EAHCA's provisions making the state responsible for enforcing the rights of handicapped children, and Congress' emphasis on the importance of those rights and guarantees. Other courts, however, held that the elev-

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12. See, e.g., Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir.) ("we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Congress enacted and amended the [EAHCA] pursuant to its enforcement powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment"), *cert. denied*, 109 S. Ct. 391 (1988); Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The [EAHCA] was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); David D. v. Dartmouth School Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 422 (1st Cir. 1985) (concluding that Congress "act[ed] under its fourteenth amendment powers"), *cert. denied*, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986).

13. The eleventh amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI.


16. *Id.* at 242.

17. *Id.* at 243.


enth amendment precluded suits against the state for retroactive relief under the EAHCA because the EAHCA does not include a provision stating that Congress intends to abrogate state sovereign immunity.\(^2\)

This Comment discusses the *Muth* decision and concludes that its analysis is flawed. As the Third Circuit demonstrated, Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the EAHCA. Part I introduces the EAHCA and its legislative history. Part II presents the history and current interpretation of the eleventh amendment. Part III argues that the EAHCA contains sufficient evidence of congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity and concludes that the "novel" canon of statutory construction announced in *Muth* frustrates congressional intent.\(^2\)

I. THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT

Congress enacted the EAHCA\(^2\) in response to an increasing awareness of the educational needs of handicapped children.\(^2\) The states had failed to meet those needs under the Education of the Handicapped Act,\(^2\) the EAHCA's predecessor. The Subcommittee on the Handi-

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20. See, e.g., Kerr Center Parents Ass'n v. Charles, 842 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1989) (Congress did not abrogate state immunity in the EAHCA); Gary A. v. New Trier High School Dist. No. 203, 796 F.2d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); Doe ex rel. Gonzalez v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1494 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Rose v. Nebraska, 748 F.2d 1258, 1262 (8th Cir. 1984) (eighth amendment bars award against state defendants), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985); Hiller v. Board of Educ., 687 F. Supp. 735, 745 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (motion to amend complaint to add claim against state defendants for retroactive relief and punitive damages denied); Gerasimou v. Ambach, 636 F. Supp. 1504, 1511-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (plaintiff's claim for transportation costs, witnesses, attorneys' fees and damages against state Commissioner of Education barred by the eleventh amendment).


The PARC court held that the state of Pennsylvania could not deny mentally retarded children access to public schools, "[h]aving undertaken to provide a free public education to all of its children." PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1259. Similarly, the Mills court held that the District of Columbia was required to provide every child of school age free and suitable public education regardless of the degree of impairment. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878.


The Education of the Handicapped Act authorized grants "to the States and outlying areas to assist them in initiating, expanding, and improving programs for the education of
capped of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare found that less than 50 percent of handicapped children were receiving appropriate education and that over a million children were completely excluded from public school systems. Congress thus passed the EAHCA to "establish and protect the right to education for all handicapped children and to provide assistance to the States in carrying out their responsibilities . . . to provide equal protection of the laws."  

States participating in the EAHCA must submit an application outlining their educational plans and policies to the Secretary of Education. The states must identify and evaluate all handicapped children, setting priorities that guarantee that those children not receiving any education are served first. The Act requires states to agree to provide full educational opportunities including, whenever possible, placement with children who are not handicapped. The states are also responsible for allocating the federal funds received to intermediate or local districts and ensuring that these localities meet the Act's objectives. If a state finds that a local district is failing to provide appropriate education to its handicapped children, it must stop the local district's funding and provide a free and appropriate education directly to the handicapped child.

Participating states also prepare individualized educational programs, which must be reviewed annually in consultation with each child's parents and teachers. The Act emphasizes that each child's education is to be at "no cost to the child's parent." Thus, the state or local agency must fund special education and related services in private institutions if

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25. See 121 Cong. Rec. 19,478, 19,486 (1975). The Subcommittee found that, although the number of handicapped children served had increased from 38 percent to 50 percent since 1970, only 3.9 out of 8.7 million handicapped children were receiving an appropriate education and that 1.75 million were not receiving any education. See id. (remarks of Senator Williams, Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare).


33. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18-19) (1982). One court characterized this provision as "requir[ing] the state to treat each child as an individual, a human whose unique qualities and needs can be evaluated and served only by a plan designed with wisdom, care and educational expertise." Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028, 1030 (5th Cir. 1983).

an appropriate education cannot be obtained in the public system.\textsuperscript{35}

Congress established an elaborate administrative procedure for dissatisfied parents or guardians, including a due process hearing before an impartial officer of the state educational agency, intermediate educational unit or local educational agency.\textsuperscript{36} Congress also granted parents the right to seek any relief deemed appropriate by the judge in federal court.\textsuperscript{37}

The Supreme Court attempted to limit a parent's right to seek relief for educational discrimination in 1984, holding in Smith v. Robinson\textsuperscript{38} that the EAHCA was the only avenue available for an equal protection claim to free public education.\textsuperscript{39} Congress reacted quickly, enacting the Handicapped Children's Protection Act\textsuperscript{40} ("HCPA") to "reestablish im-


\textsuperscript{36} See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1982). In these hearings the parents have the following rights: the right to examine all records and to obtain an independent evaluation of their child; prior written notice whenever the local or state educational agency suggests or refuses to "initiate or change, the identification, evaluation or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(c) (1982); an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter; the right to be represented by counsel, present evidence, confront adverse witnesses and to receive written findings of fact in the due process hearing; and the right to an impartial appeal. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)-(e)(1) (1982).

\textsuperscript{37} See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982). Section 1415(e)(2) provides: "Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made . . . shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any . . . district court of the United States . . . ." \textit{Id.}

Some cases brought in federal court against a state under section 1415(b)(2) of the EAHCA arise when a parent, having questioned his child's individualized educational program and placed his child in a private school, seeks tuition reimbursement. See \textit{infra} notes 94-106 and accompanying text (discussing Muth v. Central Bucks School District, 839 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720 (U.S. June 13, 1989)). In S-1 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1987), for example, parents sought reimbursement after enrolling their children in a private half-day special education program. See \textit{id.} at 295-96.

EAHCA actions are also brought to force the state to fund recommended placements. In Antkowiak v. Ambach, 653 F. Supp. 1405 (W.D.N.Y. 1987), \textit{rev'd on other grounds}, 838 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.), \textit{cert. denied}, 109 S. Ct. 133 (1988), parents brought suit to require the state to order and pay for the placement of their daughter, Lara Antkowiak, in a residential treatment facility. See \textit{id.} at 1406. The local school district recommended that Lara be placed in a residential facility and sought approval from the state agency. See \textit{id.} at 1408-09. The state refused to approve the placement. See \textit{id.} at 1409. Meanwhile, Lara was discharged from her earlier placement because her needs could no longer be met. See \textit{id.} The approved list of placement facilities contained no other suitable facilities that could accept Lara and, therefore, her parents placed her in the residential facility at their own expense. See \textit{id.} at 1410. The court ordered the state to place Lara at the requested facility immediately. See \textit{id.} at 1417. The state was also ordered to reimburse Lara's parents for the tuition expenses they had incurred. See \textit{id.} at 1419.

\textsuperscript{38} 468 U.S. 992 (1984).

\textsuperscript{39} See \textit{id.} at 1013. Justice Brennan, dissenting, stated "Congress will now have to take the time to revisit the matter. And until it does, the handicapped children of this country whose difficulties are compounded by discrimination and by other deprivations of constitutional rights will have to pay the costs." \textit{Id.} at 1031.

important rights repealed by the Supreme Court [which] ... Congress had intended to be available to handicapped children.\(^4\)\(^1\) The HCPA expressly provided for district court jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy, and the award of attorney’s fees as part of the costs to the parent.\(^4\)\(^2\) Congress added section 1415(f) to the EAHCA to provide explicitly that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal statutes protecting the rights of handicapped children and youth ... .”\(^4\)\(^3\) Enforcement of these rights was further enhanced by providing for awards of attorneys’ fees.\(^4\)\(^4\) Despite the intention of Congress manifested through these additional protections, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the eleventh amendment bars retroactive relief when suit is brought against a state.\(^4\)\(^5\)

II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The eleventh amendment provides that “the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”\(^4\)\(^6\)

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[...]


44. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Senator Weicker, co-author of the amendment, stated: “By restoring this right [to be awarded attorney fees and other reasonable expenses] we will once again demonstrate that handicapped people should be accorded the same protections as all other citizens of our Nation.” 131 Cong. Rec. 21,390 (1985).


46. U.S. Const. amend. XI. The eleventh amendment was enacted to reverse the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), that section two of Article III of the Constitution permitted a citizen of South Carolina to bring suit against the state of Georgia for debt. See id. at 428. Not only did Chisholm question the very existence of state sovereign immunity, it left the states liable to suit over revolutionary war debts and confiscation of Tory property. See id. at 452 (Blair, J., concurring); P. Low & J. Jeffries, Federal Courts and the Law of Federal State Relations 773-74 (1987); Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1413, 1438 (1975). Suits against South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia and Massachusetts were instituted immediately after the decision’s announcement. See P. Low & J. Jeffries, supra, at 774. Reaction to the Chisholm decision was “swift and hostile.” Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 484 (1987).
The amendment does not refer to suits brought by citizens against their own state. Nevertheless, in *Hans v. Louisiana*, the Supreme Court held that such suits were also barred by the eleventh amendment.


