How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter's Conundrum

Keith M. Stolte

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ARTICLES

How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter’s Conundrum

Keith M. Stolte*

It is possible that some day in some moldering mass of unpublished records of the common law may be found a report of a case in the reign of Elizabeth by a clothier for infringement of his trademark that will justify the authority with which Southern v. How has been so unanimously endowed.

—Frank I. Schechter

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* Associate, Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione, Chicago, Ill. University of Chicago, B.A. 1987; John Marshall Law School, J.D., magna cum laude, 1998. This Article is dedicated to the memory of Howard Mayer Brown, late distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, and renowned Medieval and Renaissance scholar.

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INTRODUCTION

There is a new entry in the law books as the oldest reported trademark case in Anglo-American law. It is known as Sandforth’s Case.2 Ironically, it was discovered through an obscure ref-
reference in a seventeenth century lawsuit that previously claimed the title of oldest trademark case.

History has generally honored *Southern v. How*,\(^3\) decided in 1618, as the first reported trademark case in Anglo-American law\(^4\)—despite the fact it was not a trademark case at all, but one that involved the sale of counterfeit jewels.\(^5\) Its connection with trademark law arose out of Judge Dodderidge’s dictum in that case, wherein the learned judge made a brief reference to an earlier, unnamed and apparently unreported case that involved a suit brought against a cloth maker who used another cloth maker’s mark.\(^6\) That lawsuit—published as *Sandforth’s Case*—may now be declared the earliest reported trademark case in Anglo-American law.

For four centuries, the obscure reference made in *Southern v. How* served as the foundation for all subsequent trademark law and, more broadly, the law of unfair competition.\(^7\) But *Southern v. How* provides a feeble and problematic basis for the development of the law of trademarks and unfair competition in England, the British Commonwealth, and the United States. For example, some prominent scholars, particularly Frank Schechter,\(^8\) argue that the
case is practically worthless in demonstrating that the common law of trademarks developed any earlier than the advent of the Industrial Revolution.9 Schechter has declared Sykes v. Sykes,10 decided in 1824, to be “the first reported case squarely involving the protection of trade-marks by an English common law court.”11 Many other scholars and the courts are less assertive; they simply tend to avoid the question as to the availability of relief for trademark infringement or unfair competition prior to the nineteenth century.12

9 See Schechter, supra note 1, at 8-10, 123 (criticizing the reliance of courts and legal commentators on Southern v. How as the initial basis for Anglo-American trademark law and the law of unfair competition due to the unavailing mysteries created by differing reports of the case).


11 Schechter, supra note 1, at 137.

12 See Schechter, supra note 1, at 6-10, 123; see also discussion infra notes 50-75 and accompanying text (providing a historical demonstration of how the courts and trademark scholars have treated the case). Schechter, who argued that the usage and regulation of trademarks by medieval and renaissance guilds established the antiquity of trademark law in England and throughout Europe, nevertheless stated that most commen-
We can now dispense altogether with *Southern v. How*, in favor of *Sandforth’s Case*. There is now little doubt that *Sandforth’s Case* was the very case to which Judge Dodderidge made brief reference in *Southern v. How*.

*Sandforth’s Case* conclusively demonstrates that the English courts recognized a common law right against trademark infringement as early as 1584, some two hundred and fifty years before the Industrial Revolution caused a surge in the development of this area of the law on both sides of the Atlantic.

Ironically, like *Southern v. How*, one of the two extant abstracts of *Sandforth* makes brief reference to an unreported case involving counterfeiting activity, apparently heard in the House of Commons in 1558. While it may be another four hundred years before this even earlier case surfaces, the brief treatment of the parliamentary action in *Sandforth’s Case* strengthens the conclusion that trademark infringement and unfair competition was a violation of English law as early as the mid-sixteenth century.

This Article introduces *Sandforth’s Case* to practitioners and trademark scholars and provides a brief analysis of the case, particularly in the contexts of sixteenth century commerce and law reporting. Part I explores the problems posed by, and the historical treatment accorded to, the brief reference of the case that appeared in *Southern v. How*. Part II introduces *Sandforth’s Case* as the true
tors assign the origin of the common law protection of trademarks to the early nineteenth century. SCHECHETER, supra note 1, at 11, 16. According to Schechter:

¶Those who have attained pre-eminence either as practitioners or as text-writers of trade-mark law have with few exceptions been quite content to regard that law as practically the creation of the nineteenth century, without attempting in any way to ascertain the extent to which trade-marks had been used prior to the nineteenth century, the functions or purposes which these trade-marks had served and the methods, if any, by which they came under any form of legal protection or surveillance.

Id.; see also DUNCAN MACKENZIE KERLY, LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES 2 (5th ed. 1923) (stating that “[t]he law on this subject cannot be traced back further than the nineteenth century”); SEBASTIAN, TRADE MARK REGISTRATION 3 (2d ed. 1922) (stating that “it is possible that this right [to trademark protection] was recognized as early as the reign of Queen Elizabeth; it was at any rate established in 1833”).

13. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 617 n.18.

14. See infra notes 101-142 and accompanying text (providing a comprehensive analysis of *Sandforth’s Case*).

15. Sandforth’s Case, Cory’s Entries, HLS MS. 5048, fo. 118v, reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615.
foundation of Anglo-American trademark law, yet never cited by any English or American court. Part III explores the impact of Sandforth’s Case and demonstrates that it clearly established trademark infringement as a violation of sixteenth century common law. This Article concludes that Sandforth’s Case is the bridge, sought by legal scholars, between trademark regulation by the medieval English trade guilds and the birth of modern trademark jurisprudence in the common law courts of the nineteenth century.

I. SOUTHERN V. HOW: THE BASIS OF TRADEMARK LAW OR “AN IRRELEVANT DICTUM OF A REMINISCENT JUDGE”?

For centuries, the case of Southern v. How has been subject to significant controversy.\(^\text{16}\) The question at the center of this unending debate is whether the case demonstrates that the English common law of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cultivated a tort of trademark infringement and unfair competition, or whether the case should be discarded as nothing more than a vehicle for an irrelevant, highly ambiguous piece of legal gossip.\(^\text{17}\) Whatever the answer was during the 380 year period since the case was first heard, there is no question that, until now, Southern v. How has been universally regarded as the first to make reference to an action at law involving what we would call trademark infringement.\(^\text{18}\)

A. The Reporting of Southern v. How

Southern v. How has historically engendered controversy as to its value in the development of Anglo-American trademark law because the case was reported in at least five abstracts by four different chroniclers at five different times.\(^\text{19}\) As one may expect, each of the five versions of the case differs in its treatment of an

\(^{16}\) See discussion infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text (analyzing the continuing controversy on the relevance of the case to origins of trademark law).

\(^{17}\) See Schechter, supra note 1, at 7-12, 123-26 (characterizing the import of the case in the development of Anglo-American law of trademarks as “an irrelevant dictum of a reminiscent judge”).

\(^{18}\) See Gilson, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1]; see also McCarthy, supra note 4, at § 5:2; Schechter, supra note 1, at 9-11.

\(^{19}\) See discussion infra notes 21-48 and accompanying text (examining the five reported versions of the case); see also supra note 3 (citing the five versions of Sandforth’s Case).
earlier, unnamed, unreported case during the reign of Elizabeth I. Two of the versions do not even mention the earlier case; of the three that do make reference to the earlier case, one indicates that the senior user of the infringed mark was the plaintiff in the case, while two state that the plaintiff was a purchaser of the infringing goods. The differing versions do not even agree on the year the case was decided.\textsuperscript{20}

The first published abstract of \textit{Southern v. How} appeared in \textit{Popham’s Reports} in 1656.\textsuperscript{21} That report assigns the decision to Trinity term, 15 Jac. I,\textsuperscript{22} that is, 1618. The case was a suit heard by the King’s Bench involving a civil charge of deceit. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, through his servant, sold him counterfeit jewels.

Although \textit{Southern v. How} was not in any sense a case involving trademarks, Judge Dodderidge recalled in dicta an earlier case, which he assumed to be an action heard on the tort of deceit.\textsuperscript{23} According to the abstract in \textit{Popham’s Report}, that earlier action was brought in the Court of Common Pleas by a “clothier,” who (1) had gained a “great reputation” as a skilled clothier, (2) “had

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] In fact, there is a discrepancy between the five abstracts even as to the year that \textit{Southern v. How} was heard.
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] \textit{Popham’s Reports} 143, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243. \textit{Popham’s Reports} is an important collection of numerous abstracts of early common law cases. But the author, Popham, did not report the case of \textit{Southern v. How}, which was actually published after his death. The abstract had been reported presumably by successors of Popham’s enterprise and included in the book under a section entitled “Some Remarkable Cases Reported by Other Learned Pens Since His Death.”
\item[\textsuperscript{22}] The term “15 Jac. I” refers to the 15th year of the reign of James I.
\item[\textsuperscript{23}] See \textit{infra} notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the common law tort of deceit during the sixteenth century). According to the opinion reported in \textit{Popham’s Reports}:
\begin{quote}
Dod[d]eridge said, that 22 Eliz., the action upon the case was brought in the [Court of] Common Pleas by a clothier, that whereas he had gained great reputation for his making of his cloth by reason whereof he had great utterance to his benefit and profit, and that he used to set his mark on his cloth whereby it should be known to be his cloth; and another clothier, observing it, used the same mark to his ill-made cloth on purpose to deceive him, and it was resolved that the action did well lie.
\end{quote}
\end{itemize}
great utterance to his benefit and profit,"24 and (3) affixed “his mark on his cloth whereby it should be known to be his cloth,” against another clothier who, upon “observing [the other clothier’s mark], used the same mark to his ill-made cloth on purpose to deceive him.”25 In that case, “it was resolved that the action did well lie.”26

The abstract of Southern v. How in Popham’s Reports makes clear that the plaintiff in the earlier, unnamed case is the senior trademark user and not a consumer, but the reference appears to state that the action was one that fit into the developing doctrine of tortious deceit.27 There is no indication in the abstract that the case occupied a new cause of action for trademark infringement or unfair competition, though this is a possibility.28 Nevertheless, Dod-
deridge appears to characterize the action as an intentional deceit on the senior trademark user by the defendant.

