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APPLICATION OF THE AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCE RULE TO THE RESIDENTIAL LEASEHOLD AGREEMENT

INTRODUCTION

When a residential tenant abandons leased premises he breaches a duty owed to his landlord to fulfill the terms of the leasehold agreement. According to accepted principles of contract law, the avoidable consequence rule requires a party who suffers a breach of contract to make reasonable efforts to minimize his damages. This Note examines the controversy over whether the avoidable consequence rule requires a landlord to minimize his damages occasioned by the tenant’s breach of the leasehold agreement. Jurisdictions have approached this problem


Often, the avoidable consequence rule is expressed as a duty on the part of the aggrieved plaintiff to mitigate his damages or as an obligation to take reasonable action to avoid increasing damages caused by the breaching defendant. See Lynch v. Call, 261 F.2d 130, 132 (10th Cir. 1958); American Casualty Co. v. Glorfield, 216 F.2d 250, 253 (9th Cir. 1954); John S. Doane Co. v. Martin, 164 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1947). This formulation, however, inaccurately expresses the avoidable consequence rule. See generally J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 14-15, at 610-611 (3d ed. 1987). Similar to other principles limiting recoverable damages, the avoidable consequence rule places no affirmative duty whatsoever upon the aggrieved plaintiff. See Griffin v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp., 132 Kan. 843, 847-52, 297 P. 662, 664-67 (1931); McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 354, 169 N.E. 605, 608 (1930) (Cardozo, C.J., concurring). While the rule does not deny the plaintiff his claim against the breaching party, it reduces his recovery to the extent of any damages flowing from consequences he could have avoided. See id. The plaintiff suffers this ensuing loss, however, through his own choice not to avoid these damages. See id. at 358-59, 169 N.E. at 609-10. The rule does not violate the sanctity of contract because it is applied after the breach and requires only reasonable efforts by the plaintiff. See id.

4. See supra note 3.

through judicial decisions as well as legislative enactments.\textsuperscript{6}

Some jurisdictions refuse to apply the avoidable consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement\textsuperscript{7} because, in accordance with common law principles, they classify a leasehold agreement as a conveyance of land.\textsuperscript{8} These jurisdictions equate the lease with the transfer of a property interest in the owner’s estate,\textsuperscript{9} in effect making the tenant the owner of the leasehold estate for the term of the lease.\textsuperscript{10} The tenant’s right to possession of the premises is enforced as though the tenant has a prop-


6. See cases and statutes cited \textit{infra} note 15.

7. This Note addresses only a residential tenant’s abandonment of a leasehold agreement and does not address the issue in the commercial context. The Note focuses on the modern urban landlord-tenant relationship. Some of the arguments in Part II may not apply to less populated, rural communities.


9. See cases cited \textit{supra} note 8; see also \textit{infra} notes 19-31 and accompanying text. See \textit{generally Sommer}, 74 N.J. at 452-54, 378 A.2d at 770-71 (1977) (applying avoidable consequence rule but discussing the rationale of courts that do not); W. Burby, \textit{Real Property} § 43, at 111 (1979).

10. See cases cited \textit{supra} note 8; see also \textit{infra} notes 19-31 and accompanying text. See \textit{generally} MAR-SON, Inc. v. Terwaho Enters., Inc., 259 N.W.2d 289, 291 (N.D.}
property right in the premises for the period of the leasehold agreement.11 Under this view, the avoidable consequence rule does not apply because "the lessor need not concern himself with the lessee's abandonment of the lessee's own property."12 The landlord's refusal to accept what is in effect the tenant's rescission of his lease places responsibility for all rents upon the tenant,13 who still holds the lease for the remainder of the term.14

Other jurisdictions reject this common law conveyance theory. They view the leasehold agreement as a contract for goods and services.15 Thus, the avoidable consequence rule, as a contract theory, applies to the

1977) (applying the avoidable consequence rule but giving the rationale of courts that do not); W. Burby, supra note 10, at 111 (1979).


12. MAR-SON, Inc., 259 N.W.2d at 291. Since the tenant has exclusive control over the premises, the landlord may be violating the landlord-tenant relationship if he reenters and relets the apartment. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.

13. See Sancourt Realty v. Dowling, 220 A.D. 660, 660, 222 N.Y.S. 288, 289 (1st Dep't 1927) ("[T]he lessor is not required to lease to another if he have an opportunity."

14. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.


abandonment of the leased premises by a residential tenant. This requires the landlord to avoid any unnecessary accumulation of damages by using reasonable efforts to secure an alternative tenant upon the original tenant's abandonment.


17. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.

18. See, e.g., Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Iowa 1968); Sommer, 74 N.J. at 457, 378 A.2d at 773 (1977). In doing so, the rent received from the new tenant is applied against the rent due from the defaulting tenant under the breached agreement, thereby minimizing the damages suffered by the landlord. See Vawter, 159 N.W.2d at 542; Sommer, 74 N.J. at 457, 378 A.2d at 773.


