China's Turn Against Law

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Chinese authorities are reconsidering legal reforms they enacted in the 1980s and 1990s. These reforms had emphasized law, litigation, and courts as institutions for resolving civil disputes between citizens and administrative grievances against the state. But social stability concerns have led top leaders to question these earlier reforms. Central Party leaders now fault legal reforms for insufficiently responding to (or even generating) surging numbers of petitions and protests.

Chinese authorities have drastically altered course. Substantively, they are de-emphasizing the role of formal law and court adjudication. They are attempting to revive pre-1978 court mediation practices. Procedurally, Chinese authorities are also turning away from the law. They are relying on political, rather than legal, levers in their effort to remake the Chinese judiciary.

This Article analyzes the official Chinese turn against law.

These Chinese developments are not entirely unique. American courts have also experienced a broad shift in dispute resolution patterns over the last century. Litigation has fallen out of favor. Court trials have dropped in number. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have increased. Observing such long-term patterns, Marc Galanter concluded that the United States experienced a broad “turn against law” over the twentieth century.

China's shift also parallels those in other developing countries. In recent decades, nations such as India, Indonesia, and the Philippines have resuscitated or formalized traditional mediation institutions. This is part of a global reconsideration of legal norms and institutions imported or transplanted from the West.

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Despite these similarities with global trends, this Article argues that Chinese leaders' shift against law is a distinct domestic political reaction to building pressures within the Chinese system. It is a top-down authoritarian response motivated by social stability concerns.

This Article analyzes the risks facing China as a result of the shift against law. It argues that the Chinese leadership's concern with maintaining social stability in the short term may be having severe long-term effects—undermining Chinese legal institutions and destabilizing the country.

Finally, this Article argues for rethinking the trajectory of Chinese legal studies. Scholars need to shift away from focusing on formal Chinese law and legal institutions in order to understand how the Chinese legal system actually operates and to recognize the direction in which it is heading.

我希望天下无讼 — I hope for a world without litigation.
Judge Chen Yanping

INTRODUCTION

In the early twenty-first century, Chinese authorities turned against law.

What does this mean?

Similarities exist with the American "turn against law" over the twentieth century, as characterized by Marc Galanter. Trial rates are declining. Court presidents and administrators are expressing a new official preference for mediation, rather than adjudication. Suspicion of lawyers has risen. A new narrative has emerged which views litigation as a pathology to be cured, and law as cold and unresponsive to human needs.

The Chinese shift has a broader component as well. Procedurally, Party authorities are relying on political levers to remold the Chinese judiciary. Chinese authorities are altering financial and promotion standards facing judges in order to steer them toward mediating, rather than adjudicating, cases. Party propaganda authorities are presenting Chinese courts and judges with an official depiction of their roles that is a dramatic reversal of the emphasis on judicial professionalism prevalent in the 1990s. These trends are playing out against the background of Party political campaigns that are reasserting tighter control over the Chinese judiciary, cracking

down on public interest lawyers, and attempting to curtail the influence of foreign rule-of-law norms among Chinese judges and officials.

The official Chinese turn against law, and back toward mediation, is thus tied to a politicized rejection of many legal reforms advanced in the 1980s and 1990s. It is a part of a broader reconsideration of role of law, lawyers, courts, and adjudication. This Article analyzes these shifts by examining Chinese judiciary's treatment of civil and administrative grievances—the centerpiece of earlier legal and court reform efforts.

Such statements are subject to important caveats. Law has not been abandoned in China. State authorities continue to issue statutes and regulations. Citizens and corporations continue to invoke legal norms as they seek to protect their interests. There is still some (albeit reduced) room for progressive institutional reform in China under the "rule of law" rubric.

Current developments are not without precedent. Law has never been far removed from Party politics in China, nor has the judiciary been independent of Party control. Chinese Party officials supported legal and court reforms during the 1990s and early 2000s for their own political purposes. Even at the height of this reform wave, limits existed as to how far such activity could go. And current struggles in the Chinese judiciary find historical echoes in swings between professionalism and populism that have deeply marked both imperial and modern Chinese history.

Despite these caveats, the shifts in Chinese dispute resolution practices merit both the attention (and characterization) advanced by this Article. Legal reforms pursued in the 1980s and 1990s have been halted or reversed. Chinese legal intellectuals are voicing alarm. Ji-ang Ping, one of the key drafters of China's post-1978 civil and administrative codes, has warned that "China's rule of law is in full retreat."³

Shifts in Chinese dispute resolution do bear similarities with developments elsewhere. Officials and scholars in many countries are raising questions regarding the appropriate role of formal law and court adjudication in dispute resolution. They are searching for effective alternatives to litigation to respond to (and resolve) citizen grievances. In many countries, such efforts involve reviving traditional mediation institutions or founding new ones.

But China's shift against law, this Article argues, is different. The shift is not being led by lawyers or parties who are opting out of the court system in search of alternatives to litigation. Nor is it being

implemented by neutral entities with a degree of independent legitimacy, whether traditional village structures or modern neutral mediators.

Rather, China’s turn against law is a top-down authoritarian political reaction to growing levels of social protest and conflict in the Chinese system. Chinese leaders face increasing social unrest generated by civil conflicts between citizens, and between citizens and the state. Yet Chinese officials remain unwilling to allow the gradual emergence of independent legal institutions capable of dealing with such disputes—precisely the reform track pursued by some in the late twentieth century. Instead, Party authorities are imposing (or re-imposing) ideological and bureaucratic controls on the court system in the name of social stability.

Such efforts are loosely clothed in the language of mediation or alternative dispute resolution (ADR), but this does not accurately reflect their true nature. Their main focus is not on assisting parties to resolve their grievances (although this may be a beneficial side effect in some cases). Rather, it is aimed at preventing legal conflicts and citizen petitions from rising toward central officials. As the top Chinese Party official in charge of political-legal affairs has stated, the aim of these reforms is to ensure that “small problems do not leave the village, large problems do not leave the township, [and] conflicts are not passed up to higher authorities.”

Shifts in Chinese dispute resolution efforts are not entirely negative. Excessive emphasis on formal litigation and trials during the 1990s corresponded poorly with the realities of rural Chinese courts. The new policy line may concentrate official and scholarly attention on concretely analyzing the mediation practices that actually dominate the workload of these courts. It may produce some practical changes that respond more effectively to the very real difficulties that they face. And it may open up some room for useful ADR reforms throughout the Chinese legal system.

But the official shift away from law carries real risks for China. Classic normative concerns exist with regard to the effect of these developments on the rights of parties, the role of the judiciary, and the legitimacy of legal institutions. But another set of concerns exists as well. Chinese judges are being told to—at all costs—avoid issuing decisions that might result in citizen protests, petitions, or complaints to higher authorities. This is undermining legal norms. It is rendering the judicial system susceptible to a range of populist pressure as citizens strategically elect to engage in coordinated pro-


tests on the internet or in the streets in an effort to sway court outcomes.

This represents more than a mere shift away from the emphasis on litigation and trials in the 1990s. Central to the definition of "law" is an effort to systematically apply rules and standards. In a range of civil and administrative grievances, Chinese officials are backing away from earlier (albeit tentative) efforts at doing this. Instead, Chinese authorities are increasing their demands that courts abandon such norms in order to meet political goals of appeasing popular sentiment and warding off social protest.

This turn against law is dangerous. It is eroding the very institutions Chinese authorities themselves attempted to construct in the late twentieth century as a bulwark against social instability.

The Article is divided into three Parts.

Part I examines the substantive shift in the Chinese judiciary. It tracks the dramatic U-turn in official Chinese dispute resolution efforts over the past three decades. Reliance on Maoist-era mediation practices gave way to judicial reform efforts in the 1980s and 1990s that emphasized court adjudication and trials according to formal law. But since 2003, Chinese Party and court authorities have begun to resurrect earlier mediation practices, largely as a result of increasing citizen protests and concerns regarding social stability.

Part II of this Article analyzes the political mechanisms by which Chinese authorities are implementing this shift. It examines the content of a recent 2010 "model judge" propaganda campaign surrounding Judge Chen Yanping (quoted at the introduction to this Article). It compares this with similar campaigns in the late 1990s. It identifies the new ideal that authorities are seeking to present for Chinese judges to emulate. These include a heightened responsiveness to populist demands and Party policy (rather than legal norms), a reliance on mediation rather than litigation to resolve problems, and a commitment to upholding social stability at all costs.

6. See HAN DIAU [CHARACTER DICTIONARY] (2010) defining fa (law) as "rules of conduct established and promulgated by the state, embodying the will of the rulers, which citizens must observe," and with a secondary definition of "standard" or "model." Emphasis (at least rhetorically) on systematic application of rules, albeit without the expectation such rules would independently constrain Party power, has been a hallmark of the reforms launched by Chinese authorities in the wake of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. See, e.g., DENG XIAOPING, EMANCIPATE THE MIND, SEEK TRUTH FROM FACTS AND UNITE AS ONE IN LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 157-58 (1978). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 962 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "law" as "1. The regime that orders human activities and relations through systematic application of the force of politically organized society, or through social pressure backed by force, in such a society. 2. The aggregate of legislation, judicial precedents, and accepted legal principles; the body of authoritative grounds of judicial and administrative action; esp., the body of rules, standards, and principles that the courts of a particular jurisdiction apply in deciding controversies brought before them . . . ").
This Part also examines official efforts to shift the concrete financial and performance incentives facing Chinese judges. Chinese authorities have reversed course since the late 1990s, when judicial salary and advancement rewards were strongly based on rates of issuing judicial decisions. Since the early 2000s, Chinese judicial authorities have strengthened the target mediation ratios that judges and courts are expected to attain. They have also decreased their tolerance for judicial decisions that result in disgruntled parties mounting petitions to higher authorities. Both of these have directly incentivized Chinese judges to shift away from issuing decisions in civil and administrative cases.

Part III explores the broader implications of these shifts. It analyzes the risks facing China as a result of the shift against law. It argues that official efforts to maintain social stability in the short term may be having severe long-term effects—undermining Chinese legal institutions and destabilizing China. It also examines recent signs that suggest Chinese leaders’ turn against law may be expanding into legal education. And it compares China’s shift with developments in other countries, fitting them into a broader literature regarding “law and society” and “law and development.”

Finally, Part III argues for rethinking the trajectory of legal scholarship on China. Modern research on Chinese law has been heavily dominated by studies of formal Chinese law and legal institutions. But given Chinese authorities’ own shift away from law in civil and administrative dispute resolution, and in light of the continued influence of extra-legal institutions and mechanisms, this may not be warranted. Scholars too, may need to “turn away from law” in their studies. If they want to understand how the Chinese state operates, they may need to directly incorporate the study of Party propaganda and bureaucratic personnel tools in their research.

Methodologically, this Article attempts to illustrate what such a broader approach might look like. It analyzes the shift in Chinese dispute resolution practices through an extensive examination of the full panoply of tools that central officials employ to guide bureaucratic institutions such as the judiciary—including formal law, propaganda materials, internal Party directives, and court evaluation systems. It fuses this textual analysis with first-hand interviews, public statements by Chinese judges and officials, and research conducted by domestic Chinese academics.

I. 1978-2010: Substantive Shifts in Dispute Resolution

In 1978, on the eve of the reform period, Chinese dispute resolution remained marked by practices that had characterized the
People's Republic of China since the 1950s. These relied on mediation led by community activists or officials to resolve civil grievances. Maoist practices differed from traditional mediation structures present in pre-1949 China. They were tightly interwoven with the official Party apparatus and carried a strong political cast. Party mediators did not just resolve grievances. Rather, they were also expected to transmit Party doctrine and correct the “feudal thinking” of parties. Voluntary compromise, though desirable, was not essential. Mediators could (and often did) bring coercive official or community pressure to bear on particularly troublesome parties in order to force them to reach agreement.

Procedures remained informal; legal rights were not emphasized.