The second report of *Southern v. How* appeared in *J. Bridgeman’s Reports*, published in 1659, four years after the *Popham’s* version appeared. The *Bridgeman’s* abstract cites *Southern v. How* as decided in 1616, two years before the date ascribed by the abstract in *Popham’s Reports*. This report of the case makes no reference to Judge Dodderidge’s discussion of the earlier clothier’s case, and is therefore of little use except to demonstrate the inconsistencies in the five reports of *Southern v. How*.

The third abstract of the case was published in *Croke’s Reports*, also in 1659. The *Croke’s* version, like that in *Popham’s*, indicates that *Southern v. How* was heard in the year 1618 and, like the abstract in *Popham’s*, it included a reference to Judge Dodderidge’s discussion in dicta of an earlier clothier’s case. The *Croke’s* version of the earlier clothier’s case, however, contains striking inconsistencies with the *Popham’s* version.

According to the version in *Croke’s Reports*, Judge Dodderidge referred to a case from the Court of Common Pleas, in which (1) “a clothier of Gloucestershire sold very good cloth, so that in London if they saw any cloth of his mark they would buy it without searching thereof;” (2) “another who made ill cloth put his mark upon it without his [the senior user’s] privity; and an action upon the case was brought by him who bought the cloth, for this deceit; and adjudged maintainable.

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30. The abstract indicates that the case was heard during the Hilary Term, “13 Jac. I,” that is, during the thirteenth year of the reign of James I.
Dodderidge cited a case to be adjudged 33 Eliz. in the [Court of] Common Pleas: a clothier of Gloucestershire sold very good cloth, so that in London if they saw any cloth of his mark they would buy it without searching thereof; and another who made ill cloth put his mark upon it without his [the senior user’s] privity; and an action upon the case was brought by him who bought the cloth, for this deceit; and adjudged maintainable.
*Id.* at 471, 79 Eng. Rep. at 402. The term “33 Eliz.” indicates that the case was heard during the thirty-third year of the reign of Elizabeth I, that is, in 1591.
32. *Id.* Presumably the term “they” means consumers or retailers of cloth. As a whole, this statement probably means that prospective consumers or retailers relied on the trademark appearing on the cloth to signify the quality of the cloth, thereby alleviating the need to diligently inspect the goods to assure themselves of the quality of each individual article.
mark upon it without his [the senior user’s] privity;”;33 and (3)”an action upon the case was brought by him who bought the cloth, for this deceit.”34 Also, as in the Popham’s abstract, the case was “adjudged maintainable.”35

Croke’s abstract of Southern v. How includes certain details of the earlier clothier’s case which the Popham’s version did not provide. For example, a more definite picture of the plaintiff in that case has emerged, to wit, that (1) he was a clothier from Gloucestershire, (2) he sold his goods beyond his locale—specifically in London, (3) he had a considerable reputation for the quality of his cloths, and (4) he used his mark to embody the good-will and fame of his business.36 Another very interesting difference between Croke’s version and that of Popham is that Croke’s report identifies the plaintiff as the purchaser of the infringing cloths, not the senior user of the mark. This version of the unnamed clothier’s case, therefore, found that consumers of infringing goods could have an action for deceit against the infringer, although it is not clear from Croke’s account whether the senior user of the mark could likewise find relief at law.37 Unsurprisingly, the discrepancy between the versions as to the identity of the plaintiff became the most contentious aspect of the controversy surrounding Southern v. How.38 Be that as it may, we know that Anglo-American trademark law certainly did not develop in accordance with Croke’s version.39

33. Id. In other words, without authorization. This language may offer a slight hint that it was commonplace for manufacturers of cloths to contract with others regarding the use of their trademarks.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Allowing a purchaser of inferior merchandise an action for deceit against an infringer who uses a mark, known to convey a reputation of quality, seems to fit better within the doctrine of the tort of deceit as developed by the seventeenth century. In such a case, the trademark could be viewed as serving as an acceptable type of warranty and there would be privity between the infringer and the purchaser. See supra note 27 (discussing cases requiring the existence of a warranty and privity in cases involving deceit).
38. See Gilson, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1]; see also Schechter, supra note 1, at 8-10.
39. See generally Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 170 U.S.P.Q. 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (holding that consumers have no standing to bring an action for trademark infringement); Gilson, supra note 4, §
The last two abstracts of Southern v. How appeared in Rolle’s Reports, which was published in 1676. The two reports are not consistent. The first of the two abstracts agrees with Popham’s version, which stated that Southern v. How was heard in 1618, but like the abstract published in J. Bridgeman’s Reports, this report fails to mention Judge Dodderidge’s dictum about the earlier clothier’s case.40 The second Rolle’s abstract, however, assigns the date of Southern v. How as 1619,41 and does in fact refer to Dodderidge’s comments on the earlier case.42

As reported in the second Rolle’s abstract, Justice Dodderidge referred to a case in the Court of Common Pleas involving “a clothier of Gloucester [who] made cloths which were more expensive and more saleable than the cloths of any other, and he put a special mark on them which no other clothier had before that.”43 Subsequently, “[another] clothier had counterfeited said mark and placed it on his cloths, which were not as good but which he sold at the same price as the other by this deceit.”44 The second Rolle’s abstract concluded, likewise to the abstracts in Popham’s and Croke’s, that an action “was deemed . . . against” the defendant “in this case,” but, unlike the Popham’s and Croke’s abstracts, Judge Dodderidge “did not say by which of the two the action was brought.”45

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1.01[1] (noting that courts have not yet recognized a consumer’s action for trademark infringement). Gilson states that the idea of permitting consumers to sue for trademark infringement is “a concept so advanced that even today in the age of consumerism the courts have not yet come to recognize it.” Gilson, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1].


41. This abstract indicates that the case was heard during the Trinity Term, “16 Jac. I,” that is, during the sixteenth year of the reign of James I.

42. Southern v. How, 2 Rolle’s Reports 26, 81 Eng. Rep. 635. According to the second abstract in Rolle’s Reports:

Justice Dod[d]eridge in 23 Eliz. in the [Court of] Common Pleas; the case was that a clothier of Gloucester made cloths which were more expensive and more saleable than the cloths of any other, and he put a special mark on them which no other clothier had before that; and after a [another] clothier had counterfeited said mark and placed it on his cloths, which were not as good but which he sold at the same price as the other by this deceit; [it] was deemed that the action was against him in this case, but Mr. Justice Dod[d]eridge did not say by which of the two the action was brought, i.e. by the clothier who first had the mark, or by the purchaser, although it seems to have been by the purchaser.

Id. This abstract reports that the earlier case was heard in 1581.

43. Id.

44. Id.
brought, i.e., by the clothier who first had the mark, or by the pur-
chas~ although it seems to have been by the purchaser.45

The second Rolle’s abstract points to two further aspects of the 
senior trademark user: (1) his cloths were reputed to be the most 
expensive and famous in the region, and (2) he apparently had the 
exclusive use of his mark as applied to cloths. That report also 
suggests that the defendant passed-off his inferior infringing cloths 
at the same price as the senior user’s cloths. It seems clear that 
Rolle was familiar with the previously reported abstracts because 
he specifically highlighted the discrepancy between the report in 
Popham and the abstract in Croke’s on the issue of who the plain-
tiff was.46 Rolle awkwardly posited that Dodderidge failed to indi-
cate whether the plaintiff in the earlier case was the senior trade-
mark user or a duped purchaser, although he proffered his own 
opinion that it was the purchaser.47

As demonstrated above, the five extant abstracts of Southern v. 
How are rife with inconsistencies. Despite the conflicting reports, 
the case has been universally cited as the foundation for the devel-
opment of the Anglo-American law of trademarks and unfair com-
petition.48 In response, Frank Schechter and other commentators 
have pointed out that the conflicting accounts of Southern v. How 
render the case an enfeebled and worthless precedent on which to

45. Id.
46. Id. The publication of Rolle’s Reports was pre-dated by Popham’s Reports by 20 
years and Croke’s Reports by 15 years.
47. Rolle may have favored Croke’s view that the purchaser was the plaintiff because 
such a view would fit better within the action for deceit as developed by 1676. See 
supra notes 27, 28, 37 (discussing the general requirements of a warranty and privity be-
tween the parties for an action in deceit to lie).
48. See, e.g., SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 9. Schechter, who apparently had grave 
misgivings about assigning an important historical role to Southern v. How because of the 
mass of inconsistencies appearing between the five different reports, lamented: 

Despite the fact that Dodderidge’s reminiscence,—whatever it was—was pure 
dictum, and despite the conflict of evidence as to what the dictum was, Southern v. How 
appears to have acquired considerable weight as authority for the 
proposition that the unauthorized use of a trade-mark is unlawful and may be 
the subject of an action in deceit.

Id. Schechter added that “[t]he English Courts have unequivocally relied upon the au-
thority in Southern v. How to establish the antiquity of their jurisdiction to prevent trade-
mark piracy.” Id.
lay the foundation of trademark law.49

B. The Historical Treatment of Southern v. How By Courts and Legal Scholars

The earliest court decisions bearing on the law of trademarks and unfair competition make copious references to Southern v. How as primary authority to grant legal and equitable relief for an infringer’s misappropriation of another’s trade identity.50 The case of Blanchard v. Hill,51 the first case to cite Southern v. How, is generally regarded as the second English case on trademarks to be reported.52 That case, dated 1742, involved a suit for an injunction by a playing card merchant against another for use of the mark “GREAT MOGUL” on playing cards.53

In denying the injunction, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke declared, “I do not know of any instance of granting an injunction here, to restrain one trader from using the same mark with another; and I think it would be of mischievous consequence to do it.”54 The plaintiff’s attorney, in support of the injunction, cited the unnamed reference in Southern v. How, to which the Lord Chancellor

49. Id. at 8-9; see infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text (discussing the hostility by some commentators to Southern v. How).