This Note argues that the avoidable consequence rule should apply to residential leasehold agreements. Part I examines the controversy concerning the classification of leases of residential real property as either a conveyance of land or a contract, and concludes that contractual principles mandate application of the avoidable consequence rule to residential leasehold agreements. Part II analyzes policy reasons supporting application of the avoidable consequence rule to residential leasehold agreements. This Note concludes that the avoidable consequence rule should be applied to residential leasehold agreements. It also recommends that the issue is best resolved by statute, which affords more precision and uniformity.

I. THE RESIDENTIAL LEASE: CONVEYANCE OR CONTRACT?

A. Conveyance View

According to the common law conception of residential leases, the leasehold agreement constitutes a conveyance of real property from the landlord to the tenant. Under this conveyance theory, the landlord conveys his possessory interest in the land to the tenant for the entire duration of the leasehold agreement. In effect, the tenant's rights to the land under the leasehold agreement are just as complete as those of the owner of the estate. Consequently, upon execution of the leasehold


21. See Baker v. Clifford-Matthew Inv. Co., 99 Fla. 1229, 1232, 128 So. 827, 829 (1930); Gruman, 247 Minn. at 502, 78 N.W.2d at 380; MAR-SON, Inc. v. Terwaho
agreement, the landlord relinquishes his possessory interest in the land for the term of the lease and must avoid any act of dominion over the premises until the lease expires.

Because the landlord grants the tenant the equivalent of an estate for years, he owes the tenant few obligations during the term of the lease. However, limited duties do exist between the landlord and the tenant. For example, the landlord must deliver possession of the premises and protect the tenant in his quiet enjoyment of the premises. The tenant's duties to the landlord consist of refraining from disturbing other tenants, making ordinary repairs in the absence of a covenant to the contrary, and not committing waste. Other than these limited duties, the landlord and tenant maintain a relationship essentially divorced from each other.

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24. See generally, R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, supra note 20, § 6.1, at 256 (tenant has a possessory interest while landlord retains a greater interest in reversion).
25. The tenant has a legal right to the land and the landlord is responsible for damages resulting when the tenant is prevented from taking possession of the land. See Boltz v. Crawford & North Aves. Theatre Co., 294 Ill. App. 258, 261-62, 13 N.E.2d 844, 846 (1938).
27. However, at common law there was no implied duty on the part of a landlord to put the premises in repair. See Welson v. Neujan Bldg. Corp., 264 N.Y. 303, 305, 190 N.E. 648, 649 (1934); Widmor v. Healey, 247 N.Y. 94, 96, 159 N.E. 874, 874 (1928); Edwards v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R. Co., 98 N.Y. 245, 247 (1885); Fermaglich v. Warsaw, 42 Misc. 2d 1077, 1079, 249 N.Y.S.2d 963, 966 (Rockland Co. Ct. 1964). The tenant, therefore, must bear the risk of the condition of the premises at the commencement of the lease and must repair defects in the premises existing at the time he takes possession barring any expressed covenants to the contrary. See Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 115, 23 N.E. 126, 127 (1889); Kosior v. Pomrinse, 249 A.D. 196, 197, 291 N.Y.S. 830, 831 (1st Dep't 1926).
29. See King v. Cooney-Eckstein Co., 66 Fla. 246, 63 So. 659, 660 (1913); Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450, 453-54 (1873). Landlords and tenants often make covenants that place the obligation to make specific repairs on the landlord. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 217 Miss. 650, 64 So. 2d 739, 742 (1953) (covenant to keep roof in repair).
30. The tenant is not entitled to use the land in a manner that will diminish the value of the interests owned by others in the same land. See Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 10, 79 N.W. 738, 739 (1899). For a discussion of what constitutes waste, see generally W. Burby, Real Property §§ 12-13, at 33-39 (1979).
According to the common law conveyance theory, the landlord's interest in the collection of rent arises from the tenant's ownership of the leasehold estate\textsuperscript{32} and runs from the land itself, rather than from the tenant.\textsuperscript{33} Conversely, the tenant's obligation to pay rent stems from the landlord's conveyance of the land to him. The tenant, therefore, is bound to the rental obligation for as long as he owns the leasehold estate—for the entire term of the leasehold agreement regardless of what actually happens to the premises.\textsuperscript{34} When the tenant vacates the premises, the common law treats this as an abandonment of his own estate and an offer to rescind the leasehold agreement prior to termination of the tenant's interest.\textsuperscript{35} The landlord may respond to this offer in one of three ways.

First, the landlord may simply accept the abandonment and release the tenant from his leasehold obligations by renting to someone else.\textsuperscript{36} Second, the landlord may take no action at all, thereby continuing to hold the tenant liable for the rent as it becomes due under the terms of the leasehold agreement.\textsuperscript{37} This action comports with the tenant's ownership interest in the leased premises\textsuperscript{38} because the tenant effectively owns the land during the stipulated term of the lease.\textsuperscript{39} The landlord may only collect rent.\textsuperscript{40}

Finally, the landlord may exercise the "tenant's account remedy."\textsuperscript{41} This entitles the landlord to resume possession of the property for the limited purpose of reletting it to a new tenant.\textsuperscript{42} The rent received under the new lease is applied to the defaulting tenant's account.\textsuperscript{43} The land-
lord's damages from the defaulting tenant then amount to the difference between the breaching tenant's rent and the new tenant's rent. The original tenant is not released from liability. Although this option remains available to the landlord it is inconsistent with the conveyance theory because, in essence, the landlord finds a new tenant to place on someone else's land.

