The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction

Lester M. Salamon*
The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction

Lester M. Salamon

Abstract

A fundamental re-thinking is currently underway throughout the world about how to cope with public problems. Stimulated by popular frustrations with the cost and effectiveness of government programs and by a new-found faith in liberal economic theories, serious questions are being raised about the capabilities, and even the motivations, of public-sector institutions. This type of questioning has spread beyond American political discourse to other parts of the world. Underlying much of this reform surge is a set of theories that portrays government agencies as tightly structured hierarchies insulated from market forces and from effective citizen pressure and therefore free to serve the personal and institutional interests of bureaucrats instead. The heart of this revolution has been a fundamental transformation not just in the scope and scale of government action, but in its basic forms. Instead of relying exclusively on government to solve public problems, a host of other actors is being mobilized as well, sometimes are their own initiative but often in complex partnerships with the state.
THE NEW GOVERNANCE AND THE TOOLS OF PUBLIC ACTION: AN INTRODUCTION

Lester M. Salamon*

In economic life the possibilities for rational social action, for planning, for reform—in short, for solving problems—depend not upon our choice among mythical grand alternatives but largely upon choice among particular social techniques... techniques and not “isms” are the kernel of rational social action in the Western world.1

* * *

Far-reaching developments in the global economy have us revisiting basic questions about government: what its role should be, what it can and cannot do, and how best to do it.2

INTRODUCTION: THE REVOLUTION THAT NO ONE NOTICED

A fundamental re-thinking is currently underway throughout the world about how to cope with public problems.3 Stimulated by popular frustrations with the cost and effectiveness of government programs and by a new-found faith in liberal economic theories, serious questions are being raised about the capabilities, and even the motivations, of public-sector institutions. Long a staple of American political discourse, such questioning has spread to other parts of the world as well, unleashing an extraordinary torrent of

---

* Lester M. Salamon is a Professor at the Johns Hopkins University and the Director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies. This article is adapted from the introduction to THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2001).

1. ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE 6, 16 (1953).


3. Id.; see also Donald F. Kettl, The Global Revolution in Public Management: Driving Themes, and Missing Links, 16 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 446 (1997) (noting that the “managerialism movement has radically transformed democracy” and suggesting that we must build new administrative capacity and ask “what government should do, and how can it do it best?”); CHRISTOPHER POLLITT, MANAGERIALISM AND THE PUBLIC SERVICES: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1990) (arguing that the novel approach to public services, found in “managerialism,” needs to be grasped for its ideological weight and immediate consequences).
As a consequence, governments from the United States and Canada to Malaysia and New Zealand are being challenged to reinvent, downsize, privatize, devolve, decentralize, deregulate and de-layer themselves, subject themselves to performance tests, and contract themselves out.

Underlying much of this reform surge is a set of theories that portrays government agencies as tightly structured hierarchies insulated from market forces and from effective citizen pressure and therefore free to serve the personal and institutional interests of bureaucrats instead. Even defenders of government among the reformers argue that we are saddled with the wrong kinds of governments at the present time, industrial-era governments "with their sluggish, centralized bureaucracies, their preoccupation with rules and regulations, and their hierarchical chains of command."  

Largely overlooked in these accounts, however, is the extent to which the structure of modern government already embodies many of the features that these reforms seek to implement. In point of fact, a technological revolution has taken place in the operation of the public sector over the past fifty years both in the United States and, increasingly, in other parts of the world; but it is a revolution that few people recognize.

The heart of this revolution has been a fundamental transformation not just in the scope and scale of government action, but in its basic *forms*. A massive proliferation has occurred in the *tools* of public action, in the *instruments* or means used to address public problems. Where earlier government activity was largely restricted to the direct delivery of goods or services by government bureaucrats, it now embraces a dizzying array of loans, loan guarantees, grants, contracts, social regulation, economic regulation, insurance, tax expenditures, vouchers, and much more.

---

4. *Shahid J. Burki & Guillermo E. Perry, Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter* (1998) (discussing the growing demand and need for institutional reforms in Latin America and Caribbean Countries ("LAC") in the private sector to reduce LAC vulnerability, and to provide a safety net for those most affected by global changes).


What makes this development particularly significant is that each of these tools has its own operating procedures, its own skill requirements, its own delivery mechanism, indeed its own "political economy." Each therefore imparts its own "twist" to the operation of the programs that embody it. Loan guarantees, for example, rely on commercial banks to extend assisted credit to qualified borrowers. In the process, commercial lending officers become the implementing agents of government lending programs. Since private bankers have their own world-view, their own decision rules, and their own priorities, left to their own devices they likely will produce programs that differ markedly from those that would result from direct government lending, not to mention outright government grants.

Perhaps most importantly, like loan guarantees, many of these "newer" tools share an important common feature: they are highly indirect. They rely heavily on a wide assortment of "third parties"—commercial banks, private hospitals, social service agencies, industrial corporations, universities, day-care centers, other levels of government, financiers, construction firms, and many more—to deliver publicly financed services and pursue authorized public purposes. The upshot is an elaborate system of third-party government in which crucial elements of public authority are shared with a host of non-governmental or other-governmental actors, frequently in complex collaborative systems that sometimes defy comprehension, let alone effective management and control. In a sense, the "public administration problem" has leapt beyond the borders of the public agency and now embraces a wide assortment of "third parties" that are intimately involved in the implementation, and often the management, of the public's business.

Take, for example, the system for delivery of publicly financed mental health services in Tucson, Arizona. Funding for such services comes from a variety of federal and state government programs. However, no federal or state bureaucrat ever comes in contact with any mentally ill person. Indeed, no federal or state bureaucrat even comes in contact with any local government official or private agency employee who actually delivers services to the mentally ill. Rather, the entire system is operated at two and three steps removed. The State of Arizona not only contracts out the delivery of mental health services: it also contracts out the con-
tracting out of mental health services. It does so through a "master contract" with a private, nonprofit local mental health authority called ADAPT, Inc. ADAPT, in turn, handles all dealings with more than twenty other local agencies that deliver mental health services in the Tucson area with funds provided by state and federal programs. Although this may be an extreme case, the phenomenon it exemplifies has been a central part of public sector operations for well over a generation now.

What is involved here, moreover, is not simply the delegation of clearly defined ministerial duties to closely regulated agents of the state. That is a long-standing feature of government operations stretching back for generations. What is distinctive about many of the newer tools of public action is that they involve the sharing with third-party actors of a far more basic governmental function: the exercise of discretion over the use of public authority and the spending of public funds. Thanks to the nature of many of these tools and the sheer scale and complexity of current government operations, a major share—in many cases the major share—of the discretion over the operation of public programs routinely comes to rest not with the responsible governmental agencies but with the third-party actors that actually carry the programs out.

This development has proceeded especially far in the United States, where hostility to government has long been a staple of political life, and where the expansion of governmental programs consequently has had to proceed in a highly circuitous way. Contracting arrangements invented to fight the Revolutionary War and later elaborated to handle the far more complex tasks of product development during World War II were thus quickly expanded in the aftermath of that war to fields as diverse as agriculture, health, space exploration, and social services. Grants-in-aid, loan guarantees, social regulations, insurance, and other indirect instruments

---

8. Id.
9. Id.
have expanded as well.\textsuperscript{12} As Donald Kettl has reminded us, "[e]very major policy initiative launched by the federal government since World War II—including medicare and medicaid, environmental cleanup and restoration, antipoverty programs and job training, interstate highways and sewage treatment plants—has been managed through public-private partnerships."\textsuperscript{13}

Reflecting this, a study of a cross-section of United States communities carried out by this author in the early 1980s found that the majority of the government-financed human services available at the local level was already being delivered by private nonprofit and for-profit organizations as of that date, and this was well before the advocates of "privatization," contracting out, and "reinventing government" had proposed it.\textsuperscript{14} In particular, as shown in Table 1, government agencies delivered only forty percent of these publicly funded services while private agencies—both nonprofit and for-profit—delivered sixty percent.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Table 1: Share of Government-Funded Human Services Delivered by Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Government Agencies in Sixteen Communities (1982)}\textsuperscript{16} (Weighted Average)\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Services</th>
<th>Nonprofits</th>
<th>For-Profits</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment/training</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing/community development</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts/culture</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Figures are weighted by the scale of government spending in the sixteen sites. Percentages shown represent the share of all spending in all sites taken together that fall in the respective categories.

\textsuperscript{b} Less than 0.5 percent.

Instead of the centralized hierarchical agencies delivering standardized services that is caricatured in much of the current reform literature and most of our political rhetoric, what exists in most


\textsuperscript{13} Kettl, \textit{supra} note 11, at 4.


\textsuperscript{15} Id.

\textsuperscript{16} Salamon, \textit{supra} note 14, at 88.
spheres of policy is a dense mosaic of policy tools, many of them placing public agencies in complex, interdependent relationships with a host of third-party partners. Almost none of the federal government's more than $300 billion annual involvement in the housing field, for example, bears much resemblance to the classic picture of bureaucrats providing services to citizens. Rather, nearly $190 billion takes the form of loan guarantees to underwrite mortgage credit extended by private commercial banks; another $114 billion takes the form of tax subsidies that flow to homeowners through the income tax system; and more than $20 billion takes the form of housing vouchers administered by semi-autonomous local housing authorities to finance housing provided by private landlords\(^\text{17}\) (see Table 2).

**Table 2: Federal Housing Programs, by Type of Tool (FY 1999)**\(^\text{18}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Tool</th>
<th>Amount ($ bns)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies (Sec. 8)</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage credit</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public housing</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural housing</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans housing</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan guarantees</td>
<td>187.6</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct loans</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax expenditures</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>303.1</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>332.8</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More generally, as reflected in Table 3, the direct provision of goods or services by government bureaucrats accounts for only five percent of the activity of the United States federal government. Even with income transfers, direct loans, and interest payments counted as "direct government," the direct activities of the federal government amount to only one-fourth (twenty-eight percent) of its activities. Far larger in scale are other instruments of public action—contracting, grants-in-aid, vouchers, tax expenditures, loan guarantees, government-sponsored enterprises, insurance, and regulation, to name just a few. Including just the $376 billion in net

---


additions to deposit insurance in 1999, and not the additional considerable amounts of pension, crop, and disaster insurance, a rough estimate would put the total monetary value of these activities in the neighborhood of $2.5 trillion as of Fiscal Year 1999, two-and-a-half times higher than the roughly $1 trillion in direct activities in which the federal government is engaged, and one-and-a-half times higher than the amounts recorded as outlays in the Federal budget that year. This highlights another interesting feature of many of these more indirect tools: they often do not show up on the government's budget, which further helps to explain their attractiveness.

**Table 3: Scale of U.S. Federal Government Activity, Tool of Public Action, FY 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool of Public Action</th>
<th>Amt ($ bns)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Government Goods and Services</td>
<td>186.8</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income support</td>
<td>550.4</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>229.7</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct loans (Obligations)</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal, Direct</strong></td>
<td><strong>1005.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.1%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting</td>
<td>198.8</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>286.4</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vouchers</td>
<td>251.0</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax expenditures</td>
<td>602.0</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan guarantees (Commitments)</td>
<td>252.4</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt-sponsored enterprises (Loans)</td>
<td>409.2</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance (Deposit insurance)</td>
<td>376.1</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>200.0</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal, Indirect</strong></td>
<td><strong>2575.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>71.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3581.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget outlays</td>
<td>1703.1</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other activity</td>
<td>1878.1</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This reliance on third parties to deliver publicly funded services is not an exclusively American phenomenon, however. It has also

---

been a classic—if largely overlooked—feature of the European welfare states, at least outside of Scandinavia. In the Netherlands, for example, a fierce conflict between secular and religious communities in the late nineteenth century over control of public education was resolved early in the twentieth century by a compromise under which the state was called on to finance elementary and secondary education but to leave the actual provision in the hands of private schools, many of them religiously affiliated.\textsuperscript{20} As government was enlisted to assist in the provision of health care, social services, and even humanitarian assistance overseas, this same model was replicated in these other spheres, producing a widespread pattern known as “pillarization” under which state resources are used to finance services delivered by private institutions organized along religious and, later, ideological lines.\textsuperscript{21} A similar phenomenon is also apparent in Germany, where the Catholic doctrine of “subsidiarity” has been enshrined in basic law, obliging the state to turn first to the “free welfare associations” to address social needs before enlisting state institutions.\textsuperscript{22} Belgium, Ireland, Israel, and other nations also exhibit a similar pattern. Even France, long known for its centralized governmental structure and highly developed state welfare provision dramatically increased its reliance on government contracts with private nonprofit institutions during the 1980s to implement a major decentralization of social welfare functions.\textsuperscript{23} The upshot is that many countries in Western Europe have nonprofit sectors quite a bit larger than that in the United States, financed largely through grants and contracts from the state, as reflected in Figure 1 below.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21} Id. at 19, 26-30.
\textsuperscript{24} Lester M. Salamon et al., Johns Hopkins Inst. for Pol’y Studies, Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector 14 (1999).
THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM

The proliferation of these new tools of public action has created new opportunities to tailor public action to the nature of public problems. It also has made it possible to enlist a wide assortment of different actors—governmental as well as nongovernmental—in meeting public needs. At the same time, however, this same development has vastly complicated the task of public management. In-

25. Id.
stead of a single form of action, public managers must master a host of different "technologies" of public action, each with its own decision rules, its own rhythms, its own agents, and its own challenges. Policy-makers likewise must weigh a far more elaborate set of considerations in deciding not just whether, but also how, to act; and then how to achieve some accountability for the results. And the public at large somehow must find ways to make sense of the disparate actions that are then taken on their behalf by complex networks of public and private actors. One of the central conclusions of the new field of "implementation studies" that emerged in the 1970s, in fact, was that the convoluted structure of many public programs was the source of many of the problems causing public programs to fall short of their promise.