In the early 1980s, Chinese authorities gradually began to back away from such practices. Officials advanced court adjudication according to formal law as the preferred means of resolving civil disputes. Legislative reforms enacted in 1982 clarified that mediation was merely to be “emphasized,” rather than “the primary method” for resolving disputes. The 1991 Civil Procedure Law deepened this shift. It stipulated that court mediation must be voluntary on the part of parties. It also required courts to issue decisions in the absence of an agreement between the parties. In the following decade, Chinese judicial authorities gradually fleshed out and formalized trial practices through a range of procedural and evidentiary rules. Actual implementation of pro-trial reform efforts varied dramatically. Urban court practices changed quickly. But mediation continued to dominate the workload of Chinese basic-level rural courts.

Chinese authorities pursued parallel reforms in the field of administrative law. They enacted a raft of laws and regulations,
including the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), the 2003 Administrative Licensing Law, and the 2007 Regulations on Open Government, giving citizens limited rights to challenge government actions in court. The ALL confirmed the preference for litigation, specifically barring courts from resorting to mediation in administrative cases.14

Other reforms followed. Educational reforms ensured that law students primarily studied formal law (rather than Party doctrine) while at university. This groomed a cadre of judges and officials inclined to rely on formal law and court adjudication to resolve citizen grievances.15 Reformers even imported (and indigenized) the trappings of Western judicial proceedings to give Chinese judges gravitas and set them apart from other officials. Chinese judges exchanged their military uniforms for black judicial robes in 2001, and adopted the use of the gavel the following year.16

Multiple reasons motivated these changes. First, Party authorities abandoned their revolutionary principles in the post-Mao era. They retreated from earlier efforts to control all aspects of social and economic life. This sapped the vigor from Maoist institutions, such as people’s mediation committees, which had relied on a degree of ideological fervor and official coercion.17 Second, China’s rapid economic development generated an increasing number of civil disputes. Many involved strangers, migrants, or corporate entities disconnected from traditional village or state-owned entities. As such, these disputes were less amenable to resolution by mediation institutions that relied on existing family or social ties to lead parties toward compromise.18

Other factors played a role as well. Relative disinterest of central Party authorities in dealing with civil disputes created an opening for the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) to occupy the field of civil justice. Court authorities were able to steer reforms in a technocratic direction that enhanced their own institutional relevance.19 The infusion of foreign norms emphasizing formal law gave coherence and legiti-
macy to reform efforts.\textsuperscript{20} Official Chinese desires to be seen as adopting international legal standards enhanced receptivity to reforms, particularly during the difficult negotiations surrounding China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.\textsuperscript{21}

Chinese authorities and activists promoted legal reforms to address governance problems they saw in China’s institutions. The SPC’s first five-year plan for court reform, issued in 1999, identified corruption and local protectionism as major reasons for deepening court reform and strengthening reliance on formal legal norms.\textsuperscript{22} Similarly, top Party authorities supported administrative law reforms as a means to enlist citizens in the difficult task of checking corruption and abuse of power in the lower levels of the Chinese bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{23}

Such reforms shifted the workload of Chinese courts. The percentage of civil cases resolved via mediation declined steadily from the early 1980s to the early 2000s, shrinking from around seventy percent to slightly over thirty percent.\textsuperscript{24} Following the passage of the ALL in 1989, administrative suits against the government boomed, rising from zero to roughly 100,000 in 2001.\textsuperscript{25}

But in recent years, Chinese authorities have shifted tone. They are turning away from trials and adjudication according to law. Top Party political-legal authorities are promoting mediation as the key to resolving all disputes. They have linked it to the Party’s new “harmonious society” political doctrine, enshrined as central policy in 2006.\textsuperscript{26} Central judicial authorities have reduced their new mediation policies to the catchphrase \textit{tiaojie youxian, tiaojie shenpan jiehe}—“Mediation has priority, and trials should be fused with mediation.”\textsuperscript{27} Mediation experiments have spilled over into criminal and administrative litigation, the ALL’s explicit bar notwithstanding.\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] Huang, supra note 8, at 129. Academic exchanges played a key role in facilitating transmission of norms. See Randle Edwards, \textit{Thirty Years of Legal Exchange with China: The Columbia Law School Role}, 23 \textit{Colum. J. Asian L.} 3 (2009).
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] For an excellent first-hand account of negotiations surrounding the establishment of the U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative under the Clinton administration, see generally Paul Gewirtz, \textit{The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative}, 11 \textit{Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.} 603 (2003).
\item[\textsuperscript{22}] Renmin fayuan wunian gaige gangyao [Five-Year Reform Plan of the People’s Courts], issued Oct. 20, 1999.
\item[\textsuperscript{24}] Fu & Cullen, supra note 10, at 43, figure 1.1.
\item[\textsuperscript{25}] Kevin O’Brien & Li Lianjiang, \textit{Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China}, 51 \textit{China Journal} 75, at 96, table 1 (2004).
\item[\textsuperscript{26}] Zhou, supra note 4.
\item[\textsuperscript{28}] Administrative experiments have taken place via the semantic distinction of authorizing courts to approve the withdrawal of administrative suits following “reconciliation” \textit{hejie}—as contrasted with mediation, or \textit{tiaojie}—between parties. SPC Decision on Several Questions Regarding Withdrawal of Suits in Administrative Liti-
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In their effort to revive court mediation practices, Chinese authorities are drawing on their Maoist heritage for inspiration. As Ben Liebman has shown, Chinese political-legal authorities are invoking revolutionary-era models of judging from the 1930s and 1940s for judges to emulate. These models emphasize a fusion of mediation, populism, and Party political work as the preferred means to resolve citizen grievances, instead of trial adjudication according to formal legal norms. Extreme pressure is being brought on Chinese judges to do whatever it takes to resolve popular grievances in the name of upholding social stability. To that end, informal practices and flexible norms are again the watchwords of the day.29

Official statistics reflect the shift in central preferences. Administrative litigation caseloads of Chinese courts reached a plateau in 1998, remaining little changed over the following decade.30 With regard to civil litigation, Chinese authorities are reporting figures that—at least on the surface—reflect massive increases in mediation. According to the SPC work reports, the percentage of civil cases resolved through mediation in China doubled from thirty-one percent in 2004, to sixty-two percent in 2009. If true, this would represent an astounding tripling (from 1.33 million to 3.59 million) of the total number of cases closed through mediation in just five years!31 Closer examination reveals that the SPC is fudging the numbers in an apparent effort to inflate their totals, changing their reporting (starting in 2007) to include cases withdrawn by parties as well as those successfully mediated.32 But both numerical manipulation by the SPC,
and parallel reporting by lower courts of suspiciously high mediation rates, give some idea of the practical pressures Chinese courts are facing.\textsuperscript{33}

Official emphasis on mediation takes several different forms. The first is promotion of extra-judicial mediation. Since 2002, Chinese authorities have attempted to resuscitate people’s mediation committees administered by local villagers and residents committees. A cornerstone of Maoist-era dispute resolution practices, these institutions had fallen into disrepair in the wake of the legal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. In recent years, national authorities have attempted to reverse this trend, increasing the resources available to these committees and strengthening the binding nature of mediated agreements reached under their auspices.\textsuperscript{34}

The 2010 Law on People’s Mediation builds on these efforts, codifying earlier pro-mediation measures in national law. It provides that courts may instruct litigants to seek mediation by people’s mediation committees.\textsuperscript{35} It also creates procedures for courts to ratify agreements reached via such mediation (following application by both parties within thirty days of the effective date of the agreement, and after court examination of the content). Once ratified, any subsequent violation of the agreement by one party allows the other side to initiate immediate enforcement proceedings.\textsuperscript{36}

Second, Chinese authorities are also aggressively pushing mediation within the judiciary. In 2007, the SPC issued a judicial opinion pressing lower courts and judges to employ mediation as the preferred avenue for resolving cases before them.\textsuperscript{37} Depictions vary as to what such judicial mediation involves in practice. Official propaganda portrays model judges, imbued with an unwavering desire to serve the masses, patiently visiting aggrieved individuals in their homes, day after day, listening to their heartfelt complaints, gradually leading them down the path of reconciliation, and restoring

\footnotesize{(noting merely that 50.74% of civil cases were resolved by “mediation and withdrawal of the case”).}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} See, e.g., Ma Teng, Suide fayuan minshi anjian tiaojie lü da dao 95.7 [Civil Mediation Rates for Suide Court Reach 95.7%], Suide Government Website, May 23, 2010, \textit{available at} http://www.sdhan.com/sdh/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=4709.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Halegua, \textit{supra} note 17, at 722-29.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Id., arts. 32-33.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Supreme People’s Court Opinion on Further Increasing the Positive Role of Mediation (in Litigation) in Constructing Socialism and a Harmonious Society [Zui gao renmin fayuan guanyu jin yi bu fahui susong tiaojie zai goujian shehui zhuyi hexie shehui zhong ji ji zuyong de ruogan yijian], issued Mar. 7, 2007, \textit{available at} http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=116688.
\end{itemize}
social harmony. One Chinese public interest lawyer offers a different picture:

It depends whether you are in front of one of the “slippery old judges” or one of the younger ones. The older judges will work the parties over. They will tell the villagers [plaintiffs in an environmental suit]: “It might be a good idea to accept the settlement offer in front of you—it is not certain that my decision regarding compensation will be as favorable.” Then they will go over to the defendant [corporation] and say: “You should compromise—you wouldn’t want your image to suffer if I publicly issue an adverse judicial decision.” Doing this requires a degree of social skills and an ability to push people. Younger judges just don’t have that. Their tendency is to simply try to resolve things by the book.

Yet a third form of state-sponsored mediation exists as well. Since 2004, Chinese political-legal authorities have promoted Party-led “big mediation” (da tiaojie) practices to handle complex disputes that may generate mass citizen discontent or social unrest. Examples include land seizures, corporate reorganizations of failed enterprises, and collective grievances against local officials.

As the transcript of one such “big mediation” proceeding reveals, they are primarily political conferences aimed at coordinating responses between government bureaus (including the judiciary) and crafting solutions to ward off protest. Discussions can be conducted with limited reference to legal norms, outside of legal channels (including before cases are filed, or after judicial decisions are issued), and without the actual participation of the nominal parties. Horse-trading between officials takes place. Political pressure is brought to bear on recalcitrant bureaus to compromise.

In such high-pressure cases, judges are but one party out of many at the political bargaining table. Often with their own career evaluations at stake (discussed below), the role of judges is far removed from that of a disinterested neutral. In some cases, they may serve as legal advisors, offering proposals that (if accepted) might generally keep the ultimate solution within the rough bounds of legality. In others, mediation can devolve into what Hualing Fu has

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38. See infra notes 54-76, and text.
41. Id.
termed “an exercise of state power by local bureaucrats under the guise of tradition.”

What explains the shift in central attitudes away from law, courts, and adjudication in recent years? Scholars broadly agree on a common narrative. While central Chinese leaders had heavily emphasized formal law as a tool to handle civil and administrative grievances, late twentieth century court reforms failed to create effective institutions for resolving citizen grievances. The failure to deepen institutional reform meant that courts remained weak actors vis a vis entrenched local Party, government, and commercial interests. At the same time, China experienced a growing number of economic and social disputes resulting from rapid development. This resulted in a pervasive inability to enforce court verdicts, increasing numbers of extra-legal petitions and protests to higher Chinese authorities, and violent confrontations between courts and disgruntled citizens.

Fear of mounting social unrest led central Chinese authorities to rethink reform policies. Officials viewed domestic Chinese developments against the backdrop of the 2003-2005 “color revolutions” that ousted authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Starting around 2003, civil dispute resolution moved from the margins to become a central Party concern. Some reform projects were criticized for importing formal law and legal institutions that meshed poorly with practical realities in China’s rural areas. Others were faulted for leading Chinese courts and officials away from their populist roots, creating artificial barriers between the people and officials that weakened support for the Party. Party authorities also warned that some judges had used concepts such as “the supremacy of the law” or “deciding cases according to law” as excuses to avoid or oppose Party leadership in judging cases, particularly under the corrosive influence of Western legal concepts.

Chinese authorities began to emphasize mediation in response to social stability concerns. Central authorities assert that this is neces-

44. Id. Authorities remembered lessons from their own history. Pre-1949 Party cadres were adept at exploiting similar divisions to mobilize popular discontent against the Nationalist regime.
45. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 43.
sary to resolve increasing numbers of extra-judicial citizen petitions and protests. Indeed, when SPC officials ordered lower courts to increase their use of mediation in 2007, they singled out several types of cases for which closed-door mediation was particularly encouraged—including those “involving large numbers of people” and those “that are very sensitive, receiving significant social attention.”