47. See U.S. Const. amend XI. The eleventh amendment does not provide immunity from suits involving all parties. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965) (the United States may sue a state); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (a state may bring suit against another state); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (a private citizen may bring suit against local government entities); see also Nowak, *supra* note 46, at 1414.

48. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

49. See id. at 18-19. The Justices of the Supreme Court are divided as to the meaning of the amendment. See, e.g., *Welch v. Texas Dept' of Highways and Pub. Trans.*, 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens, dissenting, disagreed with the interpretation of the eleventh amendment espoused by Justice Powell, joined by Justices O'Connor and White and Chief Justice Rehnquist; Justice Scalia declining to reach the issue); *Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon*, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (four Justices dissenting). In *Welch*, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and White, took the position that the amendment was intended to establish state sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle: "[It is] firmly established that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a broad constitutional principle of sovereign immunity." See *Welch*, 483 U.S. at 486. This "fundamental principle" acts as a bar which limits the power of the federal courts to hear any suit brought against states by private citizens. See *id.* at 472; see also Fletcher, *supra* note 46, at 1033-34. According to this view, the eleventh amendment made explicit a concept of state sovereign immunity implicit in Article III. See *Welch*, 483 U.S. at 479 (citing Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in *Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare*, 411 U.S. 279 (1973)).

The dissent believed that the amendment only bars diversity suits brought against a state by citizens of another state or by aliens. See *id.* at 497. (Brennan, J., joined by Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, J.J., dissenting). *Hans v. Louisiana*, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), therefore, should not be interpreted to bar suits based on federal question jurisdiction. See *Welch*, 483 U.S. at 519-521 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professors Field and Fletcher also accept the diversity interpretation—that Congress intended to remedy the Court's misreading of section two of article III as abrogating common law state sovereign immunity in diversity cases. See *Field*, *supra* note 46, at 538-39; Fletcher, *supra* note 46, at 1035.

Professors Low and Jeffries suggest a third view: the Federalism/Separation of Powers Interpretation. See P. Low & J. Jeffries, *supra* note 46, at 779. Advocates of this interpretation believe that the eleventh amendment only limits the law-making power of the federal courts: "Nothing in the language or the history of the eleventh amendment suggests that it must be construed to limit congressional power . . . ." Tribe, *supra* note 46, at 693; see also Nowak, *supra* note 46, at 1440-53. According to Professor Nowak, the
A. Exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment

The eleventh amendment, however, is subject to a few exceptions. In *Ex Parte Young*, the Court held that a suit for prospective injunctive relief against an official acting in violation of the fourteenth amendment was not barred by the eleventh amendment. The Court created a fiction in which the defendant's immunity from suit as a state official was "stripped" by his constitutional violation. This fiction was "necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United States.'"

In *Edelman v. Jordan*, however, the Court held that the eleventh amendment barred retroactive relief because the state, and not the state official, was the real party in interest. Retroactive relief, an impermissible raid on state treasuries, was more intrusive than prospective relief.

In a subsequent opinion, *Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman*, the Court stated that the *Edelman* opinion recognized "that the need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the States."

An extension of *Ex Parte Young* crucial distinction is between Congress' power to create a private cause of action and judicial power to find an implied one. See Nowak, supra note 46, at 1414. The interpretation is based on the idea that the states surrendered their sovereignty to Congress in certain areas when they ratified the Constitution. See Tribe, supra note 46, at 684. Article III "was designed to permit the Congress to use the federal courts for any purpose legitimately within its article I powers." P. Low & J. Jeffries, supra note 46, at 779; see Nowak, supra note 46, at 1425. The relationship between the states and the federal government is Congress' concern, and not that of the federal courts because Congress, and not the courts, is accountable to both the states and the federal government. See P. Low & J. Jeffries, supra note 46, at 779-80; Tribe, supra note 46, at 694-95, 711; Nowak, supra note 46, at 1441.

51. See id.
52. See id. at 159. Justice Peckham, explaining the fiction, stated:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity.

Id.
55. See id. at 666-67. In *Edelman*, the court of appeals awarded welfare recipients retroactive relief in the form of wrongfully withheld benefits under a theory of equitable restitution. See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993-94 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the retroactive payments were closer to an impermissible monetary award than the equitable relief permissible under *Ex Parte Young*. See *Edelman*, 415 U.S. at 666, 678. By limiting *Ex Parte Young* to less intrusive prospective relief, the Court hoped to provide a forum to ensure state compliance without raiding the state treasury by granting retroactive relief. See id. at 666 n.11, 667-68.
56. See id. at 666-68.
58. Id. at 105. In *Pennhurst*, the Court held, inter alia, that the distinction between retroactive and prospective relief did not apply when suit was brought against state offi-
Young to permit the retroactive benefits sought by the plaintiffs in Edelman would “effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States.”