Regrettably, however, existing concepts of public administration and public policy offer little help in coming to terms with these dilemmas. Traditional public administration remains preoccupied with the internal operations of public agencies—their procedures for staff recruitment, budgeting, and task accomplishment. Indeed, a cardinal tenet of the field has been that the management of public affairs is best left to neutral professionals organized in public agencies that are arrayed in hierarchical fashion and therefore able to achieve the needed specialization of functions so crucial to effective operations and democratic control. Such concepts leave little room for the proliferation of new forms of public action featuring the widespread surrender of key elements of discretionary authority over the exercise of public authority and the spending of public funds to a host of non-governmental or other-governmental actors. "Much of the time, when 'government' does something, it is the [government] employees who really take action," one recent text thus notes, conveniently overlooking the fact that in the current era it is mostly government's third-party partners that take the action instead.

Nor does the new field of policy analysis that has recently gained prominence offer much help. The central preoccupation of this field has been the application of sophisticated techniques of microeconomics to the analysis of public problems. Of far less con-

26. E.g., Jeffrey L. Pressman & Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (1973); see also Kettl, supra note 11, at 4-5.
cern has been the nitty-gritty of actual program operations. Indeed, the implementation of public programs has long been the "missing link" in the policy analysis worldview.\textsuperscript{29}

Even the "new public management,"\textsuperscript{30} and the "reinventing government movement"\textsuperscript{31} that it helped spawn, have failed to improve much on this record. To be sure, this line of thinking has made the use of alternative instruments a major goal of public sector reform.\textsuperscript{32} But to justify this prescription, as we have seen, reinventing enthusiasts have embraced a caricature of current government operations that overlooks the extent to which such instruments already have been adopted. In the process, they downplay the immense difficulties that these instruments entail and the strong possibility that the reforms they are espousing may be the source, rather than the cure, for the problems they are seeking to remedy.

What this suggests is that government does not need to be "reinvented," as the new public management has suggested. That process is already well along. The great challenge now is to find a way to comprehend, and to manage, the reinvented government we have produced. For that, however, a new approach is needed, one that acknowledges the existence and likely persistence of "third-party government," and that focuses more coherently and explicitly on the distinctive challenges that it poses.

Fortunately, some progress has been made in developing such an approach. A half century ago, for example, Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom called attention to the rapid innovation in techniques of social intervention already in evidence, referring to it as "perhaps the greatest political revolution of our times."\textsuperscript{33} Frederick C. Mosher returned to this theme in the early 1980s, emphaz-

\textsuperscript{29} Erwin C. Hargrove, \textit{The Missing Link: The Study of the Implementation of Social Policy} (1975). A considerable body of "implementation" literature has emerged in more recent years, but, as noted below, it has not systematically come to terms with the array of new tools of public action either. \textit{Infra} note 43 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{31} E.g., Osborne \& Gaebler, \textit{supra} note 6, at 19.


\textsuperscript{33} Dahl \& Lindblom, \textit{supra} note 1, at 8.
ing our failure to take sufficient account of the extent to which the federal government in the United States had changed its role from one of doing to one of arranging.\textsuperscript{34} And this author, at around the same time, proposed a wholly new focus for public management training and research concentrating on the distinctive tools or instruments through which the public sector increasingly operates.\textsuperscript{35}

Despite some useful progress in formulating such a "tools framework,"\textsuperscript{36} and the further proliferation in the use of diverse policy tools, however, most of our political rhetoric and much of our public administration training remains dominated by the image of the centralized bureaucratic state, as a recent survey of public administration textbooks makes clear.\textsuperscript{37}

The purpose of this article, and the book from which it is drawn,\textsuperscript{38} is to remedy this situation, to bring the new tools of public action that are now in widespread use to the center of public and professional attention. In the process, it suggests a new approach

\textsuperscript{34} Frederick C. Mosher, \textit{The Changing Responsibilities and Tactics of the Federal government}, 40 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 541 (1980).


The tool of grants-in-aid has been examined thoroughly in a series of publications produced by the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations during the 1970s and early 1980s and in U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, \textit{Managing Federal Assistance in the 1980s} (1983). "Regulation" has been examined as a tool of public action in a number of studies, including Charles L. Schultze, \textit{The Public Use of Private Interest} (1977); and Neil Gunningham et al., \textit{Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy} (1998).

\textsuperscript{37} Beverly Cigler, \textit{A Sampling of Introductory Public Administration Texts}, 6 J. PUB. AFFAIRS EDUC. 48, 51 (2000). For evidence that some headway is being made, see H. George Frederickson, \textit{The Spirit of Public Administration} 4-11, 78-96 (1997).

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance} (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2001). This book builds on an earlier volume that first elaborated on the concept of tools of government. Salamon, supra note 12. Where that earlier volume focused on only six tools, however, this newer work extends the analysis to many more and adds a series of analyses of the cross-cutting issues such as management and accountability that third-party government poses.
to public problem-solving for the era of "third-party government" in which we find ourselves. I call this approach the "new governance" to underline its two defining features. The first of these, signified by use of the term "governance" instead of "government," is an emphasis on what is perhaps the central reality of public problem-solving for the foreseeable future—namely, its collaborative nature, its reliance on a wide array of third parties in addition to government to address public problems and pursue public purposes. Such an approach is necessary because problems have become too complex for government to handle on its own, because disagreements exist about the proper ends of public action, and because government increasingly lacks the authority to enforce its will on other crucial actors without giving them a meaningful seat at the table. The second feature, signified by use of the term "new," is a recognition that these collaborative approaches, although hardly novel, now must be approached in a new, more coherent way, one that acknowledges more explicitly the significant challenges that they pose as well as the important opportunities they create.

The purpose of this article is to outline this approach in more detail and to introduce some of the basic concepts on which it rests. To do so, the discussion falls into three sections. The first section introduces the major features of the "new governance" paradigm and shows how they relate to existing conceptualizations in the field. The second section then spells out some of the basic analytics of the approach—what is meant by a "tool" of public action, how tools can be assessed, and what dimensions of tools are consequently most important. The final section then outlines some of the steps that still are needed to put this approach into effect.

II. The "New Governance" Paradigm

Like any new approach to a topic as old as public administration, the "new governance" is hardly entirely novel. Rather, it builds on a rich history of past thinking, changing emphases and incorporat-

39. I am indebted to George Frederickson for his suggestion to use the term "governance" to depict what I earlier termed the "tools approach" to public problem-solving. H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 78 (1997). Frederickson uses the term "governance" to refer to a broader array of phenomena than is intended by the term here—namely the processes of policy formation as well as implementation. The central idea of multiple stakeholders involved in the task of governing remains the same, however. As noted below, I have added the term "new" to the term "governance" to suggest a greater consciousness about the challenges that the new tools pose and the consequences that flow from their use.
ing new elements, but hardly replacing all that has gone before. The result, however, is a new synthesis, a new paradigm, that helps bring prevailing realities into better focus and consequently clarifies some of the central dynamics at work. In particular, five key concepts form the core of this approach, as outlined in Table 4 below. In this section we examine these five concepts and show how they relate to existing approaches in the field.

### Table 4: The “New Governance” Paradigm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classical Public Administration</th>
<th>“New Governance”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program/agency</td>
<td>Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public vs. private</td>
<td>Public &amp; private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>Negotiation and persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management skills</td>
<td>Enablement skills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### A. From Agency and Program to Tool

At the heart of the “new governance” approach is a shift in the “unit of analysis” in policy analysis and public administration from the public agency or the individual public program to the distinctive tools or instruments through which public purposes are pursued. As we have seen, such instruments have mushroomed in both number and scale in recent decades. A central argument of the “new governance” is that this has altered the nature of public management and the pattern of public problem-solving in rather fundamental ways, but ways that are only partly acknowledged in existing theories and approaches.

This focus on the tools or technologies of public action differentiates the “new governance” both from classical public administration and from the more recent “implementation” school that emerged in the 1970s. For the former, the central focus of public administration is on the operation of governmental agencies. This reflects the origins of the public administration field in the Progressive Era effort to legitimate government action to cope with the increasingly apparent shortcomings of the unfettered market system. As formulated by Woodrow Wilson, Max Weber, Frederick Taylor, Luther Gulick, and others, the classical theory posited a new type of institution, the democratic public agency, that would overcome the three major problems long associated with government bureaucracy in the American mind—i.e., excessive adminis-
trative discretion, special interest capture, and inefficiency. This was to be achieved through three principal devices: first, the restriction of executive agencies to administration rather than policy-making; second, personnel recruitment on the basis of technical competence rather than political influence; and third, a set of “scientific” management principles designed to ensure the efficient conduct of administrative work. Although subsequent work has refined and elaborated on these ideas, the basic principles have remained largely intact, fixing on public administration thinking a focus on the public agency as the basic unit of analysis, a sharp distinction between the public and private sectors, a separation between policy and administration, a preference for clear lines of administrative responsibility and control, and an emphasis on the skills of command and control.

Although these ideas have provided a workable framework for the development of a relatively successful administrative apparatus in the American context, however, they take as given that the funding and provision of public services typically are carried out by the same public entity. As a result, they apply most clearly to only one of a range of possible forms that public action can take—i.e., direct government. But as we have seen, this is no longer the dominant form of public action at the present time.

This point became clear as early as the 1970s as efforts were made to explain why the Great Society social programs of the 1960s were not living up to their promise. The answer, a new school of implementation studies concluded, was not that the classical theory was wrong but that the American political system was failing to supply the conditions necessary for it to work. Studies of program implementation revealed that, instead of clear specification of program objectives, sufficient authority to put programs into effect, and reasonable attention to the management challenges that programs entailed, administrators often were set adrift with only vague or conflicting guidance about program purposes, insuf-

40. Garvey, supra note 5, at 24.
41. For succinct summaries of the classical theory, see Ostrom, supra note 27, at 20-41; see also Garvey, supra note 5, at 18-23. Similar concerns also lay behind the European development of administrative theory, as reflected in the work of Max Weber. Stillman, supra note 10, at 111-17.
43. This line of argument also was evident in the public administration literature more generally. E.g., Ostrom, supra note 27.
icient authority to act, and little attention to the administrative tasks that programs involved.\footnote{44. \textit{E.g.}, \textit{Eugene Bardach, The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes a Law} (3d ed. 1980) (discussing the problems inherent in implementing certain certain administrative programs); \textit{Walter Williams, The Implementation Perspective: A Guide for Managing Social Service Delivery Programs} (1980) (discussing implementation as a crucial factor in the success of social service programs); \textit{Daniel Mazmanian \& Paul Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy} (1983) (presenting a model to be used to analyze policy implementation); \textit{Donald S. Van Meter \& Carl E. Van Horn, The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework}, 6 \textit{Admin. \& Soc’y} 445 (1975) (defining and exploring the process of policy implementation and suggesting a model to be used when analyzing policy implementation); \textit{Pressman \& Wildavsky, supra} note 26 (studying minor factors resulting in failure of implementation in an Oakland social service program); \textit{Hargrove, supra} note 29 (discussing implementation problems though research).} Especially problematic was the highly indirect character of many of the Great Society initiatives. The reason public programs were failing, students of implementation therefore concluded, was not that America adhered too closely to the Progressives’ ideal and built too centralized an administrative state, as “privatization” advocates now contend, but that it departed too extensively from this ideal and created programs that resembled Rube Goldberg cartoons instead, with multiple actors linked together in often implausible decision sequences.\footnote{45. \textit{E.g.}, \textit{Pressman \& Wildavsky, supra} note 26, at 94-107.} 

To remedy this, implementation theorists proposed to shift the unit of analysis in policy work from the public agency to the individual public program and to encourage clearer specification of program objectives and greater attention to program management.\footnote{46. \textit{Id.} at 143.} Far less clear, however, despite numerous case studies, was what improved management really entails and how this might vary systematically among the many types of programs that exist.\footnote{47. Implementation studies have generated numerous lists of factors thought to influence program success but with limited progress in cumulating these findings into a more generalizable body of theory. One attempt to summarize this literature finds no fewer than seventeen such factors that have so far been identified and need to be taken into account. \textit{Mazmanian \& Sabatier, supra} note 44, at 22. Included here are such factors as: the clarity of the law, the adequacy of the causal theory embodied in it, the multiplicity of decisions points, the characteristics of the implementing agencies, the presence of an implementation entrepreneur, and the adequacy of external review. \textit{Id.} For a general discussion of the limited success of implementation studies in generating testable theory, see Helen Ingram, \textit{Implementation: A Review and Suggested Framework}, in \textit{Naomi B. Lynn \& Aaron Wildavsky, Public Administration: The State of the Discipline} 463 (1990); Donald J. Calista, \textit{Policy Implementation}, in \textit{Encyclopedia of Policy Studies} 117 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 1994).}
The "new governance," by contrast, takes a significantly different approach. Rather than seeing programs as *sui generis*, the "new governance" finds commonalities flowing from the tools of public action that they employ. It thus shifts the unit of analysis from the individual program or agency to the distinctive tools of public action that programs embody. Underlying this approach is the notion that the multitude of different government programs really embody a more limited number of basic tools or instruments of action that share common features regardless of the field in which they are deployed. Among other things, these tools define the set of actors that will be part of the cast during the all-important implementation process that follows program enactment, and they determine the roles that these actors will play. Since these different actors have their own perspectives, ethos, standard operating procedures, skills, and incentives, by determining the actors the choice of tool importantly influences the outcome of the process. This focus thus builds on the insight of the implementation studies that the division between policy and administration assumed in the classical theory does not seem to work in practice, and that the process of program design does not end with legislative enactment but rather continues into the implementation phase as well. In these circumstances, it makes sense to focus attention on the decisions that shape which actors have significant roles in this stage of the process. And this is precisely what the "tools focus" of the "new governance" does. By shifting the focus from agencies or programs to underlying tools, therefore, the "new governance" provides a way to get a handle on the post-enactment process that the implementation literature identifies as crucially important. Tool choices significantly structure this process and therefore affect its results.