At the same time, authorities also took steps to rein in politically wayward courts and judges. In 2006, Party authorities launched a “socialist rule of law theory” campaign in courts and other legal institutions. This campaign stressed loyalty to the Communist Party and the need to avoid the pernicious influence of “Western” rule-of-law theories. In 2008, central authorities named a former provincial public security chief as the new SPC head. He replaced the outgoing president, closely identified with earlier judicial reform and rule-of-law efforts. Within months, Chinese courts were enmeshed in the “Three Supremes” campaign, which emphasized Party doctrine and populist sentiment as equal (if not superior) to the constitution and law as sources for guiding judicial work. In the following months, Chinese authorities reasserted Party control over the bar, and stepped up harassment of public interest activists and lawyers who had taken advantage of court and administrative law reforms to launch an increasingly well-organized series of legal challenges against local and central government policies.

46. Zhou, supra note 4.
47. SPC Opinion on Further Increasing the Positive Role of Mediation, supra note 37, art 5.
II. IMPLEMENTING THE TURN AGAINST LAW

Chinese authorities are using multiple tools to implement the shift away from court adjudication and legal norms. Some of these tools are legal in nature, such as the 2010 Law on People’s Mediation discussed above. But authorities are also using political tools to reshape the Chinese judiciary. These include “model judge” propaganda campaigns and target responsibility systems.

Neither of these mechanisms is new. Both are deeply rooted in prior Party and imperial governance practices. Model judge campaigns are the modern incarnations of 1950s-era Communist “model worker” and imperial Chinese “model official” efforts. Contemporary target responsibility systems are the lineal descendants of earlier Party and imperial bureaucratic management practices.

A. “Model Judge” Propaganda Campaigns Compared: 2010 and 1999

Chinese authorities regularly use ideological campaigns to press lower-level officials and bureaus to implement particular policy lines. These campaigns blend propaganda, official speeches, and small-group study sessions. They often focus on exalting a “model official” (or in the judiciary, a “model judge”) who inculcates specific policies or values that central authorities seek to promote. Comparing two model judge campaigns, in 2010 and in 1999, illustrates the shift in official Chinese dispute resolution policies.

The Chen Yanping campaign is a good example of a recent, nationwide model judge campaign. Unfolding over the first half of 2010, it was no small affair. On January 19th, top Party and judicial officials gathered in Beijing to commemorate the accomplishments of Judge Chen, a district court judge from Jiangsu province. Extensive

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51. Law on People’s Mediation, supra note 35.
52. See, e.g., Patricia Stranahan, Labor Heroines of Yan’an, 9 MODERN CHINA 288 (1983).
54. Aside from its recent, large-scale nature, the 2010 Chen Yanping campaign was chosen because extensive reporting on the campaign is available online, including a dedicated section on the main website of the Chinese judiciary with a full archive of state media reports, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/zhuanti/subject.php?id=454. The 1999 model female judge campaign was chosen for its roughly similar nature: a nationwide campaign, including a formal appearance with the head of the Politburo member in charge of political-legal affairs. The fact that Chen and the ten judges in the 1999 campaign are all female helps control for differences in gender depictions. Last, sufficient state media articles on the judges in the 1999 campaign permit comparisons with the 2010 one.
55. For the official praise of Judge Chen by the SPC head, see Luo Shuqin & Chen Yonghui, Wang Shengjun: Yi Chen Yanping tongzhi wei bangyang zuo renmin xinfu de hao faguan (Wang Shengjun: Take Comrade Chen Yanping as a Model, Be Good
propaganda followed in subsequent months. State media effusively praised her, detailed her exploits, and provided an official hagiography of her life. (A translated sample of two shorter articles is reproduced in the appendix.) From January to June 2010, the home webpage of the Chinese judiciary carried a banner headline extolling Judge Chen. In March, the SPC president singled her out for praise in his annual work report to the national legislature (a session for which Judge Chen was also selected as a legislative delegate). Local courts throughout China mobilized their judges to attend internal study sessions to learn from Judge Chen's example. 56

Suppose you are an astute, ambitious young Chinese judge sitting in one such study session. You seek to decode the messages contained in the official propaganda. Jaded by similar campaigns in the past, you may not actually believe the official depiction of Judge Chen. But your political antenna is attuned to shifts in content and nuance. After all, these are guides to changes in official expectations that may have implications regarding how to best advance your career. What do you learn?

Well, Judge Chen is clearly a paragon of judicial perfection for you to emulate. You read in official reports that she has handled over 3100 cases in fourteen years; without a single complaint or appeal; without a single petition by a disgruntled party; without even one wrongly decided case. Her decisions are uniformly accepted by all parties. 57 You read that her correct work ethic, merged with her earnest desire to realize the Confucian ideal of “a world without litigation” (tianxia wusong), 58 helps her achieve the Party’s goal of a “harmonious society” (hexie shehui). 59

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58. Id. This is an indirect reference to Confucius, Analects 12, “In hearing litigation, I am as good as any other. What is necessary, however, is to cause the people to have no litigation.”
59. Judge Chen’s own comments cast doubt on the wildly exuberant claims of official propaganda. As she herself noted in an interview, “A world without litigation,” this is my New Year’s wish every year. Of course, this can’t be achieved. Not only can it not be achieved, in today’s transitional society, conflicts can only increase. Take my own court, for example. Our caseload has increased 30% in the last three years . . .” Gu Weizhong, “Neng dong sifa” de hexie shizhe [A Harmony-Maker Who Can ‘Move the Judiciary’], XINHUA DAILY, Dec. 29, 2009, available at http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/xinwen_zhong_xin/2009-12/29/content_18622749.htm.
You clearly sense the newfound official preference for mediation, and you perceive some disdain for formal legal norms. Judge Chen’s successes are ascribed to her avoidance of law and her unflagging effort to mediate all cases that come before her. Unlike “some judges” who consider mediation too time-consuming or difficult, Judge Chen is willing to spend hours, days, or weeks to reach a mediated conclusion. While such work may not demonstrate or require “any consummate trial skills or [any] deep grounding in basic legal skills,” and will not result in fame or attention as the result of a media-worthy decision, it receives the “true love and admiration of the masses.”

Direct instructions grab your attention. “Judges should not be legal craftsmen who pay excessive attention to wording, believe the laws of statutes to be the only scripture, and pay no attention to social harmony and the popular interest.”

Popular interest? Ah, you see. This is an effort to return the Chinese judiciary to its Party-led, populist roots. Your court president (also the court Party secretary) is lecturing you that Judge Chen’s style of work is the spiritual successor to 1940s and 1950s “mass line” practices aimed at maintaining tight links between Party officials and the people. But you are also expected to maintain “true sentiment,” “true love,” and “a true heart” for the people, “draw close to the masses, walk among the masses... and feel the people’s concerns as [your] own.” You should not be like those other judges who merely


rely on "cold" law and "mechanical procedures" to handle cases, separating themselves from the people.

You see that Western legal norms are explicitly rejected. Campaign materials instruct that "simply adopting Western concepts of rule of law," or "fantasizing about 'transplants' or 'integrating [with the rest of the world]' as a means to replicate foreign legal systems—this is to confuse tangerines for oranges." Western judges are criticized for "living in seclusion," for "separating themselves from society," and for "divorcing themselves from reality." In contrast, China's "socialist judicial road" and national character (guoqing) demands adherence to revolutionary practices and populist spirit.

But you notice something else as well. Campaign materials do not limit themselves to Communist rhetoric. Rather, they also claim that Judge Chen embodies classical Chinese values as well. They praise her work as being "deeply nurtured by Confucianism." They describe her belief that a judge must rule through virtue and moral suasion. Her work is said to incarnate the Confucian concept of benevolence (ren). She is hailed as the "perfect embodiment" of the Confucian moral exemplar of a junzi (gentleman, exemplary person). (Odd. Didn't your parents tell you that they had participated in a Maoist political campaign during the 1970s explicitly aimed at wiping out Confucian influence?) Passages from the Confucian classics are explicitly reinterpreted for campaign purposes. The SPC bulletin eulogizes Judge Chen for adhering to the concept of "junzi bu qi." As Chinese philosophers note, the original phrase indicates that an exemplary person (or gentleman) should not be a mere specialist, but rather a comprehensive vessel, capable of being used for many

67. Id.
68. Id.
70. Id.
71. The campaign downplays specialized knowledge. Chen herself is quoted as saying "in order to serve as a judge, just like serving as a doctor, one must first establish one's moral principles and have a compassionate heart." Zhang Liang, Bu ju qingli fali wennuan ru si [Not Excluding The Accepted Codes of Human Conduct: The Warmth of the Law], Jan. 20, 2010, available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2010-01/20/content_2030784.htm?node=20729.
73. Wang, supra note 63.
74. See A. James Gregor & Maria Hsia Chang, Anti-Confucianism: Mao's Last Campaign, 19 ASIAN SURVEY 1073 (1979).
purposes. The SPC bulletin, however, provides its own gloss on the phrase:

From the perspective of the judiciary, this phrase can be understood as saying that a judge with good moral conduct cannot simply be a tool that mechanistically applies the law in the process of handling cases. Rather, a judge must grasp social conditions, be well-versed in all forms of judicial skills, be good at resolving disputes, and amply bring into play the utility of the judiciary as a good defender of the social order.

The 2010 campaign's portrayal of Judge Chen is particularly striking when compared with propaganda depictions of model Chinese judges in the late 1990s.

Similarities do exist. As with Judge Chen, late 1990s model judges were shining examples of hard work, even at the expense of their own health. Their annual case closure rates were double or triple of that of other judges. And they were almost never wrong in their decisions. Out of the ten judges selected as “National Outstanding Female Judges” in 1999, six were reported as never having a single case reversed on appeal or sent back for retrial.

State media depictions of late 1990s model judges also somewhat paralleled the current ones of Judge Chen. Judges stood firmly on the side of the Communist Party. They were praised as good Party members. They firmly supported key Party-state objectives. One published an article in the national Party theoretical journal publicly praising official efforts to wipe out the Falun Gong spiritual movement. And judges received praise for their out-of-court efforts to

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76. Wang, supra note 63.

77. See, e.g., the description of Judge Yue Lu, in Kua shiji de xianfeng zhanshi [Vanguard Warriors for the New Century], 7 GONGCHANDANGYUAN [COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER] at 12 (1999) (continuing to work while receiving extensive treatments for cancer).

78. See, e.g., the description of Judge Zhao Xiaoli, in Shensheng de zhuiqiu [Sacred Pursuit], 9 DANGJIAN [PARTY CONSTRUCTION], at 23-24 (1997).


80. See, e.g., Vanguard Warriors for the New Century, supra note 77.

resolve disputes, and their unflagging commitment to serving the people.\textsuperscript{82}

But key differences exist as well. There was no overwhelming emphasis on miraculous successes with mediation. When late 1990s model judges were extolled for resolving large numbers of cases, they were praised for doing so via \textit{shenjie} (resolving cases through trial), rather than through mediation (\textit{tiaojie}).\textsuperscript{83} Sure, passing mention was made of high mediation ratios achieved by particular judges. But there was no politicized narrative presenting mediation as a miracle cure for all instances of social discontent. And there was no effort to explicitly invoke Confucian norms to legitimate judging styles of late 1990s model judges.