Upon his abandonment, the tenant has no control over the landlord's choice of remedies. Although the landlord, through a fiction, has conveyed to the tenant, the tenant is only a limited owner of the premises during the term of the leasehold agreement; therefore, the tenant cannot divest himself of his estate to the landlord's disadvantage through an act of abandonment. The tenant cannot evade liability for the rent by abandoning the premises before the expiration of the leasehold agreement. Consequently, although the landlord owes some limited obligations to the tenant, he otherwise may ignore the granted estate during the term of the leasehold agreement; the landlord need not seek a new tenant upon abandonment by the original tenant.

B. Contract View

Recently, a large body of case law has emerged, forsaking the common law conveyance theory and treating a lease as a contract between a merchant and a consumer for goods and services. Under this contractual theory, the tenant does not receive an ownership interest in the land

44. See, e.g., Williamson, 98 Kan. at 582, 158 P. at 1116; Wilson v. Ruhl, 277 Md. 607, 613, 356 A.2d 544, 548 (1976); Love, supra note 32, at 536-44.
47. See supra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
through the leasehold agreement. Instead he only contracts with the landlord for a "well known package of goods and services" in consideration for his payment of rent.  

Courts viewing the lease as a contract reason that the modern tenant is no longer interested in the land when he enters into a residential leasehold agreement, but rather seeks a dwelling place upon the land. Furthermore, the duties between the landlord and tenant consist of those contracted for in the leasehold agreement. Accordingly, the tenant’s obligation to pay rent stems from the leasehold agreement, not from his limited ownership of the land.

Under the contractual approach, a tenant’s abandonment is treated as a breach, and the avoidable consequence rule obligates the landlord to minimize his damages by making reasonable attempts to secure a substitute tenant. Failure to undertake reasonable efforts to secure an alternative tenant results in a reduced damage recovery for the landlord.

The rationale for this contractual approach is grounded in the nature of today’s urban housing market. The conveyance theory is based on certain assumptions which are no longer valid. The common law conveyance theory comports with the nature of an agrarian economy where


The rationale for this view results from the proliferation of modern urban communities. The common law conveyance theory of leasing is not practical in urban cities where tenants rent for a place to live rather than for the land itself. The productivity of the land is irrelevant and the structure upon the land becomes the focus of the transfer between the landlord and tenant. Consequently, in urban communities the services and responsibilities that attach to the structure are of profound importance to the transaction. The landlord can no longer divorce himself from the effects of the transaction. See infra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.

55. See cases cited infra note 53.
56. As one court reasoned:

The assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal property law, that a lease primarily conveyed to the tenant an interest in land may have been reasonable in a rural, agrarian society . . . [because] the value of the lease to the tenant [was in] the land itself. But in the case of the modern apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that it gives him a place to live.

Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074; see cases cited supra note 53.
57. The parties to the leasehold agreement contract through specific leasehold covenants for the goods and services they require from each other. See Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 454-56, 378 A.2d 767, 771-72 (1977) (citing 2 Powell on Real Property, § 221[1], at 80-81, (1977 ed.)).
58. See MAR-SON, Inc. v. Terwaho Enters., Inc., 259 N.W.2d 289, 291 (N.D. 1977); cases cited supra note 53.
59. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 3, 16-18 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 3-4, 16-18 and accompanying text.
64. See cases cited supra note 53.
the land is more important to a tenant than any structures upon it.\textsuperscript{65} Today's modern tenant merely seeks a dwelling place and, therefore, rents for the purpose of obtaining shelter and services from the landlord.\textsuperscript{66} To ensure that landlords provide the essential shelter and services that the modern tenant seeks,\textsuperscript{67} landlord-tenant law must abandon the conveyance theory and instead apply contractual principles to the leasehold agreement.\textsuperscript{68}

Complexities associated with modern city life\textsuperscript{69} support the application of contractual principles to the leasehold agreement. Problems arising from these complexities are commonly solved with specific leasehold covenants.\textsuperscript{70} Inclusion of these covenants enables courts to "cast aside technicalities in the interpretation of leases and to concentrate their attention, as in the case of other contracts, on the intentions of the parties."\textsuperscript{71}

Courts also infer contractual duties from the leasehold agreement\textsuperscript{72} because tenants generally maintain an inferior bargaining position with respect to landlords.\textsuperscript{73} The application of warranties of habitability to the residential landlord-tenant relationship exemplifies the application of

\textsuperscript{65.} See cases cited supra note 53. Evolving "social factors, [however], have exerted increasing influence on the law of estate for years," justifying rejection of the application of the conveyance theory to modern residential leasehold agreements. Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 454, 378 A.2d 767, 771 (1977) (quoting 2 Powell on Real Property § 221[1], at 180-81 (1977 ed.)).

\textsuperscript{66.} See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); cases cited supra note 53.