Because of this, however, tool choices are also not just technical decisions. Rather, they are profoundly *political*: they give some actors, and therefore some perspectives, an advantage in determining how policies will be carried out. This is especially critical given the degree of discretion that the implementation literature suggests is left to this stage of the process. The choice of tool thus helps determine how this discretion will be used and therefore which interests will be most advantaged as a result. For this reason, the choice of tool is often a central part of the political battle that shapes public programs. What is at stake in these battles is not simply the most efficient way to solve a particular public problem, but also the rela-
tive influence that various affected interests will have in shaping the program's post-enactment evolution.

Such choices are not entirely free, however. Rather, cultural norms and ideological predispositions importantly shape them, and they in turn affect public attitudes toward the state.\(^{48}\) A strong pro-market bias underlies tool choices in the United States, for example, whereas the United Kingdom is much more wary of the market and much more favorably inclined toward the state.\(^{49}\) At the same time, such cultural norms are hardly immutable. To the contrary, debates over the appropriate techniques of social intervention—over block grants vs. categorical grants, direct government vs. contracting out, public enterprise vs. economic regulation—form the core of much of our political discourse.

If tool choices are fundamentally political choices, however, they are also operational choices with significant implications for the management of public affairs. Different tools involve different management tasks and therefore require different management knowledge and skills. The operation of a grant-in-aid program is significantly different from the operation of a regulatory program and this differs, in turn, from the operation of a voucher. Whatever generic skills of public management may exist, they must be supplemented by skills peculiar to the various tools being employed if public programs are to be effective. But this requires a body of literature and a type of training that is geared to the characteristics of the different tools, which is precisely what the "new governance" seeks to provide.

**B. From Hierarchy to Network**

In shifting the focus of public problem-solving from agencies and programs to generic tools, the "new governance" also shifts the attention from hierarchic agencies to organizational networks. The defining characteristic of many of the most widely used and most rapidly expanding tools, as we have seen, is their indirect character, their establishment of interdependencies between public agencies and a host of third-party actors. As a result, government gains important allies but loses the ability to exert complete control over the operation of its own programs. A variety of complex exchanges thus comes into existence between government agencies


\(^{49}\) Id.
and a wide variety of public and private institutions that are written into the operation of public programs. In these circumstances, the traditional concerns of public administration with the internal operations of public agencies—their personnel systems, budgetary procedures, organizational structures, and institutional dynamics—have become far less central to program success. At least as important have become the internal dynamics and external relationships of the host of third parties—local governments, hospitals, universities, clinics, community development corporations, industrial corporations, landlords, commercial banks, and many more—that now also share with public authorities the responsibility for public programs operations.

Not only does this broadening of the focus from public agencies to “networks” of organizations differentiate the “new governance” from traditional public administration, however; it also differentiates it from the “privatization” and “re-inventing government” perspectives that have surfaced in recent years.

Both of these schools of thought acknowledge the importance of indirect forms of government action. More than that, they both advocate it, the former as a way to replace government and the latter as a way to incentivize it.

In neither case, however, is the use of third parties viewed as particularly problematic. Privatization theories, for example, actually view reliance on the private sector to deliver public services as more likely to serve public interests than reliance on public agencies themselves. This is so, privatization advocates argue, because the civil service protections designed to insulate bureaucrats from political pressures insulate them as well from the citizens they are supposed to serve and consequently free them to pursue their self-interests instead.\footnote{50. For a discussion of these theories, see Moe, supra note 5, at 762-68; Garvey, supra note 5, at 26-33.}

In these circumstances, “the key to effective government” becomes “privatization”—reducing the size of the public sector, shifting responsibilities to the private sector, and establishing “private [sector] alternatives [that are] more attractive” to the current supporters of government programs.\footnote{51. Emanuel S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government 288 (1987); Stuart M. Butler, Privatizing Federal Spending: A Strategy to Eliminate the Deficit 45 (1985).}

The reinvention school and the “new public management” of which it is a part take a different tack. For these theories, contracting out and other forms of indirect government are less ends in...
themselves than as a means to improve internal agency management by forcing public managers to compete.\textsuperscript{52} Reinventers thus have an incentive to downplay the extent to which such indirect devices already are being used and to minimize the difficulties to which they give rise. An internal contradiction thus creeps into the new public management prescription as managers are simultaneously encouraged to take more responsibility for the results of their activity and obliged to surrender significant shares of the authority for achieving those results to third-party implementers.

The “new governance,” by contrast, shifts the focus of attention much more explicitly from the internal workings of public organizations to the networks of actors on which they increasingly depend. While acknowledging the advantages such networks can bring, however, it also acknowledges the considerable challenges they pose. As such, it builds on two other bodies of theory: “principal-agent theory” and “network theory.”

“Principal-agent theory” is part of a broader body of concepts designed to explain the existence of organizations in a market system.\textsuperscript{53} What is relevant for our purposes here is the insight this theory provides into one of the central paradoxes that arises in relationships between principals and agents in contractual or other third-party arrangements of the sort that third-party government entails. Despite the apparent influence that the principals in such relationships wield by virtue of their control of the purse strings, it turns out that the agents frequently end up with the upper hand. This is so, principal-agent theory explains, because the agents in such relationships typically have more information than their principals about what they are doing with the discretion that is inevitably left in their hands. They therefore have significant opportunities to “shirk” their duties and subject the principals to the “moral hazard” of having to rely on agents whose competence and diligence the principal cannot fully know. The only way for principals to avoid this is to secure better information about how

\textsuperscript{52} Burki & Perry, supra note 4, at 125; Osborne & Gaebler, supra note 6, at 19. For a general discussion of the “new public management” agenda of which the reinventing government perspective is a part, see Kaul, supra note 32, at 13-26; Larry Terry, Administrative Leadership, Neo-Managerialism, and the Public Management Movement 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 194 (1998) (raising concerns that “the neo-managerialist version of the public entrepreneur bears scrutiny”); Hughes, supra note 30, at 1490.

the agents are performing, but this involves costs. Every principal therefore has to find an equilibrium between the level of control it would like and the level it can afford. The more disparate the goals and characteristics of the principal and the agent, moreover, the more information will be needed, and the more costly a given equilibrium is therefore likely to be. In these circumstances, "who pays the piper" may not really "call the tune" at all, at least not without considerable effort.

What "network theory" adds to this insight is the observation that the principals in such relationships may have difficulty getting their way even when the agents share their basic goals. This body of theory was developed to explain the complexities of policy-making in many modern democracies, where power is splintered among numerous divergent groups. But it also can help explain the challenges of policy implementation as well, especially when indirect tools are used. In such situations, network theory argues, the standard relationship among actors is one of interdependence. As a consequence, no single actor, including the state, can enforce its will. This is especially true, network theory emphasizes, because of four crucial attributes that commonly characterize policy networks, making the tasks of network management in general, and the tasks of managing indirect tools in particular, especially demanding:

- First, their pluriformity—the fact that they engage a diverse range of organizations and organizational types, many of which have limited experience cooperating with each other and limited knowledge of each other's operating styles;
- Second, their self-referentiality—the fact that each actor has its own interests and frame of reference and therefore approaches the relationship with a different set of perspectives and incentives;
- Third, their asymmetric interdependencies—the fact that all the actors in a network, including the state, are dependent on each other, but rarely in a fully symmetrical way. Even when all the parties want the same thing, therefore, they still may not be able to cooperate fully because they may not all want it with the same urgency, in the same sequence, or at the same time; and
- Finally, their dynamism—the fact that all of these features change over time even as the network seeks to carry out its mission.54

Far from automatically sharing the same objectives, as the privatization and reinventing paradigms tend to assume, the actors brought into the operation of public programs through indirect tools thus typically have goals, operating styles, skills, worldviews, incentives, and priorities that, even with the best of intentions, often differ widely from each other. As a consequence, the task of securing concerted action becomes a major administrative challenge. In these circumstances, the hopeful assumptions of the reinventing government school that government can move easily from a "rowing" to a "steering" role are far from assured.55

What the "new governance" and its "tools approach" add to this network theory is a clearer understanding of the commonalities of various network arrangements. In a sense, tools significantly structure networks: they define the actors that are centrally involved in particular types of programs and the formal roles they will play. When policy-makers choose a loan guarantee, for example, they choose a network that involves a structured interaction between a public agency and the commercial banking system. When they select a grant-in-aid, by contrast, they choose a different network that engages state and local governments. By shifting the focus from hierarchies to networks and specifying more precisely the kind of network a program embodies, the "tools approach" of the "new governance" thus can offer important clues about the kinds of management challenges that particular programs will confront.

C. From Public vs. Private to Public & Private

In moving the focus of public management and policy analysis from the program and the agency to the tool and the network, the "new governance" also brings a new perspective to the relationship between government and the other sectors. Traditional public management posits a tension between government and the private sector, both for-profit and nonprofit. The public sector is distinguished, in this view, by its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, which it acquires by virtue of its responsiveness to the democratic will of the people. Public agencies thus are imbued with sovereignty, the power to act on behalf of the public.56 Many of the central precepts of classical public administration flow from this


central premise and are designed to ensure that the administrative officials so empowered do in fact respond to the public's will and not the partial will of some private group. Without this clear differentiation, accountability for the spending of public funds and the exercise of public authority becomes impossible and the public sphere is polluted by the intrusion of private interests. Keeping private interests and private organizations at arms length thus becomes a central motivation of organizational design.

This notion of a sharp divide between the public and the private sectors also figures prominently in the privatization theories. Here, however, it is the protection of the private sphere from the intrusion of the state that is the object of concern. In this view, the expansion of the state inevitably comes at the expense of the private sector, both for-profit and nonprofit. The best way to preserve a healthy market system and private voluntary sector is therefore to shrink the state and allow the private sector to take up the slack.\(^{57}\)

Many of the new tools of public action defy these precepts rather fundamentally, however. Instead of a sharp division between the public and private spheres, they blend the two together. This is not to say that sectoral differences are blurred, as is often suggested. A central precept of network theory, after all, is that the participants in a network retain important elements of their individuality. But collaboration replaces competition as the defining feature of sectoral relationships. Rather than seeing such collaboration as an aberration or a violation of appropriate administrative practice, moreover, the "new governance" views it as a desirable byproduct of the important complementarities that exist among the sectors, complementarities that can be built upon to help solve public problems.\(^ {58}\) For example, the state enjoys access to resources that are often critically needed by private, nonprofit groups. For their part, nonprofit groups are often already actively involved in fields that government is newly entering. By combining the actions of

---


the two, utilizing the state for what it does best—raising resources and setting broad societal directions—while using nonprofit organizations for what they do best—delivering services at a human scale and innovating in new fields—important public advantages can thus be gained.

Similar synergies exist, moreover, with the private business sector. So long as due attention is given to the management challenges they entail, cross-sectoral partnerships thus can yield important dividends in terms of effective public problem-solving. Rather than viewing such interaction as a “fall from grace” that undermines the purity of the respective sectors, the “new governance” views it as a source of opportunity instead.

D. From Command and Control to Negotiation and Persuasion

In emphasizing the shift from programs run by public agencies to cooperative action orchestrated through complex networks, the “new governance” also underlines the need for a new approach to public management. In this it also differs from both traditional public administration and the new privatization theories.

Traditional public management, with its focus on the operation of public agencies, emphasizes command and control as the modus operandi of public programs. This assumes that public action is carried out by hierarchically organized agencies whose central spinal chord is the chain of command. Such centralized control is, in fact, vital to the preservation of democratic accountability. Much of traditional public administration thus is preoccupied with clarifying lines of control and centralizing authority.

The privatization school, by contrast, downplays the need for administrative management altogether. Instead, it posits the market as a superior mechanism for achieving coordination and advancing public goals. Market competition, in this view, replaces public decision-making and obviates the need for administrative control.

The “new governance” rejects both of these approaches and suggests a third route for achieving public purposes in the world of third-party government that now exists. Unlike the privatization school, it emphasizes the continued need for public management


60. See generally Schultze, supra note 36.
even when indirect tools are used. This is so because private markets cannot be relied on to give appropriate weight to public interests over private ones without active public involvement. “Government’s relationships with the private sector are not self-administering,” one expert on privatization has thus noted; “they require, rather, aggressive management by a strong, competent government.”

61 Even the World Bank, long known for its market-oriented economic policies and endorsement of privatization, recently has had to acknowledge that “Institutions Matter,” as the title of a recent Bank publication puts it. “An effective state,” the Bank noted in the 1997 edition of its influential World Development Report, “is vital for the provision of the goods and services—and the rules and institutions—that allow markets to flourish and people to lead healthier, happier lives. Without it, sustainable development, both economic and social, is impossible.”