In fact, the official depiction of several late 1990s model judges was diametrically opposed to that of Judge Chen. Take Judge Qin Lingmei. Her nickname in the state media? The “Stone-Cold [Faced] Judge.”\textsuperscript{84} This referred to her reputation for “cool-headedness,” “rationality,” “adherence to neutrality,” and “rejection of excessive social contacts.” Her impassiveness and lack of contact toward parties were particularly highlighted. She maintained that, although nearsighted, she often did not wear glasses while working. When parties attempted to find her after a court hearing, she was able to pretend that she “didn’t recognize” them, enabling her to escape difficult interpersonal relationships.\textsuperscript{85} Judge Zhu Xiaomei is another example. State media praised her as the judge who “distrusted the county Party committee,” for challenging a county Party secretary’s decision regarding a pending criminal case, eventually reversing it.\textsuperscript{86}

Judge Gao Binghuan provides yet another contrast with Judge Chen. Judge Gao was eulogized for her fearless efforts in executing court judgments. After a factory boss refused to comply with a court order in commercial litigation proceedings, Judge Gao made an initial visit to attempt to reason with him. When that failed, she arrived at the factory gates with a team of judicial personnel to order his arrest. As they advanced to handcuff the factory head, he shouted for assistance from the surrounding mob of 200 factory workers (and his supporters). A large-scale riot ensued. Judges were attacked, vehicles destroyed. Judge Gao herself was beaten senseless and passed out.

\textsuperscript{82} Ji Yanan, \textit{Tianping zhong yu shan} [Heavenly Peace is Weightier than a Mountain], \textit{Guangming Daily}, Feb. 10, 1999, available at gmw.cn/01gmrb/1999-02/10/GB/17964%5EGM1-1016.htm.


\textsuperscript{84} A Brief Introduction, supra note 79.

\textsuperscript{85} Fang Ning, \textit{Yu rennao zhi wai} [Outside the Hubbub (of Life)], \textit{Shanghai Renmin Yuekan} [Shanghai People’s Congress Monthly], 2003.

After being held hostage for twelve hours, she was rescued and sent to the hospital with a concussion. Following due attention to the case from the Beijing High People’s Court and the prefectural Party committee, the factory head received a prison sentence for interfering with the execution of judicial verdicts. And Judge Gao? “She said it well: ‘[w]e must uphold the authority of the law, even at the cost of our lives.’”

Such propaganda from prior decades is strikingly discordant with the current official line regarding Judge Chen. The 1990s model judges mentioned above were not warm and fuzzy. They did not miraculously achieve social harmony. Judge Gao’s actions actually triggered an anti-government riot. Judges in the late 1990s were exalted for adhering to a somewhat autonomous concept of law. They were depicted as enforcing legal norms in civil disputes, even at the cost of social discontent, and in criminal (or administrative) disputes, even at the cost of conflict with core local Party leaders.

The contrast shows how Chinese propaganda narrative regarding judges (and law) has shifted in the last ten years. The campaign surrounding Judge Chen is part of an effort to reinterpret the role of judges: towards populist, Party-led mediation and away from adjudication according to law.

B. Target Responsibility Systems: Money for Mediation

Official Chinese efforts to alter judicial behavior and increase the use of mediation are not limited to propaganda portrayals of exemplary officials. Rather, they are also shifting the concrete performance incentives for judges.

One Chinese district court clearly explains this in an article entitled “How to Raise Mediation Rates”:

In the 2009 campaign, the Yancheng (district) court paid great attention to mediation work. It made civil mediation a component of (court) target responsibility systems, thereby altering the views of court personnel with regard to trials . . . In the past, we highly emphasized judicial rates of issuing verdicts in the courtroom [as a component of evaluating judicial work performance]. This led to high rates of cases decided by verdict. It also led to conflictual relationships between parties, difficulty enforcing verdicts, and was not beneficial for the purposes of finally and completely resolving problems (anjie shiliao).

87. Li Enshi, Nü faguan Gao Binghuan [Female Judge Gao Binghuan], 17 LABOR UNION READER (2001). Note that Judge Gao is also quoted as saying that it is essential for judges to rely on li (reason) rather than qing (sentiment, feelings) in their work. Exactly the opposite claim is made for Judge Chen Yanping. See Zhang, supra note 71.
In accordance with changing times, this court has strengthened the use of mediation. We have made mediation rates "hard targets" in annual target responsibility systems used for evaluating judicial performance. We have made financial awards to judges for mediating cases higher than those awarded for deciding cases . . . . We have insisted that every case be mediated, and paid much attention to the [judicial] rates of successful mediation. These policies have led to large increases in mediation rates for this court—15% higher compared with last year. Mediation has become a bright spot in the work of the Yancheng district court.88

Such methods are not unusual. In 2007, the SPC specifically called for courts to implement such policies in order to press judges to actively pursue mediation.89 These calls have since echoed through the Chinese judicial bureaucracy.90

What are the target responsibility systems that the Yanping court refers to? These are systems widely employed by Chinese authorities to evaluate, discipline, and reward Party and government officials (including judges). They link officials' careers and salaries to success in attaining designated performance targets, frequently numerical in nature. Local Party secretaries, for example, face annual targets for economic development, tax collection, birth control, poverty alleviation, Party building, and social order. Judges also face targets. These include mediation, case closure, and appellate reversal ratios.91 Officials who succeed in meeting their targets receive salary and career rewards, such as enhanced chances for promotion. Those who fail (or perform lower than others) are correspondingly sanctioned.92 Targets differ in importance. Exceptionally important targets—such as social order, birth control, or (in the Yancheng court) mediation—may be designated as "hard" targets or "priority targets with veto power." Failure to attain these can unilaterally cancel out positive performance in other fields. This makes officials


89. See, e.g., Supreme People’s Court Opinion on Further Increasing the Positive Role of Mediation, supra note 37, art. 21.


particularly attentive to meeting (or at least appearing to meet) such targets.\(^9\)

Target responsibility systems play a crucial role in Chinese governance. As this author has detailed in earlier work, they are a key mechanism for higher authorities to steer the lower bureaucracy.\(^9\) Setting (or altering) specific targets incentivizes lower-level officials to engage in (or change) particular behavior.

Beginning in the 1990s, Chinese authorities started to decrease the importance of mediation ratios (prominently emphasized during the 1980s) in performance evaluations of judges. In contrast, they strengthened the weight given to judicial decisions.\(^9\) Court officials set higher targets for the numbers of cases to be resolved via judicial decision.\(^9\) This (unsurprisingly) led to both decreases in the numbers of cases reported to be resolved via mediation, and increases in the numbers of judicial decisions issued.\(^9\)

Exactly the same process—but in reverse—has been playing itself out in recent years. Starting around 2003, courts across China began to increase the importance of mediation in judicial target responsibility systems. They raised required mediation target rates for civil litigation.\(^9\) Since 2006, the same process has taken place in the field of administrative litigation.\(^9\) Nor is this phenomenon limited to courts. The full spectrum of Chinese government (and quasi-government) entities engaged in dispute resolution—including local governments, judicial bureaus, urban people's mediation committees, and rural village committees—is being presented with elevated target ratios for cases successfully closed via mediation. Targets range from merely high (sixty to eighty percent) to astronomically unbelievable (ninety-seven percent or higher).\(^9\)

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\(^9\) Id.

\(^9\) See generally Minzner, supra note 49. Importantly, they have a range of internal limits and negative side effects. Id.

\(^9\) Chinese judges point this out. See, e.g., Meng, supra note 90; Chi Xiaoran, *Qiantan minshi shenpan zhong tiaojie he panjue zhi jiehe* [A Brief Discussion of Fusing Mediation and Adjudication in Civil Trial Work] (comments by a Heilongjiang judge), available at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleHtml/Article_43942.asp.

\(^9\) See Rizhao Intermediate People's Court Research Office, *Shenpan fangshi gaige daodi gaicheng shenmeyang* [What Form Should Trial Reform Take After All], *Shandong shenpan* [Shandong Trial], 1996 (setting a target for fifty percent of cases to be resolved via decision).


\(^9\) Id.; Meng, supra note 90.


\(^9\) Compare Wang Hongwei, *Yichang jiufen, tiaojie haishi panjue* [A Dispute, Mediate or Adjudicate?], *LEGAL DAILY*, Oct. 21, 2009 (detailing the requirement of the Henan provincial High People's Court that between sixty and eighty percent of first instance civil disputes be successfully mediated), available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/misc/2009-10/19/content_1168114.htm, with Pujiang sifa ju 2007 nian zhong-
Methods can be very direct. In one northeastern Chinese district court, judges who successfully mediate eighty-two percent of their civil cases receive a bonus of ten yuan per mediated case, and five yuan for each case withdrawn by the parties. Higher mediation rates generate larger rewards. Judges who successfully mediate eighty-six percent of their civil cases receive twenty yuan per mediated case, and ten yuan for each case withdrawn by the parties. Local court officials report (also unsurprisingly) that such systems have been responsible for the large increases in cases resolved via mediation in recent years.

These moves are part of a larger governance shift. Consistent with increased concerns about social instability, central Chinese authorities have ratcheted up pressure on lower-level Party and government officials to prevent instances of citizens petitioning (shangfang) to higher levels of the bureaucracy. Responsibility systems have been strengthened as a result. Local officials are receiving increasingly severe sanctions for larger and more organized instances of social protest by citizens in their jurisdictions. This also extends to the courts. Judges are being held individually liable for decisions they issue that generate petitions by disgruntled litigants to higher officials. Increased mediation targets are simply one component of this broader shift. Party institutions are issuing comprehensive orders to courts and other institutions instructing them to both keep petitioners away from higher authorities at all costs, and to successfully resolve massive percentages of disputes through mediation.

dian gongzuo zeren fenjie biao [Jinjiang Municipal Justice Bureau Chart Allocating Responsibilities for Achieving Key Work Responsibilities for 2007] (making Wang Jialang personally responsible for ensuring that ninety-seven percent of mediations conducted by people's mediation committees in the city during 2007 are successful), pg 2, available on the website of the Jinjiang municipal government at app.jinjiang.gov.cn/jgov/files/2008/8/200882316950D601.doc.swf.


102. See Meng, supra note 90 (reporting that the percentage of civil and commercial cases resolved via mediation increased from 42.3 to 68.2% between 2003 and 2007 as a result of making mediation an “important” part of judicial evaluations and adopting a system for rewarding judges appropriately); Li, supra note 97 (noting a seven to thirteen percent rise in the number of cases resolved via mediation in one year).


Target responsibility systems coexist uneasily alongside formal Chinese legal norms. Sometimes, the two move in tandem. During the 1990s, judicial performance targets emphasizing trials and judgments were strengthened, just as procedural and judicial legal reforms created a framework that courts were supposed to use for these purposes. In other cases, they clash.\textsuperscript{106} In recent years, Chinese officials have increased mediation targets facing courts and judges, but authorities have not amended the requirement under the 1991 Civil Procedure Law that mediation be voluntary; nor have they removed the bar under the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) on mediation in administrative proceedings. This creates tension. Judges and courts are being rewarded (or disciplined) for actions that do not correspond with legal norms.

The clash between law and target responsibility systems reflects a much deeper tension in Chinese governance. Target responsibility systems and personnel management structures are the beating heart of Party control at each level of the Chinese bureaucracy. Unsurprisingly, no clear institutional channels exist for working out conflicts between personnel targets and law.\textsuperscript{107} In fact, the ALL specifically bars courts from reviewing decisions of administrative organs regarding personnel rewards or sanctions of their employees.\textsuperscript{108}

III. WHAT ROAD AHEAD? IMPLICATIONS OF THE TURN AGAINST LAW

A. Practical Effects: A Destabilizing State-Society Interaction

The strategy currently employed by central Party leaders to maintain short-term stability is actually undermining the long-term development of China's legal norms and institutions.

Intense pressure on Chinese courts to resolve disputes via mediation (rather than trial) creates problematic judicial behavior. One example openly flagged by Chinese judges themselves: judges forcing settlements on parties (\textit{qiangzhi tiaojie}).\textsuperscript{109} This problem is not unique to China. One of the classic criticisms of mediation is the fear that the legal rights and interests of parties will be sacrificed, particularly when significant power imbalances prevent equal bargaining.
between parties. This can lead to courts simply ratifying mediated agreements that are manifestly unfair. These concerns are massively exacerbated when the salary and career evaluations of the judge who is conducting the mediation are directly tied to reaching settlement. In such cases, the judge herself may twist the arms of parties in order to meet her own performance targets. This detracts from the substantive fairness of the process and undermines the legitimacy of the court system.

This, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. The social stability pressures being placed upon Chinese courts and other institutions are fueling a much more complex and destabilizing state-society interaction. Two examples help illustrate this point.