50. See Schecter, supra note 1, at 9-12 (discussing nineteenth century English cases declaring that Southern v. How is the starting point for the law of trademarks).

51. 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (Ch. 1742).

52. Id. The case was dismissed by a court of equity for lack of jurisdiction.

53. Id. at 693. The senior user of the mark claimed a privilege of monopoly to the use of the mark by virtue of the grant of a royal charter bestowed during the seventeenth century upon his company, which apparently provided for the exclusive use of the “GREAT MOGUL” mark on playing cards. Id. Although Lord Chancellor Hardwicke found that the charter was valid insofar as the creation of the company, he emphatically denied that a royal grant of monopoly to a trademark was legal. Id.

54. Id. Some commentators suggest that Lord Chancellor Hardwicke’s denial of an injunction demonstrated that an action for trademark infringement was essentially legal during this early period and not susceptible to the courts of equity. See, e.g., Gary M. Ropski, The Federal Trademark Jury Trial—Awakening of a Dormant Constitutional Right, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 177, 179-80 (1980). Such a claim overstates the significance of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke’s comments. By the time that Blanchard v. Hill was heard, the courts, both legal and chancery, became quite hostile to any past monopolies granted by the monarchy and not granted by a statute of Parliament. See Motte v. Bennett, 17 F. Cas. 909, 913-14 (D.S.C. 1849) (discussing the hostility in the English courts of equity to any royal grants of monopoly rights). In some senses, Blanchard v. Hill is as much a political decision as one based on the principles of equity.
Hardwicke commented, “[b]ut it was not the single act of making use of the mark that was sufficient to maintain the action, but doing it with a fraudulent design, to put off bad cloths by this means, or to draw away customers from the other clothier.”55 By thus distinguishing the circumstances of the unnamed case discussed in Dodderidge’s dictum in *Southern v. How* from the facts of *Blanchard v. Hill*, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke suggested that had the defendant playing card merchant used the “GREAT MOGUL” mark to pass off his cards as those of the plaintiff, then an action at law, if not in equity, could indeed lie.56 If this is the case, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke recognized *Southern v. How* as valid precedent for an action of unfair competition.

The third reported action for trademark infringement, *Singleton v. Bolton*,57 was heard in 1783. Although the abstract does not mention *Southern v. How*, Lord Mansfield stated that “if the defendant had sold a medicine of his own under the plaintiff’s name or mark, that would be a fraud for which an action would lie.”58 The next six English cases bearing on the law of trademarks or unfair competition seem to display a judicial ambivalence to the value of *Southern v. How*; most fail to cite it at all, and the two that do reference the case cite it in passing and attach no significance to it.59

By the 1840s, the courts in both Great Britain and the United States, finding a need to establish “the antiquity of their jurisdiction to prevent trade-mark piracy,”60 began paying homage to *Southern v. How* as the foundation for granting relief against

58. Id. (footnote omitted).
60. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 9.
trademark infringement or unfair competition. 61 During the twentieth century, the courts continued to cite *Southern v. How* as the starting point of common law recognition of trademark rights. 62 Even in the 1990s, judicial recognition of *Southern v. How* as the foundation for Anglo-American trademark rights apparently still has significant impetus. 63

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61. See Fowle v. Spear, 9 F. Cas. 611, 612 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1847) (No. 4,996); Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 744, 748 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 13,785); Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 13,784) (Storey, J.); Clinton Metallic Paint Co. v. New York Metallic Paint Co., 50 N.Y.S. 437, 442 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1898) (declaring that the common law of trademark infringement dates back “as early as 1590” to the *Southern v. How* case, as reported in *Popham’s Reports*); Crawshay v. Thompson, 134 Eng. Rep. 146, 157-58 (C.P. 1842); Hall v. Barrows, 32 L.J.K.B. 548, 551 (Ch. 1863) (stating that “[i]t was established as early as *Popham’s Reports* that an action at law would lie for the piracy of a trade-mark”); Burgess v. Burgess, 43 Eng. Rep. 351, 353 (Ch. 1853) (declaring that the “law on the subject [of trademark infringement] is as old as *Southern v. How* in *Popham’s Reports*”); Hirst v. Denham, 14 L.R.-Eq. 542, 549 (M.R. 1872). Some attorneys during this period thought the case could be used in fields beyond mere trademark law. In 1839, the plaintiff in a case involving the fraudulent sale of a human slave in Washington, D.C., apparently found something in *Southern v. How* to support his argument that the buyer of the slave deceived the plaintiff into under-pricing the slave. See Fenwick v. Grimes, 8 F. Cas. 1144, 1145 (C.C.D.C. 1839) (No. 4,734).

62. See Magnolia Metal Co. v. Tandem Smelting Synd., Ltd., 17 R.P.C. 477, 483-84 (1900). In this case, Lord Halsbury, citing *Southern v. How*, waxes poetic, if somewhat inelegantly, on the antiquity of the British common law of trademarks stating:

> That cause of action is, as I have said, a very old and a familiar one . . . . Going back, therefore, as far as the reign of Elizabeth the form of action which the Statement of Claim adopts has undoubtedly been a form of action in which if the right of a man to have the reputation of selling that which is his manufacture, the right to prevent other people [from] fraudulently stating that it is their manufacture when it is not—if that right is infringed there is a remedy. That has, as I have said, ever since the reign of Elizabeth, been established in our Courts as being a right of action upon which anybody may sue who has a ground for doing so.

*Id.* at 484; see also Stephano Bros., Inc. v. Stamatopoulos, 238 F. 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1916) (“The right to an exclusive trade-mark is not one created by act of Congress. It is a right which the common-law courts recognized at an early day.” (citing *Southern v. How*, *Popham’s Reports* 143 (1582))); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 520 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D. Utah 1981) (citing *Southern v. How* to establish the root of the common law prohibition against passing-off).

63. See Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 354 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Judge Rader stated:

> In this earliest reference to trademarks in the King’s courts, the Judge sustained the action of a high-quality clothier against a maker of ill-made cloth who affixed the mark of the high-grade clothier to inferior products. This early case illustrates that trademarks function as guarantors of quality, suppliers of infor-
Although some trademark scholars have slavishly followed the view of the courts that Southern v. How has significant value in establishing the earliest common law of trademarks and unfair competition, still others have merely cited the case as a potential starting point for the law. Still other scholars have been even more ambivalent about the import of the case and have been skeptical to assigning it much value at all. The most hostile treatment of the case comes from Frank Schechter’s book The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks, which, after almost seventy-five years, remains the most comprehensive and reliable source on the subject. Assigning the case to the trash bin of irrelevancy, Schechter devoted more than seven pages of his book to discrediting to consumers seeking a reliable source of products, insurers of proper allocation of reward to investors in the good will and reputation of a trade name, in short, preservers of property rights and responsibilities.

Id. It is unlikely that anyone anticipated in 1618, when Southern v. How was heard, that Judge Dodderidge’s dictum could amount to so much. The musical group New Kids on the Block would probably hope that the case provided even greater scope than that accorded to it by Judge Rader. See New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Southern v. How and stating that “[t]he law has protected trademarks since the early seventeenth century, and the primary focus of trademark law has been misappropriation—the problem of one producer’s placing his rival’s mark on his own goods”). Unfortunately for the New Kids on the Block, the courts have never declared Southern v. How to prohibit non-trademark use of someone else’s mark. Id.


66. Schechter, supra note 1.
ing Southern v. How as a reliable foundation of Anglo-American trademark law. He emphatically stated that “the sole contribution of that case was at best an irrelevant dictum of a reminiscent judge . . . .”

Much of Schechter’s hostility to the level of authority Southern v. How has traditionally enjoyed is apparently the result of his frustration with the inconsistencies of the five accounts of the case. Schechter summarized “the remarkable discrepancies occurring in the reports of this case” in four points. First, Schechter noted that “[t]hree of the five reports contain no reference whatsoever to the clothier’s case in Elizabeth[‘s reign].” Second, of those three reports, although the Popham’s abstract “definitely states the action to have been by the clothier whose mark had been infringed,” Schechter highlighted that the Croke’s abstract “is equally definite that the action was by the defrauded purchaser,” and the second Rolle’s abstract, “while not perhaps so positive in this regard, like-
wise believes that the action was made by the vendee.” 71  Third, Schechter took offense to the discrepancies between the timing of the action, that is, whether “the clothier’s action occurred in 22 Elizabeth, . . . 23 Elizabeth, . . . [or] 33 Elizabeth.” 72  Finally, Schechter observed that “[o]nly two of the five reports (Popham and 2 Rolle 5) agree that Southern v. How was decided in 15 Jac. I, the other three reports giving . . . different dates for the decision.” 73

Although Schechter’s frustration is justified, it is far from clear why he devoted so much effort to dislodge the case from its precedential pedestal. Because the three versions of Southern v. How only included a very brief, ambiguous account of the earlier unnamed action, the case could not help being what Schechter called “a most fragile link between the Middle Ages and the modern commercial law of trade-marks.” Discrediting Southern v. How could not change this fact. True to his progressive nature, however, Schechter ended his treatment of Southern v. How on a positive, hopeful note. 74  Referring to the missing bridge between the guild jurisprudence of trademark law 75 and common law protection, Schechter predicted that “[f]urther researches into the history of the clothier’s case mentioned in Southern v. How on the one hand, and into the contemporaneous activity of the councilor courts in the protection of trade-marks on the other, may possibly ultimately furnish a satisfactory solution of our problem.” 76

Research during the late 1970s and early 1980s did exactly what Schechter had anticipated. Like a phoenix, rising out of some “moldering mass of unpublished records of the common law” the

71. Schechter, supra note 1, at 8-9.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 123. Schechter appeared sincere in stating that he hoped that the unnamed clothier’s case made reference to by Judge Dodderidge in Southern v. How would be unearthed sometime in the future. Along these lines, Schechter stated that:

It is possible that some day in some moldering mass of unpublished records of the common law may be found a report of a case in the reign of Elizabeth by a clothier for infringement of his trade-mark that will justify the authority with which Southern v. How has been so unanimously endowed.