62 In fact, even the process of privatization itself has been found to require “strong political commitment and effective public management.”

63 While stressing the continued need for an active public role, however, the “new governance” acknowledges that command and control are not the appropriate administrative approach in the world of network relationships that increasingly exists. Given the pervasive interdependence that characterizes such networks, no entity, including the state, is in a position to enforce its will on the others over the long run. In these circumstances, negotiation and persuasion replace command and control as the preferred management approach, not only in the setting of policy but in carrying it out.

64 Instead of issuing orders, public managers must learn how to create incentives for the outcomes they desire from actors over whom they have only imperfect control. Indeed, negotiation is even necessary over the goals that public action is to serve since part of the reason that third parties are often cut into the operation

61. KETTL, supra note 11, at 6; see also Robert W. Bailey, Uses and Misuses of Privatization, in PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 138, 140 (Steve H. Hanke ed., 1987) (noting that one policy initiative of privatization is to use the government’s power to retain ultimate responsibility for the policy and financial success of private actors).

62. BURKI & PERRY, supra note 4.

63. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD 1 (1997).

64. Dennis Rondinelli, Privatization, Governance, and Public Management: The Challenges Ahead, 10 BUS. & CONTEMP. WORLD 149, 167 (1998).

65. Negotiation and persuasion operate in administrative agencies as well, of course. In the new governance, however, they are clearly the dominant form of management action.
of public programs is that such clarity cannot be achieved at the point of enactment.

All of this suggests a new body of administrative "doctrine" that makes collaboration and negotiation legitimate components of public administrative routine rather than regrettable departures from expected practice. Reconciling such an approach with long-standing prohibitions against excessive administrative discretion will be no easy task, but interesting examples of how this can be done already are apparent in such approaches as negotiated regulation and cooperative contracting.

E. From Management Skills to Enablement Skills

Finally, because of the shift in emphasis from command and control to negotiation and persuasion, the world of "third-party government" necessitates a significantly different skill set on the part of public managers and those with whom they interact. Both traditional public administration and the "new public management" emphasize essentially management skills, the skills required to manipulate large numbers of people arrayed hierarchically in bureaucratic organizations. For traditional public administration, these are essentially the control skills summarized nicely by Luther Gulick in the classic administrative acronym POSDCORB—Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting.66 The "new public management" moves the emphasis considerably from control to performance, but it remains preoccupied with internal agency management and with the managers as the key to success. Under this body of thought, the path to successful public sector performance is to introduce business management practices into the public sector, freeing managers to manage but subjecting them to increased competition and holding them accountable for results.67

Unlike both traditional public administration and the new public management, the "new governance" shifts the emphasis from management skills and the control of large bureaucratic organizations to enablement skills, the skills required to engage partners arrayed horizontally in networks, to bring multiple stakeholders together for a common end in a situation of interdependence. Three rather different skills thus move into the center of attention as a consequence of this shift:

67. See generally Hughes, supra note 30.
1. **Activation skills.** In the first place, the “new governance” requires *activation skills*, the skills required to activate the networks of actors increasingly required to address public problems.\(^{68}\) Many of the “new governance” tools create opportunities for third parties to take part in public problem-solving but do not mandate that these opportunities be taken. Public managers, therefore, must perform a mobilization and activation role, marketing the new opportunities and encouraging the potential partners to step forward and play their roles. Thus, competent contractors must be identified and encouraged to bid in purchase-of-service programs; banks must be convinced to participate in loan guarantee schemes; and private individuals and corporations must be made aware of tax expenditures. In none of these cases can participation be taken for granted. Rather, it must often be coaxed and cajoled. One of the great challenges in purchase-of-service contracting, for example, has been to ensure an adequate supply of vendors willing to compete on the government’s terms,\(^ {69}\) and similar problems have confronted loan guarantee programs as well. Those ultimately responsible for program success, therefore, often find themselves in the unaccustomed position not of withholding desired support but rather of trying to mobilize appropriate partners to accept it.

Moreover, the task of activating networks for public problem-solving is not an exclusively governmental function. Other actors can also often take the initiative. In some cases, these are non-profit organizations or community groups mobilized by grassroots activists who bring the other stakeholders to the table.\(^ {70}\) Increasingly, private foundations have played this role in the United States, either on their own or in cooperation with corporate and community partners. Rather than wait for government to act, in other words, private institutions are taking the initiative instead. This proliferation of a sense of responsibility for activating problem-solving networks is, in fact, one of the more hopeful facets of the “new governance.”

2. **Orchestration skills.** In addition to activating networks, the “new governance” requires managers who can then sustain them.

---


\(^{70}\) For a discussion of such civic initiatives, see Carmen Siriani & Lewis Friedland, *Civic Innovation in America: Community Empowerment, Public Policy, and the Movement for Civic Renewal* (2001).
This calls for orchestration skills, the skills required of a symphony conductor. Essentially, a conductor's job is to get a group of skilled musicians to perform a given work in sync and on cue so that the result is a piece of music rather than a cacophony. Clearly, the conductor cannot do this by playing all of the instruments. Rather, he or she must tease the music out of the musicians, setting the tempo and conveying an interpretation, but nevertheless remaining within the bounds set by the physical capacities of the instruments (and the musicians), not to mention the melody prescribed in the score. The conductor is thus an enabler rather than a doer, but his or her interpretation and skill can nevertheless determine whether a given orchestra plays poorly or well.

Orchestration, therefore, does not mean command and control. Nor is the orchestrating role an exclusively governmental one any more than the activation one is. Indeed, in major systems acquisition projects, government contracts out the orchestrating role to a general contractor who then mobilizes subcontractors to produce the components of the system. In recent years, this model has been applied as well to human service contracting. In fact, defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin have drawn on their experience in orchestrating the production of complex weapons system to bid successfully on contracts to orchestrate the complex networks of day care, drug-abuse counseling, mental health service, job-search, health, job placement, and related service providers required to move welfare recipients into jobs and keep track of the results.\(^7\) Beyond this, however, other actors also can lift the baton even without this kind of governmental imprimatur. What is needed to be effective is not simply command of resources—whether financial or legal—but also the intangibles of knowledge, vision, persuasiveness, and community respect.

3. Modulation skills. Finally, the "new governance" requires the sensitive modulation of rewards and penalties in order to elicit the cooperative behavior required from the interdependent players in a complex tool network. Urban economic development specialists have referred to this as enoughsmanship—the provision of just enough subsidy to get private parties to make investments in rundown areas they might avoid, but not so much as to produce windfall profits for doing what the developers would have done anyway. Inevitably, as we have seen, third-party government leaves sub-

---

stantial discretion over the exercise of public authority and the spending of public funds in the hands of a variety of third parties over which public officials have, at best, limited control. In these circumstances, the central challenge for public managers is to decide what combination of incentives and penalties to bring to bear to achieve the outcomes desired. Excessive use of authority clearly can backfire if partners choose not to "play" or to disguise their activities in ways that "principal-agent theory" predicts. On the other hand, insufficient accountability can invite complete disregard of public goals. Public managers in the era of the "new governance" are consequently perennially confronted with the dilemma of deciding how much authority or subsidy is "enough," and how much is too much.

Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan recognized this point clearly in their classic analysis of the problem of regulatory enforcement. Rather than the classic "tough cop," Bardach and Kagan suggest that regulatory enforcement actually may be more successful if it promotes the concept of the "good inspector," the inspector who understands when forbearance rather than rigid enforcement will best achieve regulatory compliance, and who has the discretion to adjust regulatory enforcement accordingly. Similar notions also are evident in endorsements of new types of contracting stressing cooperation as opposed to classic competitive bidding. Instead of narrowing the range of administrative discretion left to the "street-level bureaucrat," the "new governance" calls for broadening that discretion and equipping the public official with the skills and understanding needed to exercise this discretion in a way that advances program objectives.

The growing use of entire "suites" of tools in particular programs only accentuates the need for this modulating, "enoughsmanship" approach to program implementation and enforcement. With rich medleys of instruments at their command, public managers can assemble highly targeted blends of incentives and disincentives specially tailored to the circumstances at hand. Although this opens opportunities for abuse, it also creates the potential for truly effec-

73. Id. at 123-51.
tive management of public programs. To be effective, however, this approach requires site-level managers who can cope with the discretion involved, and who have a well-developed feel for what constitutes the appropriate mixture of penalties and rewards required to get a given job done.

As with other facets of the "new governance," therefore, the enablement skills required will vary with the type of tool being used. The task of securing the concurrence of industrial firms with the operation of an air pollution control program is likely to differ markedly from the task of enlisting financiers to take advantage of a tax credit for low-income housing. This points out again the importance of tool-specific knowledge to the operation of the third-party arrangements that now exist. But it also underlines the fact that the new tools of public action, far from reducing the demands on public management, may increase them instead, necessitating more sophisticated management skills, requiring greater exercise of discretion, and calling for better information on performance and results. All of this suggests not the withering away of public administration, as privatization theories tend to assume, but its transformation and refinement instead.

F. Summary

In short, the proliferation of tools of public action has necessitated a new approach to public problem-solving, a "new governance" that recognizes both the collaborative character of modern public action and the significant challenges that such collaboration entails. Central to this "new governance" is a shift in the basic paradigm guiding action on public problems. Instead of focusing exclusively on public agencies or public programs, the "new governance" moves the focus of attention to the distinctive tools or technologies used to address public problems. Underlying this shift is a recognition that different tools have their own characteristic features that impart a distinctive twist to the operation of public programs. Tools importantly structure the post-enactment process of policy definition by specifying the network of actors that will play important roles and the nature of the roles they will perform. In these circumstances, the whole character of public management has to change. Instead of command and control, it must emphasize negotiation and persuasion. In place of management skills, it must require enablement skills. Far from simplifying the task of public problem-solving, the proliferation of tools has importantly complicated it even while enlarging the range of options and the pool of
resources potentially brought to bear. All of this makes the development of a systematic body of information about the dynamics and characteristics of the different tools of public action all the more urgent.

III. BUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE BASE

A. Basic Analytics

The "new governance" thus calls attention to the new world of public problem-solving that has been ushered in by the proliferation of tools of public action over the past half-century or more. Rather than resisting this trend, like the traditional public administration, or uncritically celebrating it, like the reinventing government school, however, the "new governance" calls for the development of a systematic body of knowledge that can help policymakers, public managers, and others engaged in the increasingly collaborative business of public problem-solving take advantage of the special opportunities and cope with the special challenges that these new tools entail. In the process, it directs our attention to the characteristic features of the different tools and at the often-complex networks of interaction on which many of them depend.

But which features of the different tools are most important? How can tools be analyzed and compared? Which facets are likely to have the biggest effects? And which effects are most important? Clearly, if the "new governance" and the "tools framework" on which it rests are to be more than mere metaphors, they must offer meaningful answers to these questions. It is therefore necessary to turn from the rationale for the "new governance" and the general features that characterize it to a more detailed exploration of its analytical core.

B. Definition and Classification: The Basic Building Blocks

1. Basic Definition

As a first step in this direction, it may be useful to specify more precisely what is meant by a "tool" or "instrument" of public action. This is no simple task since tools have multiple features and can be defined at any of a number of levels of abstraction. For our purposes here, however, the most basic descriptive level seems most appropriate. As used here, therefore, a tool, or instrument, of public action can be defined as an identifiable method through
which collective action is structured to address a public problem.\textsuperscript{76} Several features of this definition are particularly notable:

In the first place, each tool is assumed to have certain \textit{common features} that make it “identifiable.” This is not to say that all tools of a particular type share \textit{all} features. In addition to their common, or \textit{defining}, features, tools also have \textit{design features} that can vary from one embodiment of the tool to another. For example, all grants-in-aid involve payments from one level of government to either another level of government or a private entity, but different grant programs can vary in the level of specificity with which they define eligible purposes, in the range of eligible recipients, in how funds are distributed, and in many other features.

Secondly, tools “structure” action. What this means is that the relationships that tools foster are not free-form or transient. Rather, they are institutionalized. Tools are thus “institutions” in the sense emphasized by students of the “new institutionalism,” i.e., they are regularized patterns of interaction among individuals or organizations.\textsuperscript{77} They define who is involved in the operation of public programs, what their roles are, and how they relate to each other. They thus importantly shape the set of considerations that effectively come to bear in the all-important implementation phase of policy.

Finally, the action that is structured by tools is “collective action” aimed at responding to “public problems.” This is different from saying that tools structure only government action. Other entities are also often involved in the action that is structured by the tools of public action.

Given this definition, it is possible to distinguish \textit{tools} from both \textit{programs} and \textit{policies}, two other concepts commonly used to discuss policy action. Tools are more general than programs. Programs thus embody tools, applying them to the circumstances of a

\textsuperscript{76} This definition is quite similar to that suggested by Evert Vedung, who defines public policy instruments as “the set of techniques by which governmental authorities wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect or prevent social change.” Evert Vedung, \textit{Policy Instruments: Typologies and Theories}, in Bemelmans-Videc, \textit{supra} note 36, at 21.