Take the field of anti-discrimination. Chinese hepatitis and AIDS activists use the legal system to seek redress and push for institutional change. National Chinese law bars employers from discriminating against carriers of contagious diseases. But the SPC has not yet recognized an individual right of action (anyou) on these grounds. Actually gathering evidence from corporate or government entities to prove they have engaged in discrimination remains difficult. Both of these factors present serious difficulties for anti-discrimination activists seeking to use litigation channels.

But official pressure on judges to reach mediated settlements and avoid citizen petitions creates openings for civil society activists. One of the leading Chinese anti-discrimination organizations employs savvy media strategies and expressions of social discontent to bring significant pressure on judges in mediation proceedings. Concerned with negative performance evaluations under target responsibility systems, judges then apply pressure on defendants to make concessions in closed-door mediation proceedings even when there is no legal basis for them to do so. Eroding Chinese legal structures and weakening formal legal norms can thus actually increase opportunities for some plaintiffs to press their cases—at least for those capable of mobilizing civil society or media pressure.

Labor grievances provide a second example. Yang Su and Xin He detail how top-down pressures on courts to deal with social unrest affect judicial treatment of labor grievances by workers seeking back pay from their employers. Facing severe career sanctions under target responsibility systems for failing to handle street protests,

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110. For criticism of American mediation practices in domestic violence cases, see Aimee Davis, Mediating Cases Involving Domestic Violence: Solution or Setback, 8 CARDozo J. CONFLICT RESOL. 253, 279-81 (2006).


112. Interview, Beijing, June 28, 2010.

southern Chinese “courts in such circumstances become less concerned with their own procedural requirements than with the imperative dictated by the stability doctrine.” They “completely neglect the neutral position that a court is supposed to assume” and throw legal norms out the window in their effort to reach a settlement. This includes abandoning evidentiary and procedural standards, independently assisting workers to bring their grievances, and ordering unrelated parties (bearing no actual legal liability) to assume the burden of paying workers’ wages. Such court actions are part of coordinated Party responses that aim to “buy off” social unrest through tactical concessions. This includes court or government authorities literally paying protesting workers out of their own official budgets to get them off the streets.

One might think that these are positive examples of change. Heroic anti-discrimination activists obtain redress. Suffering workers receive compensation. But look deeper. This state-society dynamic does not generate meaningful long-term institutional change or increased social stability. Rather, it is a short-term reaction to particular expressions of social unrest or public outrage, not a response to the underlying causes.

Indeed, this isn’t even what Chinese activists themselves want. As the head of the anti-discrimination organization mentioned above notes, neither their strategies nor the government responses they prompt are viable long-term solutions to underlying institutional problems. Media pressure cannot be mobilized in every case. Civil society organizations cannot make every individual violation of citizen rights a cause célèbre. Rather, he notes, “what we need is for the government to develop standards to handle these problems in a regularized manner.”

But that is not what Chinese authorities are doing. Instead, they are forcing individual parties to make concessions in closed-door proceedings as a means of addressing cases that attract significant social attention or that generate petitions by disgruntled parties. If civil and administrative dispute resolution norms simply devolve to oiling the loudest and squeakiest wheel in every case, what is left of the Chinese legal system?
Such policies have long-term ramifications. In any legal system, most grievances (if not simply dropped) are privately settled in the shadow of the law—with the parties resolving their disputes based partly on their perceptions of what the outcome might be if they took it to courts or other formal legal institutions.\textsuperscript{120} Formal legal norms or publicly adjudicated cases provide standards against which individual parties can bargain. In such a situation, overwhelmingly high percentages of mediated or settled cases are not necessarily cause for concern. A hypothetical rate of ninety-nine percent of mediated or settled cases might suggest that the remaining one percent of cases are providing disputants with sufficient information as to the likely success of their disputes via formal channels, enabling them to privately reach an acceptable settlement.

In China, the reverse is taking place. Not only does intense pressure on judges to ward off petitions by dissatisfied parties or to attain high mediation rates affect the cases that are mediated, it also mean that the cases which are adjudicated are decided in the shadow of responsibility systems and the fear of social protest. As Ben Liebman has noted, this is fueling a "populist threat" to Chinese courts.\textsuperscript{121}

These policies are also sending dangerous signals to disputants. Official judicial responses that represent simple tactical concessions to particular instances of popular protest undermine existing legal norms and institutions. Disgruntled parties (regardless of the underlying validity of their complaint) quite logically conclude that staging a coordinated internet protest or launching a mass petition of hundreds of disgruntled farmers to the provincial capital stands a better chance of getting what they want rather than actually using legal channels. This dynamic has severe long-term implications for social stability.\textsuperscript{122}

Further, it isn’t clear that the current high-pressure emphasis on judicial mediation even helps Chinese authorities meaningfully resolve disputes in the short-term. Take one of the key official rationales advanced for the shift toward mediation: the presumably higher voluntary execution rates associated with mediated agreements. Local Chinese courts face pervasive difficulties enforcing their


121. Liebman, supra note 29.

122. Minzner, supra note 103.
decisions as a result of limited resources and low institutional standing.\textsuperscript{123} Top Chinese judicial authorities emphasize that the shift toward mediation will help solve such enforcement difficulties.\textsuperscript{124} Theoretically, this makes sense. Since judicial mediation supposedly represents a voluntary settlement by parties, acceptance of the outcome should be easier and execution rates for mediated decisions should be higher than adjudicated court decisions. After all, the parties agreed themselves to settle the dispute, right?

Well, no. Once Chinese courts and judges start aggressively pushing mediation in order to meet their own performance targets, these assumptions go out the window. As the voluntary nature of mediation itself declines, levels of voluntary compliance also start to go down. Parties begin to have second thoughts about agreements that they were pushed into signing. Plaintiffs begin to discover an increasingly wide gap between the compensation they received in court mediation proceedings and what they are entitled under law. They begin to contest mediation agreements, despite their binding nature under Chinese law.\textsuperscript{125} As a result, enforcement problems reemerge. The extent of this phenomenon can be partially gauged by comparing the percentages of judicially mediated cases and adjudicated cases that are submitted to court enforcement tribunals for compulsory enforcement (qiangzhi zhixing). In several Beijing courts, the numbers are roughly equal—between thirty and fifty percent. In one, the rate of voluntary compliance with court decisions (sixty-three percent) actually exceeds that for judicially mediated settlements (fifty-six percent).\textsuperscript{126}

Alternative dispute resolution succeeds when it truly represents an “alternative” to litigation. It allows for the resolution of those cases that can (and should) be resolved through channels such as mediation. But that is not the case when alternative dispute resolution becomes an artificial panacea for social stability, when Chinese courts face hard numerical targets for preventing petitions to higher authorities and for successfully mediating cases, and when litigation channels are simply shut in the face of disgruntled parties. At that point, the “alternative” in alternative dispute resolution vanishes. When that happens, all of the problems associated with litigation

\textsuperscript{123} Xin He, \textit{Enforcing Commercial Judgments in the Pearl River Delta of China}, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 419 (2009).


that Chinese officials are seeking to avoid—weak institutional legitimacy of courts and difficulties enforcing verdicts—simply re-emerge in new forms.

What do Chinese lawyers and scholars themselves think about the official shift against law? It depends on who you ask, and how tightly tied they are to the Party-state apparatus. The official propaganda line details miraculous successes in resolving grievances with no negative consequences. An academic expert on mediation who is enjoying increasing official attention as a result of the shift in government policy describes “isolated implementation problems” involving forced mediation.127 A Beijing local people’s congress representative carefully expresses more critical views. He warns that there is a real risk of “excessively emphasizing mediation,” that “law must be used as a ruler for determining settlements,” and that the failure to do so will simply generate more petitions by disgruntled citizens.128

Unsurprisingly, the harshest criticism comes from liberal Chinese legal scholars and public interest lawyers. They are very depressed. They view the current track as a complete repudiation of the reforms on which they have worked over recent years. “There has been a serious regression from five to ten years ago.”129 “I have completely lost the idealism I had in the late 1990s regarding courts and the law.”130

B. A Comparative Look: Similar, but Different

China’s shift away from trials and toward mediation is not entirely unique. Parties in many countries face prohibitive litigation costs. National judiciaries are grappling with overloaded court dockets that result in lengthy trial delays. Many nations are consequently experimenting with alternatives to court adjudication. These range from efforts (such as in the Philippines) to revive traditional village dispute-resolution institutions,131 to those (such as in Argentina) aimed at importing court-connected mediation models from abroad.132

With regard to developing countries, a “backlash” narrative has emerged from the law-and-development and law-and-society movements to partially explain these shifts. This narrative stresses how

127. Interview, Beijing, July 11, 2010.
129. Interview, Xi’an, June 21, 2010.
130. Interview, Beijing, July 13, 2010.
imported Western rule-of-law reforms (regarding law, litigation, and courts) pushed by international NGOs or multinational organizations such as the World Bank mesh poorly with local realities in practice. Reforms fail. This failure generates a counter-reaction in the form of experiments (or calls for such) with traditional or community mediation institutions that respond better to local conditions. Such a depiction informs both the received wisdom regarding the failures of the law-and-development movement in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, and criticism of the modern global rule-of-law movement made by scholars such as Brian Tamanaha.

Superficially, at least, it is also possible to explain the official Chinese shift against the law through precisely this rubric. Indeed, as early as 2000, Matthew Stephenson warned that:

“[I]f [Chinese] legal reform undermines the informal institutions [such as mediation] that [groups such as the poor] have evolved to protect their interests, [legal reforms] cannot work. Even worse, if the unintended consequences create especially serious social problems, there may be a backlash against reforms.”

Precisely this view—that late twentieth century legal reforms are a poor fit for Chinese conditions—informs arguments made by foreign scholars such as Randall Peerenboom, as well as by the Chinese Party authorities who are currently leading the shift against law.

A second effort to understand Chinese developments through a comparative lens emphasizes the extent to which the shift against trials and litigation is part of a broader worldwide phenomenon. Indeed, the United States is not exempt from these trends. As Marc Galanter has shown, American federal and state courts experienced a long decline in the percentage of cases resolved by trials over the twentieth century. Since the 1980s, this has been also coupled with a steep drop-off in the absolute number of cases resolved through trial. This has led to a dramatic growth of the number of cases resolved through alternative means, such as out-of-court settle-

137. Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1255-62 (2005) (noting that 19.9% of federal court cases were terminated by trial in 1938, compared with 1.7% in 2003).
ments. These trends are intertwined with efforts to press for the creation of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) institutions within American courts (such as the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act and the 1998 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act).

What explains the American shift away from trials? With regard to the long-term decline: resource constraints. Since the early twentieth century, the United States has experienced rapid growth in both legal regulation and the numbers of lawyers. Barriers excluding minorities from access to courts have eroded. These factors led to a surge in efforts to rely on the courts to resolve grievances. But growth in judicial resources has not kept pace. The result has been an increase in court backlogs, trial delays, and litigation expenses. This has made litigants more willing to look for other mechanisms (such as mediation or settlement) to resolve their disputes.139

Different factors explain the rapid short-term decline in American trials over the last three decades. To use Galanter's phrase, the United States has experienced a broad "turn against law" since the 1970s.140 Law, lawyers, and litigation have fallen in disrepute. On the left, the bar and legal institutions came under fire for supporting entrenched interests and inadequately protecting the rights of the underprivileged. This critique helped spawn the modern ADR movement. On the right, corporate interests and conservative politicians attempted to roll back what they viewed as the liberal excesses of the 1950s and 1960s.141 Specific reforms limited the role of courts in addressing grievances, by restricting plaintiff standing, individual rights, and tort liability.142 Both movements contributed to reducing the numbers of court cases brought to trial—the former through providing alternative fora for their resolution, the latter through shutting the courthouse door.