75. See id. at 38-77 (discussing the use and protection of marks within individual guilds during early English history).
76. Id. at 126.
case of *Sandforth* slipped into the hands of an enterprising legal history scholar who translated the documents and published them for posterity. Frank Schechter, in the end, shall have his way. *Southern v. How* finally can be supplanted in the annals of trademark law by the case to which it so ambiguously referred: *Sandforth’s Case*.

II. INTRODUCING SANDFORTH’S CASE: THE FIRST REPORTED TRADEMARK CASE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

This Article embodies the first comprehensive analysis of the “lost” case that Judge Dodderidge referred to in *Southern v. How*. No English or American court has ever cited to it and the case has been ignored altogether by the mass of textbooks, treatises, law review articles, and other scholarly works in the field of trademark and unfair competition law. The emergence of *Sandforth’s Case* raises questions as to why the case lay dormant from 1584 to the late 1970s and, more strikingly, why courts and trademark scholars have generally failed to take notice of the discovery of this true foundation of Anglo-American trademark law.

A. Explaining the Dormancy of Sandforth’s Case

In 1972, the British Legal History Conference (“Conference”) was held at Aberystwyth, in Wales, to discuss the problems and progress in the scholarship of British legal history. \(^{77}\) Since then the Conference has met at least twelve times and has generated a number of valuable collections of essays devoted to the mysteries of the history of the law in Great Britain. \(^{78}\) Many of those essays

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77. See Law Reporting in Britain ix. (Chantal Stebbings ed. 1995) (reporting the proceedings of the British Legal History Conference). The British Legal History Conference (“Conference”) has become the pre-eminent forum of discussion of all aspects of the history of British law. Id.

78. In addition to Law Reporting in Britain, supra note 77, the Conference has generated many other proceedings. See, e.g., The Life of the Law (Peter Birks ed. 1993) (prepared by the Conference); Legal History in the Making (W.M. Gordon & T.D. Fergus eds., 1991) (same); Legal Record and Historical Reality (Thomas G. Watkin ed. 1989) (same); The Political Context of Law (Richard Eales & David Sullivan eds., 1987) (same); Customs, Courts and Counsel (A. Kiralfy et al. eds. 1985) (same); Law, Litigants and the Legal Profession (E.W. Ives & A.H. Manchester eds., 1983) (same); Legal Record and the Historian (J.H. Baker ed. 1978) (same); Legal
are designed to introduce the modern legal practitioner and scholar to the earliest law reports and their importance in the development of statutory and common law over twelve centuries. Unfortunately, early English law case-reporting deficiencies, particularly during the Elizabethan period, have had a significant impact on “lost” cases, such as Sandforth’s Case.

1. The General Problem of Reporting Early Case Law

The most significant difficulty facing British legal historians is the sheer volume of unpublished accounts of early case law.\(^9\) A significant amount of early legal history has never been printed and lacks an exhaustive catalogue of sources.\(^9\) The next nagging problem is the discovery and collection of early reports that do exist in a plethora of institutions and private collections.\(^1\)

Although the great libraries, archives, and other institutions

\(^{79}\) See Percy H. Winfield, The Chief Sources of English Legal History 23 (1925). Professor Winfield was one of the most respected legal historians of this century and his volume remains one of the best, most readable texts on early British law reporting. The first efforts in this area of scholarship were made between 1863 and 1879 by Alfred John Horwood who translated and published five volumes of case reports during the reign of Edward I. See Paul Brand, The Beginnings of English Law Reporting, in Law Reporting in Britain 1 (Chantal Stebbings ed. 1995). Shortly afterwards, the Selden Society was formed and began publishing translations of previously unpublished primary source materials. From the 1880s until the present, the Selden Society has presented posterity with over 100 massive volumes incorporating tens of thousands of MSS (primary legal accounts by the earliest law reporters) occupying over 100,000 pages. Many of the early cases cited in this Article were obtained from the Selden Society series, the author having perused the indices of all available volumes for relevant case materials. Despite the present availability of thousands of early case reports, an untold quantity have yet to be discovered, translated, and published. See Winfield, supra, at 23-30; Brand, supra, at 1.

\(^{80}\) The author of the present Article can personally attest that, even 70 years after Winfield lamented the absence of useful indices, the Seldon Society has unfortunately failed to provide a comprehensive index of the sources published in its hundred-plus series of volumes.

\(^{81}\) See Winfield, supra note 79, at 23-26. Although the great British universities, namely, Oxford, Cambridge, Canterbury, etc., the British Library, the Inns of Court, and national archives hold much of the known MSS (primary legal accounts by the earliest law reporters), it is currently impossible to estimate the number of early sources that are in the possession of local institutions, ancient private library collections, which exist in large part in the manor houses of Great Britain, and foreign entities. See id. at 24.
probably have improved the organization and accessibility of the earliest legal records in their possession, problems still exist. Difficulties remain regarding the competent translation of legal materials.\textsuperscript{82} Also of great significance are the issues associated with prioritizing the treatment of the tremendous number of unpublished materials known to exist.\textsuperscript{83} Finally, injudicious editing of early reports over the past 150 years also has taken its toll on the legal history available. For example, Professor Baker, who discovered and translated \textit{Sandforth's Case}, has criticized some editors for such unintended censorship, stating, “Unconscious censorship by printers and editors, including even Selden Society editors, has kept [some primary case reports] largely from sight.”\textsuperscript{84} Baker presumed that reports “seemed superfluous to the Year Books, as later understood, and so they were treated as if they were not there.”\textsuperscript{85}
2. Law Reporting During the Elizabethan Era

Sandforth’s Case was heard during the middle of Queen Elizabeth’s reign. It is true that the English common law had developed considerably during the six hundred years before Elizabeth ascended the throne in 1558. Nevertheless, the record of the law thus developed created what one scholar termed “something of a crisis” by the 1590s.\(^{86}\) Much of the early British legal record was collected in a series of volumes called the Year Books.\(^{87}\) One scholar, Percy Winfield,\(^{88}\) suggests that the Year Books began coverage by 1270.\(^{89}\) Although far from complete in their present form, those Year Books provide an indispensable chronicle of British case law for more than 250 years. The Year Books suddenly ceased, however, in 1535—twenty-three years before Elizabeth became monarch.\(^{90}\) Ten years after the demise of the Year Books, the thirteen

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\(^{86}\) David Ibbetson, *Law Reporting in the 1590s*, in *LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN* 73 (Chantal Stebbings ed. 1995). Demonstrating the difficulties faced by Elizabethan lawyers and judges, Ibbetson explains:

> From the point of view of those studying law, there were hardly any didactic treatises; apart from Littleton’s *Tenures*, already well over a century old, and St. Germain’s discursive *Doctor and Student*, the few texts which did exist were little more than collections of relevant statutes and cases. There had been no attempt to reduce the law to anything like order, so that even the best-equipped student might be well advised simply to digest anything he had read under alphabetical headings, in the hope that genuine understanding might flow from this garnering of information.


\(^{87}\) The Year Books basically incorporate abstracts and reports of varying completeness and scope of most law cases heard during each year of the reign of the sitting monarch. See Winfield, *supra* note 79, at 158-75 (discussing the apparent purposes and uses of the Year Books). According to Winfield:

> On the whole, the contents of the Year-Books are of an intensely practical character. They take us into the law courts and keep us there. They do not impart elementary instruction, they tell us practically nothing of the theoretical foundations of the law. They record all procedural moves made in an action, and they assume a complete familiarity with the procedure on the part of the men likely to use them.


\(^{88}\) See Winfield, *supra* note 79


\(^{90}\) See *id.* at 171. Ibbetson states that, even until close to the sixteenth century, the Year Books had been published; but after 1535, they ceased to include any new case reports. Ibbetson, *supra* note 86, at 74. There was apparently a half-hearted, and ultimately unsuccessful, effort made to rejuvenate publication of the Year Books in 1679.
judges of the realm apparently lamented the void in legal reporting caused thereby.91

While the Year Books disappeared during the early sixteenth century, a series of case reports emerged and continued until the nineteenth century.92 Typically, they were compiled and made available by individual legal practitioners and scholars.93 Although they emerged during the sixteenth century, it was not until the seventeenth century that these new types of published case reports were able to satisfactorily replace the Year Books. Records and abstracts of law cases continued to be written in manuscript form, but not many were published in the new reporters until after the sixteenth century.94 Only two volumes of reports were generated during the period between 1535 and 1590.

It is certainly not a foregone conclusion that Sandforth’s Case would have been brought to light and used by succeeding generations had the Year Books continued to incorporate contemporaneous case reports until the end of the sixteenth century. But it can be said accurately that the decline of the Year Books fifty years before the case was heard and the paucity of the new type of case reporters in the intervening period assuredly consigned Sandforth’s Case to oblivion for 420 years. Thus, in Southern v. How, Judge Dodderidge had no other alternative but to rely on his imperfect memory to invoke Sandforth’s Case thirty-four years after it was

See Winfield, supra note 79, at 171; 2 The Reports of Sir John Spelman 164-78 (J.H. Baker ed. 1977) [hereinafter Spelman Reports].


92. See Winfield, supra note 79, at 171-72 (ascribing the substitution of those series of case reports for the Year Books to the former’s superior reporting and treatment of the cases heard by the courts during the mid-sixteenth century).

93. See id.

94. See Ibbetson, supra note 86, at 73-79. According to Ibbetson:

While the old Year Books continued to be produced in many editions during the rest of the century, there was very little modern material in print. Plowden’s Commentaries had appeared in 1571 and Dyer’s Reports in 1585, but although these were welcome additions to the canon they merely scratched the surface. The absence of recent case reports must—at the least—have inconvenienced practitioners who would have been forced to place greater reliance on the fickleness of memory.