\textsuperscript{67.} See infra notes 69, 77 and accompanying text. Applying contract principles to residential leases will help ensure availability of habitable apartments in markets where demand for housing exceeds supply. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{68.} The common law conveyance theory relieves the landlord of all but a few obligations to the tenant and cannot achieve the modern purpose of the leasehold agreement. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077-80; Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane Holding Co., 24 N.J. 139, 145, 130 A.2d 833, 836-37 (1957).

\textsuperscript{69.} Such complexities include the common everyday needs associated with modern urban dwelling. The extensive standards set out in housing regulations provide a good guide for these services. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074 n.9. Examples of such services associated with general housing regulations are hot water, garbage disposal, see, e.g., Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 482, 268 A.2d 556, 559 (1970), and air conditioning, see, e.g., Park Hill Terrace Assocs. v. Glennon, 146 N.J. Super. 271, 276-77, 369 A.2d 938, 941-42 (1977).

\textsuperscript{70.} See Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 454, 378 A.2d 767, 771 (1977) (quoting 2 Powell on Real Property § 221[1], at 181 (1977 ed.)).

\textsuperscript{71.} Sommer, 74 N.J. at 455, 378 A.2d at 772 (quoting 6 Williston on Contracts § 809A, at 592 (3d ed. 1962)). The use of these "specific lease covenants has reintroduced into the law of estates for years a predominantly contractual ingredient." Id. at 454, 378 A.2d at 771 (quoting 2 Powell on Real Property § 221(1) at 181 (1977 ed.)).


\textsuperscript{73.} The landlord's superior bargaining position arises from the fact that he owns the premises and sets the terms of the leasehold agreement. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See generally Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 202, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1976). Inequality in bargaining power also results when the demand for habitable residences exceeds supply. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
modern contract principles to landlord-tenant law.\textsuperscript{74} The landlord's obligation to provide the tenant with habitable premises is now an accepted principle of landlord-tenant law.\textsuperscript{75} Courts have also adopted legislative health regulations in determining the landlord's obligation to the tenant under the implied warranty of habitability.\textsuperscript{76} Courts have thus recognized that treating the lease as a contract, rather than as a conveyance, makes more sense in the modern urban housing market.\textsuperscript{77}

Because the residential leasehold agreement is viewed as a contract between the landlord and tenant, contractual principles, including the avoidable consequence rule, should be applicable.\textsuperscript{78} Courts employ the avoidable consequence rule in every area of contract law,\textsuperscript{79} including

\textsuperscript{74}See Johnson, Correctly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant to Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 Va. L. Rev. 751, 793 n.131 (1988).


\textsuperscript{77}The common law conveyance theory imposes few obligations on the landlord. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{79}See Brown v. Cairns, 63 Kan. 584, 588, 66 P. 639, 640 (1901); Peninsular Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. C.J. Breier Co., 137 Wash. 641, 243 P. 830, 832 (1926); see, e.g., Oakland Metal Stamping Co. v. Forest Indus., Inc., 352 Mich. 119, 125-26, 89 N.W.2d 503, 506 (1958) (buyer of manufactured goods should have rejected the first lot as defective, thus
contracts of employment, sales contracts, and even in cases of breach by anticipatory repudiation. Therefore, it is both logical and consistent with modern contract principles to apply the avoidable consequence rule to residential leasehold agreements.

II. POLICY REASONS FOR ADOPTING THE AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCE RULE

Although the modern view regards a lease as contractual in nature, courts are not bound to apply all contractual principles to the leasehold agreement. Nevertheless, strong policy reasons favor application of the avoidable consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement.

A. Economic Efficiency

Public policy and theories of economic efficiency encourage putting property to its most productive use. This goal is furthered by applying the avoidable consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement. Under the conveyance fiction, when a residential tenant abandons an apartment the landlord may stand idle and collect the full rent as, or after, it accrues, leaving the abandoned apartment vacant for the duration of the breached leasehold agreement. Failure to impose the avoidable consequence rule fosters this inefficient use of residential property. The landlord will be assured of a full recovery in the event of litigation. He therefore has little or no incentive to relet the abandoned apartment. Expenditure of time, effort, and money, such as the cost of ad-

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82. See, e.g., Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v. Krow, 40 F.2d 488, 492-93 (10th Cir. 1930); Cameron v. White, 74 Wis. 425, 431-32, 43 N.W. 155, 157 (1889).
85. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
86. See generally cases cited supra note 84. However, some incentive to act may be provided if the landlord fears that he will be unable to collect a judgment rendered in his favor. Additional incentive may be provided if the housing market will tolerate a higher rent to a new tenant.
vertising, in securing an alternative tenant becomes an unnecessary burden. Because the landlord may withhold a valuable commodity from the economy, an important community resource goes underutilized. Ultimately, the public pays for this inefficiency because it forces a dissipation of private resources to replace the loss. Withholding habitable apartments from the housing market may increase the existing housing shortages in urban areas, resulting in the need to develop additional low-income housing.