\textsuperscript{77} This usage is close to that suggested by the “new institutionalism,” particularly in economics. As economic historian Douglas North puts it, institutions are “regularities in repetitive interactions. . . . [They] are customs and rules that provide a set of incentives and disincentives for individuals.” Douglas North, \textit{The New Institutional Economics}, 142 \textit{J. Institutional \& Theoretical Econ.} 231, 231 (1986). For a broader discussion of the “new institutionalism,” see Walter W. Powell \& Paul J. DiMaggio, \textit{Introduction}, in \textit{The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis} 1-38 (Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
particular field or problem. A single tool therefore can be used in many different programs in many different fields. Typically, a program embodies a single tool, though increasingly, as we will see below, programs are coming to embody entire suites of tools. A central premise of the tools approach is that particular tools impart similar pressures and have similar operating requirements wherever they happen to be applied.

If tools are typically more general than programs, they are typically less general than policies. Policies are essentially collections of programs operating in a similar field or aimed at some general objective. The programs comprising a policy can all utilize a single tool (e.g., multiple grants-in-aid) or multiple tools. An interesting question that tools analysis raises is whether some tools are more appropriate for some policy objectives than others, an issue I will return to below.

One other distinction worth making is that between internal tools and external tools. Internal tools refers to the procedures that governments use to handle their own internal operations. Included here would be basic procedures for personnel recruitment, human resource management, budgeting, and procurement for the supplies that government needs to operate. External tools, by contrast, are those used to affect society at large, not just the government. The focus of this article, and of the "new governance" approach, is on the latter type of tools, those that seek to affect society and not just the internal workings of government.

2. Tools as Bundles of Attributes

From what has been said it should be clear that although the concept of a tool of public action is relatively straightforward, in reality tools are often quite complex. Any given tool is really a "package" that contains a number of different elements. These include:

- A type of good or activity (e.g., a cash or in-kind payment, a restriction or prohibition, the provision of information);
- A delivery vehicle for this good or activity (e.g., through a loan, an outright grant, a voucher, the direct provision of a service, or the tax system);
- A delivery system, i.e., a set of organizations that are engaged in providing the good, service, or activity (e.g., a government agency, a nonprofit organization, a local government, a for-profit corporation); and
• A set of rules, whether formal or informal, defining the relationships among the entities that comprise the delivery system.

These multiple facets naturally complicate the task of sorting and describing tools, as we will see more fully below. Tools can be classified according to any of the different facets—the nature of the good or service, the delivery vehicle, the nature of the delivery system. This means that no single classification of tools is possible. Classification schemes will differ depending on which facet is used as the basis. Table 5 illustrates this point by portraying how some of the most commonly used tools compare to each other descriptively in terms of these four features. For example, loan guarantees provide cash delivered through a loan by commercial banks operating according to a set of rules that stipulate the conditions under which the government will reimburse the bank if the loan becomes uncollectable. By contrast, direct loans provide cash through loans delivered by a government agency.

3. The Challenge of Classification

This multi-dimensionality of policy tools naturally complicates the task of describing and sorting them. This is particularly true in view of the fact that unlike tools in the physical world, such as hammers, saws, and screwdrivers, the tools of public action rarely appear in pure form. Rather, they come bundled in particular programs, many of which combine more than one tool and all of which bring different approaches to the design issues that each program must address. Beyond this, there is occasionally ambiguity about which features of a tool are truly the defining features and which are the design features that can vary with particular manifestations. For example, some observers treat "block grants," a form of grant-in-aid that defines eligible purposes fairly broadly, as a separate tool from "categorical grants," which define eligible activities more narrowly. Other observers, however, consider this distinction inconsequential.78

Coupled with the considerable ingenuity that has characterized the design of public action in recent years, the multi-dimensionality of individual tools has made it difficult to reach consensus even on the number of tools that exist. Thus, Savas identified ten different arrangements that can be used just for the provision of public services, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget's Catalog of Fed-

78. For an argument that the difference between “block grants” and “categorical grants” is not sufficiently great to warrant treating them as different tools, see Paul E. Peterson et al., When Federalism Works 21-23 (1986).
TABLE 5: COMMON TOOLS OF PUBLIC ACTION: DEFINING FEATURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Product/Activity</th>
<th>Vehicle</th>
<th>Delivery System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct government</td>
<td>Good or service</td>
<td>Direct provision</td>
<td>Public agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social regulation</td>
<td>Prohibition</td>
<td>Rule</td>
<td>Public agency/regulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic regulation</td>
<td>Fair prices</td>
<td>Entry and rate controls</td>
<td>Regulatory commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting</td>
<td>Good or service</td>
<td>Contract and cash payment</td>
<td>Business, nonprofit organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Good or service</td>
<td>Grant award/cash payment</td>
<td>Lower level of government, nonprofit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct loan</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>Loan</td>
<td>Public agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan guarantee</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>Loan</td>
<td>Commercial bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Insurance policy</td>
<td>Public agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax expenditure</td>
<td>Cash, incentives</td>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>Tax system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees, charges</td>
<td>Financial penalty</td>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>Tax system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liability law</td>
<td>Social protections</td>
<td>Tort law</td>
<td>Court system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government corporations</td>
<td>Good or service</td>
<td>Direct provision/loan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-public agency</td>
<td>Good or service</td>
<td>Consumer subsidy</td>
<td>Public agency/consumer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

eral Assistance identifies sixteen distinct tools, Osborne and Gaebler recorded thirty-six, and E.S. Kirschen of the Netherlands identified no fewer than sixty-three.79

Complicating matters further is the fact that tools are often mislabeled, sometimes deliberately. For example, President Roosevelt insisted on including a symbolic employee contribution in the Social Security Program so that this program could be characterized as "insurance," which was easier to sell politically,80 even though it lacks most of the defining features of insurance.81 This mislabeling,

---


81. Social Security recipients receive their benefits from current wage-earners, not from their prior contributions to the trust fund as would have occurred in an insurance plan.
whether deliberate or inadvertent, can play havoc with efforts to characterize tools and analyze their consequences.

All of this makes it difficult to reach clear consensus about the types of tools that exist. Several different classifications are available in the literature, but each uses a slightly different tool dimension as the basis for its grouping. Thus Christopher Hood, in one of the earliest schemes, sorted tools in terms of two major dimensions: (i) the role of government for which they are used (i.e., detecting vs. effecting); and (ii) the governmental resource they enlist (i.e., nodality, treasure, authority, or organization).¹² McDonnell and Elmore focused instead on the strategy of intervention that government uses, producing a four-fold division of tools into: (i) mandates, (ii) inducements, (iii) capacity-building, and (iv) system-changing.¹³ Schneider and Ingram elaborated on this with a classification that focuses on the behaviors that programs seek to modify, leading to a five-fold distinction among: (i) authority tools, (ii) incentive tools, (iii) capacity tools, (iv) symbolic or hortatory tools, and (v) learning tools.¹⁴ Finally, Evert Vedung returned recently to a scheme first developed by F.C.J. van der Doelen and identified three classes of tools—carrots, sticks, and sermons—based on the extent of force that each involves.¹⁵ Given this diversity, some analysts have begun to question whether the concept of a policy tool is rigorous enough to support any serious analysis.¹⁶

Our approach, by contrast, is to recognize this diversity not as a drawback of the tools approach, but as a strength. The fact is that tools have multiple dimensions in terms of which they can be compared and contrasted, and particular tools may be alike along some dimensions and different along others. This means that multiple classifications of tools are entirely appropriate since different classifications will highlight different facets. Tools thus can be sorted in a two-step process: first, basic descriptive features can be used to

¹³. McDonnell & Elmore, supra note 36, at 137 tbl.1.
¹⁴. Schneider & Ingram, supra note 36, at 513-22.
¹⁵. Vedung, supra note 76, at 21-58. In the earlier version of this scheme, F.C.J. van der Doelen divided tools into three "families" based on the type of intervention the public sector uses: (a) the legal family; (b) the economic family; and (c) the communications family. F.C.J. van der Doelen, Instrumenten voor energiebesparing (1993) cited by de Bruijn & Heuvelhof, supra note 54, at 121. For a discussion of the general popularity of classifications using the degree of coercion as the central criterion, see Linder & Peters, supra note 79, at 114.
define different tools; and second, various dimensions can then be identified in terms of which various tools so defined can be grouped together for analytical purposes.

But which dimensions are the most appropriate to use? Because the tools approach argues that various tool dimensions have significant consequences for how programs operate and what results they produce, the answer to this question depends, first, on which outcomes are of particular interest to us; and second, on which tool dimensions our theories suggest might affect them. Our approach to sorting tools therefore must be to focus on these two factors.

4. Evaluating Tools: The Criteria

So far as the first step in this process is concerned, the field of policy analysis has identified three criteria in terms of which public interventions are typically assessed: effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. The policy implementation and political science literature suggest two other criteria that also seem highly germane: manageability and political legitimacy. Taken together, this gives us five criteria in terms of which the consequences of tools can be assessed.

a. Effectiveness

Effectiveness is the most basic criterion for gauging the success of public action. It essentially measures the extent to which an activity achieves its intended objectives. Although considerations of cost can enter into this judgment, effectiveness judgments are typically made independent of costs. Using this criterion, the most effective tool is the one that most reliably allows action on a public problem to achieve its intended purposes.

Gauging the effectiveness of public action is far from easy, however. For one thing, as we have seen, program purposes are often quite ambiguous, either because precise indicators are technically difficult to locate or because conflicts exist about what the principal purpose really is. Indeed, such ambiguity is almost chronic in fragmented political systems like that in the United States, in which multiple perspectives have ample opportunities to influence the definition of program objectives. This makes the choice of tool all the more important because ambiguity at the point of enactment pushes the specification of program purposes into the implementation process, in which the choice of tool can have an even more decisive impact.

The effectiveness of different tools also varies with the circumstances. Not just the nature of the tool, but also the nature of the
circumstances, therefore, must be considered when making tool choices. One of the major tasks of the tools approach, in fact, is to specify the circumstances in which particular tools are likely to be most effective. The tool of contracting has great advantages, for example, where a competitive market exists for the goods and services that government wants to buy. However, this is often not the case, so that the adoption of the contracting tool in such circumstances can lead to great disappointments. Because other considerations are often involved in tool choices, the “new governance” can hardly avoid such dilemmas. But at least it can clarify the risks and point out the trade-offs involved.

b. Efficiency

Where effectiveness focuses exclusively on results, a second criterion—efficiency—balances results against costs. The most efficient tool may not be the most effective one. Rather, it is the one that achieves the optimum balance between benefits and costs.

The costs that are relevant to a judgment about the efficiency of a tool are not only the ones that show up on the ledger of the government that authorizes the program, however. The costs imposed on non-governmental institutions also are relevant, and for some tools these are far more immense. Regulation, for example, places heavy compliance costs on private businesses that never show up in the balance sheet of government. Indeed, with severe fiscal pressures on governments, there is a strong incentive to utilize tools that have precisely this effect. This suggests the need for a “double balance sheet” to assess the efficiency of various tools, one focused on the costs to government alone and one focused on the costs to other social actors as well.

c. Equity

A third crucial criterion in terms of which the consequences of tools can be judged is equity. The criterion of equity has two different meanings, however. The first of these involves basic fairness—the distribution of benefits and costs more or less evenly among all those eligible. A tool that facilitates the distribution of program benefits evenly across the country can thus be considered equitable in this “fairness” sense.

But equity also has a different connotation relating to “redistribution,” to channeling benefits disproportionately to those who lack them. Achieving such redistribution is, in fact, one of the principal rationales for public action. In this view, government exists in
part to remedy past inequalities and ensure equal opportunity and access to all. Students of policy thus distinguish between distributive programs, which essentially distribute benefits evenly among a class of recipients; and redistributive programs, which tilt the benefits toward the disadvantaged. Some tools might be more likely to serve such redistributive goals than others might.

d. Manageability

In addition to the classic economic criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, and equity, recent research on program implementation suggests the importance of manageability, or "implementability," as an additional criterion in terms of which to assess tools. Implementability refers to the ease or difficulty involved in operating programs. The more complex and convoluted the tool, the more separate actors are involved, the more difficult it is likely to be to manage. Some tools are more cumbersome to operate than others are. Although they may promise great efficiency and effectiveness in theory, they are unlikely to deliver it in practice because of the managerial difficulties they pose. It was for this reason that Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky identified implementability as a first rule of program design. Generally speaking, this presumably means choosing simpler, more direct tools.

e. Legitimacy and Political Feasibility

Finally, tool choices also can affect the political feasibility and perceived legitimacy of public action. They do this, in the first instance, by helping to determine which actors, and hence which interests, get to shape program implementation, and therefore which are most likely to support or oppose program passage. Clearly, no matter what the prospects for effectiveness, a program that cannot win political support cannot make headway.

Beyond this, tool choices also can affect broader public perceptions of the legitimacy of public action. As we have seen, some approaches are considered more legitimate than others in particular national settings regardless of their technical advantages. Quite apart from such national styles, the choice of tool can affect the perceived legitimacy of public action in other ways as well. For one thing, some tools may facilitate accountability for the exercise

---

88. Pressman & Wildavsky, supra note 26, at 143.
89. Howlett, supra note 48, at 1-21.
of public authority or the spending of public funds better than others may, a matter of some importance in a democratic society where such accountability is highly valued. So, too, the choice of tool can affect the extent to which the public can perceive a link between the taxes they pay and the services they receive. The more this link is attenuated or broken, the greater the degree of alienation between government and citizens and the greater the risk to democratic participation. Tool choices can thus affect the overall sense of legitimacy that government enjoys in the eyes of citizens.