These developments fueled deeper ideological shifts. Beginning in the 1970s, "too much law" emerged as a prevailing critique of the American legal system. Litigation began to be perceived as a "pathology."143 It was a symptom to be cured, rather than a natural component of the legal and political system, or (as in the 1960s) an important tool to redress social injustice. Self-perceptions of federal judges and court administrators shifted as well. They embraced the view that their job was to actively promote settlements, rather than to take cases toward trial or enforce public norms.144 Beginning in the 1990s, the perceived need to "cure" the American legal system of litigation spawned institutional reform movements such as "thera-

139. Id., at 13.
140. Galanter, supra note 2.
141. Id., at 287-99.
142. Galanter, supra note 137, at 1269-72.
143. Galanter, supra note 2, at 302-04.
144. Galanter, supra note 137, at 1266.
peutic jurisprudence" and "problem-solving courts." 145 These movements explicitly de-emphasize reliance on adversarial litigation and trials. And they seek to redefine the role of lawyers away from solely focusing on the legal rights of their clients.

Just as in China, these changes have sparked critical commentary. American scholars have warned against embracing settlement as the penultimate goal of court work. They call for careful evaluation to ensure that court settlement and ADR practices conform to norms regarding the administration of justice. 146 Others caution against applying a "one-size-fits-all" approach, identifying a range of cases (such as domestic violence) where resort to mediation may be inappropriate. 147 The problem-solving court and therapeutic jurisprudence movements have come under fire for overlooking parties' rights to due process and zealous representation. 148 Critics have proposed providing clearer guidance for judges, to ensure that judicial pro-settlement policies do not violate explicit bars in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Model Code of Judicial Ethics against coercing parties to settle. 149

Chinese and American developments have some similarities. Resource constraints and efficiency concerns are prompting authorities in both countries to look for alternatives to litigation. Scholars and activists are honestly looking for better ways to respond to citizen problems. And current shifts against law in both the United States and China reflect counter-reactions by elites with vested interests (American corporations concerned with their litigation liability, Chinese Party leaders concerned with challenges to social stability and their rule) to earlier periods in which access to the judiciary was greatly expanded and courts were charged with hearing a much wider range of civil and administrative grievances.

Parallels between China and other developing countries are also visible. Gaps between legal norms (often imported) and actual realities are becoming clearer. In the first exhilarating infatuation with

147. Davis, supra note 110, at 279-81.
149. See Sylvia Shweder, Judicial Limitations in ADR: The Role and Ethics of Judges Encouraging Settlements, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 51, 66-71 (2007) (proposing listing "downgrading the merits of one party's case," and "speaking directly to one party" as examples of specific judicial conduct that should be clarified to constitute inappropriate coercive behavior).
legal reform (whether in Latin America during the 1960s, or in China during the 1990s), it is easy to overlook such gaps. Observers naturally focus on exciting developments (new Labor Law passed!) as evidence of rapid change. But as time passes, discrepancies emerge. Because of the "connectedness of law" to the rest of society, legal reforms trigger reactions from other social forces, such as elite interests. These mute the content of the original reforms. Implementation stalls. And formerly breathtaking developments remain little more than yellowed documents (or outdated web pages) stashed in the forgotten corners of government bureaus.

But key differences exist as well. First, China does not fit the paradigm offered by law-and-society scholars and law-and-development critics. Outsiders did not impose late twentieth century legal reforms on China. Rather, after the chaos of the Maoist years, Chinese leaders themselves decided that they wanted to revise their institutions. They pursued legal reform to address problems they perceived. Foreign actors involved in the process, such as the American Bar Association or the Yale-China Law Center, have always been secondary partners invited to participate by Chinese authorities who have themselves controlled the pace, speed, and content of reforms.

China's shift against law is consequently an indigenous rejection by Chinese leaders of their own reforms, not of externally imposed ones. Ironically, it is these late twentieth century legal Chinese reforms that Tamanaha cites as a successful example of self-directed legal development, and that he contrasts with failed rule-of-law programs imposed by outsiders elsewhere in the developing world. Now it is precisely these Chinese reforms that are going under the ax.

Second, the current rejection of legal reforms is being driven by Chinese leaders, not by society at large. Contrary to Stephenson's warning, ordinary Chinese citizens are not stampeding in droves out of courtrooms toward mediation channels. The picture is much more mixed. In a series of 2001-02 surveys, Benjamin Read and Ethan Michelson found that disputants in developed areas of China were much less likely to seek assistance from third-party mediation institutions, such as residents committees, than they were to approach formal legal institutions such as lawyers and courts. The surveys, conducted during the height of the official emphasis on litigation and

150. Tamanaha, supra note 134, at 34.
152. Tamanaha, supra note 134, at 52-53.
trials, revealed a reasonably high level of urban satisfaction with the formal legal system. Two-thirds of Beijing residents who had actually used the courts reported that the experience met their expectations both with regard to substance and process.154 With respect to developed urban areas, this is hardly evidence of a widespread backlash by Chinese society against 1990s-era court reforms that might justify the official shift against law.

Of course, there is an important caveat: the picture in rural areas is dramatically different. Rural Chinese report overwhelmingly negative experiences with courts.155 They report much higher levels of satisfaction with village mediation in resolving their disputes.156 Michelson and Read find that rural residents are experiencing what Mary Gallagher has termed “informed disenchantment” with the formal Chinese legal system.157 Real-life encounters of rural residents with courts are reducing their confidence in and support for the formal Chinese legal system. Michelson consequently advises that dispute resolution reform efforts in rural China “should not be concentrated solely on opening up the courts,” but should ensure that rural residents continue to enjoy “access to local, informal solutions that appear to work relatively effectively.”158

So, even if the new policies represent a top-down, Party-led rejection of late twentieth century reforms, and even if it appears to contradict the demands of urban Chinese residents, might the turn against law still be an entirely reasonable Party response to practical problems facing rural Chinese society?

This question leads us to a third difference between Chinese developments and the “backlash” narrative offered by law-and-society and law-and-development scholars. Take the need for strengthening village dispute resolution forums in rural China as a given. Grant the law-and-society critique regarding the need to develop indigenous institutions (rather than transplanting foreign legal norms) as part of the development process. For the sake of argument, even accept prevailing American normative biases in favor of viewing litigation as a

155. Roughly sixty percent of rural respondents having experience with courts report that it fails to meet their expectations with regard to either substance or process. Id.
156. Read & Michelson, supra note 153, table 7, at 758 (noting that only forty-seven percent of rural respondents reported that their experiences with the legal system met or exceeded their expectations, compared with sixty-nine percent of respondents reporting the same with regard to village committees).
disease that needs to be “cured” through building mediation institutions. Even if all of these assumptions are correct, they are still of limited relevance to understanding the current shifts in the Chinese judiciary. Because that is not what Chinese authorities are doing. The main focus of the new official policy line is not on building the types of alternative institutions that all of these arguments suggest are necessary. Nor is it a careful experiment with “dejudicializing” a limited number of disputes. Instead it is a political rectification of the Chinese judiciary, carried out in the name of social stability, and implemented via Party propaganda campaigns and strengthened responsibility targets for petitioning and mediation.

Now, this is where it gets tricky. Despite the highly politicized cast of the new policy line, official Chinese efforts to strengthen mediation will probably not be entirely negative in result. The Chinese bureaucracy is like a large cruise ship. Central authorities have firmly shoved the rudder of legal reform in a new (and problematic) direction. This is generating a bubbling and turbulent wake of actions among local Chinese authorities. Many of these measures will simply be aimed at papering over social stability pressures that are deforming Chinese judicial institutions by endowing them with the mantra of ADR. But some reforms may be positive. After all, once the fiction of magically resolving all disputes via mediation miracle workers fades, it is local authorities who are stuck with the practical problem of what to do with disgruntled people who are upset with each other or with the state. Some officials will choose suppression. Others, however, will experiment with meaningfully strengthening quasi-autonomous village mediation institutions in exactly the way

159. Peerenboom downplays the shift against law. He portrays this as a limited and “judicious” response involving carefully “dejudicializing” “growing pains and politically sensitive cases,” and suggests that this “will, and should be limited to certain areas.” But he undermines his own argument (and confirms the broad nature of the current shift against law) by acknowledging that such cases include civil cases where people are not happy with results because of the perceived lack of competence of judges, actual or suspected corruption, the feeling that laws are at odds with local norms, difficulties in enforcing the judgment, or simply the plaintiff’s lack of understanding or unrealistically high expectations of what a legal system can do.

Peerenboom, supra note 43. That, of course, includes almost every dispute. For a recent SPC directive which directly contradicts Peerenboom’s assessment, laying out the extremely sweeping extent of current mediation policies, see Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu jinyibu guanche “tiaojie youxian, tiaopan jiehe” gongzuo yuanze de ruogan yijian” [SPC Opinion on Further Carrying Out Work Principles Regarding “Mediation Has Priority, and Mediation and Trial Should Be Fused”], June 7, 2010, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-06/28/c_12271040.htm. Similarly, the politicized cast of official mediation efforts and the reliance on target responsibility systems also call into question arguments that existing policies are an authentic reflection of timeworn Chinese “historical and cultural roots.” Waye & Ping, supra note 39, at 32.
that scholars have suggested is necessary. The coming years will witness a range of reforms—good and bad—proceeding under the rubric of mediation and ADR. The challenge will be to distinguish between them.

What are the practical implications of this analysis for outside observers looking at China through a comparative lens?

First, keep a clear head in looking at China. It is easy for countries like China to become exotified Others for those who are discontented with the deficiencies of their own legal systems, and who are searching for an imagined (and superior) reality to raise up in opposition to the perceived evils of their own systems. At least one American scholar has specifically proposed importing “Chinese court-performed mediation” into U.S. federal courts. Mediation certainly has benefits. This author would be among the first to point out the need for Americans to broaden their vision and learn from other countries. But before blindly importing Chinese mediation practices (or setting up social stability preservation offices to coordinate governmental responses to dissatisfied litigants), one must make sure to understand how they actually operate in China.

Second, foreign scholars and NGOs need to exercise a good deal of care in working on Chinese ADR issues over the next several years. Chinese institutions are reaching out to foreign scholars and international institutions for input with regard to their reforms. Mediation is now heavily promoted in U.S. government rule-of-law programs. Scholars tout it as a key component for spreading the rule of law internationally. Others emphasize the need to explore alternatives to state law in reform efforts. As these trends merge, it is important not to make simplistic assumptions that mediation here equals mediation there. It is also important to bear in mind the particular context in which mediation is being advanced and practiced. In the words of one Chinese public interest lawyer:

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160. Michelson, supra note 158, at 9. Of course, questions still exist whether this is a long-term solution to all rural Chinese disputes. Certainly some disputes (say, land conflicts involving local township authorities) would seem to be less amenable to resolution through village mediation.

161. When in doubt, ask what responsibility targets mediators and government officials face and consider what behavioral incentives might result.

162. See Michael Colatrella, ‘Court-Performed’ Mediation in the People’s Republic of China: A Proposed Model to Improve the United States Federal District Courts’ Mediation Programs, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391, 415 (2000). In Colatrella’s defense, he does say that “there is evidence that the court-performed nature of [the Chinese] system would translate well to the federal courts, but a wholesale application of China’s process would be inconsistent with longstanding values underlying the American judiciary.” Id. For an example of an American state supreme court judge gazing at Chinese mediation practices and bemoaning excessive American litigation, see Justice Robert Utter, Dispute Resolution in China, 62 WASH. L. REV. 383 (1987).


164. Tamanaha, supra note 134.
Foreign mediation experts who come to China may know a lot about mediation. But they just don’t see how it is being used here. These foreign experts talk about the benefits of mediation—how it can save time and expense. But in some cases, Chinese judges are pressing us to mediate after they have actually conducted a full trial—they do not want to issue a decision. They do this to protect their own judicial evaluations, raise their mediation rates, and guard against negative consequences of verdicts that are appealed or that generate citizen petitions (shangfang). Judicial mediation as practiced actually drags the process out and adds to the expense. Many foreign experts just don’t get that.\textsuperscript{165}

It is easy to look at litigation as “pathological” and reflexively cheer for ADR when one’s system actually has other, well-established channels for holding officials accountable or resolving conflicts between citizens. But when the national shift toward mediation is tied to a broader politicized takedown of the key institutions that have been playing those roles over recent decades, it is essential to be nuanced and careful.