Application of the avoidable consequence rule eliminates underutilization of residential space. Upon the tenant’s abandonment, the landlord must avoid any unnecessary accumulation of damages and must make reasonable attempts to secure an alternative tenant. This assures the availability of the abandoned premises. The measure of minimized damages available to the landlord avoids economic waste, while allowing the landlord to maintain the economic position guaranteed by the original tenant’s lease. A rule “designed not only to prevent and repair individual loss and injustice, but also to protect and conserve the economic welfare and prosperity of the whole community,” is an efficient rule that should be applied.

Applying the avoidable consequence rule to the leasehold agreement also comports with the efficient breach theory of contract law. Under the theory of efficient breach, the breach should result in an overall, efficient “pareto optimum” state whereby the aggrieved landlord is no worse off than he was under the existing leasehold agreement, and the breaching tenant is in the same or better position than he was under the original

87. See generally cases cited supra note 84.
89. See id; see also McCormick, The Rights of the Landlord Upon Abandonment of the Premises by the Tenant, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 211, 221-22 (1925).
90. See McCormick, supra note 89, at 221-22.
92. See supra notes 3-4, 16-18 and accompanying text.
93. The avoidable consequence rule limits the landlord’s recovery for the breach of the leasehold agreement to the difference between the rent received from the new tenant and the rent received under the breached agreement. See supra note 18.
94. There is no single rule eliciting the efficiency of this policy, but public policy favors a rule that limits recovery to a measurement based upon minimized damages. Cf. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 242-44, 129 N.E. 889, 890-91 (1921). In Jacobs & Youngs it was held that, if a contractor uses a brand of materials in building a house other than the brand specified in the contract, the measure of damages is the amount by which the contract breach has diminished the value of the house, not the cost of tearing down the house and rebuilding it correctly. See id. at 244-45, 129 N.E. at 891-92. Such decisions by courts incorporate the basic idea that economic waste should be avoided and that damages should be minimized by applying the avoidable consequence rule.
95. C. McCormick, Damages, § 125 (1935).
96. See generally Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1394-97 (1982). An efficient breach of contract is one which results in a net societal gain without economically harming the aggrieved party to the contract. See id.
agreement.\textsuperscript{97} Application of the avoidable consequence rule to the abandonment of residential premises fosters this pareto optimum state because the landlord reoccupies his vacant apartment without suffering any detriment,\textsuperscript{98} while the tenant obtains a better living situation, the presumable reason for his breach.

The avoidable consequence rule further promotes an efficient result by allowing the landlord, in effect, to cover for the tenant's breach of the leasehold agreement.\textsuperscript{99} The landlord occupies a better position than the tenant to cover for the tenant's breach because, in general, he will incur much lower costs.\textsuperscript{100} The landlord is in the business of renting property and usually has business relationships which make his cover costs, such as advertising, much cheaper.\textsuperscript{101} Furthermore, if the breaching tenant relocates somewhere far from the landlord's apartment, it will be virtually impossible for him to find a new tenant.\textsuperscript{102} Moreover, the landlord obviously knows more than the tenant about his own special needs in securing a replacement tenant.\textsuperscript{103}

Last, angry landlords may seek vengeance\textsuperscript{104} by refusing to accept a suitable alternative tenant merely because of their personal dislike of the original breaching tenant.\textsuperscript{105} Applying the avoidable consequence rule prevents such spiteful actions because the rational landlord will more likely examine his motives for vengeance if his ultimate monetary recovery will be reduced by such unproductive conduct.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{97} Cf. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) (a pareto optimum breach results in a "net societal gain"); Yorio, \textit{supra} note 96 at 1394, n.150 ("if one person's situation can be improved without causing a loss to anyone else, a clear societal gain will occur, resulting in a 'pareto improvement' over the old."). \textit{See generally} J. Hirshleifer, \textit{Price Theory and Application} (3d ed. 1980); R. Posner, \textit{Economic Analysis of the Law} (2d ed. 1977).

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{See supra} note 18.

\textsuperscript{99} \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{100} Cf. Yorio, \textit{supra} note 96, at 1384-85 (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller in a sales contract). This position is further justified by the fact that tenants usually occupy a bargaining position greatly inferior to that of landlords. \textit{See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.}, 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), \textit{cert. denied}, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); \textit{Lefrak v. Lambert}, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 202, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1976); \textit{supra} note 72 and accompanying text. Landlords typically have more resources available to secure an alternative tenant than does the breaching tenant. \textit{Cf. Sommer v. Kridel}, 74 N.J. 446, 456, 378 A.2d 767, 772 (1977) (landlord is in better position to demonstrate whether he exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to relet the premises).

\textsuperscript{101} Cf. Yorio, \textit{supra} note 96, at 1384 (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller in a sales contract).

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Id.} (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller in a sales contract).

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Id.} (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller in a sales contract).

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Id.} at 1384-85 (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller in a sales contract).

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Id.} at 1385-86 (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller in a sales contract).