5. Key Tool Dimensions

Armed with this set of criteria, it is possible to identify more precisely which tool dimensions are likely to be most important, and therefore how best to classify tools for analytical purposes. Rather than focus on a single dimension that can work for all purposes, however, the discussion above suggests the need for a range of dimensions in terms of which tools can be compared and contrasted. Tools can differ from each other along one dimension and be similar along others. Only in this way will it be possible to clarify the full matrix of choices that policy-makers face and the significant trade-offs that exist among them.

More specifically, five key tool dimensions seem most likely to have implications for the kinds of consequences identified above. These are not, of course, the only tool dimensions that might be important. Nevertheless, they usefully illustrate the analytical power that the “new governance,” and its tools framework, possess.

a. Degree of Coerciveness

Perhaps the most salient of these dimensions has to do with the nature of the activity that a tool embodies, and particularly with the degree of coercion that it utilizes. Essentially, this dimension measures the extent to which a tool restricts individual or group behavior as opposed to merely encouraging or discouraging it.

---

This coerciveness dimension is probably the most common basis for classifying tools in the literature. Economists in particular consider this dimension important because it essentially measures the extent to which a tool involves a deviation from reliance on the market as a mechanism to allocate resources and settle social roles. Such deviations are commonly viewed by economists as inappropriate except where "market imperfections" make them imperative.

The coerciveness of tools is also of concern to political scientists. This is so because coercion has implications not only for the operation of the market, but also for the operation of the political system, and especially for the preservation of democracy. Of particular concern is the degree of infringement on individual liberty that a tool entails. In a political democracy, all such infringements are viewed with skepticism and are expected to be undertaken only with clear popular authority. As we have seen, much of the classical theory of public administration, with its stress on the distinction between politics and administration, took shape in response to this concern to root administrative authority clearly in democratic decision-making. The more coercive the tool, the greater the infringement on individual liberty, the greater the potential threat to political legitimacy, and therefore the greater the burden of proof on those advocating the program embodying it.

Although almost all government action involves at least some degree of coercion, there are considerable differences among tools in the extent to which they rely on it. This is apparent in Table 6 below, which groups the various tools of public action in terms of the degree of coercion they utilize. Thus:

- At the low end of the coerciveness scale are tort liability, tax expenditures, and public information campaigns. All of these essentially rely on the voluntary cooperation of individuals and groups for their effects, though even information tools can involve considerable coercion if information crosses the border into indoctrination.
- In a "medium" category are a variety of tools that deliver subsidies of various sorts. The least coercive of these are vouchers, which deliver subsidies directly to consumers and leave it to them to do (or not do) what the program is seeking to encourage. Somewhat more restrictive are grants-in-aid, loan

---

91. Linder & Peters, supra note 79, at 114.
guarantees, direct loans, and contracting, which tend to exact more requirements in return for the subsidies that they offer. On the outer border of this category are mandatory labeling and corrective fees and charges, which impose potential burdens on those who fail to comply. These fees are still in some sense voluntary, however, because the citizen is still permitted to engage in the penalized behavior but has to pay a fine or tax on it.

- Finally, in the “highly coercive” category are social and economic regulations, both of which impose formal limitations on activities considered undesirable.

**Table 6: Policy Tools Grouped by Degree of Coerciveness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Coerciveness</th>
<th>Illustrative Tools</th>
<th>Likely Impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Tort liability Information</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax expenditures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Vouchers Insurance Grants-in-aid Government corporations Loan guarantees Direct loans Contracting Labeling requirements Corrective Fees &amp; charges</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Economic regulation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the implementation literature reviewed earlier, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that, other things being equal, the more coercive the tool the more effective it is likely to be, and the more likely to yield redistributive results, as shown in Table 6. These consequences flow from the clearer authority these tools give governments to act, the limited leeway they allow private actors to deviate from specified program purposes, and the limited costs that governments incur in operating them because much of the burden is imposed on external actors. Because of this, these tools are also more likely to generate political support among those
most eager to engage government in a particular form of social action.

These features may help to explain why the consumer and environmental movements of the 1970s in the United States insisted on command-and-control regulatory arrangements even though most academic economists cautioned against the use of this tool. After years of political struggle against often powerful, entrenched interests, advocates of protection typically wanted tools that provided the maximum certainty that the goals they sought actually would be achieved. Less coercive tools, even when backed by sophisticated economic theories, often were not able to provide this assurance.

The problem, however, is that coercive instruments purchase these advantages at a relatively high price, as Table 6 also shows. For one thing, they often entail a loss of efficiency for society at large if not for government. This has been a central theme of economic critiques of social regulation: that the apparent efficiency this tool enjoys from the point of view of government is misleading since it focuses exclusively on the government’s costs, which are trivial, and overlooks the far more substantial costs such regulations impose on the private sector. Critics argue, in fact, that these social costs are likely to be higher than necessary under regulation, because, by replacing market decisions with administrative ones, regulation surrenders the market’s efficiencies. The solution, economists like Charles Schultze therefore have argued, is not improved regulatory management but a change in the basic tool being used: in particular, a shift to less coercive tools that utilize market-like incentives and thus make “public use of private interest.”

Coercive tools also can be more difficult to manage since they impose on administrative agencies the difficult job of keeping abreast of literally thousands of decisions made by hundreds of private entities in widely disparate settings. As Schultze has put it, under social regulation “[s]ocial intervention becomes a race between the ingenuity of the regulatee and the loophole closing of the regulator, with a continuing expansion in the volume of regulations as the outcome.”

Finally, because they restrict human freedom, coercive tools are presumptively suspect in liberal political regimes and are therefore vulnerable to political attack. As the political movements leading to the enactment of these tools subside, as they frequently do, the

93. SCHULTZE, supra note 36.
94. Id. at 57.
agencies administering them often find themselves face-to-face with hostile vested interests determined to use the full panoply of legal protections available to them to rein in public authority. To avoid being totally hamstrung, agencies often find it prudent to reach some *modus vivendi* with the affected interests. The result is the well-known phenomenon of “agency capture” by those it is seeking to control.\(^95\)

\(b. \ Directness\)

Although the degree of coerciveness is by far the most common basis for differentiating policy tools in the literature, it is by no means the only possible basis. To the contrary, the implementation literature of the 1970s and 1980s points our attention to another dimension that may be equally, or more important, as the discussion above has already suggested. This dimension has to do with the *nature of the delivery system* that a tool utilizes, and particularly its degree of *directness*.

Directness measures the extent to which the entity authorizing, financing, or inaugurating a collective activity is involved in carrying it out. Underlying this concept are two crucial observations: first, that any effort to cope with a public problem is really made up of a number of separate activities; and second, that these different activities need not be carried out by the same entity. Thus, for example, it is possible to distinguish between the financing of a public service and its delivery. Each of these, moreover, can be handled either publicly or privately. This creates a minimum of four possible combinations, as shown in Table 7: (i) public finance and public delivery; (ii) public finance and private delivery; (iii) private finance and public delivery; and (iv) private finance and private delivery. The first of these, depicted in Cell A in Table 7, represents the stereotypical view of how government operates: government raises revenues through taxes and uses them to support the delivery of services to citizens by a government agency. As we have seen, however, this turns out not to be the most common pattern at all, certainly not at the national level in the United States. For one thing, even when the public sector is involved in both finance and service delivery, it is often not the same level of government that performs both functions. Rather, the federal government may raise the revenues, but it then often shifts them to

\(^{95}\) For a discussion on the phenomenon of regulatory capture, see **Marver H. Bernstein**, *Regulating Business by Independent Commission* 86-95 (1955).
state or local governments to finance the actual delivery of the services. Cell A thus itself becomes subdivided into four sub-cells. Alternatively, the public sector—either national or local—can raise the revenues but then contract with the private sector to deliver the services (Cell B). What is more, the private entities involved can be either for-profit or nonprofit firms. Finally, any of these delivery mechanisms can be connected to a private system of finance. Thus, for example, a public agency can charge a user fee for the services it provides, in which case the finance is private but the delivery public (Cell C). Alternatively, special tax advantages can be provided for private purchases of services such as day care (Cell D). All of these are forms of public action in the sense that they engage governmental authority, but each utilizes this authority in a different way and for a different part of the process.

**Table 7: Patterns of Public Problem-Solving**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DELIVERY</th>
<th>FINANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) State/local</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Nonprofit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) For-profit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even this does not exhaust the range of combinations that is possible, however, since raising revenues and providing services are hardly the only actions that public problem-solving can involve. Some tools—such as regulations—do not involve services or finances at all, but rather restrictions. In others, the services themselves are financial (e.g., the provision of mortgage finance for housing purchase). Imposing charges, creating inducements, providing information, delivering benefits—all of these as well can be used to promote public purposes. As a result, an extraordinary range of possibilities exists for combining public and private institutions in public problem-solving.

Given these possibilities, it should be clear that “directness” is a matter of degree and that different tools can vary greatly in the degree of directness they embody. Generally speaking, the more the various functions involved in the operation of a public activity are carried out by the same institution, the more direct the tool. Thus, a direct tool is one in which authorization, funding, and/or
delivery are all carried out by essentially the same governmental entity. Indirect tools parcel these various functions out to various other parties—semi-autonomous agencies, other levels of government, community groups, nonprofit organizations, commercial banks, hospitals, and others. The more extensively functions are performed by "third parties," the more organizationally distinct and autonomous these third parties are from the authorizing body, and the greater the discretion the third parties enjoy in the conduct of their functions, the more indirect the tool. Thus, for example, tax expenditures are typically more indirect than contracts since they leave more discretion in the hands of citizens; but grants are more indirect than tax expenditures because they surrender authority to other sovereign units of government, and these units typically have greater powers to resist. All three of these, however, are more indirect than service provision by government agencies.96

Table 8 illustrates this point by ranking tools in terms of their relative degree of directness. Thus, at the low end of the directness continuum are tort liability and grants while at the high end are direct government service provision, government corporations, and information campaigns that governments conduct themselves. In between are tax expenditures (which leave considerable choice to recipients but are nevertheless administered by the enacting government), contracts, and, in the American context, social regulations that make extensive use of state and local governments.

As the grouping of tools here suggests, there is some overlap between the degree of coerciveness and the degree of directness of a tool. This is so because the more coercive tools are difficult to implement through indirect delivery systems. However, this overlap is far from complete. For example, information campaigns, one of the least coercive tools, are typically operated directly, though social regulation, the most coercive, often leaves ample opportunity for involvement by lower levels of government. Clearly these two tool dimensions tap different facets of tool operations.

In classical public administration, a distinction between direct and indirect tools makes little sense because it is taken for granted that a publicly authorized and funded program should be carried out by a duly constituted, and staffed, public agency. Yet as we

96. Differences in degree of directness also exist within tool categories. Thus, for example, block grants are more indirect than categorical grants. Similarly, contracts for major military systems are more indirect than contracts for the purchase of easily specified, off-the-shelf products since more discretion has to be left to the contractor in major systems acquisitions.
## Table 8: Policy Tools Grouped by Degree of Directness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Directness</th>
<th>Illustrative Tools</th>
<th>Likely Impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Tort liability</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loan guarantees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government sponsored enterprises</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vouchers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax expenditures</td>
<td>Low/medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contracting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labeling requirements</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corrective taxes/charges</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct loans</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic regulation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public information</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government corp.s</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct government service provision</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

have seen, much of the growth of government action over the past half-century, especially in the United States, has taken place through indirect tools—grants, loan guarantees, tax expenditures, vouchers, indirect regulation, and many more. The result, as noted earlier, is an elaborate system of “third-party government” that vests a substantial portion of the discretionary authority over the spending of public funds and the operation of public programs in the hands of a variety of third-party partners. Indeed, many tools that operate directly in other countries take a more indirect form in the American context. Thus, for example, many European countries rely on public enterprise to handle the natural monopolies that often exist in public utility industries (e.g., electricity, telephones) whereas the United States tends to leave these businesses in private hands and subject them to economic regulation. The United States also has used more indirect approaches in its social regulatory programs in such areas as the environment, worker safety, and health. Although establishing national standards, these programs leave much of the responsibility for implementation in the hands of state and local governments and those being regulated.
One reason for the popularity of third-party government appears to be the political advantages that indirect tools enjoy. In particular, indirect tools provide important opportunities to cut affected interests into a “piece of the action” when government programs threaten to infringe on their fields. The more fragmented political power is in a country and the more controversial the issue, therefore, the more likely it will be that indirect devices will be used. Thus, for example, in recent American experience:

- By using a cost-based reimbursement “voucher” whose proceeds flowed to existing hospitals, it was possible to defuse the medical community’s opposition to the creation of the federal Medicare program in the 1960s;97
- By relying on loan guarantees instead of direct loans, it was possible to neutralize commercial bank opposition to federal involvement in home mortgage lending in the 1930s;98 and
- By using grants and purchase-of-service contracts, it was possible to enlist research universities to support the expansion of federal involvement in scientific research, and private non-profit organizations to support the expansion of federal involvement in social services for the poor.99

Federal constitutional structures also contribute importantly to the widespread use of indirect forms of action. For much of American history, for example, the federal government’s authority to act on a wide range of domestic policy issues has been contested thanks to constitutional provisions limiting the federal role and a political structure and system of representation firmly anchored at the state and local level.100 Use of indirect tools—particularly the grant-in-aid—thus has often been a political and constitutional prerequisite for any federal involvement. State and local officials have frequently resisted federal involvement unless that involvement is channeled through state and local government hands, and a meaningful degree of discretion is left to state and local authorities in the definition of the policy substance. Interests opposed to federal involvement also have often used their influence at the state and local level to insist on a significant state and local role as a way to

---

100. E.g., Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States 6-10 (2d ed. 1972) (discussing the nature of states as political systems and the partnership between states and the federal government).
retain some degree of influence over the implementation of policies with which they disagree.\textsuperscript{101} Use of indirect tools thus becomes the basis for political compromise, shifting the battle over the definition of policy from the enactment stage to the implementation stage in which state and local officials, and the interests that are more powerful at the state and local level, can play a more meaningful role. The use of indirect tools for federal environmental policy is probably attributable in substantial part to this factor.\textsuperscript{102}

These political advantages of indirect tools are hardly unique to the American context, however. Reliance on indirect instruments of public action is increasingly common in other countries as well, driven by historical traditions of "subsidiarity,"\textsuperscript{103} by a growing diversification of social and political power, by deepening doubts about the capabilities of state action alone to cope with complex social and economic problems, and by a resulting inability of governments to secure sufficient authority to act on their own.\textsuperscript{104}

The political advantages of indirect tools are not their only benefits, however. At least three other benefits often are claimed for them:

- First, indirect tools can inject a useful degree of competition into the provision of public services, breaking the monopoly of governmental agencies and thereby potentially improving service quality and "customer-orientation."
- Second, indirect tools can provide access to talents and resources that are desperately needed to cope with complex public problems, but that public agencies may not command. These include technical talents (e.g., university researchers, private service providers, loan officers) as well as financial and physical resources (e.g., existing facilities, charitable contributions). Indirect tools therefore can extend the reach of public agencies, making it possible for them to avoid costly start-up problems and maximizing the energies that can be brought to bear on public problems.