Id. at 73. Winfield suggests that reliance on memory in recalling precedent was paramount even during the Year Book period because the Year Books’ versions of cases suffered varying degrees of inconsistency. See Winfield, supra note 79, at 149-50.
decided.

3. A Problem in Modern Legal Scholarship

Although it is easy to understand how Sandforth’s Case was lost for more than 400 years, it is more difficult to explain why the case continued to slumber twenty years after it was first discovered and identified. The first published reference to the case occurred in 1979 in J.H. Baker’s survey text, An Introduction to English Legal History.95 Professor Baker, while citing the case, provided no translation and only a scant detail of the abstract.96 There was no further reference to the case until Baker, together with S.F.C. Milsom, published their Sources of English Legal History—Private Law to 175097 seven years after Baker’s prior book.

In that second book, Baker provided a complete translation of three documents that report Sandforth’s Case. In a footnote he once again identified the case as the one referred to in Southern v. How.98 Since 1986, however, when the second book was published, only one reference has been made to the case, and even that reference was relegated to a law review footnote.99 To explain the silence surrounding Sandforth’s Case for almost twenty years since its discovery, this Essay suggests that trademark scholars do not ordinarily peruse books on general British legal history to find support for their own literary enterprises. Moreover, as one law student once mused, trademark scholars do not possess the motivation to scour law review footnotes.100

95. ENGLISH HISTORY I, supra note 2, at 385 n.45. Professor Baker identified the case as the same one cited in Southern v. How and recognized the case to be the first account involving trademark infringement and unfair competition. Id.
96. Id.
97. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615-18.
98. Id. at 617 n.18.
99. See Timothy H. Hiebert, Foundations of the Law of Parallel Importation: Duality and Universality in Nineteenth Century Trademark Law, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 483, 492 n.45 (1990). Although Hiebert recognized that, as of 1990, “trademark historians generally have been unaware of [Baker’s] significant discovery,” he himself was not inclined to call much attention to that discovery. See id. While somewhat dismayed by Hiebert’s reticence, the present author heartily thanks him for it.
100. See Phil Nichols, Note, A Student Defense of Student Edited Journals: In Response to Professor Roger Cranton, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1122, 1131 (1987) (confessing that “a common joke among law review editors is that no one reads footnotes anyway”).
B. The Text of Sandforth’s Case

In his publication of the case, Professor Baker includes three extant reports that he discovered in manuscript form. He also referred to two additional manuscripts, which he did not furnish, that cite or explain the case. Of the three documents provided by Baker, one appears to be what is considered a complaint in the United States or a statement of claim in Great Britain and Canada. The two other documents are abstracts of the trial.

1. The Sandforth Complaint

The complaint is important in the history of trademark law. It states that the plaintiff in Sandford’s Case was a “clothier” who for twelve years, manufactured “woollen cloths called Reading kerseys, ‘halfes’ cloths and Bridgewaters,” which “were good and substantial without any fraud or deception in that behalf . . . .” The complaint further stated that the plaintiff “was accustomed to mark such cloths with the letters ‘J.G.’ and with a sign called a tucker’s handle . . . .” According to the complaint,

101. See Baker & Milsom, supra note 2, at 615 n.13. Baker cites a case entitled Samforde, CUL MS. li 5. 38, fo. 132, and another entitled Sandforth’s Case, HLS MS. 2074, fo. 84v. Since publication of his 1986 book, Professor Baker has discovered yet another brief reference to the case in BL MS. Lansdowne 1086, fo. 74v. This last reference apparently indicates that the action was heard during the Easter term, 1585, rather than in 1584, the year other sources give.

102. Baker & Milsom, supra note 2, at 615-17 (citing Cory’s Entries, BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168v. (British Library) (1584)).

103. Although the complaint in Sandforth’s Case is lengthy, its importance to trademark law makes it worthy of review. See Appendix, infra pp. 545-47 for the full text of the complaint.

104. Id. at 615. A “kersey” is defined as a “coarse ribbed woolen cloth for hose and work clothes woven first in medieval England.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, supra note 24, at 1238. The author could not locate an appropriate definition for the two other types of garments or cloths.

105. Baker & Milsom, supra note 2, at 615.

106. Id. at 616. The author could find no definition for a “tucker’s handle.” Nevertheless, potentially relevant definitions for “tucker” are (1) “an attachment on a sewing machine for making tucks,” and (2) “a piece of lace or cloth used to fill in the low neck line of a dress.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, supra note 24, at 2460. The latter definition asks to compare the word to the use in the phrase “bib and tucker.” Id. Most likely, the noun “tuck,” as identified in the first definition of “tucker,” refers to “a fold stitched or woven into cloth for the purpose of shortening, decorating or controlling
the plaintiff sold the same cloths at home and overseas.\(^{107}\)

The complaint asserted that the plaintiff’s customers had become “accustomed” to buying “those cloths well and substantially made and from wool marked as above said,” by paying the same for those “cloths as for good and substantial cloths . . . upon the affirmation of the same plaintiff and his servants and factors that the same cloths were good and substantial, without any inspection or contradiction of the same cloths . . . .”\(^{108}\) The complaint stated that the plaintiff had “lawfully and honestly obtained and acquired much gain and profit from the making and selling of such cloths, for the further support and living of the same plaintiff and his whole family.”\(^{109}\)

The complaint alleged that the defendant willfully schemed and plotted “to hinder the same plaintiff in selling such cloths of his and to take away and worsen the opinion and esteem which the aforesaid merchants and subjects had concerning the cloths of the same plaintiff.”\(^{110}\) The complaint specifically alleged that, for two years, the defendant “made various woollen cloths . . . which were ill, insufficient and unmerchantable; and deceitfully marked the same cloths with the aforesaid letters ‘J.G.’ and with the aforesaid

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107. The complaints states:

[T]he same plaintiff sold the same cloths, thus made and marked, through the whole of the aforesaid time, at T. aforesaid and at C. in the aforesaid county and in various other places within this realm of England, and likewise at M. in Wales and in various other places in parts beyond the seas, as well to various merchants and other subjects of this realm of England as to various other merchants and foreigners . . . .

Baker & Milsom, supra note 2, at 616.

108. Id. This seems to indicate that the plaintiff argued for the inherent “informational” value his mark had in relation to consumers. In this way, the plaintiff’s customers did not need to spend time and effort inspecting the nature and quality of each cloth because the customers associated the plaintiff’s trademark with high quality goods.

109. Id.

110. Id. Thus, our first recorded infringer was allegedly willful.
mark called a tucker’s handle; and exposed for sale the same cloths . . . as the cloths of the same plaintiff.”

As a result of the defendant’s actions, “various merchants and other subjects who were buyers and had previously been accustomed to buy[ing] the same plaintiff’s cloths,” relying on the letters ‘J.G.’ and the tucker’s handle mark to identify the plaintiff’s cloths, bought the defendant’s cloths after seeing the “cloths marked with the aforesaid letters ‘J.G.’ and the aforesaid mark called a tucker’s handle.” Those buyers, who bought the defendant’s cloths “without further inspection or contradiction of the same cloths, as being good and substantial cloths such as the cloths of the same plaintiff had used to be, and as being the same plaintiff’s cloths,” changed their opinion of the plaintiff’s cloths after inspecting the cloths purchased from the defendant and finding that the cloths were “deceitful, insufficient and unmerchantable, both in length and width and in quality and substance of the same cloths.” Those purchasers “not only completely reversed the opinion and esteem which they had previously had of the same cloths but also gave notice to many other merchants and subjects of the deceitful and insufficient making of the aforesaid cloths.” Consequently, when the plaintiff attempted to sell “cloths of his (marked in form aforesaid)” he was unable to sell those “cloths (marked in form aforesaid) by reason of the deceit committed and used by the aforesaid defendant as set out above.” Thus, the plaintiff alleged that he was damaged because “the merchants and subjects aforesaid who previously used to buy such cloths from the same plaintiff refused to buy the same cloths from him by reason of the aforesaid deceit.”

Assuming that all allegations of the Sandforth’s complaint were true, what modern trademark attorney would not welcome the opportunity to prosecute a case with such a mass of advantageous

111. _Id._ This suggests that the defendant posed as the plaintiff when actually making sales, or stated that he was an agent of the plaintiff with authority to make sales.

112. _Id._ at 617.

113. _Id._

114. _Id._

115. _Id._

116. _Id._
facts? The complaint furnishes all the perks that attorneys look for in a trademark infringement and unfair competition suit: (1) wide distribution of the plaintiff’s goods, (2) an apparently distinctive trademark, (3) a long period of use of the mark, (4) considerable fame in the mark (both in the plaintiff’s own region and in other regions and abroad), (5) actual confusion, (6) the apparent availability of consumer witnesses that can attest to their confusion, (7) proof of damages, (8) the unjust enrichment of the defendant, (9) willful conduct on the defendant’s part, (10) passing off, (11) loss of reputation and good will in the plaintiff’s business, and (12) finally a poor, honest, hard working small businessman whose family may have to sacrifice during the next winter on account of the defendant’s egregious conduct. The facts as alleged in Sandforth’s Case provide an almost perfect plaintiff’s case, incorporating more useful nuggets than are generally found in modern pleadings.