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Cf. In Re Estate of Pace}, 93 Misc. 2d 969, 974, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (Sur. Ct. 1977) ("[A]lthough a person may wish to deal capriciously with his property, . . . his self-interest will usually prevent him from doing so.").
B. Rejection of Traditional No-Mitigation Approach

In addition to promoting efficient results, applying the avoidable consequence rule also produces the more equitable result for the tenant.107 Because the landlord maintains a better bargaining position than the tenant,108 as a "matter of basic fairness"109 the landlord should make a reasonable attempt to cover the tenant's breach. Requiring the tenant to pay for his breach when an acceptable, alternate tenant is available is unduly punitive.110 Unfortunately, the no mitigation rule is often rationalized with traditional legal principles. The remainder of this Note examines these principles and concludes that they do not logically support a no mitigation rule.

A traditional argument raised against the application of the avoidable consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement asserts that requiring the landlord to minimize his damages by attempting to secure a replacement tenant upon the original tenant's abandonment requires the landlord to alter or increase his obligation under the original leasehold agreement.111 This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it is incorrect to interpret the avoidable consequence rule as placing an af-

108. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
109. Sommer, 74 N.J. at 456, 378 A.2d at 772. Although a reasonable tenant might attempt to mitigate his own damages by bringing in an alternative tenant, the inequity in the ability to do this indicates that the duty to mitigate should fall upon the landlord.
110. In Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977), the landlord waited fifteen months and allowed $4,658.50 in damages to accrue before attempting to relet the apartment. See id. at 457, 378 A.2d at 773. Despite the availability of a tenant who was ready, willing, and able to rent the apartment, the landlord needlessly increased his damages by turning her away. See id. There was no showing by the landlord that the alternative tenant was not a suitable one. See id. at 458, 378 A.2d at 773.
111. The logic . . . which permits the landlord to stand idly by the vacant, abandoned premises and treat them as property of the tenant and recover full rent, [must] yield to more realistic notions of social advantage which in other fields of law have forbidden a recovery for damages which the plaintiff by reasonable efforts could have avoided." Id. at 456, 378 A.2d at 772 (quoting McCormick, supra note 89, at 221-22). See generally Kaufman, The Scientific Method in Legal Thought: Legal Realism and the Fourteen Principles of Justice, 12 St. Mary's L.J. 77, 96-97 (1980).
112. See Wohl v. Yelen, 22 Ill. App. 2d 455, 464, 161 N.E.2d 339, 343 (1959). It has also been argued, in some jurisdictions, that an attempt to mitigate damages may be construed as an automatic termination of the leasehold agreement when the tenant is not in possession of the premises. Such agreements are called survival of liability clauses. See Rosenfeld v. Aaron, 248 N.Y. 437, 442, 162 N.E. 478, 479 (1928) ("Survivorship Clause"); Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N.Y. 381, 390, 62 N.E. 425, 427 (1902) ("covenant to pay, with no right to enjoy"). See generally J. Rosch, New York Landlord & Tenant Summary Proceedings § 785, at 236 (2d ed. 1971). As such, the landlord will lose all rights to damages from the tenant. However, this does not justify a no mitigation rule because in these jurisdictions the landlord and tenant may agree that the tenant will be liable for the duration of the leasehold agreement even though the tenant is out of possession. See International Publication, Inc. v. Matchabelli, 260 N.Y. 451, 454, 184 N.E. 51, 52 (1933).
firmative duty upon the landlord. 

The landlord need not act, and may still hold the breaching tenant liable. 

By doing so, however, he may receive a reduced recovery. 

The reduction in the landlord's recovery does not result from the tenant's malfeasance, but rather from the landlord's own failure to minimize damages. 

Second, this argument fails to explain why a landlord should be treated differently from any other party against whom a contractual breach has been committed. 

It is a general principle of law that an injured party is prohibited from recovering damages for harm suffered if he could have taken reasonable steps to prevent such harm. 

Another argument against applying the avoidable consequence rule to the leasehold agreement is that the landlord-tenant relationship is personal. 

To require the landlord to seek a substitute tenant may compel him to accept, in a personal relationship, a party with whom he does not wish to conduct business. This argument is flawed, however, because the avoidable consequence rule does not require a landlord to relet to any replacement tenant. The rule merely requires objectively reasonable efforts on the part of the plaintiff to minimize his damages. 

Such objective reasonable efforts need not be successful. 

Moreover, courts apply the avoidable consequence rule in employment contracts, which are more personal in nature than leases. A wrongfully discharged employee under an employment contract must attempt to minimize his damages by seeking employment elsewhere. In applying the avoidable consequence rule in the employment context, courts have adopted an objective test in determining the extent of the employee's ob-

112. See supra note 3. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. 
115. See id. 
117. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. 
118. Cf. Wohl v. Yelen, 22 Ill. App. 2d 455, 464, 161 N.E.2d 339, 343 (1959) (mitigation required even in employment contracts, where personal element is even more important). 
119. See id. 
120. The avoidable consequence rule is based on the unreasonableness of the non-breaching party's actions. See 5 A. Corbin, Contracts, § 1039 (1964). It does not force the landlord to accept an alternative tenant who is not a suitable substitute. See infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text. 
121. See Ninth Ave. & Forty-Second St. Corp. v. Zimmerman, 217 A.D. 498, 500, 217 N.Y.S. 123, 125 (1st Dep't 1926). These efforts need not involve unreasonable expenses, cf. Taylor v. Steadman, 143 Ark. 486, 220 S.W. 821, 823 (1920) (party whose property was flooded by neighbor's diversion of water from a creek need only expend reasonable effort and expense to mitigate his damages); Chambers v. Belmore Land & Water Co., 33 Cal. App. 78, 80, 164 P. 404, 406 (1917), nor jeopardize the landlord's credit rating, see Audiger, Inc. v. Town of Hamilton, 381 F.2d 24, 25 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam). 
ligation to seek alternative employment. The discharged employee need not minimize his damages by accepting employment in a different position or on different terms, employment at a lesser rank, at a reduced salary, or at a location unreasonably distant from his former place of employment.