B. Congressional Abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment

The eleventh amendment’s bar to recovery of retroactive relief is also lifted in other circumstances. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, for instance, the Court held that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting legislation pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment. In Bitzer, male employees of Connecticut alleged that changes in the state’s retirement benefit plan discriminated against them on the basis of their sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court held that section five, which explicitly granted Congress the authority to enact legislation to enforce the fourteenth amendment, “necessarily limited” the eleventh amendment. The states, by ratifying the fourteenth amendment, “clearly contemplate[d]” the subsequent limitations on their authority and thus consented to suit for money damages.

A finding that Congress statutorily abrogated state immunity pursuant to
to the fourteenth amendment, however, requires evidence of congressional intent to do so. The standard used by the Bitzer Court was Edelman's "threshold fact of congressional authorization." Title VII contained explicit references to the states, thus meeting the necessary threshold of congressional intent.67

In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,68 the Court required more than Edelman's "threshold fact of congressional authorization,"69 holding that Congress must express its intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment in "unmistakable language in the statute itself."70 Scanlon reversed
a Ninth Circuit holding that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (["Rehabilitation Act"]) contained the authorization required by Edelman and Bitzer. While recognizing that the eleventh amendment was necessarily limited by Congress' power to enforce the fourteenth amendment, the Court stated that section 504 fell "far short of expressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity." Unmistakable language was required to protect the "constitutionally mandated balance of power" between the States and the Federal Government... adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of 'our fundamental liberties.'

Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, dissenting, agreed that if the doctrine was necessary to protect fundamental liberties, it would be "unobjectionable." Justice Brennan, however, characterized the eleventh amendment doctrine as resting upon "flawed premises, misguided history, and an untenable vision of the needs of the federal system it purports to protect." Justice Brennan

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74. See Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 238.
75. Id. at 247.
76. Id. at 242 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)). A second interest discussed by the Court was the limited jurisdiction of federal courts. See id. at 243. By holding that Congress intended to abrogate state immunity, the Court stated, federal courts necessarily expanded their own jurisdiction. See id.
77. See id. at 247 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 248. Characterizing the doctrine as "pernicious," Justice Brennan stated:
   In an era when sovereign immunity has been generally recognized by courts and legislatures as an anachronistic and unnecessary remnant of a feudal legal sys-
   tem, the Court has aggressively expanded its scope. If this doctrine were re-
   quired to enhance the liberty of our people in accordance with the Constitution's protections, I could accept it. If the doctrine were required by
   the structure of the federal system created by the Framers, I could accept it.
   Yet the current doctrine intrudes on the ideal of liberty under law by protecting
   the States from the consequences of their illegal conduct. And the decision
   obstructs the sound operation of our federal system by limiting the ability of
   Congress to take steps it deems necessary and proper to achieve national goals
   within its constitutional authority.
Id. at 302 (citations omitted).
contended that the majority, in the name of federalism, frustrated clear congressional intent. 79

Congress agreed. In 1986, Congress enacted an amendment to the Rehabilitation Act that provides in pertinent part that "[a] state shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States for a violation of [the Rehabilitation Act] or provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance." 80 As Justice Brennan pointed out in his Muth dissent, this amendment was enacted "because '[t]he Supreme Court's decision in Scanlon] misinterpreted congressional intent . . . . It would be inequitable for Section 504 to mandate state compliance with its provisions and yet deny litigants the right to enforce their rights in Federal courts when State or State agency actions are in issue." 81 In Muth, the Court has repeated this error.

In Muth, as in Scanlon, the Court emphasized the eleventh amendment's importance to the constitutionally-required balance between the states and the federal government. 82 This balance protects the interests of federalism and requires the courts to be certain of Congress' intent before subjecting the states to suit in federal court. 83 In Bitzer, the Court referred to the standard required to protect the interests of federalism as a "threshold fact of congressional authorization." 84 Subsequently, in Quern v. Jordan, 85 the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 86 did not "explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States." 87 Finally, in Scanlon, the Court required an expression of intent "to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself" to protect the interests implicated by the eleventh amendment. 88

Scanlon did not set a new standard, but stated it differently, as did the

79. See id. at 252. Justice Brennan stated: "Given the unequivocal legislative history, the Court's conclusion that Congress did not abrogate the States' sovereign immunity when it enacted § 504 obviously cannot rest on an analysis of what Congress intended to do or on what Congress thought it was doing." Id.


83. Id. at 243.


87. Quern, 440 U.S. at 345. The Court distinguished Bitzer's finding of threshold authorization in Title VII. See id. at 344-45. Hutto was also distinguished because of its legislative "history focusing directly on the question of state liability," id. at 345 (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 698 n.31 (1978)), even though "the statutory language in Hutto did not separately impose liability on States in so many words." Id. at 344-45.

88. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 243.
Bitzer and Quern courts. The Court has always required certainty of congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Writing for the majority in Scanlon, Justice Powell characterized the abrogation standard as consistent with Quern and Edelman, stressing that the Court would not temper the requirement of an unequivocal expression of congressional intent. Justice Powell emphasized certainty of congressional intent, not a more restrictive standard for statutory interpretation.

The Scanlon Court did not intend to limit the federal courts to the "four corners of a statute." As the Seventh Circuit, interpreting Scanlon, stated, "[t]he Court has never held . . . that a statute must expressly provide that it abrogates the states' immunity." The test, therefore, is whether the federal courts are certain of Congress' intent, and not whether the EAHCA includes a provision expressly stating that Congress intended to abrogate state immunity.

III. WHETHER THE EAHCA ABROGATES STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

A. The Muth Decision

In 1983, Alex Muth, a "bright child" with a learning disability asked to be placed in mainstream classes. Alex had some difficulties, however, and the school district recommended placement in classes for the handicapped. His father challenged the suggested placement and requested a due process hearing pursuant to section 1415(b)(2), placing his son in a private school for the learning disabled. Initially, the hearing officer found that the district's proposed plan was inappropriate. After the district modified its plan, however, the hearing officer decided in favor of the district and his decision was affirmed by the state Secre-

89. See id. at 242-43; In re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987); Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1987). In Scanlon, Justice Powell stated: "[I]n determining whether Congress in exercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have required 'an unequivocal expression of congressional intent.'" Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 240 (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)).


93. Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1987); see also In Re McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d 311, 324 (7th Cir. 1987) (the Scanlon test's essence is the requirement that the "federal courts . . . be certain of Congress' intent" (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (emphasis in original))).


95. See id.


97. See Muth, 839 F.2d at 117.

98. See id. at 118.
tary of Education. Mr. Muth appealed to the district court, naming the local school district and the Secretary of Education for the State of Pennsylvania as defendants.

In August 1986, the district court held that Pennsylvania's due process procedures were inadequate and ordered the district and the Secretary to reimburse the tuition costs incurred by Mr. Muth because of the delays caused by the due process flaws. In affirming the district court's order, the Third Circuit noted first that the EAHCA authorized federal courts to award any appropriate relief and that the Supreme Court had held that its provisions granted the courts broad, equitable discretion to award even retroactive relief. The court then turned to the issue whether the eleventh amendment barred such an award against the Secretary of Education. The Third Circuit found that the EAHCA and its legislative history left "no doubt that Congress intended to abrogate the [eleventh] amendment," following other courts that have taken the position that Congress intended to abrogate state immunity in enacting the EAHCA. In both Muth and David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee, the courts cited the preamble of the EAHCA as unmistakable language: "it is in the national interest that the Federal government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure equal protection of the law." Other courts, however, had held that the EAHCA did not satisfy the

99. See id.
100. See id. at 116.
101. See id. at 118.
103. See id. (quoting Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985)).
104. See id. at 128.
105. See id.
107. 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985).
109. David D. and Muth also relied on the EAHCA's repeated references to state and local agencies. See David D., 775 F.2d at 422; Muth, 839 F.2d at 129. The Muth court found this passage from David D. persuasive:

Under the federal Act and its implementing regulations, the State educational agency promises to ensure that it and its local educational agencies will provide at minimum a free appropriate public education. . . . The culmination of the state administrative appeals process is the right of any party "aggrieved" by the decision or procedure employed to take the matter to either state or federal court. Obviously, since the state is responsible for guaranteeing that a child will receive both the substantive and procedural rights set forth in the Act, Congress intended that the State should be named as an opposing party, if not the sole party, to the proceeding.
"unmistakable language in the statute" requirement imposed by *Scanlon* and thus did not manifest an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. In *Kerr Center Parents Association v. Charles*, the Ninth Circuit held, without further discussion, that "Congress had not, in the EAHCA, expressed in unmistakable language its intent to abrogate states' sovereign immunity pursuant to section [five] of the Fourteenth Amendment." In *Gary A. v. New Trier High School District No. 203*, the Seventh Circuit stressed that congressional abrogation must be "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." The court found that the EAHCA, like the Rehabilitation Act, included only "[a] general authorization for suit in federal court [and that] is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment."

In reversing the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court conceded that "the [EAHCA's] frequent reference to the States, and its delineation of the State's important role in securing an appropriate education for handicapped children, make the States... logical defendants" yet held that this "permissible inference" was not "the unequivocal declaration" required for congressional abrogation.