\textsuperscript{101} Id. at 165.
\textsuperscript{103} Salamon & Anheier, supra note 22, at 151-62.
\textsuperscript{104} E.g., L.J. O'Toole et al., Managing Implementation Processes in Networks, in Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector 142-43 (Walter J.M. Kickert et al. eds., 1997).
• Finally, indirect tools offer a greater degree of flexibility, making it easier for government to experiment, to change course when needed, and thus to remain responsive to new needs. This is so because the authorizing government does not have to create the entire administrative structure to operate an initiative.

Although indirect tools may have important political and operational advantages, however, they also carry with them offsetting liabilities. For one thing, as Table 8 also notes, they can be far less effective and far more difficult to manage. This certainly seems to be one of the central conclusions of the implementation literature of the 1970s and 1980s. In his 1979 study of the implementation of three human service programs in Massachusetts, for example, Gordon Chase found that the most serious implementation problem was the presence of "some player or players in the implementation process whom the program manager does not control but whose cooperation or assistance is required." 105 Pressman and Wildavsky similarly found that even clear specification of goals and general concurrence on desired outcomes are no guarantee of success when multiple actors are involved in executing a program. 106 The sheer mechanics of securing agreement at each stage of the process can still inject debilitating delays. No wonder "more direct means for accomplishing . . . desired ends" is their recommended "first rule in program design." 107

Experience with indirect tools of public action thus has ironically provided new reason to value bureaucracy. "The costs of bureaucracy—a preference for procedure over purpose or seeking the lowest common denominator—may emerge in a different light," Pressman and Wildavsky thus note, "when they are viewed as part of the price paid for predictability of agreement over time among diverse participants." 108 By internalizing transactions, minimizing the legalisms involved in complex contractual negotiations with external actors, and providing a more stable framework for bargaining, direct government offers distinct advantages for accomplishing complex tasks. 109

106. PRESSMAN & WILDAVSKY, supra note 26, at 102-13.
107. Id. at 143.
108. Id. at 133.
These conclusions find considerable support, moreover, in the new economic theories of organization. According to these theories, the "principal-agent" problems that inevitably arise within organizations are even more severe in cross-organizational relationships. This is so because having all of the factors of production in a single entity creates certain advantages:110

- It permits a more creative reward structure to induce agents to pursue the principal's objectives;111
- It helps convey the expectation that all involved should work to a common purpose;112 and
- It may help diminish the losses associated with breakdowns and delays in bargaining.113

When multiple organizations are involved in a given task, the chances increase that the interests and values of the principal and the agents will diverge. The more dispersed the authority, therefore, and the less the coincidence of interests and perspectives between principals and agents, the greater the risk of goal displacement and principal-agent difficulties. Not just the extent of indirectness but also the type of third-party partner a tool engages can thus affect the extent to which public purposes are achieved. Public sector managers of human service programs thus have traditionally shown a preference for nonprofit contractors over for-profit ones when service contracting has been employed on grounds that nonprofits are more likely to share the objectives of the public sector. When principals and agents lack a shared set of values or worldviews, the task of ensuring that the principal's objectives are being served grows more complex and more problematic.

Not only does the directness of tools have implications for the overall effectiveness of programs; but it also may have particular implications for their ability to promote equity and redistribution goals. This is especially the case when the partners brought into the operation of a public program by a tool lack incentives to achieve these equity goals. Yet this is often the case with private businesses. As management theorist Regina Herzlinger has pointed out, "when resources are given to providers who in turn

111. Pratt & Zeckhauser, supra note 53, at 11.
112. Id.
113. Id.
have the discretion to allocate the goods and services they produce . . . [the] providers will try to attract consumers who will improve their measurable performance." In the process, however, redistributive goals may be sacrificed as producers engage in "creaming" to attract better-off clients. Although public agencies themselves are hardly immune from these pressures, the risks appear greater with indirect tools.

Finally, although enjoying important immediate political advantages, indirect tools also suffer from certain longer-term political limitations. In particular, they weaken the perceived link between citizens and government by channeling services financed by public revenues to recipients through private intermediaries or other levels of government. In the process, the connection between the taxes citizens pay and the services they receive can become dangerously attenuated.

In short, despite their advantages, indirect tools are especially difficult to manage. Far from easing the public management problem, as is often supposed, they significantly complicate it instead.

c. Automaticity

A third key dimension in terms of which policy tools can be differentiated is the level of automaticity they embody. Automaticity measures the extent to which a tool utilizes an existing administrative structure for its operations rather than creating its own special administrative apparatus. Tools that utilize the market, for example, are highly automatic. This would include corrective fees and charges or the "tradable permit" system authorized by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Vouchers are another example of a market-based tool: by placing purchasing power in the hands of program beneficiaries rather than the institutions that serve them, vouchers equip these beneficiaries to make use of the market rather than an administrative mechanism to select the quantity and quality of services they will receive.


115. Smith & Lipsky, supra note 90, at 207-11.

The market is not the only existing system that can be mobilized to carry out public purposes, however. Others include the tax system, the private credit system, the court system, and, to lesser extent, the networks of local governments and private, nonprofit agencies. Where these existing systems are operational, important options exist for structuring public interventions in ways that build on them rather than having to establish separate administrative structures. A certain overlap exists, therefore, between the automaticity dimension and the directness dimension of tools. However, not all automatic tools are indirect and not all indirect tools are automatic. For example, tax expenditures are automatic but not wholly indirect, whereas contracting is indirect but far from wholly automatic.

Table 9 below arranges various tools of public action in terms of their reliance on automatic, non-administered processes. As this table shows, tools embodying fees and charges, vouchers, or tax expenditures are relatively automatic, as is the use of the existing tort law system to control environmental damage or ensure workplace safety. By contrast, social regulation, direct service programs, and government information campaigns are at the low end of the automaticity spectrum. In between are tools such as grants and contracting, which have some automatic features but operate within essentially administered systems.

Like the other tool dimensions I have examined, there is reason to believe that the automaticity dimension has significant implications for the performance of programs. Indeed, in a 1972 book on the preconditions of public program success, economist Robert Levine identifies this dimension as the single most important determinant of public program success.\textsuperscript{117} Programs are most likely to fail, Levine argued, when they rely on “highly administered system[s].”\textsuperscript{118} Instead, more reliance should be placed on “market-like and bargaining systems that combine the workable features of decentralization, self-administration, personal economic or political motivation, and the gross application of public policy rather than systems administered in detail by public officials to private clienteles according to plans laid out in detail by public planners.”\textsuperscript{119}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} \textit{ROBERT A. LEVINE, PUBLIC PLANNING: FAILURE AND REDIRECTION} 17-24, 186-87 (1972).
\item \textsuperscript{118} \textit{Id.} at 19.
\item \textsuperscript{119} \textit{Id.} at 23-24.
\end{itemize}
Economist Charles Schultze reached a similar conclusion in his pioneering 1977 analysis of regulatory programs, criticizing prevailing regulatory approaches as inherently inefficient because they utilize command and control techniques rather than relying on the automatic mechanisms of the market to promote public objectives. Instead of prescribing what anti-pollution devices polluters must install to clear the nation’s rivers, for example, Schultze recommends making “public use of private interest” by imposing effluent charges that would give polluters an economic incentive to find the lowest cost way to meet environmental goals.

Because they make use of existing mechanisms, such as the market, automatic tools also can be expected to be more manageable. In a sense, they reduce the amount of public management that is necessary, substituting for it the control systems already built into these existing systems—the market, the tax system, the court system, or the private banking system.

For all their appeal, however, automatic tools have proved in practice to fall significantly short of their promise. For one thing, there is reason to question how effective they are. The great advantage of automatic tools is that they make it possible to enlist existing systems in the pursuit of new objectives. But this advantage

---

120. SCHULTZE, supra note 36, at 84-90.
121. Id. at 35.
is also the source of serious problems because these systems typically have their own objectives and dynamics. There is always a question, therefore, whether the public objectives will redirect the existing system or the existing system will co-opt, and distort, the public objectives. After all, it is the failure of the existing systems that often necessitates public involvement in the first place. For example, the demands for environmental and safety regulation grew directly out of disappointments with the effectiveness of tort law and the court system to handle consumer and environmental problems.

The effectiveness of automatic tools thus depends on identifying the incentives that can turn existing systems to desired public purposes. In practice this has proved to be more difficult than often assumed. Economist Robert Levine, for example, acknowledged "the hard barrier of our lack of knowledge about what incentives work for officials of local government."122 The incentive structures of for-profit businesses are presumably easier to fathom, but even here complications arise. Contracting, for example, is assumed to be a fairly automatic tool because of its reliance on the private market. However, this assumes that a competitive market actually exists for the goods and services needed to address public problems. In fact, however, this critical prerequisite is often lacking in government contracting because government is often in the position of purchasing goods and services that are not generally available on the open market (e.g., military aircraft) in markets in which the number of suppliers is highly constricted. Complicating matters further is the fact that the desired outputs in public programs are often difficult to specify and then to achieve (e.g., getting the most disadvantaged welfare recipients into permanent jobs). As management specialist Regina Herzlinger has noted, this makes it extremely difficult to "structur[e] enforceable contracts with the private sector" and to exercise the control function that such contracts require.123

Similar problems have arisen with voucher programs. The effectiveness of vouchers depends critically on the responsiveness of markets to the kind of demand that voucher recipients will make, and on the ability of voucher recipients to make wise decisions. Both of these are often problematic, however, potentially making vouchers a source of windfall profits for providers without making recipients significantly better off.

122. Levine, supra note 117, at vii.
123. Herzlinger & Kane, supra note 114, at 110.
Perhaps because of these problems, automatic tools also have political problems. On the one hand, their reliance on existing structures lends them a certain political legitimacy. However, because they enlist institutions and processes that have somewhat different objectives, such tools rarely can attract the enthusiastic support of those pushing for a policy initiative. Thus, environmental advocates have been reluctant to embrace the concept of tradable pollution permits for fear that this would legitimize the right to pollute and create "hot spots" of heavy pollution in less desirable neighborhoods. Consumer advocates similarly have resisted the idea of weighing the value of a human life against the cost of protection in structuring approaches to workplace or consumer safety. Despite their claims to greater efficiency, therefore, automatic tools often have lacked a political constituency.

Finally, experience with automatic tools has raised some serious questions about how easy they are to manage. Automatic tools turn out to be far more cumbersome to administer than advocates assume. Tradable permitting schemes, for example, still require the establishment of initial threshold pollution levels, the estimation of pollution charges that are consistent with prevailing technology and industry incentive structures, the collection of detailed information on actual pollution levels, and the maintenance and operation of a market in pollution rights. As with the other tool dimensions, therefore, this one, too, involves difficult trade-offs in terms of the criteria outlined earlier.

d. Visibility

The fourth tool dimension that seems likely to be important is the degree of visibility a tool exhibits in the normal policy review processes, particularly the budget process. Obviously, this dimension is highly sensitive to the structure of these processes. Thus, for example, countries that do not utilize a capital budget, like the United States, tend to put direct lending programs at a competitive disadvantage. They require that the full value of a loan show up on the operating budget as an expenditure the year in which the loan is made. Until changes were made in 1990, this gave a real advantage to loan guarantee programs over direct lending programs since the value of loan guarantees shows up on the budget only if

124. For an analysis of the administrative challenges entailed in the application of market-based tools to environmental protection, see Nat'l Acad. of Pub. Admin., The Environment Goes to Market: The Implementation of Economic Incentives for Pollution Control (1994).
and when they go into default. Similarly, until the 1970s in the United States, no official record was kept of tax expenditures, making them largely invisible in the annual budget process.\textsuperscript{125} Not until the 1990s, moreover, were such tax expenditures considered in the normal budget decision-making process.