The plaintiff’s attorney seems to have framed the issues and facts in the complaint of Sandforth’s Case in a manner that is remarkably modern, albeit too reliant on the now-discarded word “aforesaid” or its Latin counterpart. Can it be a mere coincidence that a practitioner of the mid-Elizabethan age had the tools and presence of mind to draft a complaint that, if the pleaded facts were found to be true, would sail to a summary judgment, complete with a grant of increased damages, attorney’s fees and costs? While this question calls for wild and unnecessary speculation, it highlights the possibility that actions of the sort found in Sandforth’s Case may not have been uncommon during the sixteenth century, and that the plaintiff’s attorney may have had doctrinal resources at hand to assist him in drafting his complaint. After all, contemporaneous case reports during the reigns of Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth were not collected and published in an appreciable degree, but were left to languish as unnoticed and long forgotten manuscripts, as Sandforth’s Case had been. In the meantime, we must simply encourage Professor Baker, his colleagues, and their successors to keep digging among the massive body of unpublished manuscripts for additional cases of this species.
2. The Sandforth Decision

Now that we are aware of the pleaded facts of Sandforth’s Case, we must turn to the two extant records of the court’s decision in the case. These abstracts are considerably less detailed than the complaint. According to the text of the first abstract, the action was brought by “J.S.,” a clothier known for making “good cloth” who used a mark, against “J.D.,” a different clothier known for making “bad cloth” who used another mark. “J.S. brought an action on the case against J.D.” because “J.D. set J.S.’s mark on his [own cloth], and by means thereof obtained good business (utterance).” At trial, “[J.D.’s] cloth was found . . . to be bad, and by reason thereof J.S.’s cloth was discredited and he could not have as good business afterwards as he had before.”

Chief Judge Anderson noted that “[i]t seems the action lies, because J.S. is damaged by J.D. using his mark.

Peryam J. said there was no law against anyone using whatever mark he wished; and when J.D. used the mark which J.S. used he did no wrong to J.S., it being a lawful act. And even though J.S. was thereby damaged, he shall not have an action on the case for it, because it is damnnum absque injuria.

Anderson C.J. said if someone has a house he may lawfully burn it if he wishes; but if by its being burned someone else’s house is burned, the latter shall have an action on the case; and yet it was a lawful act.

Id. (citing the manuscript denoted as HLS MS. 2071, fo. 86).

117. The text of the first abstract is as follows:

J.S., being a clothier who made good cloth, used a mark; and J.D., being also a clothier but who made bad cloth, used another mark; then J.D. set J.S.’s mark on his [own cloth], and by means thereof obtained good business (utterance); but [J.D.’s] cloth was found upon trial to be bad, and by reason thereof J.S.’s cloth was discredited and he could not have as good business afterwards as he had before. Upon all this matter J.S. brought an action on the case against J.D.

Anderson C.J. said it seems the action lies, because J.S. is damaged by J.D. using his mark.

Peryam J. said there was no law against anyone using whatever mark he wished; and when J.D. used the mark which J.S. used he did no wrong to J.S., it being a lawful act. And even though J.S. was thereby damaged, he shall not have an action on the case for it, because it is damnnum absque injuria.

Anderson C.J. said if someone has a house he may lawfully burn it if he wishes; but if by its being burned someone else’s house is burned, the latter shall have an action on the case; and yet it was a lawful act.

Id. (citing the manuscript denoted as HLS MS. 2071, fo. 86).

118. There is a discrepancy between this abstract and the complaint. In the complaint, the plaintiff’s initials (and mark) are “J.G.,” but in the abstract, the initials are “J.S."

119. Based on the manuscripts, Baker identifies the defendant as some variation of Samford, Sandforde, or Sandforth. Id. at 615 n.13. The text of this abstract identifies him as “J.D.”

120. Id. at 617.

121. Id. The same term was used in the Popham version of Southern v. How.

122. Id.

123. The Chief Judge, Sir Edmund Anderson, was known to be a very independent and efficient jurist. See A.L. ROWSE, THE ENGLAND OF ELIZABETH—THE STRUCTURE OF
because J.S. is damaged by J.D. using his mark.”

Judge Peryam, however, disagreed, finding that “there was no law against anyone using whatever mark he wished; and when J.D. used the mark which J.S. used he did no wrong to J.S., it being a lawful act.”

Peryam added that “even though J.S. was thereby damaged, he shall not have an action on the case for it, because it is *damnum absque injuria*.”

Chief Judge Anderson responded by ruling that “if someone has a house he may lawfully burn it if he wishes; but if by its being burned someone else’s house is burned, the latter shall have an action on the case; and yet it was a lawful act.”

In this abstract of the case, the Chief Judge recognized the damage sustained by the senior user and declared that relief is available under the common law. Judge Peryam disagreed, stating that he was not aware of any action at law that would justify relief, even if the plaintiff had been damaged. The most interesting aspect of the abstract, however, is Anderson’s analogous reply that the action constituted a trespass, regardless of whether the defendant’s conduct had theretofore been assumed lawful. In other words, a merchant may choose to apply any mark he wishes to his

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*Society* 374 (1961). The English Historian, Professor A.L. Rowse characterized Anderson thus:

> Anderson, C.J., who was of Scots descent, was a quick worker, but harsh and brutal in manner . . . [H]e had certain qualities of a great judge: he was even more independent than Coke [the sixteenth century’s most famous jurist]; it was he who stood up to Leicester over the Cavendish case and drew up the protest of the judges against arbitrary imprisonment. He came down strongly against a Puritan mayor of Leicester for imprisoning a man for setting up maypoles: the Puritans considered this a pagan survival. One finds the judge’s action congenial. At the age of seventy-two, while on circuit in Somerville, confronted with a disturbance, he snatched a sword from a man-at-arms, laid about him, and quelled it. A man of spirit, he gave judgement according to reason; if he considered there was no reason in the old books, he threw them over.

*Id.*


125. *Id.*

126. *Id.* The term “*damnum absque injuria*” refers to an injury for which there is no legal remedy. *See* BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990) (defining *damnum absque injuria* as a harm or loss “which does not give rise to an action for damages against the person causing it”).


128. *See id.*

129. *See id.*
goods—that is his right—but once his choice of a mark results in quantifiable damage to another merchant who had previously chosen and used the mark, the former’s choice becomes actionable.

Baker’s second abstract of Sandforth’s Case is much more interesting than the first report. The second abstract contains a note by “Fletewoode,” stating “that an action on the case lies by the custom of London for counterfeiting another’s mark.” The second abstract also includes language that suggests that “Fenner” informed the court that “a clothier did give the mark of another clothier, but with a little difference hardly to be perceived, and set that on bad and false cloths, whereby the cloths of the other

130. The second abstract of Sandforth’s Case reads as follows:

Note, by Fletewoode, that an action on the case lies by the custom of London for counterfeiting another’s mark. And he put this case when the following matter was moved by Fenner: ‘a clothier did give the mark of another clothier, but with a little difference hardly to be perceived, and set that on bad and false cloths, whereby the cloths of the other (which made good) were after discredited.’ And it was demanded whether an action on the case lay.

Anderson C.J. said it did.

Wyndham J. agreed, if the statute enacted that no clothier shall give the mark of another.

Fletewoode. In 5 Mar. it was adjudged in one Longe’s case accordingly in parliament, and the counterfeiter was [a member] of the house and for this reason was put out and paid the other 300 pounds.

Peryam and Mead JJ. said that anyone may give what mark he will, and it is damnnum absque injuria to the other; and deceit does not lie against him who does a wholly lawful act for his own profit.

131. Winfield identifies William Fletewoode as “at one time Recorder of London” and the indexer of the Year Book series for the reigns of Edward V, Richard III, Henry VII, and Henry VIII. WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 181. Fletewoode was also a member of the Middle Temple and represented parties at court at least during the 1560s. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 488 (presenting a case heard in 1565 at which Fletewoode acted as plaintiff’s counsel). In their index, Baker and Milsom also characterize Fletewoode as acting as a Sargent of Law in Sandforth’s Case. As a Sargent of Law, Fletewoode could have been present at the hearing and voiced his views without necessarily acting as either of the party’s counsel. Telephone Interview with J.H. Baker (Oct. 21, 1997).

132. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 617-18.

133. Edward Fenner acted as counsel during the later part of the sixteenth century and was later appointed as a justice to the King’s Bench sometime during the reign of James I. He died in 1612.
(which made good) were after discredited."134 Furthermore, "it was demanded whether an action on the case lay."135

As in the first abstract, Chief Judge Anderson "said it did."136 Judge Wyndham "agreed, if the statute enacted that no clothier shall give the mark of another."137 Fletewoode informed the court that, in "5 Mar.,"138 the matter "was adjudged in one Longe's case accordingly in parliament, and the counterfeiter was [a member] of the house and for this reason was put out and paid the other 300 pounds."139 Judges Peryam and Mead said, however, "that anyone may give what mark he will, and it is damnnum absque injuria to the other; and deceit does not lie against him who does a wholly lawful act for his own profit."140

As the construction of the abstract is ambiguous, it is not entirely clear whether Fletewoode and Fenner represented the parties in Sandforth's case in opposition to each other, jointly represented just the plaintiff, or acted as counsel at all. The language, "Note, by Fletewoode," might mean that the court was presented by a written record penned by Fletewoode relating to an earlier trademark counterfeiting case heard in the House of Commons in 1558. Perhaps the language indicates that Fletewoode authored the abstract itself or a previous version of it. Alternatively, and more likely, the phrase should have read, "By Fletewoode, note that an action on the case lies . . . ." If that is the correct interpretation, then Fletewoode could have acted as counsel in the case. According to the gist of his comments, Fletewoode likely acted as plaintiff's counsel; he cited an earlier precedent where an action for trademark counterfeiting was recognized by the House of Commons.

On the other hand, if Fletewoode acted as defendants' counsel,

134. Id. Baker indicates that the passage in internal quotation marks was originally in English, indicating that the other portions of the abstract were either in Latin or French. Id. at 618 n.19.
135. Id. at 618
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. During the fifth year of the reign of Mary: 1558.
139. Id. The best interpretation of this phrase is that the counterfeiter was expelled from the House of Commons for his conduct and was forced to pay damages.
140. Id.
his comments may be a badly edited effort at distinguishing the facts in *Sandforth* from the earlier case. It would appear, by the language of the abstract, that Fenner probably did act as counsel for the plaintiff because the record states that he “moved” the matter in *Sandforth*. It also is possible that both Fletewoode and Fenner appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, and the silence of the defendant’s counsel could be explained away by a speculation that he had nothing memorable to add to the proceeding. Finally, because Fletewoode was a “sargent of law,” he simply could have been present and pointed out the prior parliamentary action to the court in his official position, without having represented either party.