**B. The Necessity of Retroactive Relief**

Under *Young* and *Edelman*, suits against a state agency brought by a parent for prospective relief, such as a change in a child's educational

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111. 842 F.2d at 129 (quoting *David D.*, 775 F.2d at 422) (citations omitted, emphasis added).
112. Id. at 1059; see also *Maher*, 793 F.2d at 1494.
113. 796 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1986).
114. Id. at 944 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
115. Id. (quoting *Scanlon*).
placement or for provision of additional services, clearly would not vio-
late the eleventh amendment. Prospective relief, however, is often insuffi-
cient to protect a child's right to free and appropriate education. The EAHCA's extensive administrative appeals system can lead to years of delay. These lost years are critical to a child's development. Most parents, at least those financially able, do not choose to leave their child in an inadequate and inappropriate situation while waiting for administrative orders. Therefore, the opportunity to seek retroactive relief is necessary to fully protect the rights guaranteed in the EAHCA. In order to grant retroactive relief, however, courts must find that Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity by enacting appropriate legislation pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment.

C. Requirements for Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity and the EAHCA

The first requirement for a finding of congressional abrogation is evidence that the EAHCA was enacted pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment. This determination requires a "discern[ible] . . . legislative purpose or factual predicate that supports the exercise of that

117. For example, in David D. v. Dartmouth School Comm., 615 F. Supp. 639 (1984), aff'd, 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986), the court found that the local districts' proposed individualized education program was insufficient and ordered the district to place the child in a more appropriate setting. See id. at 647-48. In Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1983), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered Mississippi to provide full-year instruction to handicapped children. See id. at 1035.

118. See Burlington School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370-71 (1985). Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, stated:

If the administrative and judicial review under the Act could be completed in a matter of weeks, rather than years, it would be difficult to imagine a case in which such prospective injunctive relief would not be sufficient. As this case so vividly demonstrates, however, the review process is ponderous.

Id. at 370.

119. In Burlington, the parent initially contested his child's placement in 1979. See id. at 362. The child and his parents went through several hearings even before the case went to federal court, where it was reversed and remanded twice. See id. at 366. The Supreme Court heard the case in 1985, nearly six years later. See id. at 359.

Additional examples include Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 391 (1988) and Antkowski v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 133 (1988), in which the plaintiffs initiated their suits three years prior to the circuit cases.

120. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.

121. See, e.g., Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir.) ("we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Congress enacted and amended the [EAHCA] pursuant to its enforcement powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 391 (1988); Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The [EAHCA] was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); David D. v. Dartmouth School Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 421-22 (1st Cir. 1985) (concluding that Congress "acted pursuant to its fourteenth amendment powers"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986).
power."  

Discernible legislative intent to invoke the fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee is evident in the statute itself. Section 1400(b)(9) expressly states that "it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure equal protection of the law."  

As the Court indicated in Scanlon and reemphasized in Muth, however, evidence that Congress acted under the fourteenth amendment is not sufficient. Congress must also have intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity unequivocally and textually.

The EAHCA meets Scanlon's unmistakable language requirement. The Rehabilitation Act, at issue in Scanlon, did not refer specifically to the states, although states and their subdivisions received a large percentage of federal funds. Congress aimed the EAHCA, however, directly at the states and their localities, not at "any recipient of federal assistance," the Rehabilitation Act's general authorization for suit. Section 1400(b)(8) of the EAHCA provides: "State and local educational agencies have a responsibility to provide education for all handicapped children . . ."  

Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, Congress made the states responsible for ensuring that handicapped children receive the equal educational opportunity they are entitled to under the fourteenth amendment. This authorization is distinguishable from the Rehabilitation Act's "general authorization," which Scanlon found insufficient to

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125. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 245-46.
126. See id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

In support of the EAHCA, Senator Williams stated: "[T]hese provisions reinforce the right to education . . . by setting up a process by which State and local educational agencies may be held accountable for providing educational services for all handicapped children." 121 Cong. Rec. 19,492 (1975) (remarks of Senator Williams). The court in David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee, 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986) found that "since the state is responsible for guaranteeing that a child will receive both the substantive and procedural rights set forth in the Act, Congress intended that the State should be named as an opposing party, if not the sole party, to the proceed-
abrogate sovereign immunity. The Rehabilitation Act’s general authorization probably would not even meet Edelman’s “threshold fact of congressional authorization” test. In contrast, the EAHCA’s explicit emphasis on the states and their responsibilities should be sufficient evidence of congressional intent to abrogate state immunity. The Muth Court, however, characterized these obligations placed on the states as congressional “coy hints.”

In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court applied Edelman’s “threshold fact of congressional authorization” standard and found that Title VII abrogated state sovereign immunity. The terms of the EAHCA, although arguably subject to a stricter test under Scanlon, contain greater evidence of congressional intent to abrogate than Title VII. Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices. The Bitzer court’s finding of congressional intent to abrogate was based on a 1972 amendment that struck an express exclusion of state and local governments in the definition of employer and added “individuals ‘subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision’” to the definition of employees.

While Title VII is aimed generally at “employers,” the EAHCA is aimed solely at states and their subdivisions. For example, the provision of procedural safeguards established by Congress in the EAHCA is the sole responsibility of “[a]ny State educational agency, any local educational agency, and any intermediate educational unit” receiving assistance under the Act. Federal courts should be permitted to hold the states liable for retroactive relief under the EAHCA because of the EAHCA’s more specific aim at the states.