Courts may easily adapt a similar test to the landlord-tenant relationship. The landlord need not relet to a tenant who will use the premises for a substantially different purpose than that contemplated in the original lease. Nor must the landlord alter or increase his obligations in order to secure a replacement tenant. Objective factors such as whether the tenant is financially ready, willing and able to comply with the terms of the breaching tenant's agreement help determine the alternative tenant's suitability. Moreover, the landlord need only expend rea-

123. See cases cited supra note 122; see also infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., American Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 F. 774, 783 (9th Cir. 1921) (chief accountant need not accept position as bookkeeper); Billetter v. Posell, 94 Cal. App. 2d 858, 211 P.2d 621, 623 (1949) (employee not required to accept re-employment in mitigation of damages if new employment would bring lower salary or would sacrifice employee's rights to damages under original contract); San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Collins, 61 S.W.2d 84, 89 (Tex. App. 1933) (wrongfully discharged railroad employee not required to accept work which is not of substantially same status, capacity or grade as previous position).
125. See, e.g., Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 182-83, 474 P.2d 689, 692-93, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740-41 (1970) (actress engaged as lead in a musical film need not accept a substitute role as lead in a western film); Cooper v. Stronge & Warner Co., 111 Minn. 177, 126 N.W. 541 (1910) (department manager need not accept a position as a sales clerk for the same salary).
126. See, e.g., State ex rel. Freeman v. Sierra County Bd. of Educ., 49 N.M. 54, 157 P.2d 234 (1945) (principal need not accept a job as a teacher for a reduced salary).
127. See, e.g., American Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 F. 774, 783 (9th Cir. 1921) (resident of China hired in the Orient need not seek employment in the United States); San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Collins, 61 S.W.2d 84, 89 (Tex. App. 1933) (resident of Houston need not accept employment in San Antonio).
128. See, e.g., Foggia v. Dix, 265 Or. 315, 321, 309 P.2d 412, 414-15 (1972) (holding that landlord could restrict reletting to all dentists when he attempted to minimize damages).
129. See id.
130. See, e.g., Marmont v. Axe, 135 Kan. 368, 369, 10 P.2d 826, 827 (1932) (factors applied to commercial leasehold agreement). For example, the Alaska residential landlord and tenant statute specifies the grounds on which the landlord may reject an alternative tenant:
   1. insufficient credit standing or financial responsibility;
   2. number of persons in the household;
   3. number of persons under 18 years of age in the household;
   4. unwillingness of the prospective occupant to assume the same terms as are included in the existing rental agreement;
   5. proposed maintenance of pets;
   6. proposed commercial activity; or
   7. written information signed by a previous landlord, which shall accompany the rejection, setting out abuses of other premises occupied by the prospective occupant.
Alaska Stat. § 34.03.060(d) (1975); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1951.4 (West 1985). See generally Weissenberger, supra note 8, at 12 n.52. The issue is essentially one of fact to be
sonably diligent efforts in searching for a substitute tenant.\textsuperscript{131}

A third argument traditionally used to support the common law no mitigation rule relies upon the contractual theory sometimes referred to as the "lost volume" seller's rule.\textsuperscript{132} The rule, as applied to the landlord-tenant relationship, provides that the landlord of a multi-unit building with empty apartments will not be able to minimize his damages by simply reletting a breaching tenant's apartment, because, by doing so, he may lose the opportunity to lease one of his other vacant apartments.\textsuperscript{133}

This argument proves no more compelling than the other two, however, because the avoidable consequence rule is based upon the reasonableness of the aggrieved party's efforts to minimize his damages.\textsuperscript{134} The avoidable consequence rule can be applied on a case-by-case basis when determined by the jury. See Friedman v. Colonial Oil Co., 236 Iowa 140, 18 N.W.2d 196, 198 (1945).


The lost-seller's volume rule traditionally is applied to the breach of a sales contract. According to the theory, the aggrieved promisee in a breach of contract should not suffer for ensuing losses that he cannot truly prevent by making a substitute contract with another party. See Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972). This will occur when the substitute contract would have been available to the promisee even if the original contract had not been breached. In other words, but for the breach, the promisee could have had the advantage of both the original and the second substitute contract. Accordingly, the second substitute contract does not truly mitigate the loss from the breach of the first contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 comment f, § 350 comment d (1981).