C. The Turn Away from Law: Is Legal Education Next?

In the face of the recent shift away from legal norms and ideals held out as models since the 1980s and 1990s, one field has remained relatively immune, at least so far: legal education. Despite the mounting pressure on courts and lawyers to redefine themselves in accordance with the new (or revived) ideals of Party leadership and populist responsiveness, Chinese law schools have continued to churn out graduates largely educated in formal law. Chinese law professors—many with overseas experience in the West or Japan—continue to reflect the values of the late twentieth century reform era in which they were trained. Their research and writing tends to emphasize the importance of formal law. Many strongly oppose the changes currently sweeping through China’s legal system. How long can this disconnect persist?

Perhaps not long. Chinese authorities are taking steps to extend the rollback against late twentieth century legal reforms into classrooms. Beginning in the fall of 2010, students in China’s political science and law (zhengfa) universities had a mandatory class on “Socialist Rule of Law” added to their studies, pursuant to a joint directive by Party political-legal, propaganda, and education authorities. Students use a textbook compiled under the guidance of the

\textsuperscript{165}. Interview, Beijing, July 13, 2010.
CHINA'S TURN AGAINST LAW

former head of the central Party political-legal committee. These reforms are likely to expand. Training sessions on “socialist rule of law” have begun for young faculty members at law schools throughout China.

What these educational changes will actually involve remains unclear. “Socialist rule of law” is a mushy concept. Authorities have reduced it to a series of contradictory slogans that echo those currently reverberating through the judiciary and other institutions. Comments made by key supporters of the “socialist rule of law” (such as the former dean of the Beijing University law school) emphasize that it is intended to emphasize social stability. It is explicitly intended as a contrast with “Western rule-of-law” concepts that are deemed inappropriate for China. It aims to direct scholarly attention away from book learning, in order to focus on and learn from China's own characteristics, historical circumstances, and practical realities. Some academics have embraced these calls. Rejecting the prevailing orthodoxy in Chinese legal academia regarding the importance of formal law, litigation, and legal institutions, they have lent their support to an alternative vision, pushing for increased emphasis on mediation and alternative dispute resolution practices in Chinese law schools and training programs for judges.

These efforts are unleashing deep conflicts in faculty meetings throughout China. Many Chinese legal academics are politically liberal, remain committed to earlier reform-era legal norms, and resist these shifts. Some oppose any effort to skew the content of higher education for political purposes. They view such moves as a swing away from the partial de-politicization of higher education over the past several decades, and a reversion to pre-1978 Maoist practices. Others, such as civil litigation and civil procedure professors, have more direct objections. They view the turn away from litigation and toward mediation and de-professionalization as a frontal attack on the relevance of their fields (and careers).

Just to be clear: this is not a simplistic conflict between “good” liberal law professors who support litigation and “bad” Party officials or academics who support mediation. Many of the critiques of the

166. Zhao Lei, “Shehui zhuyi fazhi” jin jiaocai, jin ketang, jin naodai, [“Socialist Rule of Law” to Enter Textbooks, Classrooms, Minds], SOUTHERN WEEKEND, Nov. 11, 2009, available at http://www.infzm.com/content/37227.
167. Interviews, supra notes 130-33.
168. Specifically, “rule the country according to law, enforce the law in the popular interest, [uphold] equality and justice, serve the overall situation [i.e., not narrow legal technicalities], [uphold] Party leadership.” Zhao, supra note 166.
170. Interview, Beijing, July 11, 2010.
171. Id.
1990s-era legal reforms have merit. Excessive reliance on imported legal norms and institutions may not respond fully to the needs of rural China. Many Chinese academics (like their counterparts overseas) remain occupied with theoretical ruminations that have little relevance to practical reality. Carefully considered mediation policies could help improve dispute resolution in China. Indeed, if these critiques were raised in the context of a nuanced, balanced discussion, it might help address many of the pressing problems facing China today.

But that is not what is happening. These shifts are taking place against the backdrop of an official political campaign reconsidering the role of law—a campaign sponsored by Party authorities for overtly political purposes. This is beginning to narrow the room left for open academic debate. Academics who oppose these policies or work on fields that do not accord with them (such as constitutionalism) are finding their conferences canceled, and research funds unavailable. Those who support the official line are finding their stars rise. This is affecting scholarly output. Chinese ADR specialists are reframing their views to parrot central slogans and policies.172

Two dangers exist if China’s turn away from law continues to expand in the educational realm. First, it may lead to the silencing of voices calling for the concept of law as an institution for resolving civil grievances between citizens, or as a tool for limiting government power. Of course, whether this qualifies as a “danger” may depend on one’s political views.

Second, it may create a problematic “echo chamber” effect. What happens if increasing numbers of scholars searching for funding, promotions, or official recognition join the bandwagon of the politically approved line? Discussion will narrow. There will be a proliferation of academic articles and government-funded research projects with titles such as “Further Outstanding Successes in Building the Socialist Rule of Law: Rural Township in Gansu Province Achieves ‘World Without Litigation.’” Continue these trends far and long enough, and the role of Chinese legal academia as one of the few institutions able to (at least partially) speak truth to power could be degraded, gripped by a new legal orthodoxy that chokes off open discussion. Central Chinese leaders themselves would suffer. They will find themselves in a house of mirrors, lacking any objective means to gauge the suc-

172. Compare the content of the Chen Yanping propaganda campaign with the introduction to a recent textbook on alternative dispute resolution (stating that the ideal of a “world without litigation” is not a concept lacking in actual evidence, that some local mediation committees have indeed successfully achieved Party goals of social stability in ensuring that “small problems don’t leave the village, and large problems don’t leave the township,” and that alternative dispute resolution practices can help realize classical Chinese Confucian governance ideals better than adversarial litigation). Fan Yu & Li Hao, Jiufen Jiejue [Dispute Resolution], at iii-vii (2010).
cess or failure of their own policies, with tame scholars and sycophantic local officials merely reflecting back a distorted Panglossian version of reality.

D. Whither the Study of Chinese Law: Back to the Future?

We also need to reconceptualize the academic study of Chinese law. We should recognize that we have entered a "third wave" of scholarship, and call into question prior assumptions dominating the field. A brief review of two earlier periods may be helpful.

As of the mid-twentieth century, Chinese law simply did not exist as a discrete field of research in the West. Imperial legal codes that governed Chinese dynasties reaching back to the seventh century AD were untranslated; imperial Chinese legal institutions were unstudied. True, historians did know of their existence. But the orthodox depiction in this "first wave" emphasized the relative unimportance of legal institutions. "Law was subordinate to morality," according to the pithy 1948 summation by prominent China historian John Fairbank. Imperial law was viewed as primarily penal in nature, and rarely applied with any rigor or consistency. Under this narrative, private law simply did not exist in China. Business dealings and transactions were instead handled according to time-honored local Chinese customs and traditions.

Similar trends governed the study of the People's Republic of China (PRC). During the decade after the founding of the modern Chinese state in 1949, Western academic studies of PRC law were almost non-existent. Communist authorities' closure of the nation to all but a selected handful of foreigners certainly posed a practical barrier. But the polarized ideological atmosphere in international political and academic circles of the time also fostered a view of Chinese law as but a simple extension of Maoist political slogans. As one 1956 commentator noted, "it is futile, therefore, to attempt any comparative study of criminal law on the Chinese mainland, for there appears to be no 'law' as we understand its meaning in the free world." China thus remained the classic Other. Its legal system was inscrutable and impenetrable, operating on norms completely foreign to Western scholars.

Beginning in the 1960s, this orthodox portrayal of the Chinese legal system came under challenge by a "second wave" of scholarship. Historians such as Derk Bodde, T'ung-Tsu Ch'ü, Clarence Morris,

174. Id., at 108-10.
175. Huai Ming Wang, Chinese and American Criminal Law, 46 J. of Criminal Law, Criminology, & Political Science 797 (1956). Of course, consistent with the prevailing political biases of the time, not all Chinese law was dismissed. The author continues, "Only the law now effective in Nationalist China has legal and historical value, and it alone should be taken as a representation of real Chinese law." Id.
and James Watt broke open Western academic understanding of the imperial Chinese legal system with their detailed examinations of Qing dynasty legal cases and imperial legal institutions.\textsuperscript{176} Full translations of the imperial Chinese codes followed.\textsuperscript{177} Scholars such as Philip Huang delved into local Chinese archives, demonstrating that imperial Chinese civil disputes were not confined to informal dispute resolution mechanisms. Rather, imperial Chinese magistrates found themselves confronted with a wide range of inheritance, debt, and land claims, which they did not hesitate to resolve according to relevant statutory law.\textsuperscript{178}

Similar processes took place with regard to modern Chinese law. Foreign scholars found that there was indeed law to study in mainland China. Relying on interviews with mainland refugees in Hong Kong, Jerome Cohen published the first casebook on Chinese criminal law in 1968 (thereby directly refuting the assertion advanced twelve years earlier).\textsuperscript{179} Other scholars took full advantage of what limited channels of access to the PRC existed for foreigners in the 1970s, attending events such as the semiannual Canton Trade Fair to observe how Chinese businessmen resolved commercial disputes in practice. Research and publications resulting from these activities helped erode the myth of the Other that surrounded the Chinese legal system.\textsuperscript{180} PRC legal institutions and practices came to be seen as intelligible objects of study, albeit still very different from their foreign counterparts and subject to the political vagaries of a one-Party state.

The onset of the reform period in China in 1978 shifted these efforts into high gear. Chinese authorities sought to import laws and institutions to facilitate economic growth. The opening of China to the outside world made regular interactions possible. Exchange programs such as the Ford Foundation-funded Committee on Legal Educational Exchanges in China brought Chinese legal scholars to the United States for study during the 1980s. Beginning in the late 1990s, foreign governments began to directly fund rule-of-law

\textsuperscript{176} T'ung-Tsu Ch'\textsuperscript{\textdegree}, Law and Society in Traditional China (1961); Derk Bodde & Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China (1967); James Watt, The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China (1972).

\textsuperscript{177} The Qing Code (William Jones, trans., 1994); The Great Ming Code (Jiang Yonglin, trans., 2005).

\textsuperscript{178} Huang, supra note 8, at 239-45.


\textsuperscript{180} As one foreign participant in the Canton Trade Fair summarized his experiences, "Rather than being an area where lawyers have no role, trade with the People's Republic of China is a significant area for legal activity, and a fit subject for academic analysis." Roderick O'Brien, One Lawyer's View of Trade with the People's Republic of China, 1 The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 91, 104 (1979).
projects in China. Many of these efforts, as well as the scholarship they generated, emphasized the translation of foreign legal norms and institutions and the transplantation of them to China. In the case of U.S. government-funded programs, the purpose was openly stated: to support the development of democratic institutions and political liberalization.

But the reluctance of Chinese authorities to deepen legal reforms and their continued hostility to political liberalization has led many who pioneered research in Chinese law to question the fate of the field. As Stan Lubman noted,

The search that I undertook forty years ago has changed, because China has undergone, and continues to be in the midst of, remarkable transformations. There is an impressive amount of Chinese law on the books now, and more will continue to appear. When I began, one question was whether law could ever be a lens that could be useful for viewing and deepening foreign understandings of China. The last twenty-five years of Chinese history provide a ready answer, but another even more pointed question is present today: What is, and what will be, the significance of law in the governance of the Chinese Party-state?

Since the 1990s, and partly in response to such questions, the field of Chinese law has begun to experience a new wave of scholarship. Some, such as Randall Peerenboom, question whether the adoption of foreign legal norms is practical, or even normatively desirable, given China's current political institutions and level of economic development. Such critiques are tightly interwoven with arguments elsewhere in legal academia. These include critical analyses by law and development scholars in Western academic circles, and an ongoing debate inside China between scholars who seek to deepen legal reform along Western lines (such as He Weifang) and those who reject it (such as Zhu Suli).