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135. See id. at 452, 456.
136. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
142. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (1982). Section 1415(a) provides: “Any State educational agency, any local agency, and any intermediate educational unit which receives assistance under this subchapter shall establish and maintain procedures . . . to assure that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate public education by such agencies and units.” Id.
D. The Importance of Legislative History in Determining Congressional Intent

The function of the courts is to "construe the language [of a statute] so as to give effect to the intent of Congress." In Muth, however, the Supreme Court held that the Scanlon test restricts a court's analysis to the language of the statute. Yet Scanlon's emphasis on certainty of congressional intent supports, not restricts, the traditional approach to statutory interpretation, which includes an examination of legislative history. As Justice Brennan pointed out, the rule of statutory construction announced by the Muth majority is a novel one.

In the past, the Supreme Court cautioned against plain meaning when such an interpretation would be contrary to the legislation's policy. As one court stated:

If the words of the statute make no reference to a suit against a state, it is highly unlikely that we can be "certain" that Congress intended to create such a cause of action. However, especially where the statute expressly provides for a suit against a state, we will not hesitate to consult the legislative history to resolve any lingering uncertainty.

The Scanlon Court did not expressly prohibit references to legislative history. Arguably, the Court did not refer to the Rehabilitation Act's legislative history because the Act's failure to refer to the states was sufficient evidence of Congress' intent.

The Court has often examined legislative history when considering congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. In Bitzer and Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, later character-

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143. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940); see also In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 325 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987); Note, supra note 92, at 1448.
144. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720, 4722 (U.S. June 13, 1989). Justice Kennedy, for the majority, stated:

Legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. If Congress' intention is 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,' recourse to legislative history will be unnecessary; if Congress' intention is not unmistakably clear, recourse to legislative history will be futile, because by definition the rule of [Scanlon] will not be met.

Id.
145. See id. at 4724, 4725.
146. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 543-44 ("When aid to construction of the ... statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use ... ").
147. McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 324 (emphasis added).
148. 411 U.S. 279 (1973). The Court held that congressional intent could not be inferred absent "clear language that the constitutional immunity was swept away." Id. at 285. In Employees, state employees brought suit to recover overtime pay under section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1069 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982)) ("FLSA"), on the grounds that FLSA reflected Congress' power to regulate work conditions under the Commerce Clause. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 281.
Section 216(b) provides that "[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of [section 6
ized by the Court as requiring an express statutory waiver for abrogation,\textsuperscript{149} the majority looked to legislative history.\textsuperscript{150}

If, as the \textit{Scanlon} Court suggested, protection of the eleventh amendment is premised on certainty,\textsuperscript{151} then reference to legislative history should be required.\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Gomez v. Illinois State Board of Education},\textsuperscript{153} recognizing the importance of certainty of congressional intent, interpreted \textit{Scanlon} to permit an inference of abrogation when any other reading of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act\textsuperscript{154} ("EEOA") would nullify the statute's express terms.\textsuperscript{155} The Seventh Circuit, interpreting the statute, found that "without the abrogation of sovereign immunity, state agencies would, in practice, vanish . . . ."\textsuperscript{156} The relevant definitions in the EEOA are nearly identical to their counterparts in the EAHCA.\textsuperscript{157}

or section 7 of this Act] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid . . . compensation . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). The Court expressed concern that holding states liable under the FLSA would "implicate elevator operators, janitors, charwomen, security guards, secretaries, and the like in every office building in a State's governmental hierarchy." \textit{Employees}, 411 U.S. at 285. The Court did indicate, however, that Congress can "place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States" under the Commerce Clause. \textit{Id.} at 284.

Justice Brennan, however, dissented on the ground that both the FLSA and the Federal Employers' Liability Act were enacted under the Commerce Clause and therefore the States had "surrendered their sovereignty to that extent when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce." \textit{Id.} at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting).\textsuperscript{149} See \textit{Quern v. Jordan}, 440 U.S. 332, 344 n.16 (1979). Justice Powell, for the Court in \textit{Quern}, indicated that legislative history should be considered when looking for congressional intent. See \textit{id.} at 345. The Court held that there was nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress had abrogated state immunity in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). \textit{Id.}

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As Justice Brennan argued, if the Court were "in fact concerned with Congress' intent it could not have adopted the strict drafting regulations it devises today, ruling out resort to legislative history and apparently also barring inferential reasoning from text and structure." See \textit{Muth}, 57 U.S.L.W. 4720, 4724 (U.S. June 13, 1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).\textsuperscript{152} See \textit{Bitzer}, 427 U.S. at 449 n.2; \textit{Employees}, 411 U.S. at 283-85.