The jewel, and inevitably a nagging annoyance, of this abstract is the reference to *Longe’s Case*, an earlier case—reportedly heard in parliament and not at the Queen’s Bench—involving trademark infringement. That brief citation, if ever discovered and published, could authoritatively push back the date of the earliest British trademark law to 1558—prior to the reign of Elizabeth. Baker states that no record exists in the Journal of the House of Commons for that year.141

Another interesting point is that Fletewoode characterized an action for trademark counterfeiting as a “custom of London.”142 That characterization, which demonstrates that trademark infringement violated local London law at the time, together with the

141. *Id.* at 618 n.1.

142. A “custom” was a type of legal action heard by local or municipal courts, as opposed to common law courts. Telephone Interview with Professor J.H. Baker (Oct. 21, 1997). Professor Baker indicated that Fletewoode, who had served as Recorder of London and would therefore have been quite knowledgeable about the actions that would lie in a London municipal court, characterized the action in *Sandforth’s Case* as one which would ordinarily lie in a London court. *Id.* Common law courts frequently adopted the “customs” of important municipalities, such as London, and incorporated them into the common law of the realm. *Id*; see Andrea C. Loux, Note, The Persistence of the Ancient Regime: Custom, Utility, and the Common Law of the Nineteenth Century, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 185-201 (1993) (providing a thorough discussion of the history and importance of legal customs and their impact on the development of the English common law); see also Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making 85-88 (1927) (stating that “if a custom is proved in an English Court by satisfactory evidence to exist and to be observed, the function of the Court is merely to recognize the custom as operative law”). See generally Albert Kiralfy, Custom in Mediaeval English Law, 9 J. LEGAL HIST. 26 (1988) (discussing differences in customs based on geography, as well as the various customs in specific areas of the law).
fact that in Sandforth’s Case and possibly in an even earlier, pre-Elizabethan parliamentary case, trademark infringement was actionable, would strengthen the contention that the origins of the common law of trademarks should be securely assigned to the sixteenth century and not, as historically argued, the nineteenth.

III. THE IMPACT OF SANDFORTH’S CASE

Although the reports of Sandforth’s Case undoubtedly will pose more questions than they answer, one question that should be addressed now is whether the case represents the old action for the tort of deceit or an entirely new type of action, theretofore unrecognized and uncategorized. Certainly, if the case was an action for deceit, it is a hybrid. Ultimately, the answer to this question will not detract from the newly established authority of Sandforth’s Case as the first reported action for trademark infringement. But it may support the argument that in Elizabethan England, the common law courts, responding to a quickly changing and expanding mercantile economy, promulgated a new tort, separate from that of deceit, and in later cases in later centuries, reverted back to the nomenclature of deceit. There is not enough in Sandforth’s Case to justify the viability of such an argument, but any attempt to fit the case into the tort of deceit poses significant difficulties.

A. Categorizing Sandforth’s Case

In his assertion that a case did not lie, Justice Peryam specifically identified the tort doctrine he thought was being invoked as deceit. At the time Sandforth’s Case was decided, Peryam’s position appears to have been the stronger one; it was supported by the common law of the day. Even though Peryam’s position appears to be correct, his rationale was not. Peryam reasoned that a merchant could use any trademark he fancied, including the famous and successful marks of competitors. The actual reason that Sandforth’s Case should not have been actionable in deceit is that at least one—and possibly two—elements normally required under the sixteenth century common law of deceit were missing: a warranty by the defendant and a relationship of privity, or at least a re-
The requirement of a warranty in cases involving deceit was firmly established within the common law between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. Essentially, an action for deceit would lie only if the plaintiff could establish that the defendant warranted goods or services and subsequently breached his warranty. In 1604, the Court of the Exchequer confirmed that the warranty rule prevailed in the British common law. A few years later, however, in another case involving the same parties, the court of the King’s Bench relieved the plaintiff from the burden of showing that a warranty existed, relying instead on the defendant’s fraudulent intent as an alternative. Other cases required privity or some relationship of trust between the parties as well. In Sandforth’s Case, there is no warranty made by the defendant, at least not made to the plaintiff. Furthermore, it seems clear that there was no relationship between the parties, either in privity or in trust. Therefore, Sandforth’s Case does not appear to fit into the common law action for deceit.

Nevertheless, some legal historians have depicted the action for

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143. See supra note 27 (discussing reported cases in deceit arising during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries).


145. Chandelor v. Lopus, 79 ENG. REP. 3, 3-4 (Ex. 1604). Here the Court of Exchequer stated that:

[T]he bare affirmation that it was a bezar-stone, without warranting it to be so, is no cause of action; and although he knew it to be no bezar-stone, it is not material; for every one in selling his wares will affirm that his wares are good, or the horse which he sells is sound; yet if he does not warrant them to be so, it is no cause of action.

Id. The author could find only one case sounding in deceit before the seventeenth century where a court may have relaxed the warranty rule. Commentator’s Note, Caryll’s Reports, Keil 91, pl 16 (1505), reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 516.


147. See, e.g., Lord Mounteagle v. Countess of Worcester, Dyer’s Reports, 121, BL M.S. Harley 1691, fo. 94 (1555) (requiring privity or a relationship of trust between the parties); Anon, Year Book, Trinity Term, 11 Edw. IV, fo. 6, pl. 10 (1471); Anon, Year Book, Michealmas Term, 9 Hen. VI, fo. 53v, pl. 37 (1430).
deceit as evolving as early as the sixteenth century. For example, Professor Baker contends that the term deceit, or its Latin or French equivalents, were invoked to characterize all kinds of cases of trespass, devoid of any true basis in the old common law tort of deceit. According to Baker, “[d]eciet [was] featured at one stage or another in most other actions on the case for wrongs. Conversion was a ‘plea of trespass and deceit’ or ‘deceit on the case’; but here again the deceit was to become, probably by the mid-sixteenth century, a meaningless allegation.”

_Sandforth’s Case_ may be an example of the abuse—alluded to by Baker—of attaching the nomenclature of an established tort to an action where the facts of the case do not fit the tort’s parameters. The _Sandforth_ court, looking for the nearest analogous doctrine of tort to fit the facts, may have simply settled for deceit. We will never know this. Moreover, it is unknown whether the action for deceit had expanded by the time of _Sandforth’s Case_ to ease the requirements of warranty and privity. Whatever the ultimate answers to those questions, _Sandforth’s Case_ clearly establishes trademark infringement as a violation of sixteenth century common law.

B. Placing Sandforth’s Case in the Commercial and Economic Context of Sixteenth Century England

Whether the court in _Sandforth’s Case_ created a new tort or expanded the scope of an action for deceit to encompass trademark infringement and unfair competition is, at this point, of little consequence. Regardless of its doctrinal basis, the court recognized that the prevailing economic and commercial realities of the realm required the promulgation or expansion of the common law to protect merchants against trademark piracy and unfair methods of competition in the marketplace. Anticipating the substantial development of the law during the Industrial Revolution 250 years later, the courts of the Elizabethan era witnessed extraordinary

148. See Spelman Reports, supra note 90, at 230-32.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
151. Id. (citations omitted).
economic and commercial growth throughout England and probably had little alternative but to fashion the common law to meet the exigencies of the times.

With the advent of the Tudor Monarchy, the English Middle Ages came to an end. The sixteenth century brought to England a tremendous growth in commerce and the economy. In fact, during this period, England experienced so much progress in its internal economy as well as its development of external markets that the century “amounted to a sort of Industrial Revolution.”

152. The House of Tudor, which assumed hold of the British throne in 1485, produced three of the most dynamic monarchs in English history. The Tudor Monarchy was ushered in after the bloody Battle of Bosworth Field, when Henry Tudor, a bastard pretender to the throne, vanquished Richard III, thus putting an end to the War of the Roses, which disrupted English commerce and society for thirty years. See generally J.R. Lander, The Wars of the Roses (1965); Joseph R. Strayer & Dana C. Munro, The Middle Ages 395-1500, at 500-06 (5th ed. 1970). Henry Tudor was crowned as Henry VII and his direct future lineage included Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth I, the death of the latter in 1603 extinguishing the Tudor hold on the British throne.

153. See generally Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (1860) (expressing the view that the late Middle Ages was a period of economic and cultural decline); F.R.H. du Boulay, An Age of Ambition: English Society in the Late Middle Ages (1970) (exploring the transformation of social, economic, cultural, and religious forces and institutions at the close of the fifteenth century); J. Huiszina, The Waning of the Middle Ages (1955) (sharing Burckhardt’s views of the late Medieval period in England); Percival Hunt, Fifteenth-Century England (1962) (offering the view that the late Middle Ages was less a period of stagnancy and decline and more a bridge to the Renaissance than generally supposed).

154. See Edward P. Cheyney, An Introduction to the Industrial and Social History of England 116-51 (1937). Focusing on the notable distinction of the sixteenth century as a passing of one era to another, from the Middle Ages to what we like to refer to as “modern times,” Professor Cheyney opined that:

The century and a half which extends from the middle years of the fifteenth century to the close of the sixteenth was, as has been shown, a period remarkable for the extent and variety of its changes in almost every aspect of society. In the political, intellectual, and religious world the sixteenth century seemed far removed from the fifteenth. It is not therefore a matter of surprise that economic changes were numerous and fundamental, and that social organization in town and country alike was completely transformed.

Id. at 120-21; see also George Clark, The Wealth of England 1496-1760, at 57-89 (1961) (arguing that mercantile enterprise and the development of a money economy resulted in the wide availability and significant surpluses of raw materials and finished goods during the sixteenth century).