Although the visibility of tools may be affected by the accounting processes in place, however, there are still some general structural features of tools that affect their standing along this dimension. Table 10 thus offers a tentative grouping of tools in terms of their degree of visibility. As shown there, insurance and regulatory tools are still relatively invisible whereas direct government grants, contracts, and vouchers tend to be more visible. Loan guarantees and tax expenditures are examples of tools that were once largely invisible in normal budget processes in the United States but have become more visible in recent years as a result of accounting changes designed to bring them into better view. Changes similarly have been under way for more than a decade to increase the visibility of social regulatory programs by requiring economic impact analyses before regulations go into effect.

Visibility has perhaps its greatest impact in the political realm. At a time of budgetary stringency, invisibility is a tremendous political asset. Invisible tools are therefore the easiest to pass. This may explain why regulation, loan guarantees, and tax subsidies grew so massively in the 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{126} Though different in many respects, all of these tools shared a low level of visibility in the normal budgetary process. In the case of loan guarantees, for example, until passage of new credit budgeting procedures in 1990, only the projected losses from loan guarantee defaults were carried on government budgets while the face value of the contingent liabilities were relegated to a special annex.\textsuperscript{127} A similar procedure is used with insurance programs. In the case of regulation, only the direct cost of the regulatory agency personnel show up in the government's budget, whereas the indirect costs imposed on businesses and households are largely invisible. Finally, in the case of tax expenditures, until the adoption of the Budget and Accounting Act in 1974,\textsuperscript{128} these were largely invisible as well in the budget process, and it was not until the early 1990s that lawmakers were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} Analytical Perspectives, supra note 17, at 107.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Salamon, supra note 12, at 4-7.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Analytical Perspectives, supra note 17, at 129-30.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Budget & Accounting Procedure Act of 1950, ch. 946, 64 Stat. 832 (1950) (codified as 31 U.S.C. § 18b). The enactment has since been repealed.
\end{itemize}
TABLE 10: POLICY TOOLS GROUPED BY DEGREE OF VISIBILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Visibility</th>
<th>Illustrative Tools</th>
<th>Likely Impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Economic regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labeling requirements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tort liability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Contracting information campaigns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loan guarantees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax expenditures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Direct government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grants-in-aid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct loans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vouchers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corrective taxes/charges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

required to take explicit account of such tax expenditures in making annual budget decisions.\(^{129}\)

This dimension also may explain why corrective fees and charges have made rather limited headway as vehicles for environmental control despite the advantages claimed for them as efficient mechanisms of public action. Unlike tax expenditures, which are essentially invisible, corrective taxes and fees are highly visible and therefore harder to enact.

The very feature that makes invisible tools so attractive politically, however, makes them problematic along other dimensions. Most obviously, the less visible the tool, the more difficult it is to hold accountable. This can have implications for the efficiency of programs embodying this tool. One of the central criticisms of regulatory programs, for example, is that by keeping their true costs hidden, they impose burdens on the economy that are far greater than are needed to accomplish their purpose. Similarly, tax expenditures are sometimes accused of delivering windfall gains to taxpayers who would engage in a particular activity even in the absence of the subsidy. Programs embodying tax subsidies, therefore, may be highly inefficient, paying unnecessarily for behavior that would have occurred anyway. This same concern applies to insurance programs. Far from preventing activities that entail

risk—such as locating houses in flood plains—insurance programs may inadvertently encourage them. But their relative invisibility keeps the inefficiencies of these tools from being recognized and addressed.

Because of these accountability problems, those opposed to public spending tend to resist the use of invisible tools. On the other hand, those on the receiving end of public largesse naturally prefer to have their benefits delivered in the least visible form. What this means in practice is that the stronger the constituency, the less visible the tool it is likely to be able to use for any benefits it receives. This may explain why low income welfare recipients receive their benefits through highly visible grants-in-aid whereas middle class homeowners receive theirs through far less visible tax expenditures.

The visibility of tools also may have implications for the extent to which they are used to pursue equity goals. This is so because of the legitimacy attached to equity goals in the political arena. The more visible the tool a program uses, therefore, the more likely the program will be used to serve redistributive goals. Conversely, the more special subgroups of the population, such as oil well owners or large investors, are being targeted for benefits, the more attractive less visible tools will be.

IV. FROM ANALYTICS TO ACTION: RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF THIRD-PARTY GOVERNMENT

A. The Paradox of Third-Party Government

The four dimensions identified above hardly exhaust the bases for classifying different tools of public action and analyzing their effects. Further fruitful distinctions can be drawn, for example, between tools that deliver their benefits in the form of cash versus those that deliver them "in kind," and between those that operate through producers and those that deliver their benefits directly to consumers.130 What is more, at this stage of research, the rela-

130. Most economists would argue, for example, that cash benefits are more efficient than in-kind benefits, because they allow beneficiaries to utilize resources where they value them the most. However, in-kind tools, such as vouchers and loan guarantees, have substantial political advantages because they often can mobilize producer interests in support of particular programs and neutralize opponents who fear that recipients will squander benefits on purposes other than those intended.

131. Consumer side subsidies, such as vouchers and tax expenditures, are thought to be more efficient, because they allow consumers to shop for the best combination of service and cost. However, producer side subsidies, such as grants and contracts,
tionships between tool dimensions and tool consequences are more in the nature of plausible hypotheses than proven facts.

Even with these caveats, however, it should be clear that the "new governance" approach, and the tools framework on which it rests, has considerable analytic power as a source of insights into the challenges of public problem-solving in the era of third-party government. Perhaps most fundamentally, the discussion has pointed up a critical paradox that seems to characterize contemporary efforts to respond to public problems. That paradox, very simply, is this: policy-makers seem to be under increasing pressures to select those tools of public action that are the most difficult to manage and the hardest to keep focused on their public objectives.

More specifically, a variety of factors—the growing fragmentation of political power, the increased complexity of public problems, the recent skepticism of government, the preoccupation with efficiency as the major criterion for public action—have put a premium on tools that are indirect, invisible, and automatic. Such tools have the advantage of defusing political opposition to governmental action, recruiting new talents and resources to the tasks of public problem-solving, and avoiding the enlargement of the public sector. At the same time, however, they have the disadvantage of vastly complicating the tasks of public management and risking the subversion of public purposes. In a sense, we seem caught in a vicious circle in which disappointment with public action yields forms of such action that seem most likely further to disappoint. Clearly, the future of collective efforts to respond to public problems will remain gloomy unless this paradox can be resolved.

**B. Resolving the Paradox**

For this to be possible, however, it will be necessary to move beyond slogans and address the three critical challenges associated with the rise of "third-party government."

1. *The Management Challenge*

The first of these is the management challenge. Contrary to the hopeful assumptions of some, third-party government poses immense management challenges, perhaps far more immense than those posed by traditional public administration. With power dispersed and numerous semi-autonomous entities involved in the op-

---

retain the political edge, because they are more likely to stimulate producer-side political support.
eration of public programs, even straightforward tasks become difficult. Indirect tools require advance planning of far more operational details than is the case with more direct tools. Matters that could be dealt with internally on an ad hoc basis in direct government have to be settled in advance through legally binding contracts under "third-party government." Similarly, incentives have to be devised sufficient to induce desired behavior, but not so substantial as to yield windfall gains; concurrence has to be secured at numerous points in complex decision chains; and disparate organizations have to be forged into effective networks capable of integrated action. Each of these tasks requires not only extensive programmatic knowledge but also considerable diplomatic skill as well as detailed knowledge of the operational parameters of the different tools and the internal dynamics of the entities that the tool engages. Also necessary is a sophisticated appreciation of the context in which the tool is being deployed and how this compares to the conditions required for the tool to function optimally.

2. The Accountability Challenge

Side-by-side with this management challenge is the accountability challenge that "third-party government" poses. As noted, many of the newer tools of public action vest substantial discretionary authority in entities other than those with ultimate responsibility for the results. What is more, these other entities have their own autonomous sources of authority that allow them to operate with considerable independence of the authorizing body: they are sovereign state and local governments, private commercial banks, independent nonprofit organizations, profit-seeking companies, universities and hospitals with powerful governing boards, and many more. Each of these enters its relationship with governmental authorities on its own terms, with its own expectations, its own objectives, and its own bottom line. What is more, as we have seen, the choice of the instrument that structures these relationships is often dictated as much by political considerations as by the appropriateness of the instrument for the purpose at hand. In these circumstances, the traditional notions of accountability embodied in administrative law, with their emphasis on controlling the discretion exercised by governmental agencies,132 do not quite suffice for the obvious reason that governmental agencies are no

longer in control of the programs they administer. What is needed, therefore, is both a different set of standards and a different frame of reference, including, very often, a different time frame. One of the more hopeful studies of accountability under federal grant-in-aid programs discovered, for example, that initial efforts to enforce accountability to federal objectives through rigorous and detailed guidelines ultimately provoked more resistance than cooperation. Over time, however, as professionals came to occupy strategic positions at both federal and local levels, the salience of the federal versus state conflicts declined and a true synthesis of objectives evolved as efforts at coordination and control gave way to true collaboration.133

Third-party government and the indirect tools of government it utilizes thus fundamentally change the meaning of accountability in government programs. Instead of thinking of accountability as responsibility to a single dominant unit of government that authorizes a program, third-party government institutionalizes and legitimizes multiple perspectives on the goals and purposes of programs. In these circumstances, the diversion of national goals in a national program may not be a “problem” to be solved after all. Rather, it simply may be the price that has to be paid to give the authorizing government a seat at the table in the first place. In a sense, the use of indirect tools denies the authorizing government the authority to enforce its goals on other actors. Rather, it gives such governments at best a “hunting license” to enter into a bargaining relationship with these other actors.

This has profound implications, however, for the practice of administrative law. The central focus of administrative law has long been on controlling the exercise of discretion by administrative agencies. To do so, administrative law relies on a variety of essentially procedural controls, such as notice and comment requirements and prohibitions on ex parte contacts, embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act134 and associated case law. The aim

of these procedures is to force administrative discretion into the open and ensure fair access to its exercise.\textsuperscript{135}

Third-party government, by contrast, offers a kind of institutional solution to the problem of administrative discretion. It does so not by trying to control the exercise of administrative discretion within administrative agencies, but by parceling it out to a variety of third-party partners which come to share with the government administrators the discretionary authority to shape program operations. This has the result, however, of placing the exercise of discretion beyond the reach of classical administrative law. Instead, it relies on the bargaining relationship between government administrators and the third-party actors brought into the operation of public programs to find a solution that all the relevant stakeholders can accept. It is for this reason, perhaps, that legal scholars such as Martin Shapiro have begun referring to a "new discretion."\textsuperscript{136} Devices such as "negotiated rule-making," "cooperative regulation," "negotiated contracting," and "cooperative contracting" are the tangible manifestations of this new approach.\textsuperscript{137} How to square these new approaches with the more traditional procedural safeguards of administrative law, however, is still far from settled. Clearly, however, classical notions of democratic accountability may need to be loosened and more pluralistic conceptions developed. But this will require extensive education, new decision-making procedures, and new attitudes of all involved.

3. The Legitimacy Challenge

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, for all its political appeal, third-party government ultimately may pose even more serious challenges to popular support of government than did the bureaucratic model before it. Fundamentally, "third-party government" threatens to fray the link between citizens and the services they receive in return for the taxes they pay. It does so by vesting much of the responsibility for delivering these services in the hands of institutions other than those that voted the programs and raised the revenues for them. In these circumstances, it is not surprising


\textsuperscript{136} Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 Yale L.J. 1487, 1500 (1983).

\textsuperscript{137} On the negotiated and cooperative models of contracting, see DeHoog, supra note 74.
that citizens might begin to wonder where their taxes are going and
what they receive in return.

CONCLUSION

A new era of public problem-solving has dawned in the United
States and many other parts of the world. Instead of relying exclu-
sively on government to solve public problems, a host of other ac-
tors is being mobilized as well, sometimes on their own initiative
but often in complex partnerships with the state. In this new set-
ting, traditional notions of public and private responsibilities are
being turned on their heads and traditional conceptions of public
administration rendered largely obsolete.

To cope with this new reality, a new paradigm, a new conceptual-
ization, is needed, one that acknowledges the complex networks of
interaction that now characterize our efforts to deal with public
problems, that appreciates the strengths these networks can mobil-
ize, but that also recognizes the challenges they entail.

We have argued that what we have called the "new governance"
provides such a conceptualization. The "new governance" focuses
our attention on the wide array of tools now being used to address
public problems and on the diverse collection of institutions being
activated in the process. In doing so, it alerts us to the increased
substitution of complex networks of organizations for the rigid hi-
erarchies of old to solve public problems and to the resulting need
for enablement skills rather than simple management skills to cope
with the resulting interdependencies. Far from simplifying the
tasks of policy management, the "new governance" thus empha-
sizes the increased difficulties it now entails.

To take full advantage of the opportunities that the "new gov-
ernance" opens up, therefore, significant work is still needed.
Whole new bodies of knowledge must be developed about the
tools of public action now in widespread use. And new forms of
management must evolve that acknowledge the central features
that these tools embody. The first step, however, is to understand
better the fundamental character of the third-party system that in-
creasingly has evolved and that seems likely to persist. If this arti-
cle has shed some light on the nature of this system, the dynamics it
exhibits, and the implications it consequently holds, it will have
served its purpose well.