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153. 811 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1987).


155. See \textit{Gomez}, 811 F.2d at 1036.

156. See \textit{id.} at 1037-38.

157. Both 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982) and 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1982) are explicitly aimed at the states. Section 1412(1) of the EAHCA requires that "a State shall demonstrate to the Secretary that the following conditions are met: (1) The State has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1982). Section 1703 of the EEOA provides that "No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1982).

The EAHCA's and the EEOA's definitions of state educational agencies are identical. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(7) (1982); \textit{id.} § 3381(k). Section 1401(7) of the EAHCA and section 3381(k) of the EEOA define state educational agencies as "the State board of education or other agency or officer primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools." 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(7), 3381(k) (1982).

The \textit{Gomez} court went on to distinguish section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act from the EEOA: "Unlike, for example, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 and 794a, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1703(f) and 1706
nation of the EAHCA’s legislative history to support a finding of congressional intent to abrogate state immunity does not offend the basic principles of federalism encompassed by the eleventh amendment.

E. A Finding of Abrogation Comports with the Fundamental Principles of Federalism

The Scanlon Court feared that subjecting the states to suit would upset the balance of power between the states and the federal government and jeopardize “fundamental liberties.” 158 According to the majority, the Framers believed that strong state governments were a necessary “counterpoise” to the federal government. 159 The states ratified the eleventh amendment to preserve this constitutional balance 160 and to protect their treasuries. 161

The EAHCA was enacted to protect the equally fundamental constitutional principle of equal protection. Allowing a state to invoke sovereign immunity frustrates that purpose and the federal courts’ “primary obligation to protect the rights of the individual that are embodied in the Federal Constitution.” 162 The fourteenth amendment clearly limits the power of the states. 163 When Congress acts pursuant to the fourteenth amendment to enforce equal protection guarantees, the states’ interest in sovereign immunity, including their interests in protecting the public, must give way. 164 Congress originally attempted to protect the right of handicapped children to equal educational opportunities by a less intrusive manner in the Education of the Handicapped Act. 165 Yet, under this earlier act, “handicapped children [remained] ‘either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting

do not simply provide relief against a general class of defendants that may or may not include the states and their agencies.” Gomez, 811 F.2d at 1038. Yet six months earlier, in Gary A. v. New Trier High School District No. 203, 796 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1986), the Seventh Circuit held that the EAHCA was “similar in all relevant parts” to the Rehabilitation Act. Gary A., 796 F.2d at 944.

159. See id. at 239 n.2.
160. See id.; supra note 49.
161. See supra note 46.
164. See id. at 454. The Court cited Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880):
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action, however put forth, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty.

Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 454 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)). Although the states still have an interest in the integrity of their treasuries, they are not as vulnerable as they were in 1793, when the states were near collapse because of their crushing Revolutionary War debts. See supra note 46.
165. See supra note 24.
the time when they were old enough to ‘drop out’.” 166 This inequity required the increased protections of the EAHCA.167

Judicial interpretation of congressional action also implicates the constitutional balance between the legislature and the judiciary.168 Failure to give effect to Congress’ intent is as dangerous to the Framers’ conception of the constitutional plan as undermining sovereign immunity’s “vital role.”169 Emphasis on certainty of Congress’ intent protects the interests of federalism and the separation of powers.

The clear intent of Congress in enacting the EAHCA was to guarantee handicapped children the right to free and appropriate public education.170 Congress made it the states’ responsibility to provide an appropriate education at no cost to the child’s parent.171 The view that Congress did not abrogate sovereign immunity simply because the Act does not say “we intend to abrogate” plainly conflicts with Congress’ intent in the EAHCA.

CONCLUSION

Congress, in enacting the EAHCA, recognized the important national

167. See id. The EAHCA’s Conference Report emphasized that “Congress must take a more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped children are provided equal educational opportunity. It can no longer be the policy of the Government to merely establish an unenforceable goal requiring all children to be in school.” S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1425, 1433.

[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. . . . the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.

Id. at 550-51.
170. See supra notes 125-142 and accompanying text.

The Senate Report stated that “if a State or local educational agency has placed or referred [a] child to a private school or to another school or facility. . . because the State or local educational agency did not have an appropriate program for the child, then the State or local educational agency remains financially responsible for that child’s education.” See id. at 1456 (emphasis added).
interest in providing handicapped children with an equal educational opportunity. Prospective injunctive relief under the EAHCA is not a sufficient guarantee of a handicapped child’s right to a free appropriate education. Congress’ intent to subject the states to suit in federal court is unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. Holding that the eleventh amendment bars retroactive relief under the EAHCA, the Muth decision frustrates Congress’ intent and violates a child’s fundamental right to equal protection of the law. To ensure that all handicapped children have a free, appropriate public education available to them, Congress intended parents to have a complete remedy.

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