While land was still the economic basis for making and maintaining family fortunes during the period, the century saw a rise in local markets, the increasing availability of consumable goods, and a significant escalation of exports to the continent and other parts of the world.\footnote{156} New inventions and technological advances vastly expanded Britain’s industrial capabilities, thereby increasing the production and distribution of goods throughout the realm and beyond.\footnote{157} Moreover, the recent discovery and colonization of North and South America, and the colonization of parts of India, Asia, and...
and Africa during the century, made no small impact on the growth of British industry.

Local craftsmen and artisans made way for a new class of businessmen, the merchant-adventurers.\textsuperscript{158} As a result of this and the vast expansion of industry and foreign trade in general, the guilds, which had theretofore dominated as the regulating force in the English economy, began to decline in membership and influence.\textsuperscript{159} Schechter demonstrated that it was the guilds that regulated the earliest form of “trademark law” in Great Britain.\textsuperscript{160} It is highly probable that the decline of the guilds, the escalation of the powers of the general government, and the growing influence of the merchant-adventurers in the English economy converged at this period in removing the regulation of trademarks from the “guild jurisprudence” to the common law courts.\textsuperscript{161}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[158.] See id. at 139-43. There was such a surplus of new finished goods during this period that England’s export trade flourished. See id. The new wealth also resulted in the greater desire for foreign luxury items and other types of imports. See id. During the sixteenth century, Britain’s import-export business was booming. According to Cheyney: These merchants exported the old articles of English production and to a still greater extent textile goods, the manufacture of which was growing so rapidly in England. The export of [raw] wool came to an end during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, but the export of woven cloth was more than enough to take its place. There was not so much cloth now imported, but a much greater variety of foodstuffs and wines, of articles of fine manufacture, and of the special products of the countries to which English trade extended. Id. at 139. In fact, the merchant-adventurers had become so numerous, wealthy, and influential during the century that they furnished 10 out of the 16 London ships sent to assist the British fleet in destroying the Spanish Armada. See id. at 142.
\item[159.] See id. at 135-38.
\item[160.] SCHECHTER, \textit{supra} note 1, at 38-77.
\item[161.] CHEYNEY, \textit{supra} note 154, at 136-38. According to Cheyney: Thus the gilds lost the unity of their membership, were weakened by the growth of industry outside of their sphere of control, superseded by the government in many of their economic functions, deprived of their administrative, legislative and jurisdictional freedom, robbed of their religious duties and of the property which had enabled them to fulfil them, and no longer possessed even the bond of their dramatic interests. So the fraternities which had embodied so much of the life of the people of the towns during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries now came to include within their organization fewer and fewer persons and to affect a smaller and smaller part of their interests. Although the companies continued to exist into later times, yet long before the close of the period . . . they had become relatively inconspicuous and insignificant. Id. at 137.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
With the guilds in decline, the plaintiff in *Sandforth’s Case*, and potentially others like him during the sixteenth century, probably viewed the common law courts as a more appropriate forum for obtaining relief against a trademark pirate. “J.G.,” or whatever his name may have been, could expect the courts of that period to render a judgment that made sense in light of the economic and commercial context of that time. As the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century made it imperative to extend substantial legal protection against trademark infringement and unfair competition, so too did the earlier, more contained “Industrial Revolution” of the sixteenth century.

**CONCLUSION**

More than seventy years ago, the legal scholar Frank Schechter challenged other legal scholars and historians to find a bridge linking the regulation of trademark usage by the medieval English trade guilds to the later assumption of trademark jurisprudence by the common law courts of the nineteenth century. Schechter fully discounted the case of *Southern v. How* as providing such a bridge. The recent discovery of *Sandforth’s Case* now allows us to disregard *Southern v. How* as the earliest basis for trademark and unfair competition law in English legal history. Moreover, *Sandforth’s Case*, together with the unreported parliamentary action in *Longe’s Case*, provide the historical bridge linking guild regulation of trademarks to the development of trademark jurisprudence by the common law courts as early as the mid-sixteenth century, 250 years before *Sykes v. Sykes*, the case that Schechter declared to be “the first reported case squarely involving the protection of trademarks by an English common law court.”
APPENDIX

THE COMPLAINT IN SANDFORTH’S CASE

Although the complaint in *Sandforth’s Case* is somewhat lengthy, its importance in the history of trademark law makes it worthy of full review. Accordingly, an annotated version of the complaint is provided in its entirety as follows:

[The plaintiff, by his attorney, complains] that, whereas the same plaintiff is a clothier, and for 12 years past at T. in the county aforesaid used the art and mystery [of making] woollen cloths called Reading kerseys, “halfes” cloths and Bridgewaters, and during all that time all such cloths as he made at T. aforesaid were good and substantial without any fraud or deception in that behalf; and for the whole of the aforesaid time he was accustomed to mark such cloths with the letters ‘J.G.’ and with a sign called a tucker’s handle; and the same plaintiff sold the same cloths, thus made and marked, through the whole of the aforesaid time, at T. aforesaid and at C. in the aforesaid county and in various other places within this realm of Eng-

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162. See *Baker & Milsom*, supra note 2 (providing the bracketed text).
163. Location unknown. Some versions of *Southern v. Hall* indicated that the plaintiff operated his business out of Gloucester or somewhere in Glouchestershire.
164. See *Baker & Milsom*, supra note 2 (providing the bracketed text).
165. A “kersey” is defined as a “course ribbed woolen cloth for hose and work clothes woven first in medieval England.” *Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary* 1238 (1986). The author could not locate an appropriate definition for the two other types of garments or cloths.
166. The author could find no definition for a “tucker’s handle.” However, during the Medieval and Renaissance periods, a “tuck” was a slender sword or rapier. *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* 1923 (3rd ed. 1992). It is possible that the device used as part of the plaintiff’s trademark was the handle of a sword. Other potentially relevant definitions for “tucker” are (1) “an attachment on a sewing machine for making tucks” and (2) a piece of lace or cloth used to fill in the low neck line of a dress.” *Webster’s Dictionary*, supra note 100, at 2460. The latter definition asks to compare the word to the use in the phrase “bib and tucker.” *Id.* The definition for the most likely noun “tuck” identified in the first definition of “tucker” is “a fold stitched or woven into cloth for the purpose of shortening, decorating or controlling fullness.” *Id.* A “tucker’s handle” could have been a tool of a clothier’s trade.
167. Location unknown.
land, and likewise at M.\textsuperscript{168} in Wales and in various other places in parts beyond the seas, as well to various merchants and other subjects of this realm of England as to various other merchants and foreigners; and the buyers thereof were accustomed for eight years\textsuperscript{169} last past to buy those cloths well and substantially made and from wool marked as above said, from the same J.G.\textsuperscript{170} at all the aforesaid several places, and to pay for the same cloths as for good and substantial cloths (the same cloths in truth being good and substantial), upon the affirmation of the same plaintiff and his servants and factors that the same cloths were good and substantial, without any inspection or contradiction of the same cloths;\textsuperscript{171} and by reason thereof the same plaintiff throughout the aforesaid time lawfully and honestly obtained and acquired much gain and profit from the making and selling of such cloths, for the further support and living of the same plaintiff and his whole family: [nevertheless]\textsuperscript{172} the defendant, being not unaware of the foregoing, scheming and plotting to hinder the same plaintiff in selling such cloths of his and to take away and worsen the opinion and esteem which the aforesaid merchants and subjects had concerning the cloths of the same plaintiff, for the space of two years now past at T. aforesaid made various woollen cloths called etc. which were ill, insufficient and unmerchantable; and deceitfully marked the same cloths with the aforesaid letters ‘J.G.’ and with the aforesaid mark called a tucker’s handle; and exposed for sale the same cloths, so insufficiently and deceitfully made and marked as aforesaid, in the aforesaid several places, as the cloths of the same plaintiff and under the aforesaid

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168} Location unknown.
\item \textsuperscript{169} The document previously states that the plaintiff had manufactured and marketed his cloths for twelve years, not eight.
\item \textsuperscript{170} Only the initials of the plaintiff are given.
\item \textsuperscript{171} This would seem to indicate that the plaintiff argued for the inherent “informational” value his mark had to consumers. The plaintiff’s customers need not spend time and effort inspecting the nature and quality of each cloth since the customers’ association of the plaintiff’s trademark with high quality goods had already been established.
\item \textsuperscript{172} See Baker & Milsom, supra note 2 (providing the bracketed text).
\end{itemize}
mark and letters, in the name of the selfsame plaintiff, whereupon various merchants and other subjects who were buyers and had previously been accustomed to buy the same plaintiff's cloths, trusting to the aforesaid words and [seeing] the aforesaid cloths marked with the aforesaid letters 'J.G.' and the aforesaid mark called a tucker's handle, bought the same cloths (deceitfully and insufficiently made by the defendant aforesaid) from the same defendant, without further inspection or contradiction of the same cloths, as being good and substantial cloths such as the cloths of the same plaintiff had used to be, and as being the same plaintiff's cloths; and the aforesaid buyers, when they later inspected the aforesaid cloths deceitfully sold by the aforesaid defendant as aforesaid, and found the aforesaid cloths to be deceitful, insufficient and unmerchantable, both in length and width and in quality and substance of the same cloths, not only completely reversed the opinion and esteem which they had previously had of the same cloths but also gave notice to many other merchants and subjects of the deceitful and insufficient making of the aforesaid cloths; and as a result of this same plaintiff, when he recently desired to sell certain good and substantial cloths of his (marked in form aforesaid) at the aforesaid places, and there exposed the same cloths for sale, could not sell those good and substantial cloths (marked in form aforesaid) by reason of the deceit committed and used by the aforesaid defendant as set out above, but the merchants and subjects aforesaid who previously used to buy such cloths from the same plaintiff refused to buy the same cloths from him by reason of the aforesaid deceit; to the damage etc.

173. This may mean that the defendant assumed the imposture of the plaintiff himself when actually making his sales, or that he stated himself to be the latter's agent, and therefore authorized by the plaintiff to make the sales.

174. Sandforth's Case, Baker & Milsom, supra note 2, at 615-17 (citing Cory's Entries, BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168v. (British Library) (1584)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (footnotes added).