For example, in \textit{Neri}, the buyer agreed to purchase a boat from the seller. After a down payment was rendered, the buyer defaulted on the contract. See \textit{Neri}, 30 N.Y.2d at 395, 285 N.E.2d at 312, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 166-67. The seller quickly secured an alternative buyer for the boat. See \textit{id.} at 396, 285 N.E.2d at 312, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 167. The original buyer claimed that by doing this the seller mitigated his damages and, therefore, he was liable only for any offset between the two contract prices. See \textit{id.} at 396, 285 N.E.2d at 312, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 167. The court, however, held that the loss of the original contract was unmitigatable because the second, alternate buyer could have purchased an entirely different boat from the seller, resulting in the advantage of two boat sales to the seller. See \textit{id.} Consequently, the seller was awarded the value of the lost sale. See \textit{id.} at 401, 285 N.E.2d at 315, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 171.

134. See supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
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dealing with multiple vacant units. In certain cases, when equity favors the landlord, courts should not strictly enforce the mitigation doctrine. The rule does not require the landlord to actually secure an alternative tenant, but merely to make reasonable efforts to secure a new tenant. For example, courts should take into account the number of vacant units the landlord has for rent in determining the reasonableness of this effort. However, in most populated urban areas where significant housing shortages exist, the availability of numerous, acceptable, alternative tenants should place a greater burden upon the landlord in making a reasonable effort to locate a replacement tenant.

A final argument against applying the avoidable consequence rule to residential leasehold agreements holds that the rule will make tenants less prone to complete the term of the lease. The tenant will not fear the consequences of abandonment if he knows that the landlord must attempt to relet his vacant apartment. Moreover, such widespread abandonment of property is an invitation to vandalism.

This ignores reality. Requiring the landlord to minimize his damages does not completely relieve the tenant of his leasehold obligation. The tenant remains liable to the landlord for that amount over and above the rent that is secured from a replacement tenant. Because the landlord will receive this offset from the abandoning tenant, he will not hesitate to relet to a substitute tenant at a cheaper rent, imposing this additional financial burden on the abandoning tenant. Furthermore, the abandoning tenant also must pay rent in order to live somewhere else.

135. See, e.g., Dushoff v. Phoenix Co., 22 Ariz. App. 445, 528 P.2d 637, 641 (1974) ("Reasonableness is to be determined by an examination of the totality of circumstances giving due regard to the efforts of the landlord in renting the abandoned premises, and the number of units he has for rent."); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 457, 378 A.2d 767, 773 (1977) ("If the landlord has other vacant apartments besides the one which the tenant has abandoned, the landlord’s duty to mitigate consists of making reasonable efforts to re-let the apartment."). For example, a landlord of a multiple-unit dwelling with several vacant apartments would not be required to make special efforts to re-let a breaking tenant’s apartment rather than the other available units.


137. Officials around the nation are concerned that over the next decade more than one half million low- and moderate-income families may be ousted from federally subsidized apartments built in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Estimates from a current New York City survey indicate that there were approximately 72,050 vacant residential apartments for the year 1987. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at B1, col. 4. Many tenant advocates believe a significant number of these apartments were deliberately kept off the rental market by landlords attempting to “warehouse” them prior to conversion into cooperatives or condominiums. See id. Preventing warehousing would alleviate the current housing shortage by freeing up a significant number of low-income rental apartments. See id.

138. See Restatement (Second) of Property § 12.1 comment i, at 392 (1977).

139. See id.

140. See id.

136. See supra notes 3-4, 16-18 and accompanying text.

142. See id.

143. See Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 466, 308 A.2d 17, 20 (1973) ("[The tenant]
possibility of such harsh financial burdens will discourage involuntary and unnecessary abandonments by residential tenants. In addition, because application of the avoidable consequence rule requires the landlord to attempt to relet the premises,144 vacancies will not persist. This is especially true in most urban areas where significant housing shortages exist.145

CONCLUSION

The controversy over whether to apply the avoidable consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement arises from a disagreement about whether the basic nature of a lease is a conveyance of land or a contract. To comport with modern needs, courts have applied contractual principles to the leasehold agreement. This Note concludes that this is the better view, and therefore the avoidable consequence rule, a principle of contract law, should be applied to the residential leasehold agreement. Moreover, policy reasons support application of the avoidable consequence to the residential leasehold agreement. The rule fosters efficiency and maintains equity between the landlord and tenant.

In most jurisdictions, the trend toward the adoption of the avoidable consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement has been primarily statutory.146 This produces a more efficient and equitable system by giving each jurisdiction the capacity to tailor the rule to its own particular housing market. For example, the Tennessee statute requires landlords to mitigate damages only in densely populated areas.147 This policy recognizes the difficulties that a landlord in a rural area may encounter in securing an alternative tenant. Thus, an apparent resolution of the confusion among the courts is for state legislatures to adopt statutes applying the rule to residential leasehold agreements. Until this is done, however, courts should clarify the existing confusion by judicially imposing the avoidable consequence rule to residential leasehold agreements.

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may be unable to find other quarters that he can afford and that he wishes to rent and in any event he will be saddled with the not inconsiderable expenses of moving.”).

144. See supra notes 3-4, 16-18 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 15.
147. See id.