There is yet another critique. It does not focus on normative questions of whether China should adopt transplanted foreign legal

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182. Id. Similar assumptions appeared in academic literature as well. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, The Rule of Law as Transition to Democracy in China, in Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization (Suisheng Zhao, ed., 2006).
184. Lubman, supra note 119, at 92.
185. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES (2007).
186. For an argument (in English) along the latter lines, see Pan Wei, Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, in Debating Political Reform in China, supra note 182, at 32-40.
norms. Rather, this critique emphasizes that extent to which China has not done so in practice. Historians such as Philip Huang have demonstrated that traditional Chinese judicial practices continue to flourish in the People's Republic of China, notwithstanding the ruptures caused by the 1949 Communist revolution or the post-1978 effort by Chinese authorities to adopt formal Western law and norms. Legal scholars such as Tom Ginsburg have emphasized the extent to which foreign concepts such as judicial review have been indigenized in practice in Taiwan and Korea, creating a form of "Confucian constitutionalism." This work collectively constitutes a "third wave" of scholarship that is nuancing earlier depictions of Chinese legal reform. It calls into question the extent to which Chinese law and legal institutions have been, will be, or can be affected by foreign models. And it suggests that China's own traditions and historical legacy will continue to play a crucial role in determining the future course of reform. This Article fits squarely into this "third wave" of scholarship. It emphasizes the importance of not simply examining the Chinese versions of institutions that foreign scholars are trained to look at when they try to understand legal change in their own societies—such as formal laws and regulations. Rather, it emphasizes the importance of also examining those institutions that Chinese authorities themselves use to push legal and institutional change in their own society—tools such as politicized "moral exemplar" study campaigns and Communist Party personnel structures. Put aside the question of whether one believes these instruments to be good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate. If one's aim is to understand how China and its legal system work, one has to look at them. And to date, they have remained sadly understudied as constituent components of the Chinese legal system.

This also opens up the question of what is actually moving legal developments in China. If many of the shifts in judicial reform in China over the past three decades can simply be attributed to lower courts falling in line with the moral exemplar campaigns and performance evaluations that are the flavor of the day (Try cases! Wait, now mediate them!), how much do the vaunted national legislative or regulatory reforms (say, with regard to evidentiary standards) actually matter? Perhaps they simply represent the partial and incomplete detritus (coincidentally expressed in legal form) of much.

187. See generally Huang, supra note 8.
more important Party implementation mechanisms. If that is true, much of the focus on national law may be quite misplaced, and foreign scholars should be rewriting textbooks on Chinese law, focusing much more on how local Party committees and organization bureaus implement higher-level norms in practice.\textsuperscript{190}

Some may instinctively reject this argument. The current mainstream of Chinese legal scholarship (the "second wave") found its roots in rejecting one-dimensional stereotypes of the Chinese legal system (in the "first wave") as monolithic, unchanging, and weighted by its imperial, Confucian, or Communist heritage. Consequently, representatives of this "second wave" are sensitive towards arguments that raise history or philosophy, perceiving in them the veiled hint that China lacks "law," that its culture creates a barrier to the import of legal institutions enjoyed by outsiders, or that Chinese people deserve or seek anything less than the institutions enjoyed by others.

But this Article is not reverting to the pre-1960s "first wave" depiction of the Chinese legal system. It does not portray China as an enigmatic (or intimidating) Other to be contrasted with idealized ethnocentric fantasies of superior Western norms and practices. Nor does it claim that China's historical and cultural legacy mandates that it must follow a particular developmental track completely different from that of other countries.\textsuperscript{191}

Rather, this Article simply argues that we need to study China's historical and institutional legacy because that is where Chinese authorities have decided to take modern Chinese law. They are the ones who are resurrecting Maoist dispute resolution practices. They are the ones who are explicitly clothing judges in the mantle of Confucian exemplars. And they are the ones who are relying on responsibility systems rooted in Party and imperial bureaucratic practices to run their country.

Chinese leaders are the ones who have turned against law. They are the ones looking back to their past. And it is not certain how far back they want to go.

\textsuperscript{190} Alternatively, national developments might be largely irrelevant. The apparent shift of local Chinese court work from mediation to trial and back to mediation may be nothing more than a highly evolved response by local officials to central pressures—cooking the books and feeding higher authorities what they want to hear ("Get your editing pen out, Zhang San, the boys upstairs want our work reports to show more mediated cases this year.").

\textsuperscript{191} This Article does not claim that Chinese authorities' use of China's own institutional and cultural resources as a source for legal reform is normatively or practically "better" or "more authentic" than foreign ones that "second wave" scholars sought to bring to China. Party authorities are mobilizing China's own ideological and institutional resources for an instrumental goal: to maintain their own control. As discussed above, this self-interested short-term strategy may be generating significant long-term costs for the nation at large.
"The Spirit of Chen Yanping is a Guide for Today's Judges"
Wang Mingzhuo, China Court Network - January 22, 2010

There is a cautious and conscientious judge in the Yangyuan District People's Court of Jingjiang Municipality, Jiangsu Province. She has uncomplainingly given 14 years of her youth to trial work, remaining firmly rooted in the grassroots. She has meticulously handled 3100 cases, without a single error, without a single complaint, and without a single petition [i.e., from a disgruntled party], winning the trust and praise of the local populace in her region...

Today, following the public exposition of this judge's outstanding accomplishments in the media, her name will be sung throughout China and carved into the monuments to the outstanding judges of the People's Republic of China. She is a paragon among judges—"National Model Judge Chen Yanping."

... Chen Yanping's sentiment for the people is the concentrated embodiment of her true heart, true sentiment, and true love for the people. Her spirit will undoubtedly become the guiding thought for today's judges, leading other judges to carry out the sacred responsibilities of "people's judges for the people" through their concrete actions.

A true heart is a direct prerequisite for judges to serve the people. As the steadfast guardian of last resort for completely and finally resolving all grievances, judges only need to be like Chen Yanping and have a true heart for the masses... If they draw close to the masses, walk among the masses... and feel the people's concerns as their own... they can construct a bridge serving the people and linking judges and the people.

True sentiment is an effective means for judges to resolve conflict. True sentiment is the warmest thing on earth. It can melt hard ice and resolve conflicts. For Chen Yanping, using sentiment to explain rational concepts, using sentiment to move people is the best starting point to resolve conflicts. Judges should be like Chen Yanping, always hold true sentiment for the people, and always maintain relations as close as flesh and blood with the people. They should take cold legal opinions and mechanical procedures, infuse them with judicial warmth and human concern, and transmit true sentiment to every party that comes before them.

True love is the best method for judges to resolve the concerns of the people... It is precisely because of Chen Yanping's true love for the masses that she can root herself in 14 years of work in the basic-level courts. It is precisely because she has true love for the masses that she can win their trust and support. Moreover, it is because of true love that she can shine her maternal radiance on disabled and handicapped parties. For judges, only if they are like Chen Yanping,
using love to go forward, resolving the concerns of the people, and conscientiously carrying out their judicial duties, can justice for the people truly be realized.

. . . Judges should follow the principle of "people's judges for the people," absorb and carry on Chen Yanping's "True Heart, True Sentiment, True Love" spirit of service, wholeheartedly carry out the work of hearing cases . . . and let the flame of justice and fairness burn ever brighter with time.
APPENDIX #2

“‘An Exemplary Person Should Not Become a Vessel’ - The Judicial Wisdom of Chen Yanping”
Wang Zichen, Bulletin of the Supreme People’s Court—February 9, 2010

The Analects (Book Two) states “Confucius said: ‘An exemplary person [junzi] should not become a vessel.’” In today’s era, where social conflicts are exceedingly complex and the duties of judges exceedingly strenuous, Chen Yanping perfectly incarnates the meaning of this phrase through the reality of her work as a basic-level judge. From the perspective of the judiciary, this phrase can be understood as saying that a judge with good moral conduct cannot simply be a tool that mechanistically applies the law in the process of handling cases. Rather, a judge must grasp social conditions, be well-versed in all forms of judicial skills, be good at resolving disputes, and amply bring into play the utility of the judiciary as a good defender of the social order.

“An exemplary person should not become a vessel” first requires that a judge should be an exemplary person [junzi]. An exemplary person is a moral exemplar. Naturally, a judge as an exemplary person must thus have good professional and personal integrity. In a rule-of-law society, judges do not only operate the practical machinery of law and ensure the efficient operation of society’s mechanisms. They are also seen as the guardians of legal order and social justice. The rule-of-law environment for all of society depends to a great extent on their spirit and attitude toward the law. For this reason, it is particularly important that a judge have good moral conduct. Chen Yanping frequently says: “A lawsuit is but a once in a lifetime event, but the effects of a lawsuit will last all ones’ life. As a judge, if I cannot fairly administer justice, then I have dishonored the solemn national emblem above me, and I have dishonored the ordinary masses below me who come seeking the law.”

Chen Yanping once handled a case in which the plaintiff heard that the defendant was a village cadre and was a good friend with Chen Yanping’s husband. As a result, the plaintiff feared that the case would not be handled fairly. But in short order, the decision in the case was handed down, the defendant lost, and the court’s judgment was quickly carried out. In the 21 years of her judicial career, Chen Yanping has never accepted a gift from a party, and has never handled (or intervened) in a single case as a result of her personal relations or feelings.

“An exemplary person should not become a vessel” emphasizes that an exemplary person should not be limited to a single strength. They should not develop themselves to be a household utensil of limited utility. In historical periods when skills and reason were highly
valued, judges were regarded as craftsmen. So, for judges guided by the concept of Socialist Rule-of-Law, how should they fully bring to play their technical role to satisfy popular demands and expectations? Judges should not be legal craftsmen who pay excessive attention to wording, believe the laws of statutes to be the only scripture, and pay no attention to social harmony and the popular interest. Even less should they be the kind of people who play with the law and abuse their power, using law as an evil weapon to help the tiger [i.e., evil people] pounce on his victims.

Through practice, Chen Yanping has cultivated many skills and developed an effective work style. She not only has paid attention to studying the local dialect and understanding local customs and attitudes, she also frequently takes legal language and translates it into the local dialect, allowing local residents to understand the point immediately. In order to blend in with the ordinary people, she works at grasping the mood of villagers, and she has learned to use “humanitarian” methods of executing the law to win the hearts of the people. In studying Chen Yanping, one should devote particular attention to research on experiences and skills accumulated by judges over time via practice, and which have guiding value for the judiciary, and spread the “Chen Yanping work style” far and wide.

The commentaries on the Book of Changes say: “The higher form [of understanding] is what we call the Way, the lower form [of understanding] is what we call a tool.” One goal of judges’ work is deciding cases and [completely] solving problems. But some judges only apply the lower form of understanding to the concept of “deciding cases and [completely] solving problems.” They take their only goal that parties don’t complain after cases have been handled, and they exalt mediation rates as the most important target to use in evaluating judges performance. Chen Yanping views the concept of “deciding cases and [completely] solving problems” as requiring values inspired by the higher form of understanding—completely resolving the case does not simply mean that the parties do not complain.

In the past, Chen Yanping has used plain language to incisively explain this [concept]. After one particular case was mediated to conclusion, one of the lawyers asked Chen Yanping—“This case would have been really easy to decide via adjudication. Why did you insist on mediating it?” Chen Yanping said, “The plaintiff’s mother and father passed away a long time ago, leaving only the father’s younger brother [presumably the defendant in the case]. To be sure, the grievances between the two of them are deep. But by diligently uncovering the crux of their grievances, and by reawakening their familial feelings for one another, the conflict is very easily resolved. If I tried to save time by issuing a verdict, the case would be finished, but the conflict would remain, and the dispute would emerge yet again. It is
even possible that problems would escalate, the dispute would intensify, and a small grievance would become deep hatred. If a civil case becomes a criminal one, the result would be even more serious. That would be a situation where the case was decided, yet the issue was not.”

We are currently in an era of legal transformation. Judges stand where the wind and waves are the strongest. Each step forward for rule-of-law in China has the deep official mark of scholars and legislators who have deeply thought about the issues. Even more, it has the solid judicial foundation of judges’ work in practice. Chen Yanping is worthy of this great era. Under the guidance of the concept of “Socialist Rule-of-Law with Chinese Characteristics,” she has continually improved her skills and self-cultivation. With the values and spirit appropriate for a judge, she has sought opportunities for the rule of law to grow where the soil for it is traditionally weak, and she has made her own contribution to upholding fairness and justice. We hope that the judicial philosophy of “An exemplary person should not become a vessel” will become the motto for even more judges engaged in resolving social conflicts.